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Abstract……………………………………………………………………… 
Dalits who are placed at the bottom of the Brahmanical social order, have been the victims of social 
discrimination, economic exploitation and political oppression for several centuries.  Recognising their 
problem as partly a political problem, the Dalits have taken to active politics during the end of colonial 
India and made a strong claim for political power. They demanded political representation ever since 
representative politics was introduced in India back in 1909. Despite the torturous setbacks under the 
Congress system in post-Independence India, the Dalits, by the early 1990s, had succeeded in carving out a 
space for themselves in India’s caste-based political landscape.  
 
Despite the similarity in the unjust socio-economic and political conditions of the Dalits, and Dalit 
mobilisations all over India against the injustices meted out to them by the caste-Hindu society, Dalit 
trajectories of political power have varied across time and region. Recognising the regional variations in the 
trajectories of Dalit politics, both in colonial and post-colonial India, my thesis analyses the evolution of 
Dalit politics in two states, i.e., Uttar Pradesh (UP) in Northern India and Andhra Pradesh (AP) in Southern 
India. It challenges the conventional North-South contrast, which suggests that while politics in northern 
India for much of the twentieth century was organised around the Hindu-Muslim axis, in southern India it 
was organised around caste lines. It also suggests that while the lower castes in northern India have come to 
be influenced by the conservative ideology of Gandhi and his Congress, the Dravidian ideology set the tone 
and content of lower caste politics in South India, and it is this ideology that resulted in their political 
empowerment.  
 
Such claims, however, do not explain the present political power in the hands of the lower castes of the 
northern region and why Dalits in Southern India continue to be subservient to the domination of leadership 
of the upper castes. The divergent outcomes of Dalit politics, this thesis argues, are due to the ideological 
underpinnings through which their politics have come to be shaped and practised in these states. The socio-
economic conditions of the Dalits in these states also contribute, to an extent, towards those divergences. 
Beyond the analysis of regional divergences, this thesis also attempts to analyse the impact of Dalit 
assertions upon the upper caste-based political system as well as upon the hierarchical social system. It 
argues that by deploying caste in their mobilisations, as well as caste-based distribution of, including 
demands for intra-Dalit, representative seats in the political arena, the Dalits are not only challenging the 
political domination of the upper castes, but also attempting to challenge the hierarchical nature of the 
Brahmanical social order in ways that go beyond upper caste ameliorative action for Dalits as well as other 
lower caste assertions (eg. OBC). 
 
This thesis makes two principal arguments. First, it challenges the dominant understanding of the North-
South contrast, of the South being more advanced than the North in terms of lower caste assertion. Through 
a detailed analysis of Dalit politics in UP and AP from the late 19th century to the present, I show that Dalit 
politics in the North has been ahead of the South, particularly in terms of challenging the dominance of the 
upper castes in the political arena. Second, the thesis argues that Dalit politics has been ideologically 
distinct both from upper caste activism on behalf of downtrodden castes, as well as from the politics of 
other lower castes such as OBCs, in seeking to transform the Brahmanical social order. These arguments 
develop Dr Ambedkar's pioneering theses on the importance of political power and the annihilation of caste 
for Dalits.  The evolution of Dalit politics in UP and AP is analysed in its historical, sociological and 
ideological aspects.  
 
This thesis is broadly divided into two main sections, while the first section examines Dalit politics in UP, 
the second section focuses on AP. On the basis of their trajectories, this thesis recognises three stages in 
Dalit politics. In the first stage which was set in colonial India, Dalit politics in UP were radicalised by the 
ideologies of Swami Acchutaananda and Ambedkar.  But in AP the conservative nature of Gandhi and his 
Congress Party led to co-optation and ultimately domestication of the Dalit leadership. In the second stage, 
which is set in post-Independence India, while the Dalit politics in UP grows out of the colonial period to 
5 
 
revolve around the idea of seizing political power, in AP they continued to revolve around the notion of 
self-respect without any attention to the idea of political power for the Dalits.  And in the final stage, while 
the notion of ‘democratisation’ determines the nature of Dalit politics in UP; the idea of ‘classification’ of 
Dalit reservations had become the main content of Dalit politics in AP.   
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Glossary of Terms…………………………………………………………. 
 
Achhut ---- Outcaste or Untouchable  
 
Ad Dharm (Adi Dharm) ----  the original religion  
 
Adi ----  original  
 
Adi-Dravida ----  the original people among the Dravidians of South India, used      
        as self-identification by some of the Dalits in Tamilnadu 
 
Adi-Karnataka (Kannada) ----  the original inhabitants of Karnataka, used as self-identification 
         by some of the Dalits in that state 
 
Adivasi ----  aboriginal tribe 
 
Andhra Kesari ---- lit. ‘lion of Andhra’, name given to the legendary Tanguturi  
        Prakasam, leader of a Congress Party faction and founder of the  
        Praja Party 
 
Anicuts ----  irrigation system  
 
Anna ----  elder brother  
 
Arrack ----  distilled liquor 
 
Babasaheb ----  honorific term devised for B. R. Ambedkar 
 
Backward Castes ----  the Shudra castes, which are immediately above the Dalits in  
         the ritual hierarchy 
 
Bahujan ----  lit., mean ‘majority’, this is the term brought into the Indian  
          political lexicon and popularised by the Bahujan Samaj Party 
 
Beedi ----  traditional Indian lead cigarette 
 
Bhakti ----  a medieval and later revivalist movement of Hindu worship that  
       stressed devotion rather than learning 
 
Bhangi ----   sweeper caste within the Dalit category 
 
Bhumihar ----   landowning caste in Northern India 
Brahmin ----   The caste of highest rank in the four-fold varna order 
 
Brahminwadi ----  derogatory term used by the followers of Kanshi Ram and   
        Mayawati to identify attitudes or behaviour claimed to embody  
        Brahmanical prejudice against Dalits 
 
Chamar ----  One of the Dalit castes in northern and western India with a 
9 
 
       traditional occupation connected to leather work 
 
Chappal ----  leather sandals 
 
Crore ----  Ten million  
Dalari ----  broker or middleman 
 
Dalit ----  a Marathi word for ‘Untouchables’, sometimes used for  
       oppressed in general, but now used to identify the SCs 
 
Dalit Maha Sabha ----  a socio-political organization of the Dalits in AP 
 
Desam ----  Land, nation  
 
Deshmukh ----  revenue collector turned village landlord  
 
Dharma ----  duty/religion/law 
 
Dharna ----  sit-in as a form of protest 
 
Dhobi ----  caste of washer-folk, Dalits in northern and western India 
 
Diwali ----  Hindu New Year celebrated by the lighting of lamps and  
       associated rituals  
 
Dora ----  Landlord 
 
Gadi ----  residence of landlord 
 
Garibi Hatao ---- lit. Banish poverty. It was Indira Gandhi’s election slogan in  
        1971 
Gherao ----  a form of protest in which workers prevent employees leaving a  
       place of work until demands are met 
 
Goonda ----  goon; thug 
 
Gram Panchayat ----  village Panchayat; the third tier of the Panchayat raj system 
 
Gurukul ----  Arya Samaj monastery 
 
Harijan ----  People of god, used to identify Dalits by Gandhi and his  
       Followers 
 
Harijan Sevak Sangh ----  Welfare organization established by Gandhi to persuade caste  
       Hindus to abolish Untouchability  
 
Hartal ----  Closure of shops or other facilities as a form of protest 
 
Holeya ----  One of the developed Dalit castes in Karnataka 
 
Inam ----  Land grant made by the State in lieu of free services rendered  
 
Jagirdar ----  holder of land grand given for services rendered to the Nizam 
 
Jagirdari System ----  a type of land revenue system in Mughal India and later in the  
        Nizam’s Hyderabad State, in which the jagirdar was technically 
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        the holder of an assignment of revenue  
 
Jajmani ---- system of reciprocity of services and goods by different castes 
 
Jatav ----  a segment of Chamars located in western UP 
Jati ----  One of constituents of ‘caste’, also used for nation  
 
Kabir panth ----  Sect that follows the teachings of the bhakta Kabir 
 
Kamma ----  a dominant peasant caste in AP 
 
Karma ----  a tenet of mainstream Hindu philosophy whereby one’s  
       deeds/condition (including caste) will determine lives yet-to-be  
        lived;  
 
Karnam ----  village officer in-charge of land records in AP 
 
Kayastha ----  One of the upper castes in northern India, it is highly educated      
        caste         
 
Khatik ----  one of the Dalit castes in northern India; they are shepherds as  
        well as butchers 
 
Kisan ----  cultivator  
 
Koiri ----  One of the peasant castes in northern region  
 
Kshamaseema ---- lit. stalking ground of famines  
 
Kshatriya ----  the second highest caste within the four-fold varna order, their  
       traditional occupation was to rule 
 
Kulak ----  Rich peasant 
 
Kullarh ----  disposable earthenware pot 
 
Kurmi ----  peasant caste in UP and Bihar 
 
Lakh ----  One hundred thousand 
 
Lassi ----  butter milk 
 
Lathi ----  a long heavy wooden stick used as a weapon by India police  
 
Lingayat ----  One of the dominant (peasant) castes in Karnataka 
 
Lok Sabha ----  lower house of Parliament  
 
Madiga ----  the most deprived Dalit caste in AP and Karnataka 
 
Mahanadu ----  The annual conference of the TDP 
 
Mahatma ---- lit. great soul, a term of honour for M. K. Gandhi 
 
Mala ----  One of the developed castes among the Dalits in AP 
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Mali ----   peasant caste in northern and western India 
 
 
Mandal ----  association or society; also the restructured middle-tier of the 
       Panchayat Raj system 
Mandal praja parishad ----  the middle-tier of the Panchayat Raj  system in AP 
 
Mang ----  a deprived Dalit caste in Maharashtra 
 
Mantra ----  repetition of words of prayer 
 
Manusmriti ----  the laws according to Manu 
 
Manuwadi ----  derogatory term used by the members of the Bahujan Samaj  
       Party to identify behaviour claimed to embody upper caste  
        prejudice against Dalits and other lower castes 
 
Mela ----  celebration, festival or gathering  
 
Mazhabi Sikh ----  sweeper caste within the  Dalit category but converted to  
         Sikhism 
 
Mehtar ----  another word for Bhangi 
 
Munsif ----  village headmen in Andhra region 
 
Musahar ----  the third largest (after Chamar and Dusadh) Dalit castes in  
       Bihar, they are one of deprived castes within the Dalit category 
 
Nadars ---- once Untouchable caste in Tamilnadu, but now it is kept in the  
        Backward castes list 
 
Namashudras ----  large Dalit caste in Bengal 
 
Nirguna bhakti ----  the more radical branch of bhakti 
 
Nizam ----  the ruler of the Hyderabad state 
 
Other Backward Castes (OBCs) ----  socially and educationally deprived castes among the upper  
       Shudras to whom the Constitution of India sanctioned  
       reservation facilities 
 
Paleru ----  Farm servant 
 
Palle ----  village or rural locality  
 
Panch ----  a committee of five elders 
 
Panchama ----  Sanskrit term suggesting that the Dalits are in the ‘fifth’ category 
        of the varna order 
 
Panchayat ----  village or caste council (panch means five, hence lit., council if 
        five  
 
Panchayat Samithi ----  the middle-tier of the pre-Telugu Desam Party Panchayat Raj  
       system; in the place of the Panchayat Samithis a number of  
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        smaller units called mandals were created by the TDP  
        government in AP in the mid-1980s 
Panchayati raj ----  system of rural local government with three ascending tiers, viz., 
       gram Panchayat, Mandal or Panchayat Samithi and Zilla  
       Parishad 
Pandit ----  a Brahmin scholar 
 
Pasi ----  One of the Dalit castes in Bihar, traditionally they are brewers 
 
Paswan ----  variant of Dusadh 
 
Patel ----  dominated landlord caste of Gujarat 
 
Patwari ----- junior revenue official  
 
Pettamdar ----  the dominant caste/landlord 
 
Pettamdari ----  economic and social dominance  
 
Pradhan ----  head of panchayat or council 
 
Pulaya ---- One of the Dalit castes in Kerala 
 
Raedasi Sikh ----  Chamars of Punjab who converted to Sikhism 
 
Rajbhanshi ----  One of the Dalit castes in Bengal 
 
Rajya Sabha ----  the upper house of the Indian Parliament  
 
Rasta rook ----  road blockade- a form of protest 
 
Reddy ----  One of the dominant castes in AP 
 
Reddy-raj ----  Rule by Reddis, a term used to describe the Congress rule in AP  
       from the 1960s to early 1980s  
 
Ryot ----  cultivator  
 
Scheduled Castes ----  the official name for the Dalits  
 
Shudras ----  the lowest of the four categories of the varna order, their 
        traditional occupation being to ‘serve’ in a wide variety of  
        manual tasks 
 
Suguna bhakti ----  the less radical stream of bhakti 
 
Samaj ----  Association  
 
Sangham ----  Association 
 
Sant ----  Hindu saint 
 
Sarpanch ----  head of Panchayat 
 
Satyagraha ----  a particular form of non-violent struggle that Gandhi developed 
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Sufi ----  devotional cults of Islam 
 
Sweepers ----- occupational term for a number of Dalit castes whose traditional  
         job is to sweep public spaces and collect nightsoil  and garbage 
  
Taluq ----   Sub-division of a district  
 
Tehsildar ----   revenue official  
 
Telugu ----   the official language of the state of Andhra Pradesh  
 
Toddy ----   country liquor distilled from  coconut trees 
 
Twice-born  ----   the first three categories of the varna order whose males are 
         entitled to wear the ‘sacred thread’ after a ceremony of early  
          manhood; hence, a general term for ‘upper caste’ 
 
Varna ----    the four categories (lit., colours) into which classical Hindu  
          texts divide society  
 
Vedas ----     ancient Hindu texts  
 
Veedi ----    Street 
 
Wada ----   locality  
 
Vyshyas (Vyshyas) ----   the third category of the Hindu varna order, their traditional   
          occupation was that of traders 
 
Valmiki ----   the now usually preferred name for the Bhangis  or sweeper 
        community which follows the teachings of the saint Valmiki 
 
Zamindar ----   revenue intermediaries and landlords under the British  
 
Zilla ----   District 
 
Zilla parishad ----   top-tier corresponding to the district in the three-tier Panchayat  
        raj system  
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Abbreviations……………………………………………………………… 
 
AISCF ..... All India Scheduled Caste Federation  
AP ..... Andhra Pradesh 
APDMS ..... Andhra Pradesh Dalit Maha Sabha 
BAMCE ..... All India Backward (SC/ST/BC) and Minority Communities Employees Federation  
BC ..... Backward Castes 
BJP ..... Bharatiya Janata Party 
BSP ..... Bahujan Samaj Party 
CPI ..... Communist Party of India 
DMS ..... Dalit Maha Sabha 
DS-4 ..... Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangarsh Samithi (Struggle committee of the oppressed Dalit Society)           
ERDL ..... Explosive Research and Development Laboratory 
MRPS ..... Madiga Reservastion Porata Samithi (Struggle Committee for the Madiga Reservations  
MLS ..... Member of Legislative Assembly 
NTR ..... Nandamuri Taraka Ramarao 
OBC ..... Other Backward Castes 
PPP ..... Poor Peoples Party 
RPI ..... Republican Party of India 
SC ..... Scheduled Castes 
SCF ..... Scheduled castes Federation  
SP ..... Samajwadi Party 
ST ..... Scheduled Tribe 
TDP ..... Telugu Desam Party 
UP ..... Uttar Pradesh 
UPSCF ..... United Provinces Scheduled Castes Federation  
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****** 
Prologue………………………………………………………………………  
Dalits’1 struggle for social equality, political power, and democratisation of the socio-cultural 
and political spaces in colonial India or post-Independence India has been shaped by their 
position in the Brahminic social order, the Chaturvarna vyavastha. As the very name clearly 
demonstrates, the system is constituted by four varnas, i.e., the Brahmins, the Kshatriyas, the 
Vaishyas, and the Shudras; thus, Dalits have neither a designated space nor recognised 
position within the official body of the Chaturvarna vyavastha.  This, in turn, forced them to 
remain outside the system. Some social reformers in the late colonial India, such as Mahatma 
Jotirao Phule (1827-1890), and some politically-oriented caste-Hindu reformers, such as 
Mahatma Gandhi, tried to rectify this specific condition. Phule, for instance, by calling the 
Dalits as Ati Shudras, tried to make them part of the Shudra category, and thereby, 
incorporate them in the varna vyavastha. Barring the thin boundary between the two social 
categories, i.e., while the Shudras were inside the system, Dalits were outside it, the socio-
economic, political and cultural conditions of both the categories were at the same level. In 
that respect, bringing them together under a larger umbrella would have been an opportune 
thing to do; and their combined strength in the emerging political representative institutions 
during the colonial era, would have had different connotations. To that extent, Phule’s 
gesture appears to be both revolutionary as well as pragmatic. But by calling the Dalits Ati-
Shudras, Phule was not placing the Dalits along with or on a par with the Shudras inside the 
varna vyavastha, but directly below them; and thereby, allowing the Brahminic socio-
hierarchical distinctions between them to flourish. 
 
Similarly, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (hereafter Gandhi) also made some efforts such as 
trying to incorporate the Dalits into the body of the Chaturvarna vyavastha by calling them 
Harijans (children of god). Such an act by Gandhi was somewhat heroic.  For until then, the 
Dalits, who were treated as Asprushyas (untouchables) and kept outside the Hindu 
community, had become children of god, and he declared that they were also part of the 
                                                 
1 Dalit, a term that has become synonymous with Untouchable, is the name that many ex-untouchables, 
especially politically aware individuals, have chosen for themselves. The name means ‘oppressed’ and 
highlights the persecution and discrimination they face on a daily basis. For a discussion of the evolution of 
the meaning of the term ‘Dalit’, see Omvedt, Gail. 1994. Dalits and Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar 
and the Dalit Movement in colonial India. New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp: 162-167. 
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Hindu society. Having said that, it is important to note here that Gandhi’s campaign against 
untouchability was not necessarily born out of a genuine concern for the plight of millions of 
Dalits, but mainly on account of his concern for Hinduism; for Gandhi was convinced that 
the practise of untouchability was an ‘ineffable blot’ on Hinduism.2 In other words, Gandhi’s 
concern for the Dalits and his activities against the practise of untouchability sought to 
remove that ‘blot’ from the face of Hinduism rather than to secure social equality and 
political opportunities for the Dalits.  
 
Further, one should ask two pertinent questions to understand the possible motivations 
behind Gandhi’s new nomenclature for Dalits. First, if Gandhi was to believe in the 
fundamental equality of human beings, as he always claimed, then why only Dalits were 
treated as ‘the children of God’? Are caste-Hindus not children of God? Secondly, what is the 
position of the so called ‘children of God’ in the varna vyavastha? It is important to note here 
that despite describing the Dalits as Harijans and his claim that the Harijans are part of 
Hindu society, Gandhi never mentioned in which varna the Harijans were to be placed.  It 
was a well-known fact that Gandhi had always been an ardent advocate of the Chaturvarna 
vyavastha, and the traditional occupations assigned to the four varnas by that system. To my 
mind, this suggests that Dalits were to be integrated into the varna vyavastha, and to that 
extent they would become a part of the Hindu community.  Yet, they would retain their name 
as Harijans which is nothing but untouchables.  
 
This argument can be substantiated from other aspects as well. Once the Harijans were 
integrated into the varna vyavastha, what occupation should they pursue? Each varna in the 
varnashrama dharma, according to Gandhi, had ‘its own dharma, its own rightful modes of 
livelihood, conduct, and service’.3  Thus, in the name of dharma, Gandhi was asking the 
Harijans to follow their traditional occupations, which were forced on them by the 
Brahmanical social order. Though Gandhi did say that no varna’s occupation, skills or 
abilities were superior to any other varna’s dharma. For instance, imparting knowledge to the 
society - the dharma of the Brahmins - is not superior to manual scavenging - the dharma of 
the untouchable Bhangis. But if this is so, then why don’t the Brahmins or any other caste-
Hindus take on the manual scavenging occupation of the Bhangis? Surely, Gandhi sought to 
                                                 
2 Arnold, David. 2001. Gandhi. London: Pearson, p. 174.  
3 Ibid., p. 173.  
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do this, but his acts were more symbolic than substantive in nature, for none of the followers 
of Gandhi from upper caste backgrounds took-up scavenging as their occupation. In a way, 
this clearly demonstrates that the intended integration of Dalits into varna vyavastha is a 
mere symbolic gesture, which entraps them into a false belief that they are also part and 
parcel of the Hindu community without any substantive power or benefits that are enjoyed by 
the other four varnas. Moreover, the very term ‘Harijan’, for many Dalits, “is patronising and 
condescending, reinforcing and rationalising the hegemony of the upper castes over God’s 
children.”4 These limitations and criticisms apart, one must truly acknowledge the 
contribution of Gandhi to the question of untouchability, in giving the issue a new political 
prominence.  
 
Keeping aside the intentions behind the activisms of the social reformers against the practice 
of untouchability, both from the lower castes as well as upper castes, and the overall impact 
of such activism over the Hindu social organisation, and whatever the individual problems of 
the Dalit individuals, their collective situation at the bottom of the social hierarchy led to four 
fundamental problems: social discrimination, economic exploitation, cultural alienation, and 
political oppression. For almost all the caste-Hindu reformers, who acted against the 
appalling conditions of the Dalits, either on account of genuine personal concerns or political 
compulsions, the problem of untouchability is one of the social problems; and so they tried to 
ameliorate it by initiating some corrective programmes, such as opening up special schools 
for Dalit children, teaching them cleanliness, urging them to abandon alcohol and meat-
eating, etc. But untouchability, unlike some social problems, such as widow remarriage and 
dowry, is not a social problem. It is essentially, as most categorically stated by Bhimrao 
Ramji Ambedkar (1891-1956), a political problem. He argued: 
It is wrong to say that the problem of the Untouchables is a social problem.  For, it is 
quite unlike the problems of dowry, widow remarriage, age of consent, etc., which are 
illustrations of what are properly called social problems.  Essentially, it is a problem of 
quite a different nature in as much as it is a problem of securing to a minority liberty and 
equality of opportunity at the hands of a hostile majority which believes in the denial of 
liberty and equal opportunity to the minority and conspires to enforce its policy on the 
minority. Viewed in this light, the problem of the Untouchables is fundamentally a 
political problem. 5  
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 180. See also, Ambedkar, B.R. 1991[1945]. What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the 
Untouchables. In: Moon, Vasant., ed., Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol. 9. Bombay: 
The Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, esp. Chapter X: ‘What Do The Untouchable Say? 
Beware of Mr. Gandhi’, pp: 226-256.  
5 Ambedkar, B. R. 1991[1945]. What Congress and Gandhi..., p.190.  
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Precisely that was the reason why he always urged the Dalits to concentrate their energies 
towards gaining political power: 
Nobody can remove your grievances as well as you can and you cannot remove them 
unless you get political power in your hands.6 
 
But, how the Dalits responded to their conditions and problems is the fundamental question, 
which this thesis seeks to address. An important aspect in answering this question is that of 
the physical location of the actors. Dalits are not located in one particular geographical 
region. Although in some regions thickly and in some other regions thinly, nevertheless, they 
are spread throughout India. This is what complicates the Dalit question.  In the sense, 
irrespective of their physical location, i.e., whether in northern India or southern India and 
western India or eastern India, their social location throughout the country is the same – the 
bottom of the Hindu social hierarchy; and so, their problems are same everywhere.  Yet, there 
are few similarities in their fight against untouchability. Their geographical locations and 
socio-economic and political conditions and contexts that are specific to their respective 
geographical regions shaped the Dalits’ response against untouchability. Although this 
complicates the very question of untouchability, it also gives an opportunity, especially from 
the point of research, to examine and analyse the Dalit response to the question of 
untouchability comparatively. The current thesis aims to seize that unique opportunity by 
analysing Dalit politics in Uttar Pradesh in Northern India and Andhra Pradesh in Southern 
India from an Ambedkarite perspective. By comparing Dalit politics in these two states, it 
seeks to understand the Dalit responses to the injustices and violence suffered at the hands of 
the upper castes. It also seeks to understand the social as well as political dominance of 
higher castes over Dalits; and Dalit mobilisations and assertions against such dominance and 
the ideological bases of that assertion. It further seeks to understand the impact of Dalit 
politics upon the Brahmanical social order and upper caste-dominated political order.  In 
short, this thesis seeks to contribute to four major discussions regarding Dalit politics: a) the 
debate regarding the master-narratives in the politics of North and South India, i.e., the 
Hindu-Muslim cleavage in the North and Caste in the South; b) the claim that historically 
Dalit consciousness was less developed in the North than in the South; c) the debate around 
                                                 
6 Ambedkar at the 1930 Nagpur Conference on Depressed Classes, quoted in Nath, Trilok. 1987. Politics of 
the Depressed Classes. Delhi: Deputy Publications, p. 225.  
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the Dalits and Shudras (OBCs) as an undifferentiated category of people; and d) why Dalits 
in UP succeeded in attaining political power while they did not do so in AP.   
****** 
First………………………………………………………………………...... 
Introduction 
In the year 2002, two articles provoked me. The first one was Ashutosh Varshney’s ‘Is 
India Becoming More Democratic?’ In this article Varshney claims a certain 
‘Southernization of North India’. He claims that while the politics in northern India had 
thus far been organised around the Hindu-Muslim axis, in South India, it was organised 
around caste lines.  For him, “If the Hindu-Muslim cleavage has been the ‘master 
narrative’ of the politics in northern India for much of the twentieth century, caste 
divisions have had the same status in South India”.7  But with the rise of lower-caste 
politics what is happening in the North today, Varshney claims, is the Southernization of 
North India.  I was intrigued by this claim.  Two questions that struck me, and which 
haunted me for a long-time were: is caste-based politics a contemporary phenomenon in 
North India or is caste the main axis around which politics has always been organised in 
North as well as in South India?  And, is this the first time that the lower-castes, 
especially the Dalits, are challenging the caste-based cultural hegemony and political 
domination of the caste-Hindus by competing for political power?  
 
The second article was, ‘Rise of the Dalits and the Renewed Debate on Caste’ by Rajni 
Kothari.  In this article, Kothari comes up with two fascinating arguments.  First, 
“Casteism in politics”, for Kothari, “is no more and no less than politicisation of caste”.8  
Such politicisation of caste, he firmly believes, will lead to a transformation of the caste 
system.  He substantiates this position by directing our attention to transformations that 
have already been happening in India both structurally and ideologically.  Compelled by 
the electoral process, the traditional castes have engaged in a whole variety of new 
                                                 
7 Varshney, Ashutosh. 2000. Is India Becoming More Democratic? The Journal of Asian Studies, 59 (1), 
pp: 3-25, here, p. 5.  
8 Kothari, Rajni. 1994. Rise of the Dalits and the Renewed Debate on Caste. Economic and Political 
Weekly (hereafter EPW), 29 (26), pp: 1589-1594, here, p. 1590.   
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alignments, splitting and federating along secular political lines to bargain with political 
parties.  Such engagement is, of course, motivated by the self-interest of these castes, and 
yet, that engagement has “undermined the rigidity of the system”.9 On the ideological 
front, Kothari points out a whole range of shifts.  In the place of hierarchy, there is 
plurality. Earlier, while the status of an individual in society was ordained, now it is 
negotiable. Earlier, while the roles and positions of people were ritually defined, now the 
same roles have civic and political definitions.   
 
Kothari’s second argument is that although caste is oppressive, it can provide a base for 
the struggle against oppression; and, in fact, caste facilitates the oppressed to move away 
from the traditional structure to modern spaces. In a way, for him, caste “has the 
potentiality of being a two-pronged catalyst: as purveyor of collective identity and 
annihilator of the same hierarchical order”.10 Although I was, and still am, extremely 
sceptical about the second argument, I still am convinced with the first argument, 
especially the idea of transformation on the ideology of caste.  This conviction was borne 
out of my experience of the Dandora Movement in Andhra Pradesh (AP).   
 
In 1995, the Madigas, one of the four major Dalit castes in AP - (the Malas, Adi-Andhras 
and Rellis are the other three major Dalits castes), mobilised under the banner of Madiga 
Reservation Porata Samithi (MRPS - Madiga Committee for Reservation Struggle) for 
sub-classification of Dalit reservations in the state. Questioning the appropriation of a 
major share of the Dalit reservations by the Malas and Adi-Andhras, the MRPS 
demanded caste-based re-distribution/sub-classification of the reservations. Along with 
this demand, one of the audacious acts of the MRPS activists was suffixing the caste title 
‘Madiga’ to their names.  For instance, Krishna, a prominent leader of the movement, had 
become Krishna Madiga and Krupakar, another main leader of the movement, had 
become Krupakar Madiga. Such suffixing of caste title to individual names had hitherto 
been an exclusive preserve of the upper castes and some of the upwardly mobile castes 
within the Shudra category, such as Yadavas.  They use the caste titles with great pride 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 1590.  
10 Ibid.   
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and insist that others, especially the lower castes, address them with those caste titles in 
private or in public.  
In contrast, the Dalits never felt confident in suffixing their caste identities, for most of 
their caste titles, such as Madiga, served as terms of abuse in the hands of the caste-
Hindus.  The pride and arrogance displayed by the caste-Hindus through their caste titles 
was suddenly “punctured”11 when the Madigas, the so-called “lowest of the low”, also 
began to use their caste title.  Thus, this experience substantiates Kothari’s argument on 
the transformation of the ideology of caste.  However, I was still doubtful of his argument 
that the “politicisation of caste” leads to the “transformation of the system”, and that 
caste has the potentiality of working as a catalyst or annihilator of the hierarchical order. 
Not surprisingly, this doubt has generated a host of questions, which directed me towards 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh. 
 
The BSP, which was started by Kanshi Ram in 1984 in UP, mobilised the Dalits and 
other lower castes under the broad category of Bahujan (majority of the people) for 
political power.  By deploying caste in its electoral mobilisations, the party not only 
succeeded in politicising caste in UP, but also gained political power in that state. Did 
that politicisation transform the system?  What did the BSP do to transform the lives of 
the Dalits?  These two questions actually pulled me back to AP and forced me to reflect 
on the Dalit movement and politics in that state.   
 
The Dalits in AP suffered two major atrocities in the mid-1980’s and early 1990’s at the 
hands of the two main dominant castes in the state.  The first one was organised against 
the Madigas of Karamchedu village in 1985 by the Kammas; the other was conducted by 
the Reddys against the Malas in Chunduru village in 1991.  These two atrocities led to 
the emergence of the Andhra Pradesh Dalit Maha Sabha (APDMS), under the leadership 
of Bojja Tarakam and Katti Padma Rao, with the twin demands of self-respect and 
annihilation of caste.  For nearly a decade, the APDMS mobilised the Dalits, Adivasis, 
and Shudras (or the Backward Castes) against the caste-based atrocities committed 
                                                 
11 Balagopal, K. 2000. A Tangled Web: Subdivision of SC Reservations in AP. EPW, 35(13), pp: 1075 – 
1081, here, p. 1077.  
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against the Dalits and other lower castes by the upper castes, and against the socio-
economic and political domination of the latter. These mobilisations generated a strong 
consciousness among the lower strata in the state, particularly among the Dalits; and, by 
the early 1990’s, prepared them as strong contenders for political power. However, this 
contention did not result in political power for Dalits in particular and Bahujans in 
general in the state.  Why did Dalits succeed in winning political power in UP and why 
did they fail in AP?  
 
With these questions in mind, I read some key books on the Dalit movement and politics 
in UP and AP.  Among these, two books on UP were the latest at that time, and one book 
on AP was acclaimed as path-breaking by critics. Sudha Pai’s Dalit Assertion and the 
Unfinished Democratic Revolution: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh 
examined Dalit politics in post-Independence UP.  By focusing on the BSP, Pai examines 
three key aspects of the Party: the origin and trajectory of the BSP, its mobilizational 
strategies, and its ideology. Two claims that caught my attention in Pai’s book were: first, 
she claims that, in comparison with western and southern India, the northern province of 
UP did not witness any anti-Brahmanical movements by the Dalits prior to Independence.  
The second claim is that the BSP, which claims to espouse Baba Saheb Ambedkar’s 
ideology, failed to fulfil his dream of a democratic revolution.  These two claims 
impelled me to ask: Is it true that the Dalits did not have any anti-Brahmin movement in 
colonial UP?  What was Ambedkar’s dream of democratic revolution and how and why 
did the BSP fail to fulfil that dream?   
 
The second pivotal work is Christophe Jaffrelot’s India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of 
the Low Castes in North Indian Politics, which examines the lower castes’ electoral 
assertion in North India.  In order to explain the contemporary caste-based politics of the 
lower castes, Jaffrelot not only examined their politics in colonial North India, but also 
attempted to make sense of all India politics by comparing the lower caste politics of 
northern India with that of the politics of the southern India’s lower castes.  A particular 
claim, by Jaffrelot, that caught my attention is that the Dravidian ideology set the tone 
and content of lower caste politics in South India, and it is this ideology that resulted in 
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their political empowerment.12 Two problems, however, with this claim are: first, by 
South India, did he mean only Tamil Nadu or all the regions/states in South India?  
Jaffrelot was right if he meant it in the first sense.  But the same cannot be said to be true 
with the other regions/states in South India.  For regions and states like Coastal Andhra 
and Hyderabad in South India did not witness the Dravidian movement.  If lower caste 
movements, especially the Dalit movement in colonial Coastal Andhra and in the Nizam 
State of Hyderabad, were not based on the Dravidian ideology, what was the ideology 
around which the Dalit movements were organised?   
 
This question took me to a close reading of Gail Omvedt’s work: Dalits and the 
Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India. In this 
fascinating work, Omvedt examined Dalit movements and politics in three regions in 
colonial India, i.e., Maharashtra, the Nizam State of Hyderabad, and Coastal Andhra. 
After a closing reading of the book I felt that this work was a one-dimensional reading of 
the Dalit movement and politics in the Nizam State of Hyderabad and Coastal Andhra; 
because even prior to the entry of Ambedkar in these two regions, the Dalits mobilised 
around the ‘Adi’ ideology. By assuming the identities of Adi-Hindu and Adi-Andhra in 
Hyderabad and coastal Andhra, respectively, they mounted a strong critique of 
Brahmanism and demanded their share in the emerging political power. Of course, she 
mentions these aspects, but as passing commentary.  My second problem with this work 
is with its presentation of Dalits and their politics. Dalits were presented as if they were 
one homogenous category, organised against Brahmanical ideology and its oppression. 
Were all Dalits united in their fight against Brahmanism?  Viewing Dalit politics and 
their movement from the vantage point of caste-based movements among the Dalits in 
contemporary AP, it becomes clear that Dalits have always been divided on the basis of 
caste.  And so, what was happening inside the Dalit category?  And if they were united, 
what led to disunity among the Dalits in contemporary AP?  These questions have shaped 
my research agenda.   
 
 
                                                 
12Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India. 
London: Hurst & Company, pp: 166-180. 
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With the above questions in mind, in this thesis, I attempt to understand the contours of 
Dalit politics along three principal axes: (i) historically, in the context of a history of anti-
caste and especially Dalit protests from the late 19th century onwards in UP and AP; (ii) 
thematically, in the context of contemporary debates about enlarging the space of 
democracy in India; (iii) comparatively, by making a broad contrast between North India 
and South India.  The following delineation elaborates the nature and aims of the present 
study. 
 
Analysing Dalit politics, historically and thematically, became important in order to 
understand the contours shaping Indian politics today.  The present study, therefore, has 
the potential to shed new light on the question of caste and politics in India.  Indeed, in 
the last few years, public-political arguments over the institution of caste have plainly 
intensified and, more than ever before, social scientists are studying an institution which 
is reshaped by contentious and confusing discourses. A theme worth exploring here is 
what some social scientists have called the “substantialisation of caste”, i.e., moving 
away of caste groups from their more traditional relationships of socio-economic 
interdependence towards more competitive models of social interaction13 - primarily, but 
by no means exclusively, in the context of Dalit self-assertion.  A comparative regional 
profile could lend further dimension to the problem. A hypothesis worth exploring is 
whether the politics in North India and South India are based on different trajectories.  As 
has been pointed out recently, if the Hindu-Muslim cleavage has been a master narrative 
of politics in North India through much of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
caste division has had the same status in southern India. While plausible as an 
assessment, this assertion would require further probing, and I propose to do so from an 
Ambedkarite perspective within both North and South Indian politics.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 In the words of Louis Dumont the ‘substantialisation of caste’ is “transition from a fluid, structural 
universe in which the emphasis is on interdependence …to a universe of impenetrable blocks, self-
sufficient, essentially identical and in competition with one another,” in which structure seems to yield to 
substance, each caste becoming an individual confronting other individuals.” Dumont, Louis. 1970. Homo 
Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications. Delhi: Vikas, pp: 222 & 227. 
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North and South Indian Politics – A Comparison 
Two influential claims on North and South Indian politics impel the present research. 
One claim is that of ‘Southernization of North Indian politics’ by Ashutosh Varshney; the 
second claim is made by Christophe Jaffrelot. For him the divergences in the 
politicisation of the lower castes in North and South India were mainly due to the 
composition of castes in both the regions. Let us examine these two claims one after the 
other briefly. First, as noted above, Ashutosh Varshney, in his article: ‘Is India Becoming 
More Democratic?’,14 claims that while politics in northern India, so far, was organised 
around the Hindu-Muslim axis, in south India it was organised around caste lines; as such 
for him, “If the Hindu-Muslim cleavage has been the ‘master narrative’ of politics in 
North India for much of the twentieth century, caste divisions have had the same status in 
South India.”15 However, with the rise of lower caste politics in today’s North India what 
is happening is, Varshney argues, the ‘Southernization of North India’. Viewing the 
politics in northern India from the vantage point of religious cleavages and the way the 
politics in North India, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, has been unfolded since the late 
1970’s and the way caste has been brought onto the centre of the political dais, it might 
appear that the politics in North India appears to be following in the footsteps of politics 
in South India. However, the question remains, is caste-based politics only a 
contemporary phenomenon in North India? Is this the first time that the lower castes, 
especially the Dalits, are challenging the caste-based cultural hegemony and political 
domination of the upper castes by competing for political power?  
 
It was true that the ‘Hindu-Muslim cleavage’ had been the main axis around which 
politics in colonial Northern India were organised. But that does not mean that it was the 
only axis around which people organised their politics. While several social scientists 
have noted that caste is the central fault-line of India – pre-colonial and post-colonial,16 
others have been reluctant to accept and engage with the caste question.17 At least in the 
                                                 
14 Varshney, Ashutosh. 2000. Is India…, pp: 3-25.   
15 Ibid., p.5 
16 See for instance, Aloysius, G. 1996. Nationalism without a Nation in India. New Delhi: OUP; Menon, 
M.Dilip. 2006. The Blindness of Insight: Essay on Caste in Modern India: Chennai: Quadra Press.  
17 One recent example is Ashutosh Varshney’s 2002. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims 
in India. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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United Provinces, if not entire northern India, we have evidence, presented in Chapter 
Two, to suggest that in the political domain caste cleavages are as important as that of the 
religious-cleavages. In a way, it is to claim that the Hindu-Muslim cleavage is a master 
narrative is to fail to appreciate the politics of those people who organised outside the 
fold Hindu or Muslim.  
 
Secondly, Jaffrelot in his India’s Silent Revolution: the Rise of the Lower Castes in North 
India claims that divergences in the politicisation of the lower castes in North and South 
India were mainly due to the composition of castes in both the regions. In northern India, 
the caste system is traditionally the closest to the varna model with its four orders 
(Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vyshyas, and Shudras) and the Untouchables. In the South, on the 
other hand, the twice-born are seldom ‘complete’ since the warrior and merchant castes 
are often absent or poorly represented, as in Maharashtra and Bengal.  By the same token, 
the upper varnas are more in number in the North, whereas in the South, the proportion 
of the Brahmins and even of the twice-born is often low.18  The North-South contrast 
derives also from the kind of land settlement that the British sustained in these two areas.  
While the Zamindari system prevailed in North India, the Raiyatwari system was more 
systematically implemented in the South. The former solidified the hierarchy of peasant 
society whereas the latter was more conducive to different forms of social equality.19  
Moreover, in Northern India the “demographic weight of the upper castes and their role 
in the local power structure”20 prepared the ground for the development of Gandhian 
conservative ideologies in politics. This, in turn, led to arresting lower caste 
consciousness in the prison of Sanskritisation. On the contrary, the politicisation of the 
lower castes in the South, Jaffrelot argues, was due to the absence of a complex middle 
order, that is, “the warrior and merchant castes are often absent or poorly represented”.21  
Such absence, in turn, Jaffrelot claims, has facilitated a strong lower caste mobilisation 
under the banner of Dravidianism against Brahmanical hegemony and domination.  
                                                 
18 According to the 1931 census, the last one which enumerated castes, the upper varnas represent from 
13.6% (Bihar) up to 24.2% (Rajasthan) of the population. In Andhra Pradesh, for instance, the Brahmins 
and Kshatriyas represent respectively 3 and 1.2% of the population.       
19 Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. India’s silent …, pp: 5-6. 
20 Ibid., p. 9.  
21 Ibid., p. 7.  
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There are two fundamental problems with Jaffrelot’s reading of the politicisation of the 
lower castes in South India.  First, one does not understand the possible link between the 
absence of a middle order in the caste hierarchy and the politicisation of the lower castes. 
In the sense, the upper castes discriminated against the lower castes, especially against 
the Dalits, irrespective of the presence or absence of the middle order in the caste 
hierarchy; as victims, it was natural for the Dalits to organise against their victimisers. 
Secondly, Jaffrelot seems to have based his present argument upon the simple assumption 
that all the lower castes who had been the victims of a common enemy and common 
ideology, i.e., Brahmins and Brahmanism respectively, have mobilised under the 
universal category of non-Brahmins by embracing the ideology of Dravidianism during 
the colonial era. This is rather a sweeping generalisation. For all the lower castes may be 
victims of Brahmanism, yet they were (and are) not united in their fight against that 
ideology. Every caste, especially those castes that were placed at the top of the non-
Brahmin hierarchy, fought its battles against Brahmanism independently.   
 
Further, a problem in Jaffrelot’s argument is in his understanding of the idea of lower 
castes or the non-Brahmin category and the extent of their power in the socio-political 
and cultural domains. It is true that the caste system in the Hindi belt is traditionally 
organised around the varna model or at least, closest to that model with its four orders – 
Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras, and the Untouchables. The hold of the first 
three castes on the economic resources and their domination in the socio-political and 
cultural domains were so complete that there was very little space available for the 
Shudras and Untouchables during the colonial and immediate post-Independence periods. 
In other words, when we say the lower castes in the Hindi belt it is both the Shudras and 
Dalits.  
 
Similarly, in South India also the lower caste category includes both the Shudras and 
Dalits. But then, just as there are differences between the Shudras and Dalits – in terms of 
their position in the caste hierarchy and the availability of resources, particularly 
economic resources, there are differences within the Shudra category as well. The Shudra 
category in Southern India is essentially divided into two layers of castes. The first layer 
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comprises of castes, like Kammas and Reddys in Andhra Pradesh, Lingayats, 
Vokkalingayats, Shettys in Karnataka, and Reddiyars, Mudaliars, Chettiyars, Pillais in 
Tamil Nadu. This set of castes or category of castes are also known as the sat-Shudra 
category. In terms of caste position, these castes may be placed below the Brahmins, 
Kshatriyas and Vaishyas in the social hierarchy, but in terms of their control over the 
economic resources and domination in the social and political spheres, this category of 
people are more powerful than the Brahmins or any other castes in the social hierarchy. 
The second layer is constituted with service castes like, Yadavas, Kurmis, Gollas, Salees 
etc. During the colonial as well as the immediate post-Independence periods, there was 
not much difference between this set of castes and the Dalits, particularly in terms of 
social status and availability of resources for economic and social development. The 
dynamics of these differences between the Shudras and Dalits have changed since the late 
1970’s, which is, of course, a different matter altogether.  
 
But the point that I am trying to make here is that lack of an ample presence of the 
warrior and merchant castes in South India does not mean that there were no castes that 
occupied and controlled similar spaces of power as those occupied by the Kshatriyas and 
Vaishyas in the Hindi belt. In other words, the castes in the Sat-Shudra category may be 
viewed as compensating for the lack of Kshyatriyas and Vaishyas in South India.  And as 
the castes within the non-Brahmin category were divided both vertically and horizontally, 
they were at variance in their responses against Brahmins and Brahmanism. The castes 
like Reddys and Kammas, who have been in positions of privilege within the non-
Brahmin category, were not against the Brahmanical caste system per se. They were 
simply against the Brahmins, who enjoyed the highest social status and cultural 
privileges. To put it differently, the privileged non-Brahmin castes were against the 
privileges enjoyed by the Brahmins, while at the same time aspiring for the same social 
status and cultural privileges. During the early part of the twentieth century the dislike for 
Brahmins that the privileged non-Brahmin castes nurtured reached the heights, when jobs 
in the British government in India were completely taken up by the former. It was against 
this domination and to stake a claim for a share in the job market that the Sat-Shudras 
launched the non-Brahmin movement.  
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On the contrary, the aspirations of the lower castes within the non-Brahmin category – 
especially the Dalits - with imposed restrictions were different in important respects from 
the aspirations of the privileged non-Brahmin castes. Of course, the Dalits, just like the 
Sat-Shudras, also condemned the pre-eminence of the Brahmins in government 
employment, and they too sought their share of jobs. But unlike the privileged non-
Brahmin castes, the Dalits sought to destroy the system that deprived them of human 
dignity. In essence, the Brahmins in AP, unlike their counterparts in UP, were not 
dominant castes; the intermediate non-Brahmin castes, particularly the Reddys and 
Kammas were the dominant castes. This was the main reason why that the Dalits in AP 
allied with the Brahmins rather than with the non-Brahmins; and this was also the main 
reason for the slower emergence of an independent Dalit movement in the state. Thus, the 
politics of lower castes cannot be understood adequately under the rubric of the non-
Brahmin category, for the category is not homogenous. There are massive differences 
among the castes within the non-Brahmin category, in terms of social status, the social 
respect they command, access to economic resources and in terms of their position in the 
local power structures. These differences must be taken into consideration while studying 
the politics of the non-Brahmins.  In particular, both societies in North and South India - 
are pervaded by the Hindu hierarchical caste structure and Dalits in both the places are 
kept at the bottom of the society, including by non-Brahmins. This study it intends to 
compensate for the inadequate attention to Dalit views in dominant scholarship by 
focusing on the Dalit struggle for recognition as equal human beings and their politics for 
social justice and democratisation of the Indian society. 
  
Caste and Democracy in India: Understanding caste, as a system of social hierarchy 
and domination is central to understanding the position of Dalits in India today. Why is it 
that caste continues to persist in modern India? At the time of independence, Nehruvian 
progressive ideologues and academic theorists expected that institutions of democratic 
government would exert destructive influence on the traditional structure of caste.  It was 
expected that the idea of modern citizenship and economic progress would eliminate all 
forms of intermediate affiliations of identity and loyalty between the state and the 
individual.  To put the same in the words of Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘the logic of industrial 
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development and the logic of democratic citizenship were both to work as combined 
logic of individuation, and dissolve primordial identities like caste and religion’.22   
 
The modernist project, however, did not lessen the relevance and significance of caste. 
Rather, it has only increased political potency.23 Drawing from the experiences of 
democratic politics, M.N. Srinivas argued that although socially caste is declining, it has 
been strengthened in the context of modern politics. This is because, “the power and 
activity of caste has increased in proportion, as political power passed increasingly to the 
people from the rulers”.24  Caste has become an important factor in the functioning of the 
democratic institutions. Given the importance of the caste factor in the political process 
of the country, Rudolph and Rudolph argued that the importance of caste was unlikely to 
decline because “…the need for mediating collective and adaptive structures based on 
birth and integrated by primary group sentiment and interest transcends the imperatives 
of modernity in politics and society.”25 Taking a similar line, Kaviraj argues, “since 
elections required aggregation of perceived interests and the format of perception of 
identity was deeply traditional, appeals to caste or occasionally religious identities were 
more effective in the short term.  It was evident that politicians wished to win elections 
before they modernised their country”, and to win elections, “politicians manipulated the 
existence of traditional identities in actual electoral practice”.26   
  
For some scholars, these political trends – the amalgamation of caste and politics – are 
positive. Rajni Kothari, for instance, argues that as long as caste consciousness was the 
preserve of the Brahminical caste-Hindus, it was respectable.  But today those who suffer 
from within the system are also invoking caste identity to break it rather than preserve it.  
To put it in his words, “Caste can be oppressive but it can also provide a basis for 
struggle against oppression.  It can at once be traditionalist and modernist. It has the 
potential to be a two-pronged catalyst: a preserver of collective identity as well as an 
                                                 
22 Sudipta, Kaviraj. 1997. Introduction. In: Kaviraj, Sudipta. ed., Politics in India. New Delhi: OUP, p.8. 
23 See for instance, Srinivas M.N. 1978[1962]. Caste in Modern India: And Other Essays, London: JK 
Publishers, p.15; Rudolph L.I. and Rudolph S.H. 1967. The Modernity of..: Kothari, Rajni. 1970. Caste in 
Indian politics. New Delhi: Orient Longman; ...., 1986. Politics in India. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.  
24 Srinivas, M.N., 1978. Caste in Modern …, p.23.  
25 Rudolph L.I. and Rudolph S.H. 1967. The Modernity of …, pp: 97-98. 
26 Sudipta, Kaviraj. 1997. Introduction…, p.8. 
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inhibitor of the same hierarchical order from which collective identity is drawn”.27  He 
also insists that caste, far from being an impediment to the creation of a democratic 
political order, was a structure through which politics must ‘strive to organise’.28 He 
maintained that the political mobilisation of castes had made a substantial contribution to 
the development of democracy. He explains further that “it is because ‘ethnic’ identities 
are openly acknowledged, politically organised, and made explicit bases for bargaining 
that more open processes of institutional penetration and political integration has been 
possible in India”.29 Javeed Alam too debunks one of the myths of modernisation that 
caste can always be reduced to casteism.  He argues that the collective nature of ‘un-
freedom’ in India, unlike Europe, has made the struggle for emancipation community-
based rather than a struggle based on the individual.30 This thesis seeks to deepen these 
arguments by foregrounding the Dalit view, which has been insufficiently addressed in 
these debates. Dalits have been using their caste to focus attention on the collective 
nature of their oppression.  
 
Further, this thesis will demonstrate that a study of Dalit politics will contribute not only 
to an understanding of the nature of domination but such a study will tell us about the 
nature of democracy on the Indian subcontinent. For as mentioned above, the rise of 
lower castes and Dalits in the northern India and their simultaneous empowerment in 
southern India has led scholars to argue collectively that India’s democracy has become 
more inclusive and participatory.  Yogendra Yadav, for instance, argues, “[d]emocratic 
system enjoys greater legitimacy today than in the past.  The poor and the deprived 
defend democracy more vigorously than the elite”.31 Ashis Nandy too rather forcefully 
asserts that, “socialism, secularism, development, nationalism, security, science and 
technology have all become debatable, in some cases abrasively so, but not 
democracy”.32 He continues that the peace movement in the ’50’s and ’60’s, 
environmentalism and the re-emergence of Gandhism in the ‘70s, and globalisation in the 
                                                 
27 Rajni, Kothari. 1970. Introduction. In: Kothari, Rajni. ed., Caste in …, pp: 4-5.  
28  Ibid., p. 225. 
29 Ibid., p.241. 
30 Alam, Javeed. 1999. Is Caste Appeal Casteism? EPW, 34(13), pp: 757-761.  
31 Yadav, Yogendra. 1999. The Maturing of Indian Democracy. India Today, 31 August.  
32 Nandy, Ashis. 1999. Sustaining the Faith. India Today, 31 August. 
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’90’s - they have all risen and fallen. But only “the appeal of democracy has not faded in 
India.  Indeed, it has deepened over the years. It now cuts across parties, educational 
levels, classes, castes, religion, gender, and ethnic divisions. The poor seem committed to 
it more than the ultra-rich”.33  Sheth also endorses these views and calls this process as 
the ‘secularisation of Indian politics’.34 Further, he is of the opinion that the “Indian 
representative democracy is indeed moving closer to the people. They now feel more 
involved and show greater concern for institutions of local and regional governance”.35 
 
Such judgements are, however, contested. Even those who agree that power has 
decisively moved down the caste hierarchy are unsure about what it means for the poor 
and the oppressed. Jayal argues, “free and fair elections, freedom of speech and 
expression, and the rule of law and its protection to all are necessary, but by no means 
sufficient conditions for a democracy to be meaningful”.36 The democratic project is 
incomplete until the meaningful exercise of the equal rights of citizenship has been 
guaranteed to all.  Political equality, she argues, gets severely restricted by inequalities 
that deny many from having equal opportunities. Kaviraj also argues that the introduction 
of the formal principle of political equality could not overcome the actual unequal 
economic structure of Indian society, reinforced by the uneven distribution of gains under 
a predominantly capitalist economy.37  However, despite his criticism on the process of 
democratic politics, Kaviraj recognises its contributions to and the changes it has been 
effecting on caste, a process which he theorises as the ‘democratisation of caste’. One 
unintended consequence of populist politics, for him, was that it fundamentally altered 
the structural properties of caste in the electoral arena. As political parties became 
concerned more with the spatial concentration of castes than their status within the caste 
hierarchy, electoral politics resulted in a ‘democracy’ of caste groups in place of a 
                                                 
33 Ibid.  
34 Sheth, D.L. 2000. Caste and the Secularisation Process in India. In: Ronald, de Souza Peter., ed., 
Contemporary India: Transitions. New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp.237-263. 
35 Ibid., p. 243. 
36 Niraja Gopal, Jayal. 2001. Introduction. In: Jayal, Niraja Gopal. ed., Democracy in India. New Delhi: 
OUP, pp: 23-37; also see Jayal, Niraja Gopal. 2001. Democracy and the State, New Delhi: OUP, pp: 2-3. 
37 Kaviraj, Sudipta. 2002 [2000]. Democracy and Social Inequality. In: Frankel R. Francine et al., eds., 
Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. New Delhi: OUP, pp: 89-119. 
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‘hierarchy’.38  He further argues that, on the one hand, there is considerable decline of 
caste in traditional arenas of social behaviour, like commonality and marriages.  In 
political life, on the other hand, caste has been given a powerful new life due to electoral 
politics.  People started claiming, Kaviraj asserts, “equality on the basis of caste, without 
giving up their caste identity”.39  
 
If one were to view caste and politics from a non-Dalit perspective, then secularisation of 
caste and democratisation of caste successfully capture the nuances of the social and 
political processes in India.  However, viewed from the Dalits’ sociological and political 
discourses the above theorisations have limited significance. Democratic practices are 
supposed to involve a process of transformation that takes place through the opening up 
of opportunities to participate, the inclusion of excluded voices, democratising access to 
the media, politicising the depoliticised, empowering the powerless, and reducing 
political dependency by transforming a passive citizenship into an active one.  However, 
in the Indian democracy, historically, it is largely the dominant upper castes that have 
defined and decided the political agenda of Dalits, with Dalits receiving token 
representation and excluded from substantial participation in political life. Further, the 
denial of access to resources, participation in political processes, exclusion from the 
social milieu, and subjugation to an ideology of servitude and bondage of the Dalits have 
not been tackled sufficiently in academic scholarship. For instance, in recent years, 
persons from the Shudra category, with their newfound strength in electoral politics have 
started claiming ‘equality’ and started suffixing their caste name to their actual names.  
Madiga, Golla, and Kurmi are just a few examples of this phenomenon. Along these 
lines, Gupta has argued that this is because “castes are proud of their identity, regardless 
of where the textual traditions place them on the ‘purity-pollution’ hierarchy. Each caste 
puts itself in some way, for some reason at the high-end of the hierarchy, meaning that 
there is no one uncontested ranking of castes but rather, there are perhaps as many 
rankings as there are castes.”40  
                                                 
38 Ibid., p.102. 
39 Ibid., p. 109. 
40 Gupta, Dipankar. 2004. Introduction: The certitudes of caste: When identity trumps hierarchy. 
Contributions to Indian sociology (n.s.) 38 (1& 2) (2004), pp: v-ix. 
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However, this theory does not hold ture when applied to the lowest status groups, Dalits 
and Adivasis.41 Dalit caste names have connotations of dirtiness and low status. Dalit 
caste names like ‘Madiga’, ‘Chamar’, ‘Mahar’ and ‘Mala’ are not prestigious; rather they 
are dirty words for the upper castes. And Dalits are seen as intrinsically lower - even the 
so called political equality hasn’t helped to put an end to this situation. After more than 
half a decade of Independence, a vast mass of this group still lives in segregated colonies 
on the outskirts of villages; the major chunk of the Dalit masses - more than 80 percent - 
still live in rural areas and also continue to suffer due to the continued practice of the 
two-class system - the most obvious sign of this oppression. This, however, does not 
mean that I am undervaluing changes that have been happening at the grassroots, 
particularly rapid economic transformations in the era of market reforms.42 
 
But while material advancement addresses one layer of the problems suffered by the 
Dalit constituency, their problems are much larger than simple material deprivation. 
Indeed, it is not just the uneducated and poor Dalits, even educated and employed, who 
have benefited from positive discrimination policies have been victims of caste-based 
discrimination and segregation. In fact, their educational, economic and cultural 
development did not help to disentangle them from caste-based discrimination.  In a way, 
class mobility has not helped the stigmatised social identity. Thus, it is this cultural 
segregation and violence against the Dalits that form the basis of their struggle for 
recognition, equality, and political power. It should be noted here that there are two 
aspects in the Dalits’ struggle for politic power: first, it is a struggle against their 
marginalisation in the political arena. From this aspect, it is a struggle to realise their 
citizenship rights, that is to say, as citizens they have every right, like the upper caste 
citizens, to take part in the politics and acquire political power. Second, John Gaventa 
had argued elsewhere, in a different context, that institutionalised arrangements for 
participatory governance would not necessarily be more inclusive or pro-poor. Rather, it 
                                                 
41 In Andhra Pradesh, the Lambada group in the Adivasi category have been suffixing ‘Naik’, their caste 
name, to their proper names, but other groups like ‘Yanadi and Erukula’ do not want to follow this due to 
the stigma of a ‘tribal’ attached to these groups.  
42 See, for instance, Kapur, Devesh et al., 2010. Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the 
Market Reform Era. EPW, 45 (35), 39-49.  
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would depend on the nature of power relations which those institutional spaces43 imbued. 
Drawing from Gaventa’s argument, I would like to ask, once in power, how has that 
power been used by the Dalits. That is, whether political power in the hands of Dalits has 
been used to reverse the situation, i.e., Dalits dominating the political arena and thereby 
marginalising the upper castes in that arena, or whether such power has been used to 
create possibilities for the marginalised to take part in local governance and thereby make 
way for transformation at the grassroot-level.  It is these nuances that this study offers to 
bring forth from the vantage point of an Ambedkarite perspective.  But what is an 
Ambedkarite perspective?  
 
Ambedkarite Perspective:44 The term Ambedkarite or Ambedkarvadi, literally means 
someone speaking and advocating Ambedkar’s philosophy – akin to the Marxist 
(Marxvadi), or the Liberalist (udaravadi) or Ambedkar vicharavadi (subscribing to 
Ambedkar’s thought). During the late fifties, especially after Ambedkar’s diksha 
ceremony (initiation ceremony) to Buddhism in October 1956, the term was used 
somewhat disapprovingly by his critics and opponents, and conversely, with an aura of 
respect by adherents of the philosophy of Ambedkar.45  Ever since its inception in 1957, 
the Republican Party of India made all efforts to popularise the term, and by the early 
960’s, the term and its equivalents in regional languages, were widely used across India 
to denote a distinctive mode of beliefs and values, mobilisation, organisation, and also 
religious pursuits.46 Although the term lost its appeal to ‘Dalit’ with the rise of the Dalit 
Panther Movement in the 1970’s, the émigré followers of Ambedkar have always 
preferred to describe themselves as Ambedkarites rather than Dalits.47 
 
                                                 
43 John Gaventa. 2004. Towards participatory governance: assessing the transformative possibilities. In: 
Hickey, Samuel and Giles Mohan., eds., Participation: from tyranny to transformation? Exploring new 
approaches to participation in development. New York: Zed Books, pp: 25-41, here, p. 25. 
44 I thank Prof. Valerian Rodrigues (JNU, New Delhi) and Dr. Kusuma Satyanarayana (EFLU, Hyderabad) 
for clarifying my understanding of the Ambedkarite perspective.   
45 For an earlier hostile view, see Jivaka. 1959. B.R. Ambedkar’s Buddhism and His Dhamma. The Maha 
Bodhi (periodical), 67(12), pp: 352-53. 
46 Kshirsagar, R. K. 1994. Dalit Movement in India and Its Leaders. Delhi: M.D.Publications. 
47 Hardtmann, Eva Maria. 2009. The Dalit Movement in India. New Delhi: OUP, p. 159. 
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That apart, the Ambedkarite perspective quintessentially draws from Ambedkar’s ideas 
on caste oppression and degradation of the marginalised in all walks of life - democracy, 
equal rights, the State. Yet, at the same time, an Ambedkarite perspective does not 
necessarily confine itself to the ideas of Ambedkar, which evolved in particular socio-
political or economic contexts. Rather, it involves a dynamic and critical re-interpretation 
of Ambedkar’s ideas in any given context. Such an active re-interpretation of ideas is not 
retrograde in nature, but rather seeks to enlarge the space of democracy and equality in 
the society at large.   
 
Ambedkar’s ideas and ideology essentially revolves around the individual, that is to say, 
the well-being of the individual is at the heart of Ambedkar’s ideas and activism and so 
the individual constitutes the centre of his analysis. But the Hindu social order, as 
Ambedkar argued, “does not recognise the individual as a centre of social purpose…there 
is no room for individual merit and consideration of individual justice…”;48 “…The 
division of labour brought about by the Caste System is not a division based on 
choice…It is based on the dogma of pre-destination.”49 In a way, individuals have been 
trapped by Hinduism through its caste system. It is important to recognise here that when 
we say individuals, it refers to all the castes in the Caste System.  A Brahmin individual 
may enjoy greater freedom, rights, privileges and status compared to a Dalit, but he is 
also trapped by the social ideology of Hinduism. In the sense, he does not have a choice 
(in the traditional social structure) but to adhere to the occupation and values imposed 
upon him by the Caste ideology. As Caste does not allow individual merit, effort and 
choice, what Ambedkar wanted first and foremost was to annihilate Caste so as to 
liberate individuals from its clutches. Of course, at this stage it is also important to 
recognise that in advocating the annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar is primarily concerned 
with individuals from the Dalit and lower caste backgrounds; for their subordination is 
                                                 
48 Cited in Gore, M.S. 1993. The Social Context of an Ideology: Ambedkar’s Political and Social Thought. 
New Delhi: Sage, p. 262, quote taken from Rochana Bajpai. 2012. Liberalism in India: A Sketch. In: 
Jackson, Ben and Marc Stears, eds., Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden. 
Oxford: OUP, p.72.  
49Ambedkar, B.R. 1979[1936]. Annihilation of Caste with a Reply to Mahatma Gandhi. Bombay: 
Government Central Press, p. 47. 
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greater than individuals of the upper castes. The question is, how to destroy Caste? For 
Caste, as Ambedkar perceptibly argued, is not a physical object but a state of mind:  
Caste is not a physical object like a wall of bricks or a line of barbed wire which prevents 
the Hindus from co-mingling and which therefore has to be pulled down. Caste is a 
notion, it is a state of the mind. The destruction of Caste does not therefore mean the 
destruction of a physical barrier. It means a notional change.50 
 
Such notional change is possible only by destroying “the belief in the sanctity of the 
Shastras”, for it is the Shashtras that have been inculcating the notion of Caste among the 
Hindus.  But is it possible to destroy the Shashtras? In case there is such a possibility, is it 
going to be an easy task?  Destroying Shashtras, i.e., destroying belief in the sanctity of 
the Shashtras, is possible. In the sense, it requires replacement of the Hindu belief system, 
a system that believes in denying liberty, equality and fraternity in favour of separatism 
and exclusion, with another religious belief system that recognizes liberty, equality and 
maitri among all the people.51 Yet Ambedkar knew that such a replacement is not an easy 
task. Because the Caste system not only divides people into separate communities, it also 
places these communities in a graded order, one above the other with regard to social 
status; not surprisingly, it is this gradation that allows these communities to claim 
superiority over the other. In Ambedkar’s words:  
Each caste takes its pride and its consolation in the fact that in the scale of castes it is 
above some other caste. As an outward mark of this gradation, there is also a gradation of 
social and religious rights, technically spoken of as Ashtadhikaras and Sankaras. The 
higher the grade of a caste, the greater the number of these rights; and the lower the 
grade, the lesser their number….Castes…are jealous of their status and know that if a 
general dissolution came, some of them stand to lose more of their prestige and power 
than others do.52 
 
As the Caste System through its gradations bestows rights on each caste, they all cling to 
their respective positions in the social hierarchy. In short, all castes may not be equal in 
status but are jealous of their status, and so are “slaves of the Caste System”.53 And it is 
simply on account of this slave mentality that a general mobilisation of the Hindus 
against the Caste System is a Himalayan task and so the destruction of Shashtras.  This 
may be the case, but Ambedkar does not want people, especially the Dalits and other 
marginalised sections of Indian society to suffer due to Caste. He firmly believed that the 
                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 68. 
51 See, Ambedkar, B.R. 2004[1936]. Conversion as Emancipation. New Delhi: Critical Quest.  
52 Ambedkar. B.R. 1979. Op. cit., p. 72. 
53 Ibid.  
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entrenched social problems could be rectified with better political arrangements. Indeed, 
as we have noted in the prologue, unlike other nationalist leaders, such as Gandhi, 
Ambedkar categorically notes that untouchability is not a social problem but a political 
one; and for a political solution the intervention of the State is sine qua non, as the State 
has a responsibility towards the poorest and the most underprivileged. One way of 
fulfilling that responsibility is by providing universal franchise because franchise is “the 
inherent right of every individual in the State”,54 and  positive discrimination in favour of 
the oppressed, that is to say, providing guaranteed places for Dalits and other similarly 
placed groups in government and public services. Perhaps it is not out of place to note 
here that Ambedkar was, as rightly pointed by Bayly, “one of the first intellectuals 
worldwide to argue the case for the principle of positive constitutional and political 
discrimination in favour of an underclass”.55 
 
Further, for Ambedkar, while elections, political parties and parliament were important, 
they were only formal institutions of democracy that could not be effective on their own 
in an undemocratic atmosphere.  Yet, we know that during his lifetime, Ambedkar had 
floated two political parties, the Independent Labour Party and the All India Scheduled 
Castes Federation; the Republican Party of India, which was formally established in 
October 1957, was, in fact, the brainchild of Ambedkar and floated a short while before 
his death in 1956.56 In other words, Ambedkar knew that political parties were perhaps 
only formal requirements in a democracy, yet they were indispensable for the working of 
a democracy. Indeed, they are sine qua non towards realisation of democracy. And 
Ambedkar viewed democracy as a form and method of government whereby 
revolutionary changes in the economic and social life of the people could be brought 
about without bloodshed.57 At the heart of Ambedkar’s approach to the question of 
democracy was the space available to the marginalised sections to bargain for adequate 
protection – in terms of their presence in political parties and in the government, the 
                                                 
54 Vasant Moon, ed., 1976. Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. II. Bombay: Government 
of Maharashtra, p. 559, quoted in Bajpai. 2012. Op. cit., p. 72.  
55 Bayly, C.A. 2012. Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire. 
Cambridge: CUP, p. 297.  
56 Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2000. Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste, London: 
Hurst & Company, p. 86.  
57 Das, Bhagawan. 1963. Thus spoke Ambedkar. Jalandhar: Buddhist Publishing House, p. 61.  
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access to opportunities in education and employment and the opportunities to earn respect 
and live a dignified life. It may be noted here that from the above description it is clear 
that Ambedkar’s ideas and idealism are quite diametrically opposite to Gandhi’s.  In a 
sense, while Gandhi, in the name of dharma, did not allow individuals to have freedom 
and choice; Ambedkar insisted upon the freedom and choice of individuals.  
 
In a way, while there are certain core determinations attached to being Ambedkarite, its 
substantive meanings vary widely. In one sense of the term, an Ambedkarite is one who 
argues that untouchability is a distinct social phenomenon and must be addressed in the 
political domain rather than through social reform as emphasised by Gandhi. It calls for 
political mobilisation of Dalits and other similarly placed groups at all levels which 
among other things would demand preferential consideration and affirmative action for 
them as a way of democratic inclusion. In another sense, an Ambedkarite accuses the rest 
of society, particularly the Brahmins and the upper castes, as being responsible for the 
degradation of the lower castes and for not being predisposed to extending special 
considerations to the latter. Moreover, the upper castes are said to speak the language of 
equal rights or that of class mobilisation to ward off their culpability. In this perspective, 
the Brahmin becomes the Dalits’ Other, and traditional authority, including culture, is 
rendered deeply suspect.  
 
Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh as case studies: As noted above, in order to map 
the contours of Dalit mobilisation for social equality and political power through 
democratic politics in India, I have taken Uttar Pradesh in northern India and Andhra 
Pradesh in South India as case studies, by settingup a contrast between them. Uttar 
Pradesh is often described as the “Hindi–speaking heartland” of India. The State has a 
population of 16.61 crore as per the 2001 Census and a geographical area of 2.41 lakh 
sq.km. Its share in the total area of the country is 7.3 per cent, while its share in the 
country’s total population is 16.2 per cent. Nearly 80 per cent population of U.P. resides 
in rural areas spread over 97,942 inhabited villages. The state is now organised into 71 
districts, 311 tehsils and 820 development blocks. It is divided into four economic 
regions viz. Western region, Central region, Eastern region and Bundelkhand. The first 
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three regions fall in the Gangetic plains, while Bundelkhand forms part of the southern 
plateau. Economically the state is one of most backward states in India, “giving its 
citizens less than some of the worst performing economies in sub-Saharan Africa”.58  
However, it sends eighty-five members to the Lok Sabha, out of 545.  This makes it 
politically the most crucial region in terms of determining the formation of the central 
government in New Delhi.  It is also the chief locale for the transition to a post-Congress 
polity and is the pivotal site of contest among non-Congress groups.  Inter-caste conflict, 
assertive lower castes, and Hindutva politics all manifest themselves in UP. Potentially, 
the most radical challenge to upper caste hegemony, the outcome of which would affect 
the overall structure of social inequality, is taking place in UP today. The BSP, a Dalit 
political party, has been in power for the longest period in the state.  The way in which 
conflicts between castes and communities are played out in UP will influence the course 
of democratic politics and alter the ways of wresting and sustaining political power at the 
national level.  
 
Similarly, Andhra Pradesh is one of the major states in India and ranks fifth in terms of 
population. The population of the state was about 75.7 million in 2001 (Census 2001). Its 
geographical spread of 274.4 lakh hectares accounting for 8.37 per cent of the total area 
of the country makes it the fourth largest state in the country.  There are 23 districts and 
1128 Mandals in the state; and geographically it is divided into three regions which are 
distinct in terms of socio-economic characteristics for historical reasons and the region-
specific resource base. Of the 23 districts, nine are in Coastal Andhra; ten are in 
Telangana and four in Rayalaseema.  
 
The state is still largely agricultural in terms of population and employment. Although the 
share of agriculture in GSDP has declined from above 60 per cent in the 1950’s to around 
22 per cent recently, it continues to be the primary source of livelihood for around 60 per 
cent of the population in the state.  This complex and semi-feudal economic scenario has 
also decisively influenced the power structure in the state.  The agriculture land has been 
                                                 
58 Hasan, Zoya. 2000. Representation and Redistribution: the New Lower Caste Politics of North India. In: 
Frankel R. Francine et al eds., Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. New 
Delhi: OUP, p.148.  
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monopolised by the upper caste landowners, specifically Reddys and Kammas, on whom 
the landless and indigent Dalits are dependent. The Reddys and Kammas, the two main 
upper castes within the non-Brahmin category, are classic examples of those castes M.N. 
Srinivas has called ‘dominant castes’ in Indian society.59 Since the late ’70’s, the state has 
witnessed a massive mobilisation of different sections of society - women, rural poor, and 
Dalits in particular - marking a new phase in grassroots politics in the state.  After the 
Telugu Desam Party’s assumption of power in 1983, tension grew between the upper 
caste peasant communities and the Dalits in the villages.  The two major attacks on Dalits 
in 1985 and 1991 by the Kammas and Reddys, respectively, caused a great upheaval in 
the state; consequently the Dalits were organised by people from within the community 
in a protracted struggle for justice against these atrocities.  
 
Today, however, the political potency of the Dalits is increasing. There is an 
unprecedented politicisation of caste taking place, which has significantly taken the form 
of both segmentation and mobilisation of Dalits. The Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi 
(MRPS), a separate Madiga organisation, demanded the classification or sub-
categorisation of reservations in education, employment, and governmental benefits, in 
tune with the numerical strength of the sixty castes within the Dalit category.  On the 
other hand, the Malas, who have been enjoying a greater presence in education, 
employment, and political spaces that are reserved for the Dalit category as whole, 
objected to this demand and formed the Mala Maha Nadu (MMN) as a counter-
movement.  As such, with the emergence of the MRPS as a major force and MMN in 
opposition, the crisis in the Dalit movement and in politics in the state has reached a 
different level today. Such segmentary and yet comprehensive assertion may have 
significant impact on the course of politics in AP and signal the shape of Dalit 
mobilization in the future.  
 
To sum up, this thesis aims to examine Dalit politics comparatively in Uttar Pradesh in 
northern India and Andhra Pradesh in southern India. It seeks both to challenge the 
                                                 
59  They are ‘numerically the strongest in the village or local area and economically and politically exercise 
a prepondering influence’. See, Srinivas, M.N. 1959. The Dominant Caste in Rampura. American 
Anthropologist, 61 (1), pp: 1-16 
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dominant thinking on politics in northern India and southern India and to fill the gaps in 
our understanding of Dalit mobilisations for political power and social justice in Uttar 
Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. I make four main arguments in this thesis. First, it was not 
just around the axis of the ‘Hindu-Muslim cleavage’, but also around the axis of caste 
that the politics in northern India was organised. Second, Dalit consciousness in the 
northern region was not underdeveloped in comparison with Dalit consciousness in the 
Southern region. Dalit in UP were among the first to make a claim for political power, 
while their counterparts in other regions were seeking social equality. Third, in seeking to 
transform the Brahmanical social order and upper-caste dominated political power, Dalit 
politics is ideologically distinct both from upper castes activism on behalf of 
downtrodden castes, as well as from the politics of other lower castes such as OBCs. 
Finally, Dalits in UP succeeded in gaining political power both due to the foundations 
laid by the Adi-Hindu movement and the Dalit mobilisations for political power through 
the United Provinces Scheduled Castes Federation (UPSCF) in colonial India and 
Republican Party of India (RPI) in post-Independence UP and continuation of that 
tradition of mobilisation for political power in the contemporary period under the 
leadership of Bahujan Samaj Party. The Dalits in Andhra Pradesh, however, could not 
acquire political power due to their over-emphasis on the idea of social equality during 
the colonial as well as the post-Independence periods; and also due to their incarceration 
in caste-based activism on the question of sub-categorisation of the Scheduled Castes 
reservations in the state. 
 
Research Methods: To make a comparative study of Dalit politics in North and South 
India, I carried out intensive research in UP and AP over a twelve-month period 
(November 2003-October 2004). I also add here that I am a Telugu-speaking Dalit from 
AP and so bring to this thesis first-hand experience of the issues examined. A lifetime of 
personal experiences as a Dalit who continues to experience upper caste dominance, has 
produced a lack of objectivity but a wealth of in-depth knowledge that will influence this 
thesis. As an individual who grew up in a Dalit community and experienced 
discrimination, and dominance along caste lines, I have particular biases and views. 
However, I hope to bring some of the richness of personal experiences to the thesis.  
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This project mainly used three methods of research. Firstly, the informal interview 
technique was employed, which was useful in garnering the attitudes, values and 
obtaining a deep and personal understanding of the Dalit critique of caste. Altogether 100 
people were interviewed in both UP and AP. Secondly, I used participant observation 
among political leaders, Dalit leaders, activists, and villagers. Thirdly, I have also 
collected a whole range of documents and primary material, including pamphlets, 
newspaper articles, and other published articles from various Dalit political parties as 
well as social organisations that have been working for the development of Dalit 
communities in UP and AP.  
 
Fieldwork in UP: Before I began my fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh I did not know anyone 
in that state.  I landed in JNU in the first week of October, 2003 and contacted Dr. Vivek 
Kumar, know for his sympathies towards the BSP and its activities. He introduced me to 
Avinash Goutham, one of the M.Phil students in the Centre for Studies of Social Systems 
(CSSS). I spent nearly a week in JNU campus interacting with political sociologists like 
Prof. Valerian Rodrigues, Prof. Gopal Guru, Prof. Surendra Jodhka, Prof. Mary John and 
also with Dalit students from various parts of India. In the second week of October I 
moved to Lucknow and with Avinash’s help, who also hails from Lucknow, I visited the 
offices of all the main political parities, particularly, Bahujana Samaj Party (BSP), 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Communist Party of India (CPI), Congress (I), and 
Samajwadi Party. I spent nearly a week talking to the office-bearers and activists from 
various political parties and another week talking to BSP workers, office- bearers and 
sympathisers. In my interaction I was mainly focusing on the workers’ relationship with 
the BSP, when and why did they join the Party, what have been the Party’s achievements 
while in power and what did the Party do to improve the socio-economic conditions of 
the Dalits and other marginalised communities in the state.   
 
In the last week of October, both Goutham and I left for Banda in Bundelkhand region. 
This region comprises of seven districts: Jhansi, Jalaun, Lalitpur, Hamirpur, Mahoba, 
Banda and Chitrakoot. In Banda we met Mr. Ram Kishore Varma, who was BSP’s 
divisional co-ordinator.  With his help we met BSP MLAs – both from Dalit and non-
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Dalit backgrounds in all the seven districts and took extensive interviews.  We also met 
Bahujan Samaj Party workers and leaders in all the district headquarters in the region. 
The party workers took us to their villages and helped us to interact with the Dalits as 
well as with the non-Dalits.  In Chitrakoot, Hamirpur and Banda districts we visited a few 
Dalit villages, where the Ambedakar Village Scheme (AVS) was implemented.  
 
During my fieldwork in UP, national elections were announced.  Having previously 
visited party offices and made a wide range of contacts among the upper echelons of the 
local political parties, I was invited by BSP, BJP, and SP party leaders to observe their 
campaigns. It was during this time that I managed to obtain the most informative and 
complex data. Information pertaining to voting practices as well as ethnographic material 
relating to the national elections were also collected. By the end of March 2004, through 
intensive interviews and interactions, in-depth information pertaining to Dalit politics in 
UP had been collected and the observations were recorded. 
 
Fieldwork in AP: Andhra Pradesh being my home state, I had an easier time in 
conducting fieldwork in the state. I began the fieldwork in AP in April, 2004. Initially I 
stayed in Guntur district to observe the national as well as state election campaigns. That 
gave me an excellent opportunity to observe and understand not only the machinations of 
Dalit politics, but also the caste-inflected nature of mainstream politics at a crucial time 
in the state and indeed national history. Post-elections, I travelled across the state, 
particularly to the district headquarters, to meet Dalit leaders and activists. I made three 
trips to Karamchedu and Chunduru villages, where violence against Dalits was 
orchestrated by the upper caste Kammas and Reddys.  
 
After spending three months in observing the elections, interacting with district-level 
Dalit activists and leaders and meeting with the victims of violence, I moved to 
Hyderabad, the capital city of AP. I spent three months meeting and gathering 
information from Dalit activists and leaders there belonging to organisations including 
Madiga Dandora, Mala Mahanadu, SC, ST, BC and Minorities Employees’ Welfare 
Associations. Leaders and activists belonging to Dalit political parties like Mahajana 
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Sangarshana Samithi (MSS), Republican Party of India (RPI), and BSP were also 
interviewed.   
 
Structure of Study: My thesis comprises of eight chapters, including the introductory and 
concluding chapters. These chapters are divided into two main sections: while Chapters Two, 
Three and Four are on UP Dalit politics, Chapters Five, Six and Seven are on Dalit politics in 
AP. As seen above, the introductory chapter had discussed the claims made by Ashutosh 
Varshney and Christophe Jaffrelot and limitations of their claims. I also discussed the 
limitations in existing literature on caste politics and democracy, and the objectives of the 
study I have undertaken.  
 
Chapter Two will examine Dalit politics in UP, both during the colonial as well as the 
immediate post-Independence periods. The chapter concentrates on the mobilisation of 
Dalits for their share of political power in the wake of the introduction of the Montague 
and Chelmsford Reforms in 1919. It also focuses on Dalit politics under the banner of the 
Republication Party of India (RPI). The examination will address the following 
questions: Is religion the only axis around which politics in colonial UP was organised or 
did caste also play important role? Was Dalit consciousness in colonial UP delayed due 
to lack of social and political movements? Finally, what were the demands and activities 
of the Dalits under the RPI during immediate post-Independence period in UP? The aim 
of the chapter is to challenge the North-South contrast as observed by Varshney and Pai’s 
arguments of delayed development of Dalit consciousness in UP; I argue that it was not 
just around the Hindu-Muslim divide that the politics in northern India had been 
organised, but also around caste.  I also argue that by demanding their share in the 
emerging political power, the Dalits in UP exhibited a political consciousness in the 
colonial era in constrast to what some scholars have suggested.  
 
Chapter Three examines Dalit politics in post-Independence UP, particularly from the 
early 1970’s to the early 1990’s. The chapter mainly focuses on Dalit relationship with 
the Congress party as well as the context in which the BSP emerged. It will address the 
following questions: What was the so-called special relationship between the Congress 
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and the Dalits?  Did this empower the Dalits? What kind of socio-economic conditions 
provided the context for Dalit mobilisation around BAMCEF and later on, under the 
banner of the BSP? How did the BSP mobilise the Dalits and other lower castes for 
political power? The aim of the chapter is to examine the relationship between the 
Congress and Dalits in the post-Independence era in UP and effects of some of the socio-
economic measures on the Dalits - during Congress regime in the state. The chapter also 
aims to examine the history of the BSP, especially the wider socio-economic context and 
the ideological features of Dalit politics in the state.  
 
Chapter Four examines BSP’s electoral politics for power. It also concentrates on the 
party’s idea of ‘social justice’ and its programme whilst in power. The examination will 
address following questions:  Why was the political alliance between the SP and BSP 
short-lived? Were there major differences between the BSP and SP’s ideological vision? 
What was the BSP’s idea of social justice and how did it try to realise this?  The aim of 
the chapter is to show the contradictions between the politics of the Shudras and Dalits, to 
analyse the BSP’s concept of ‘social justice’, and also to understand the BSP 
government’s programmes.  
 
Chapter Five examines Dalit mobilisations and their politics in the Madras Presidency, 
particularly in the Telugu region during the colonial era. The chapter concentrates mainly 
on the ideologies adopted by the two major Dalit groups in the British-ruled Andhra 
region and Nizam’s Hyderabad state.  The main argument in this chapter is that Dalits in 
the state were organised around the ideology of Adi-Hindu, rather than the ideology of 
Dravida.  I also argue that unlike political agenda in UP, in AP the social agenda 
dominated the Dalit movement, which led to their ‘domestication’ in post-Independent 
AP politics by the Congress and the Communists.   
 
Chapter Six focuses on three aspects of Dalit politic in post-Independence AP: (a) Dalit 
politics under the Congress and Communist parties; (b) Dalits mobilisation under the 
banner of the APDMS; and (c) the rise and fall of the BSP in the state. The examination 
will address the following questions: how did the Congress and Communist parties 
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address the Dalit question? What was the context that led to the formation of the 
APDMS? What was the ideology of the APDMS and what were its programmes and 
activities? What were the reasons for the emergence of Dalit movement under the banner 
of the Andhra Pradesh Dalita Maha Sabha (APDMS)? And, why did the BSP fail at 
electoral politics in AP? The chapter will show how the upper-caste based leadership of 
the Congress and Communist parties used their power to strengthen the domination of the 
upper castes in the political and social domains, and how this, in turn, led to the 
marginalisation of the lower castes, particularly the Dalit constituency in the state. It also 
shows how casteism among the Dalits and other lower castes resulted in the failure of the 
BSP in electoral politics.  
 
Chapter Seven examines the emergence of the Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi 
(MRPS) and Mala Mahanadu (MMN) in AP during the early 1990’s. The chapter’s main 
focus is on the arguments and counter-arguments concerning the classification of SC 
reservations in the debate between the Madigas and Malas in the state. The examination 
will address the following questions: what were the arguments forwarded by the MRPS 
in support of its demand for caste-based classification of the SC reservations? What 
arguments were put forward by the MMN in its opposition to the classification demand of 
the MRPS? And, what were the main challenges thrown up by marginalisation within the 
Dalit castes to the larger Dalit politics?  The chapter shows, contrary to Omvedt, that 
there were differences within the Dalit category. The Dandora movement best captures 
the distinctiveness of an Ambedkarite Dalit ideology with respect to social transformation 
The conclusions of the study are discussed in Chapter Eight.  
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Two.................................................................................................................... 
Making Claims for Power:  
Dalit Politics in Uttar Pradesh, 1919‐67 
 
Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous pages, two influential claims impel the present research on 
UP Dalit politics. While the first claim is about the Hindu-Muslim cleavage as the master 
narrative of politics in North India by Ashutosh Varshney, the second claim was that of 
the delayed Dalit consciousness in Uttar Pradesh by Sudha Pai. I have noted my 
reservations on Varshney’s claim in the introductory chapter. Therefore, let us examine 
Pai’s claim. In her work: Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution: The 
Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh, Pai argues that the Dalit consciousness in the 
state was delayed due to lack of social and political movements comparable to similar  
movements in southern and western India. Is it true that the Dalits in UP did not launch 
any socio-political movements, movements that were comparable to those launched by 
their counterparts in South and West India? For me, the claim made by Pai is a simplified 
one. Two aspects are systematically emphasised by scholars who studied the socio-
religious movements based among the lower castes; the lower castes have never passively 
accepted the social hegemony of the upper castes, social hegemony which has been 
institutionalised in the form of ‘caste’ and legitimated through religion; in fact, there have 
been significant differences in the cultural traditions of lower caste Hindus compared to 
those of the upper caste Hindus, and above all, in the area of socio-religious ideology.60 A 
                                                 
 The title of this chapter is inspired by an article of Rawat, R.S. 2003. Making Claims for Power: A New 
Agenda in Dalit Politics of Uttar Pradesh, 1946-48. Modern Asian Studies, 37 (3), pp: 585 – 612. 
60 Kolenda, Pauline Mahar. 1958. Changing caste ideology in a north Indian village. Journal of Social 
Issues, 14 (4), pp: 51-65; -----, 1960. Changing religious practices of an untouchable caste. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 8(3), pp: 278-87; -------, 1964. Religious anxiety and Hindu fate.  
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 23, pp: 71-81; Lynch, Owen. 1972. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Myth and 
Charisma. In: Mahar, Michael J. ed., The untouchables in contemporary India, Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, pp: 96-112; Zelliot, Eleanor. 1970. Mahar and Non-Brahman Movements in Maharashtra. 
Indian Economic & Social History Review, 7(3), pp: 397-415; -----, 1980. Chokhamela and Eknath: Two 
bhakti modes of legitimacy for modern change. Journal of Asian and African studies, Vol. 15, pp: 136-56; 
David N. Lorenzen. 1987. Traditions of non-caste Hinduism: The Kabir Panth. Contributions to Indian 
Sociology (n.s.), 21(2), pp: 263-284; Schaller, Joseph., 1996[1995]. Sanskritization, Caste Uplift, and 
Social Dissidence in the Sant Ravidas Panth. In: David, N. Lorenzen., ed., Bhakti Religion in North India: 
Community Identity and Political Action. New Delhi: Manohar, pp: 94-119; Robb, Peter., ed., 1993. Dalit 
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few scholars, like Robert  Miller,61 Mark Juergensmeyer62, and Gail Omvedt,63 have 
suggested that there exists a ‘parallel’, ‘alternate’, or ‘counter’ cultural tradition carried 
principally either by the Untouchables or the Adivasis. The Dalits in UP too have 
engaged in a powerful spiritual battle against Brahmanical Hinduism, even before the 
colonial times, and formed their own religious traditions in the form of Bhakti.  The 
social strength gained through these traditions was employed in political activism during 
the latter half in colonial India. Therefore, my main argument in this chapter is that the 
Dalit consciousness in UP was not delayed as claimed by Pai and other scholars, if we 
look at the cultural as well as political sphere. On the eve of Montague and Chelmsford 
reforms in 1919, the Dalits in the state as their counterparts in the other regions of the 
country, especially western and southern India, which we shall see later in Chapter Five, 
have claimed a separate ‘Dalit’ identity for themselves, i.e., the Dalits as a separate 
community, separate from the caste- Hindus. Indeed, this Dalit identity had become the 
foundation for the formation of a new politics, raising a new set of issues and mobilising 
all Dalit castes collectively under a single umbrella. Significantly, this identity did not 
exist earlier, but emerged in the 1920’s and gradually acquired a concrete form between 
the 1940s and 1960s.  
 
My main objectives in this chapter are twofold: (a) to show how caste which had been the 
main axis around lower caste politics had been organized in colonial UP. This I will show 
by an examination of Dalit activities and politics during the colonial era.  Such an 
examination is intended to show the importance of caste, in addition to the Hindu-Muslim 
cleavage, in analysing the politics of UP. It also intended to show that Dalit 
consciousness in UP was not delayed, and therefore, the Dalits were not behind their 
counterparts in southern and western India in raising their voice against Brahmanical 
                                                                                                                                                 
Movements and the Meanings of Labour in India, Delhi: OUP; Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics of the 
Urban Poor in Early Twentieth – Century India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
61Miller, Robert J. 1966. Button, button…great tradition, little tradition, whose tradition? Anthropological 
Quarterly, 39(1), pp: 26-42.  
62 Mark, Juergensmeyer. 1980. What if untouchables don’t believe in Untouchability? Bulletin of concerned 
Asian scholars, 12(1), pp: 23-28; -----, 1982. Religion as social vision: The movement against 
Untouchability in 20th century Punjab. Berkeley: UCP.   
63 Omvedt, Gail. 1980. Adivasis, culture and modes of production in India. Bulletin of concerned Asian 
scholars, 12 (1), pp: 15-22.  
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Hinduism and the domination of the upper castes in social and political spaces. In fact, by 
demanding their share in the emerging political power under the Adi-Hindu ideological 
umbrella, Dalits in the state were far ahead of their counterparts in other parts of India 
during the colonial era; and (b) to explore Dalit politics through the Republican Party of 
India (RPI) in  post-Independent UP.  
 
With these objectives in mind, this chapter has been divided into two main sections. 
While the first section which is divided into two sub-sections examines how the context 
of the national movement for power has set the Dalits’ claim for power in UP during the 
colonial era, the second section concentrates on Dalit politics in post-Independent UP 
through the Republican Party of India (RPI). The first sub-section of the first section 
examines the Dalit relationship with Arya Samaj as well as Dalit activism under the 
banner of Adi-Hinduism. In this section, my main argument is that by rejecting the 
identities that were imposed on them by the caste-Hindus, and by reconstituting 
themselves as a separate community around the achhut identity, Dalits not only 
demanded equality, but importantly also claimed their share in the emerging political 
power. The second sub-section in the same section examines Dalit politics under the 
leadership of B. R. Ambedkar and his United Provinces Scheduled Caste Federation 
(UPSCF).  In the second main section, I examine the Republican Party of India (RPI) 
with specific emphasis on the supposed shift ‘from caste to class’ in Dalit politics. I argue 
that the shift from caste to class is only to explore the possibilities of building political 
alliances without losing focus on a united achhut identity and agenda.  
 
2. I.   National Movement – Context of Dalit Activism in colonial United Provinces  
At the dawn of the 20th century, Dalits in the United Provinces were seen organising 
themselves through the Adi-Hindu movement and Buddhist organisations.  Through these 
organisations, they made two claims: one, they are mula bharatvasi (original inhabitants 
of India),64 and they wanted separate representation for the Dalits on the lines of Muslims 
in political institutions. It is important to note here that for many scholars, for instance 
                                                 
64 I have drawn my information on Adi Hinduism mainly from Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics of the 
Urban…, esp. Chapter 5. ‘Untouchable assertion’, pp: 143 – 184; Khare, R.S., 1984. The Untouchable as 
himself: ideology, identity, and pragmatism among the Lucknow Chamars. Cambridge: CUP.  
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Owen Lynch,65 Ambedkar’s entry into UP politics had been a turning point for Dalits and 
their politics in this region. The real shift, for me, however, came from the Adi-Hindu 
movement. For, prior to this movement, the efforts of Dalits were aimed at gaining social 
respectability and a respectable position within the Brahmanical social order. But, Adi-
Hinduism did not merely divert that focus from the religious sphere to the political, but it 
also sought to disentangle Dalits from the Hinduism preached by Brahmins by 
constructing an independent identity for them. The Dalits, through these claims, sought 
not merely a respectable social identity for themselves and social equality, but also, due 
share in the emerging political power. The context of these claims was of social and 
political developments both at the regional and national levels. The Dalits, especially 
those who were living in the urban centres, were affected by these developments.  
 
The Indian national movement, as forcefully argued by Aloysius, was not only a struggle 
for freedom from colonial rule; also, importantly, it was a struggle for power among the 
divergent castes and communities.66 These divergent communities could broadly be 
categorised into two: the Brahmin communities that include the first three 
castes/communities in the varna order;67 and the subaltern or non-Brahmin communities, 
which include Dalits, Shudras, Adivasis, and Muslim masses.68 As these categories 
represent different layers, i.e., higher and lower, in the hierarchal social order, their social 
discourse was also largely shaped by their social standing. Not surprisingly, the same 
social discourse was reproduced in their political consciousness and agendas.  
 
By the early 20th century, the dichotomies between those two social forces – the Brahmin 
and non-Brahmin communities – were more obvious. While the first group of castes were 
clamouring for reincarnating the Brahmanical social order as nationalist ideology, the 
non-Brahmins were making every effort to demolish the same order. In order to achieve 
those objectives, both the groups required political power and we see both the groups 
                                                 
65 Lynch, Owen. 1969. The Politics of Untouchability: Social Mobility and Social Change in a City of 
India. New York: Columbia University Press.  
66  Aloysius, G. 1997. Nationalism without a Nation in India. Delhi: OUP.   
67 Until and unless specified, I will be using this definition of Brahmin, as including Kshatriya and Vaishya.  
68 Aloysius, G. 1997. Nationalism…, esp. chapter IV: ‘Nationalism: The Movement for Transfer of Power’, 
pp: 93 – 122; also, Ghosh, S. K., 1989. India and the Raj 1919 – 1947, Calcutta: Prachi.  
55 
 
demanding that the British transfer political power to the colonised. Interestingly, from 
the outset it appears that both the groups were placing similar or one demand, i.e., 
transfer of power. Yet, it is important to note here that the intentions behind the same 
demand were quite conflicting, indeed, in direct contradiction to one another. While the 
former was demanding transfer of power to retain its dominance in the social structure, as 
well as to attain a hold in the emerging power structure, the latter, whose position within 
the socio-political structure until recently had appeared to be immutably fixed at the 
bottom rung through the formidable doctrine of karma and dharma, were aspiring for 
homogenisation or equitable distribution of power within society.   
 
While these disparate social forces with divergent political and social agendas have 
engaged simultaneously in collaboration with each other against the coloniser and in 
competition against each other for power, the occurrence of two events in the 1920’s had 
not merely changed the nature and course of the national movement for freedom but also 
changed the discourse of power. The proposal for further devolution of power to Indians 
by the colonial government was one such event; the entry of Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi (hereafter MK Gandhi) 69 into the Indian national movement was the other 
event.70 Dalits in the United Provinces responded to these events; first by establishing 
Adi-Hindu Dharm and later through the United Province Scheduled Caste Federation 
(UPSCF). The greatest significance of these organisations was that, until then, Dalit 
struggles were concentrated on gaining social respectability and acceptability from caste- 
Hindus. Since the 1920’s, however, these organisations have directed the energies of 
Dalits to gain their share in power in the emerging democratic representative institutions.  
Before we examine these aspects, let us briefly look at the Dalit conditions in northern 
India at the turn of the 20th century.  
 
                                                 
69 For instance, see Brown, Judith. 1969. The Mahatma and Modern India. Modern Asian Studies, 3(4), pp: 
321 – 42; Parekh, Bhikhu. 1989. Colonialism, Tradition and Reform. New Delhi: Sage Publications; ----, 
1989a. Gandhi’s Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination. Houndmills: Macmillan Press; Arnold, 
David. 2001. Gandhi. Harlow: Longman; Hardiman, David. 2003. Gandhi in his times and ours: the global 
legacy of his ideas. New York: Columbia University Press.  
70 In treating Gandhi and his activities as an event I follow Aloysius line of thinking. For him understanding 
Gandhi as an Event means ‘the unearthing of Gandhi that had a determining role on the course of the 
nationalist movement’. Aloysius, G. 1997. Nationalism…, pp: 170 – 213. 
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The Dalits in northern India were, as their counterparts in southern India, which we shall 
see in Chapter Four in the AP section, deeply discriminated against and prevented from 
entering into public places by the caste-Hindus. By the 1920’s, caste-based exclusions 
and discrimination against Dalits had become a pervasive problem, and they were 
prevented from engaging in any form of economic or public activities. Such exclusions 
were not just in rural areas, but also in urban spaces. For instance, outside the confines of 
menial jobs, such as sweeping, scavenging, and leather works, there were very few 
economic avenues available for them in urban areas.71 For the upper caste Hindu 
employers preferred Shudras for unskilled manual labour rather than Dalits. The colonial 
government’s urban local policies also added to their difficulties. Nandini Gooptu 
mentions three such areas of difficulties: first, after the First World War, the government 
began to put tremendous restrictions on Dalit occupational activities, particularly on those 
who handled dead animals, hides, and skins or engaged in pig-rearing, through municipal 
sanitary by-laws and licensing regulations; secondly, the colonial government’s new 
schemes of the Improvement Trusts for sanitary improvement; and finally, the 
development of un-reclaimed lands also adversely affected Dalits by displacing and 
dispossessing them from their residential areas.72  
 
In addition to these economic restrictions and regulations, Dalit were also excluded from 
the intellectual spaces available at that time.  For instance, some of the educated Dalits, 
who were small in number and who were to become the most active Adi-Hindu 
ideologues in later years, aspired to participate in the burgeoning Hindi public sphere. 
But they came to experience exclusion from participating in those public debates, not on 
account of lack of intellectual capabilities but simply on account of their low caste status 
as well as social concerns. The views and social concerns of the educated Dalits were, 
understandably, coloured by their experiences as members of the ‘untouchable’ castes, 
and hence, they attempted to raise caste-related issues and concerns through some of the 
                                                 
71 The first generation of Dalits that migrated to the growing urban centres, such as Allahabad, Benaras, 
Kanpur and Lucknow, in the late nineteenth century was absorbed as scavengers, sweepers and 
conversancy workers in the army cantonments, civil stations and municipalities and as leather workers in 
the leather industries.  But at the turn of the century, despite the population growth, the urban expansions 
have slowed down. As a result the second generation Dalits were forced to look for jobs other than menial 
ones and trades. See Gooptu, Nandini.2001. The Politics of the Urban…, pp: 143 – 184. 
72 Ibid., p. 153. 
57 
 
platforms available to them, such as the social uplift programmes of the Arya Samaj and 
Hindu reform literature.73 
  
However, as Francesca Orsini’s study of the developing Hindi sphere in the early decades 
of the 20th century demonstrates, the educated Dalits were almost neglected by the 
participants of the mainstream Hindi literary field. For the mainstream participants, who 
were invariably drawn from the Brahmanical communities, “only matters which appeared 
under the jatiy or ‘national’ guise were fit to be discussed.  Anything which appeared 
particular or heterogeneous was, as a consequence, not part of the ‘public’”74 In a way, 
Dalits were sandwiched between the Brahmanical communities, who in the name of caste 
and religious sanctions practised untouchability, and the colonial government which in 
the name of developmental activities dispossessed the Dalits by placing restrictions on 
their only economic activities.  Against these sanctions and restrictions, Dalits began to 
actively seek ways and means for educational and employment opportunities.  
 
This was also a period in which Dalits were compelled to realise the importance of 
having representation in local political bodies. For, apart from the colonial government’s 
local policies, it was the Indian local authorities – read upper caste individuals - who 
entered the colonial bureaucracy and restricted Dalits’ access to municipal schools.  Had 
Dalits accessed these political institutions they would have argued against such policies 
and prevented those catastrophes. It was on account of such blatant restrictions that they 
felt a strong need to “find avenues for engagement with institutional politics and to 
organise themselves to contend with local policies.”75 The opportunity to realise that need 
came in the form of Montague and Chelmsford reforms or ‘Mont-ford reforms’ in 191976. 
That introduced the concept of communal representation for the Muslims.  
 
                                                 
73 Wilkerson, B. Sarah. 2006. Hindi Dalit Literature and the Politics of Representation. Ph.D. University of 
Cambridge, p. 31 
74 Orsini, Francesca. 2002 . The Hindi Public Sphere, 1920 – 1940: language and the literature in the age 
of nationalism. New Delhi: OUP, p. 12. 
75 Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics…, p. 153. 
76 Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2005. Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Fighting the Indian Caste System. New 
York: Columbia University Press, pp: 53. 
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The Montford reforms, as noted by Mendelsohn and Vicziany, had dual relevance for 
Dalits: first, the Dalit demand for communal representation along the lines of 
representation given to the Muslims was actively supported by the Muslim League. Such 
support, of course, was born out of the self-interest of the League. For the Hindu numbers 
were exaggerated because of the latter’s “false identification of the ‘degraded castes’ as 
Hindus”, an identification that would fetch more representative positions for the Hindus. 
This, in turn, means undue advantage for the Hindus against the Muslims in 
representative bodies. Secondly, the concept of representation for Muslims successfully 
established a precedent for political representation for other communities.77 While these 
political developments had a bearing in the concerns and activities of the Hindu 
nationalists of various ideological stances, the instance of the reforms provided an 
occasion for Dalits to introspect their relationship with the upper castes and the latter’s 
efforts at religious reform through the Arya Samaj.78 A brief examination of the Dalit 
relationship with the Arya Samaj is in order. For “the immediate impetus,” for the 
emergence of Adi Hinduism, as observed by Gooptu, 79 came from the shifts in the 
activities of the Arya Samaj.  
 
2. I.1A. Dalits and Arya Samaj: As caste discrimination against the urban Dalits in the 
social and economic activities increased, they began to look for effective ways to contain 
it. While some of them converted to Christianity, as it could offer education as well as 
material benefits, others, especially the educated young Dalits, began to take active 
interest in the activities of the Arya Samaj. The Samaj through its doctrinal position of 
“Brahmin by merit, not birth”, or “varna on the basis of individuals’ merits, actions, and 
                                                 
77 Mendelsohn, Oliver and Marika Vicziany. 2000. The Untouchables: Subordination, poverty and the state 
in Modern India. Cambridge: CUP, p. 99. 
78 The Arya Samaj was established as a socio-religious reform movement in Bombay in 1875 by Swami 
Dayananda Saraswati. The Samaj sought to revise Hinduism that was based on the Vedas and revitalisation 
of Hindu society based on the golden age of the Vedic Aryans. In order to strengthen the Hindu society it 
urged the lower castes, who had converted to Christianity and Islam to return to the Hindu-fold through the 
process of ‘purification’ or shuddhi. See Jones, Kenneth. 1976. Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th 
century Punjab. Berkeley: UCP; Jordens, J.T.F. 1978. Dayananda Saraswati: his life and ideas. Oxford: 
OUP; Van der Veer, Peter. 1994. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley: UCP.  
79 Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics of…, p. 155. 
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temperaments”, 80  and its social activities, such as setting up of schools, hostels, and 
scholarships for the children of the lower castes, attracted many young Dalits. 
 
The Samaj, although instituted to serve the interests of the caste-Hindus, initially 
appeared to be serving the interests of Dalits (and for that matter other lower castes as 
well). First, illiteracy among Dalits was falsely considered to be the cause for their social 
domination by the educated upper castes and of their exclusion from better jobs and 
opportunities.81 Education had become a highly valued qualification, and quite naturally 
the Dalits began to appreciate the efforts of the Arya Samaj. They enrolled their sons in 
schools run by the Samaj, indeed, they themselves joined these schools. For instance, 
Manikchand Jatavaveer (1897-1956), one of the founders of the Jatav Mahasabha in 
1917, was a teacher in a school run by the Samaj in Agra. Sunderlal Sagar (1886-1952), 
another co-founder of the Mahasabha was even versed in Sanskrit so much so that he was 
called Pandit.82  Some Dalit members of the Samaj even became its preachers. For 
instance, Swami Acchutanand (1879-1933), whose given name was Harihar, became the 
Samaj’s upadeshik (itinerary preacher) under the name of Hariharananda, and preached 
moral reform, vegetarianism, teetotalism, and temperance as means of achieving a purer 
status.83  
 
Secondly, the Samaj’s advocacy of non-hereditary nature of varna is an important 
departure from the hereditary and sacrosanct nature of varna of Brahmanical Hinduism. 
Such advocacy led the Dalits to believe that the Hindu religion is capable of change and 
through such change it is capable of accepting individuals as equal human agents. 
Thirdly, until the establishment of the Samaj, no upper caste Hindu organisation had ever 
argued that an individual’s varna could be improved. In the sense, all the arguments 
against the sacrosanct nature of varna had come from the lower castes, the victims of the 
system, but not from the upper castes, the beneficiaries of the system. Quite naturally, the 
                                                 
80 Dayananda, Swami. 1981. The Light of Truth. cited in Jaffrelot, C. 2003. India’s…,  p. 191.  
81 D.C. Dinakar. 1986. Swatantra Sangram mein Acchuton ka Yogdan. Lucknow, p. 89, cited in Gooptu. 
Nandini. 2001. The Politics of …p. 154. 
82 Kshirsagar, R.K. 1994. Dalit Movement and Its Leaders. New Delhi: MD Publications, p. 230-231. 
83 Ibid., p. 321. Also see, Jigyansu, Chandrika Prasad. 1968. Adi Hindu Andolan ka Prabartak Sri Swami 
Acchutanand Harihar. Lucknow: Bahujan Kalyan Prakashak.  
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Samaj’s advocacy of non-hereditary nature of varna made the Dalits and other lower 
castes believe that by acquiring merit they can surmount caste divisions as well as enter 
the Hindu caste hierarchy.84 Perhaps one should also mention Dayananda Saraswati’s 
position against Brahmins that gave a fillip to the hopes of the lower castes.  In his 
Sathyartha Prakash (The Light of Truth), Saraswati uses very strong words against “the 
sectarian and selfish Brahmins…these ignorant, sensual, hypocritical, irresponsible, and 
vicious people…(who) often dissuade persons from learning and ensnare them (the lower 
castes) into their evil ways with the result that they lose health, peace of mind, and 
wealth.”85 Following the Samaj’s position on varna, many Dalits began to claim 
Kshatriya status. For instance, the Chamars claimed descent from the Yadu race, which 
entitled them to Kshatriya status.86  
 
It may be mentioned here that if one were to compare the doctrinal position of the Samaj 
with that of the Brahmanical stance, the stance of the former is a liberal one.  Unlike the 
varna of Brahmanical Hinduism, the varna in the Hinduism professed by the Arya Samaj 
is not based on inheritance of an individual, but upon an individual’s good conduct and 
actions of merit not in the previous but the present birth. Yet, the said doctrinal stance of 
the Samaj is a twist in language rather than a major substantive change of position on the 
varna.  It not only condemns the inherited nature of the varna, but upholds caste, which 
produces divisions (varnas) among the people. This means the Samaj does not intend to 
bring about equality either of varnas or of individuals. It still upholds the classification of 
people in the name of varna.   
 
Moreover, the proposed up-gradation of the lower-varnas to the upper-varnas is dubious 
for two reasons:  first, Arya Samajis were ready to give Kshatriya status to both the 
Shudras and Dalits, but not Brahmin status, the highest varna in the hierarchy. This 
means that the prescribed good conduct and actions of merit take the lower-varnas up to 
a certain level in the hierarchy but not to the highest layer in the hierarchy, in effect 
creating a glass ceiling for the Dalits and the Shudras. Secondly, endogamy has been the 
                                                 
84 Gooptu. Nandini. 2001. The Politics…, p. 155. 
85 Jaffrelot, C. 2003. India’s silent…, p. 90.  
86 Lynch, Owen. 1969. The Poltiics of Untouchability…, pp: 68-69. 
61 
 
central pillar of the varna/caste system. By insisting on the strict enforcement of 
endogamy, the Arya Samajis are simply upholding the caste system, an extension of the 
varna vyavastha. An upgradation to the Kshatriya varna but strict adherence to the 
practice of endogamy means that a Dalit, who acquires merit by swimming against 
currents, would be promoted to the Kshatriya status. Yet, he is not worthy of marrying a 
woman from upper-varnas and so he will still have to marry a woman from his own caste. 
Thus, had the ideas of the Arya Samaj been put into practice or followed by people, the 
social structure of the Hindus would have ended up with three layers, where the top and 
bottom of the hierarchy would be represented by Brahmins and Vaisyas, respectively; 
and rest of the castes and varnas would be accommodated in the middle layer. This 
means that in the middle layer there would be Kshatriyas, Shudra Kshatriyas, and Dalit 
Kshatriyas. These larger categories would be further sub-classified in the name of castes. 
For instance, there would be Thakur Kshatriyas, Yadav Kshatriyas, Chamar Kshatriyas, 
and so on.    
 
Perhaps, it may not be out of context to add a few lines on the idea of ‘classification’.  In 
Chapter Seven in the section on AP, we see that the Madigas launched a social movement 
for the ‘classification’ of the Dalits into four groups and for the re-distribution of the 
opportunities of reservation provided for them on the basis of each group’s 
proportionality in the total Dalit population in the state. The idea of proportionality was 
put forward by the Madigas because the Malas and the Adi-Andhras are the two castes 
that are relatively forward castes within the Dalit group in the state. Despite their 
relatively small population (especially) in comparison with the Madigas, they have been 
enjoying a major share in the quota of the reservation for the Dalits.  As one would have 
gathered, I do not subscribe to the Arya Samaj’s variety of classification; such 
classification is simply to divide the people on the basis of their imposed social 
situations.  Such an act of classification ultimately results in preventing one group or the 
other from accessing opportunities, which in turn, leads to the preservation of those 
opportunities as exclusive to these groups.  This, in essence, produces and re-produces 
individuals around imposed social identities with little hope of ever overcoming those 
identities and situations in social, economic, and political spaces.  On the contrary, one 
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will see in Chapter Seven that I support the Madigas’ proposal for classification.  For 
such classification does not thwart any group from accessing opportunities. In fact, such 
classification only leads to equitable distribution of the opportunities of reservation 
among all the Dalit castes. Such distribution ultimately leads to eradication of socio-
economic and political differences among the Dalit castes, which, in turn, facilitates the 
Dalits becoming one group – true to the word and spirit.   
 
To get back to our discussion on Dalits and Arya Samaj, in addition to the above 
discussed theoretical positions of the Samaj, some of its political activities, particularly 
after the introduction of communal representation, made the Dalits disenchanted with its 
activities for social uplift and eventually led to their alienation from the Samaj. In 1919, 
the British colonial government introduced communal representation on the principle of 
relative numerical strength of various religious groups.  The Arya Samajists and other 
Hindu nationalists were increasingly troubled by this introduction not only because of its 
basis or principle, but more importantly, also for the accentuated religious activism 
among the Muslims in response to the Khilafat movement. To contain the religious 
‘ferment’ among the Muslims and to expand and strengthen the Hindu community, the 
Samaj intensified its shuddhi activities for the inclusion of the lower castes and Hindu 
converts to Islam and Christianity, especially the former.87 A large number of Shudras, 
who were aspiring to acquire Kshatriya status within the caste structure, were drawn into 
the Samaj only to become its ‘foot soldiers.’88 
                                                 
87 Many Arya Samajists in the early twentieth century were concerned about the growing ‘census 
mentality’ which suggested a declining strength of the Hindu community based on population statistics.  
Shuddhi campaigns were originally used as a defensive tool by the Arya Samaj against the conversion of 
Indians to other ‘foreign’ religions, namely Christianity and Islam and were performed on upper caste 
religious converts. After 1900, Shuddhi ceremonies were done to ‘purify’ members of the lower castes in 
order to bring them back into the Hindu fold. According to Jones, the Shuddhi campaign drastically altered 
the internal social composition of the Arya Samaj by increasing the numbers of untouchable Samajists.  
These campaigns also instigated increasing tensions within both the Arya Samaj and within the larger 
Hindu community since none could agree on how to position ‘purified’ untouchables within a casteist 
society, particularly since Arya Samaj’s untouchables and uplift activities directly threatened upper caste 
domination at the local level. See, Jones, K.W., 1976. Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth-
century Punjab. Berkeley: UCP.   
88 See Das, Veena. ed., 1992. Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia. Delhi: 
OUP; Gupta, Charu. 2001. Sexuality, Obscenity, Community: Women Muslims and the Hindu Public in 
Colonial India. Delhi: Permanent Black; Menon, M. Dilip., 2006. The Blindness of Insight...  
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Of course, the shuddhi activities were not entirely confined to converted Muslims or 
Christians alone. At times, the shuddhi programme was extended to Dalits as well. For 
instance, in 1923, a shuddhi society exclusively for the Dalits was inaugurated by the 
Arya Samaj in Benaras and Allahabad.89 The shuddhi ceremony evolved from the ritual 
of prayaschit. Such conversion programmes among the Dalits, as Jordens observes, 
implicitly suggest that the condition of the Dalits prior to being purified was sinful.90  
Moreover, as we have seen in the above, Dalits who had joined the Samaj were not 
accorded equality of status. They were continually distinguished from the other Samajists 
in the name of their ‘untouchable’ status.   
 
Not surprisingly, the Dalits in the Arya Samaj became disillusioned with the lack of 
social equality observed between ‘purified’ members of the lower castes and upper 
castes, even among members of the Arya Samaj. Achutaanand’s biographer notes 
feelings of ‘disillusionment’ as he questioned the ulterior motives of the Hindu reformers, 
who, he now believed had no intention of instituting true social equality among the 
castes, but simply desired to strengthen the Hindu community whose numbers had 
dropped in successive colonial Censuses.91 Thus, the Dalits were convinced that “the 
Samaj acted as the ‘army of high caste Hindus’, whose only intention was to rally the 
Hindu community against the Muslims, and that the Samaj’s attempt to uplift the lower 
castes was merely a part of this strategy…the Samaj did not aim to eradicate 
untouchability and that shuddhi was a cunning ploy to perpetuate the hold of the higher 
castes over the untouchables.”92 In fact, the intention behind the Samaj’s intensification 
of shuddhi after 1919 political reforms was also very sharply criticised by the Dalits. 
Ram Charan, for instance, argued that “in 1919 reforms came…and representation was 
given according to population; those religious groups who were more populous would get 
more places; and what else but acchutodhar [uplift of untouchables] conferences 
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91 Jigyasu, Chandrika Prasad., 1968. Adi Hindu Andolan ka Prabartak Sri Swami Achutaanand Harihar.  
Lucknow, cited in Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics of the Urban Poor… p. 157. 
92 Ibid., pp: 156 -57. 
64 
 
everywhere.”93 It was at this crucial juncture that Dalits, in order to repudiate Vedic 
Hinduism and the caste system and, more importantly, to construct a new and positive 
Dalit identity, evolved the new ideology of Adi-Hinduism.  
 
2. I.1B. Adi-Hindusim and Dalits claims for Power: Swami Achutaanand,94 in association 
with some other ex-Arya Samaj Dalits, particularly Ram Charan,95 evolved the ideology 
of Adi Hinduism. Two central claims made through this ideology were: (a) the present 
lower castes (Dalits, Shudras, and Adivasis) are the descendants of the Adi Hindus, the 
original inhabitants of India; and (b) bhakti is the original religion of the Adi Hindus.96 
As Adi Hinduism developed in the social context of exclusion encountered by the Dalits 
in urban centres, especially in the sphere of work and labour, and in the political context 
of communal representation, the aims of these two claims are obvious. First, it was an 
attempt to challenge the ritually imposed low social status and menial occupations as a 
                                                 
93 Chaudhury, A.P. 1973. Picchre tatha Dalit Brag ke Mahan Neta Rai Ram Charan ka Jivan Charit tatha 
Unke Sanshipta Karya (Ram Charan Biography), quoted in Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. op. cit.,  p. 47.  
94 Swami Achutaanand was born to a Chamar family in Umari village in Mainpuri district, UP.  As his 
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Dayal, Ravidas and Namdev.  Achutaanand also read R C Dutt’s Bengali translation of the Rig Vedas, and 
engaged in lengthy discussions with the missionaries of the Theosophical Society and with the Jain and 
Buddhist sadhus. After his disassociation with the Arya Samaj, Achutaanand launched the All India Achhut 
Caste Reform Sabha in 1919. See, Kshirsagar, R.K. 1994. Dalit Movements in India and its Leaders (1857 
– 1956). Delhi: M.D. Publishers.  
95 Ram Charan, unlike Swami Achutaanand, was born in a slum in Gwaltoli in Kanpur. Despite eking out 
their livelihood as casual labourers, Ram Charan’s parents sent him to a local municipal school.  As an 
adult he moved to Lucknow, where he worked in the Railway Audit Office to earn a living and continued 
his studies in a night school.  After earning a degree in law, Ram Charan became widely known for using 
his legal knowledge to defend Dalits in their court cases and organising local Adi Hindu organisations 
across the state of U.P. See, Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics…p.160. 
96 In making these claims the Adi Hindu ideologues relied upon two sources, other than the existing bhakti 
traditions among the Shudras and Dalits. First, one of the Arya Samaj’s arguments in favour of the shuddhi 
was that Hindus had been forcibly converted to Islam by the Muslim conquerors and rulers in medieval 
India. And these converts were to be reconverted to the Hindu-fold through the shuddhi. (See Jones, K.W. 
1976. Arya Dharm…,pp: 150-1). Achutaanand, observes Gooptu, adopted this explanatory concept of 
‘forcible imposition of religion’ and ‘projected it backwards to the Vedic age to argue that the Aryan 
invaders had subjugated and imposed Vedic Hinduism on the original Indians, the Adi Hindus, and 
deprived them of their bhakti (religion).’ Secondly, the colonial government in its ethnographical 
classifications propagated the notion that the caste system originated through the encounters between the 
Dravidian and Aryan races. While these ideas gained publicity through Census records, the Dalits in UP 
became acquainted with them through the Christian missionaries. See, Ibid., p. 158. 
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consequence that were crosses to bear for the Dalits; and secondly, it was also an attempt 
to demand social equality on the basis of their pre-Aryan ancestry as the original rulers of 
India, as well as the followers of egalitarian religious systems.  
 
Swami Achutaanand, in his Adi Hindu theory, argued that the so-called ‘untouchables’ 
were once the rulers of a thriving civilization. Their ‘golden age’, however, came to an 
end when the invading Aryans with their brute force and treachery, overpowered the 
peace-loving Adi Hindus. Once conquered, the Adi Hindus were turned into slaves and 
forced to perform ‘low’ jobs; furthermore, the Brahmanical Hinduism, with its 
hierarchical caste system, was imposed upon them by the Aryans.  It may be mentioned 
here that although Swami Achutaanand was the first to propagate this theory in the North 
Indian context, nevertheless, he was not the first to articulate this particular re-
interpretation of ancient history. In fact, he seems to have been influenced by Jyotiba 
Phule, a radical social reformer of Maharashtra during the mid-nineteenth-century. Phule 
presented an early critique of the caste system as a Brahmanical imposition. He was also 
one of the first to popularise the alternative interpretation of the Aryan race theory by 
positioning the lower castes as the original inhabitants of India. 97   
 
The Adi Hindus’ radical re-interpretation of the theory of the Aryan invasion is 
significant for three reasons. First, it offers a historical explanation for the origin of 
untouchability and forced imposition of menial occupations. “They [Dalits] were made to 
do the most insulting and demeaning jobs, such as cleaning excreta and dirty clothes. 
They were repeatedly told that you are shudras and your only work is to serve [gulami].  
Those who were thus made to serve [gulam or dasa] were then called untouchables.”98  
Secondly, it explains how the upper castes, in the name of religion, came to occupy 
higher positions in society. The Aryans, it was argued by the leaders of Adi Hinduism, in 
order to make education, political power, and wealth their exclusive preserve assumed the 
higher status of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vyshyas.  “The rule of making shudras was 
                                                 
97 O’Hanlon, R. 1985. Caste, Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low-Caste Protest in 
Nineteenth Century Western India. Cambridge: CUP, pp: 131 – 141.   
98Extract from a speech by Ram Charan in 1927, cited in Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics..,p.162. 
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not a religious one. It was political to the core”, 99and  thirdly, the Adi Hindu ideology, 
by stretching the ‘beginning’ of ancient Indian history farther back in time, prepares the 
ground for Dalits to stake a claim for the powerful category of ‘indigenes’, i.e., the 
original inhabitants of India. It is interesting to note here that this claim of being the 
‘rulers of India’ by the Adi Hindus has striking similarity to that of the claims made by 
Dalits under the Arya Samaj for Kshatriya status.  
 
Commenting on the Adi Hindus’ claim of being the original inhabitants of India, Jaffrelot 
observes: “Far from establishing a separate identity that would pull the Dalits out of the 
caste system, the Adi Hindu movement used their so-called original identity as a means 
of promoting their status within the system. Thus, the bhakti resurgence did not imply a 
radical questioning of their belonging to Hinduism.”100 Jaffrelot seems to have misjudged 
the importance of the Adi Movement and its shifts. The Dalit question is invariably 
entangled in the problem of caste, which, in turn, is linked with the ideology of 
Brahmanical Hinduism. In their assertion of pre-Aryan origin of Dalits, Shudras, and 
Adivasis – the ideologues of Adi Hinduism – found an effective means to disentangle 
themselves from the Brahmins and other upper castes that began to claim the Aryan 
origin. Interestingly, this self projection of the upper castes is powerfully employed by 
the Adi Hindus to buttress their own claim. In a sense, they could not only project the 
Brahmins and other upper castes as outsiders, but also effectively unite all the other 
marginalised communities as the descendants of the original inhabitants and rulers of 
India. In other words, rather than working within the upper-caste paradigm where to be 
an ancient ruler necessitated Khatriya lineage, the Adi Hindu ideologues put forward a 
powerful historical narrative, which enabled them to claim that the upper-castes were 
actually foreigners to the sub-continent and that Adi Hindus had ruled India until their 
invasion.  It is, indeed, a strong moral claim to autochthonous being over kshatriyahood 
as the new authority to govern, an idiom increasingly valued during a time of growing 
upper caste Hindu (Indian) nationalism. 
 
                                                 
99 Ibid., p. 164. 
100 Jaffrelot, C. 2003. India’s silent…, p. 204.  
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Apart from claiming the status of original inhabitants of India, the Adi Hindu ideologues 
also claimed bhakti as their original religion, and urged the Dalits to adopt the 
introspective dimension of bhakti (atmavad). Bhakti is a form of worship of God through 
devotion, meditation, self-introspection, and direct communion. Spiritual knowledge, 
they argued, is the only way to arrive at true knowledge or satyagyan and evolve one’s 
world-view. Introspection would lead to self-realisation or self-knowledge (atmagyan), 
which, in turn, would facilitate the follower to articulate an autonomous value system that 
was not derived from or imposed by the upper castes.  The Adi Hindus emphasised on 
spiritual introspection primarily for two reasons: first, to stimulate ‘thinking-for-oneself’ 
without reference to received notions and religious prescription of the upper castes; and 
secondly, to bypass the Brahmin as the middle man (pujari) between God and 
worshipper: 
Do not follow any ideology [mat] because you have been hearing it for a long time, or 
because it is held by some great [bade, literally big, implies a socially superior person of 
upper class or caste] person or because it is the view held by any cult or sect. Accept only 
an ideology that you have arrived at yourself.101 
 
In order to propagate their ideology – that the Adi Hindus are the mula Bharatvasis – the 
original inhabitants of India, and bhakti is their separate, pre-Aryan religion – the Adi 
Hindu leaders initiated a number of activities. To begin with, a number of Adi Hindu 
sabhas (associations) were opened in main cities, particularly in Kanpur, Lucknow, 
Benaras, and Allahabad. Each sabha had its pracharaks (advocates) and upadeshiks 
(preachers), who regularly visited Dalit neighbourhoods to preach Adi Hindu ideology.102 
Apart from elaborating the ideas of Adi Hinduism, one of the central focuses of the Adi 
Hindu leaders during these meetings was to denounce Hindu religious rituals and 
ceremonies and ask their audience to restrain from observing those ceremonies. They 
argued that the elaborate and expensive modes of observance of religious rituals and 
festivals were prescribed by the Brahmanical communities not only to impose the 
Brahmins’ superiority over them (since Brahmins are needed to conduct religious rituals), 
but also to impoverish them, which, in turn, would ensure that the lower castes remained 
in a constant state of economic dependence upon the upper castes. Dalits were asked to 
                                                 
101 Jigyasu, Chandrika Prasad. 1968. Adi Hindu Andolan…,cited in Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. op. cit., p. 162.  
102 The idea of preaching a religion through pracharaks and upadeshiks, was undoubtedly, borrowed from 
Christian missionaries and Arya Samajis.  
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achieve economic self-sufficiency, occupational diversification, and to gain education.  
The meetings addressed by the Adi Hindu leaders were occasions for Dalits of different 
caste groups and bhakti sects to come together and exchange their views.103  
 
Throughout the 1920’s, UP had witnessed an unprecedented rise in the socio-religious 
activities of the Dalits. For instance, the Ravidas Chamars of Kanpur and Allahabad 
attended a number of meetings organized by the Adi-Hindu sabhas. Almost all those 
meetings were chiefly addressed by Swami Achutaanand. In 1925, the Mehtars 
(sweepers) in Kanpur organised several meetings for the social uplift of their caste group; 
and Swami Achutaanand, in his capacity as the leader of the Adi-Hindu movement, was 
invited to preside over some of these meetings.104 In Lucknow, in April 1927, a number 
of Chamar caste groups convened a joint meeting to pledge their support to the Adi-
Hindu movement and resolved to form a volunteer corps. Achutaanand’s constant appeals 
to all the lower castes roped in a number of individuals from disparate caste groups into 
the Adi-Hindu movement. As a result of all those activities and appeals, the participants 
in the Adi-Hindu conferences in the 1930’s included individuals from the Chamar, 
Dhobi, Paasee, Bhangi/Valmiki, Kureel, Dhusia, and Kori castes.  A ‘spirit of revolt’, as 
reported in the police reports, sowed its seeds among the Dalits.105 In other words,  by the 
early 1930’s the Adi-Hindu movement, which was initiated by a few ex-Arya Samajis in 
the early 1920’s, succeeded in bringing divergent Dalit castes under its umbrella. The 
Adi-Hindu identity became the Dalit identity and the ideology of the Adi-Hindu 
movement became the ideology of the Dalits in the state.  
 
Two other initiatives undertaken by the Adi-Hindu leaders to propagate their ideas were 
literary works and street theatre. Achutaanand first expressed his Adi Hindu philosophy 
in poetry in 1917.106 His poems, including Ghazal Chetavani (Warning in the form of a 
Ghazal), Itihas Gyan (Knowledge of History) and Adi Vams Astak (The Original Lineage 
in Eight Stanzas), outlined a basic history of the original inhabitants of India and their 
                                                 
103 Gooptu, Nadini. 2001. The Poltiics…, p. 159. 
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid, p. 160. 
106 This was five years before the Adi Hindu movement formally began its agitations in 1922. See Jaffrelot, 
C. 2003. India’s silent…,p. 201-05. 
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oppression by the invading Aryans. Through these poems, he consciously called upon 
members of all the lower castes to ‘remember’ their past as ‘Adi-Hindus’ (original 
inhabitants) and rise to re-claim their true heritage as the descendents of the ancient 
rulers. Achutaanand’s poems provided a graphic description through which his audience 
was able to visualise the greatness of their lineage and their subsequent ‘fall’ due to an 
Aryan conspiracy.  
 
In addition to these literary works, Achutaanand established a press which initiated a new 
field of radical literature on Adi Hindu philosophy in pamphlets written by Dalits for the 
consumption of Dalits.107 Further, he published a monthly newspaper Achut from the 
early 1920’s (which later became a daily and changed its name to Adi Hindu, and was in 
print until 1932) and monthly journal called Usha (Dawn) published from 1928.108  
Achutaanand’s literary production through his press, as observed by Sarah Beth 
Wilkerson, inspired many Dalit literatti to set up publication houses; one of these was 
Chandrika Prasad Jigyasu’s ‘Bahujan Kalyan Prakashan’ (Bahujan Welfare Press) in 
Lucknow. The growth of several independently-owned Dalit presses, as Wilkerson notes, 
“brought about a proliferation of small, inexpensive Dalit literary pamphlets in Hindi 
which began to circulate at untouchables’ meetings, community gatherings, and local 
melas (festivals) and spread a new political consciousness among various ‘untouchable’ 
communities.”109 
 
Drawing from Phule, Achutaanand also adopted street theatre as a form of transmitting 
his Adi Hindu ideology to an audience who were largely illiterates. One of the plays of 
Achutaanand that gained tremendous popularity among Dalits was Ram-rajya nyaya (The 
Justice of Ram’s Rule). The death of Shambuk, a member of the lower castes at the hands 
of the Hindu ruler Ram, who kills the former on the advice of a Brahmin, and the slavery 
of the original inhabitants of India, i.e., the Adi-Hindus under the Brahmins’s ideology, 
were the two main themes of the play. Ramrajya (the kingdom of Ram) has been 
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108 Badri Narayan. 2004. Introduction. In: Narayan, Badri and A. R. Misra. Multiple Marginalities: an 
anthology of identified Dalit writings. New Delhi: Manohar, p.19.  
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portrayed by the caste Hindus as an age of highest point of Hindu rule under the ideal 
King Ram.110 Dalits, in opposition to the dominant Hindu narrative, characterise 
Ramrajya as the time of injustice, misrule, and an age of severe oppression of Dalits. 
They epitomise the injustice of Ramrajya against them in the story of Shambuk, who was 
wrongly condemned to death for practising asceticism against the dictates of the Vedas 
on account of his lower caste origins. Drawing from the Dalit narratives of Ram katha 
(Ram’s story) Achutaanand in his play highlights the true meaning of slavery and 
freedom. When a charge was levelled against one of his subjects, Ram, in his position as 
the king of the state, should have enquired into the charge; instead, he simply followed 
the ill advice of a Brahmin and killed an innocent but intelligent citizen. 
 
In a way, Achutaanand was showing how an issue was manipulated by Brahmins to 
monopolise knowledge; and how the King, who lacks thinking prowess, is enslaved by 
the former. In contrast to Ram, the slave of the Brahmins, Shambuk, was depicted as an 
embodiment of true freedom. For, by refusing to obey the dictates of the Brahmins and 
their ideology, he stood for his freedom. In fact, he chooses death to protect his freedom. 
Thus Achutaanad, in his play, shifts the basic meaning of slavery and freedom to 
emphasise the core of his ideology – “that freedom for Dalits lies in the ideological 
rejection of Hindu philosophy and the ‘remembering’ of one’s glorious past as the 
indigenous inhabitants of India.”111  In the next chapter, we will see how the BSP has 
employed many of the propagating strategies employed by Achutaanand and the other 
Adi-Hindu leaders in its political mobilisations.  
 
Having established a base of support for the Adi-Hindu movement and having 
demonstrated the strength of the Dalit constituency, the Adi Hindu leaders began to 
channel their mobilised energies onto the political realm of representative institutions, to 
secure representation for themselves in the legislative bodies as well as to gain economic 
                                                 
110 Romila Thapar, in one of her excellent essays, asserts that the narrative of Ramrajya, known as Rama 
katha, (Ram’s story) was neither a sacred text nor history (itihasa) but kavya, a poetic composition.  It was 
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myth.  See Thapar, Romila. 2000. A historical perspective on the story of Rama. In: Thapar, Romila., ed., 
Cultural pasts: essays in early Indian history. New Delhi: OUP.  
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facilities. In 1925, they formed the Adi-Hindu Depressed Classes Association (also called 
the All-India Adi-Hindu Mahasabha) as a mouthpiece for their political campaigns. 
Through this association they effectively consolidated and united the disparate Dalit 
castes for political action.  
 
In a conference held on December 27 and 28, 1927 in Allahabad, the Mahasabha, while 
laying out its agenda, made a claim for an inclusive achut or ‘untouchable’ identity. This 
was an all India conference, which was attended by 25,000 Dalits from UP and another 
350 delegates from other parts of the country, such as Punjab, Bihar, Delhi, the Central 
Provinces, Poona, Bengal, Madras, and Hyderabad. The deliberations of the conference 
were widely reported and discussed in contemporary newspapers in UP.112 It was 
declared in the conference that the Adi-Hindu Mahasabha was a movement of all Dalits 
and Swami Achutaanand was its leader. Some of the issues that were discussed in the 
conference were in direct confrontation with the Hindu nationalists and Congress. For 
instance, the movement’s struggle against social injustice, as noted by Ramnarayan 
Rawat, was described as “achut nationalism -- social uplift as their religion and self-
respect as their Home rule and the audience was advised to ignore Hindus who called 
them ‘traitors’”.113 It should be mentioned here that through this specific event one can 
confidently conclude that the Dalit consciousness in UP, as argued by Pai, was not 
delayed.  In fact, by organizsng an all-India Dalit conference – for the first time in the 
entire country – and bringing all the regional Dalit leaders under one umbrella for the 
purpose of uniting the entire Dalit community in the country,  the Adi-Hindu leaders in 
UP had become national leaders during the 1920’s and 30’s. Also, the participation of 
Dalit delegates from Nizam’s Hyderabad in the conference – we will  see more on this in 
Chapter IV  – clearly shows the similarities in the concerns and activities, which brought 
out the trends in Dalit activism, both in UP and AP together.   
 
                                                 
112 Report of All India Adi-Hindu Mahasabha, January 7, 1928, submitted to the Simon Commission. 
Apendix: List of Memoranda, Evidence – UP/427, Report on United Provinces (3 vols) Indian Statutory 
(Simon) Commission, OIOC, British Library, cited in Rawat, S.R. 2006. ‘The Problem’. Seminar: The 
Monthly Symposium, February.  
113 Ibid.   
72 
 
Two significant political events that catapulted the Adi-Hindu Mahasabha into 
heightened political activism were the visit of the Indian Statutory Commission or Simon 
Commission to Lucknow in 1928 and the deliberations of the Round Table Conferences 
in 1931-32. The importance of these events was that they further sharpened the questions 
of separate Dalit identity and Hindu unity.114 While Dalits put forward their claim for 
separate representation on the basis of their separate identity, the caste Hindus opposed 
such representation for Dalits on the grounds that a separate representation for the Dalits 
threatened Hindu unity.  
 
On the eve of the Simon Commission’s visit to Lucknow on November 28, 1928, a 
mammoth mass demonstration, followed by the staging of a street play at the Charbagh 
Railway Station, was organised by Ram Charan and Shiv Dayal Singh Chaurasia, leaders 
from the Adi Hindu Mahasabha. In a memorandum to the Simon Commission, the Adi 
Hindu leaders demanded political rights as well as preferential treatment. They argued 
that “owing to their ‘low’ and ‘depressed’ status, they continued to be confined to low-
paid, menial jobs, and failed to obtain education, better employment, and a voice in the 
representative institutions.”115 
 
A point to note here is that the Adi Hindu Mahasabha was not alone in demanding 
separate representation for Dalits on the basis of their separate identity. The Simon 
Commission received similar petitions from Dalit organisations across UP, including the 
Adi Dharmis from Dehradun, the Kumaon Shilpakar Sabha of Almora, the Jatav 
Mahasabha of Agra, the Dom Sudhar Sabha of Garhwal, and the Chamar Sabha of 
Kanpur. Thus, unanimity in claiming a separate achut identity had become a marked 
feature of Dalit politics of the time.  
 
Over the issue of separate/joint electorate for Dalits, a number of public demonstrations, 
agitations, and meetings were organised and addressed by the Adi Hindu leaders as well 
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as other Dalit groups during the Round Table Conferences in 1931-32. For instance, 
during the Second Round Table Conference in London in 1931, a ‘wire’ was sent by a 
group of Jatavs from Agra, in which they insisted that ‘Ambedkar, not Gandhi’ was their 
leader.116 Again, when Gandhi undertook a fast against the Communal Award of 1932, 
which sanctioned separate electorates for Dalits, the Congress and Gandhi’s project of 
Harijan uplift were subjected to violent criticisms by the Adi Hindu leaders. They 
pointed out rather sharply that, unlike the rest of Indian society, the Dalits were the 
victims of ‘double servitude’117 – first, to the caste-Hindus and, second, to foreign rule. 
And they questioned that after the foreigners leave, “who would rule in independent 
India?”118  
 
At this juncture, it is suggested that we discuss further, although briefly, the issue of 
separate electorates for the Dalits and the subsequent Poona Pact.  The Indian leaders 
failed to arrive at a harmonious agreement over the question of representation for various 
communities in the second Round Table Conference in 1931 in London. Such a failure 
was, as asserted by Aloysius, primarily due to disagreement between Ambedkar and 
Gandhi, especially the latter’s obsession with self: 
 He (Gandhi) was concerned more with being the sole recipient of the power settlement 
rather than the terms of the settlement itself.  He obsessively claimed that he, in his 
person, represented everybody in India and no other representatives were required to 
bargain for power.  Gandhi’s main purpose for attending the Round Table Conference 
appeared to be to gain monopoly of power, or otherwise to let power remain in alien 
hands. On no count could power be shared with those who had the temerity to sit as 
equals with the traditionally elevated and privileged.119  
 
Following that failure, it was decided that the representatives would abide by the decision 
of the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, who presided over the Conference.  
On August 16, 1932, MacDonald announced the ‘Communal Award’ by which a total of 
seventy-one seats in the Indian legislatures were to be set aside for Dalits. The Prime 
Minister, however, also promised to respect any alternative arrangement that the 
representatives of various communities might agree to.   
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What did the Award entail? The Award entitled the Dalits to the following: (a) that only 
they would choose their representatives, and (b) they would be able to cast a second vote 
to choose who among the caste-Hindus was best suited to represent their interests in a 
legislative body.  Such a safeguard was necessary, Ambedkar argued, since not only were 
the Dalits outnumbered by savarnas (caste-Hindus), they were also vulnerable to physical 
attacks by caste-Hindus during the elections. In other words, Ambedkar believed that the 
political severance of the Dalits from the rest of the Hindu community was supremely 
necessary if the former were to escape their subjugation in either a colonial or 
independent India.   
 
However, for Gandhi, who claimed to “represent the vast majority of the Untouchables”, 
Ambedkar’s argument was complete anathema. Interestingly, he could understand the 
arguments advanced by other minorities, but the claim advanced on behalf of the Dalits 
was ‘the unkindest cut of all’.120 Further, despite the room for negotiations on the 
provisions of the Communal Award, Gandhi saw the Award as something that divides the 
Hindu community, and he undertook a ‘fast unto death’ to register his protest against the 
Award and also to persuade the Dalits and caste-Hindus to unite in rejecting it. Although 
Ambedkar at first opposed any negotiation - ‘I do not care for political stunts’,121 he 
stated rather boldly. Yet, he did not want to take the responsibility for Gandhi’s death. 
Moreover, his position was undermined by the willingness of the other important Dalit 
leader, M.C. Rajah, to support a joint rather than a separate electorate. Thus, Ambedkar 
was forced to sign the Poona Pact, which stripped the Dalits of the unique ‘double vote’ 
as well as a separate electorate for which Ambedkar had so long campaigned. The impact 
of the Poona Pact on Dalit politics was tremendous.  Dalits had to pay a heavy price, in 
the sense it was the caste-Hindu majority that decided which of the Dalit candidates – 
faceless and pliant – would win.  We shall see the consequences of the terms of the Poona 
Pact in the next sub-section.   
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To get back to our discussion on the Adi Hindu activities, through their arguments and 
socio-political activities, the Adi Hindu leaders succeeded in bringing the disparate Dalit 
castes under the umbrella of the Adi Hindu organisation; and they also succeeded in 
uniting the Dalit castes in their claim of separate achut identity.  It was on the basis of 
their separate identity, the Adi Hindu leaders, put forward a charter of demands or a Dalit 
agenda that included: “proportionate representation in legislative bodies, reservations in 
government jobs, adequate Dalit representation in the Congress ministry, permanent 
rights over land by changing the tenancy Acts, fixed wages for agricultural labour and for 
the removal and skinning of dead animals, rights to use public wells, the abolition of 
begari, the right to convert to any religion, and rejection of the term ‘Harijan’”.122 Thus, 
the ideologues of Adi Hinduism, as observed by Khare, provided not only “an ideology 
of radical equality” and a “strategy for doing better in everyday life”, but also “a political 
culture for civil rights and organised protest.”123  
 
When the Adi Hindu dharm was at its height in popularising the concept of original 
inhabitants of India, Buddhism also gained considerable attention among the lower castes 
in UP, particularly in Lucknow and Kanpur.124 While Swamy Bodhanand Mahasthvir 
(1874-1952) was instrumental in popularising Buddhism in Lucknow, Acharya Ishvardatt 
Medharthi (1900–1971) was preaching the message of the Buddha in Kanpur. What is 
significant for our understanding is that in their preaching of Buddhism they have 
combined the ideological arguments put forward by Swami Achutaanand. For instance, 
Bodhanand, who was also active in the Adi Hindu movement, powerfully articulated the 
Adi Hindu ideology in three books. He wrote these books with Chandrika Prasad 
Jigyasu:125 Mula Bharatavasi Aur Arya (‘Original Inhabitants and Aryans’); Bhagavan 
Gautam Buddh; and Bauddha charyapaddati.126 Through these books, he powerfully 
argued that Sudras and Dalits were the original inhabitants of India, and had been 
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deprived of their land and enslaved by the Aryans because they had been defenceless and 
peace-loving.  Bodhanand’s disciples carried out his message with the propagation of 
self-respect among the lower castes. 
 
In 1916, Bodhanand founded the Bharatiya Buddh Samiti and in 1925, he set up the 
Buddh Vihara in Risaldar Park in Lucknow. Through these monastery-like centres, he 
gathered a circle of young and educated Dalit and Shudras, who were to become torch-
bearers of the Dalit movement and politics in the later years. For instance, Chandrika 
Prasad Jigyasu, who was a disciple of Bodhanand, founded the Bahujan Kalyan 
Prakashan and through this press, he published a number of books pertaining to Dalit 
history and politics.  He even brought out a number of booklets, which were famous as 
‘two-anna’ editions. These editions, which were short and concise, covered all major 
Dalit topics. Further, Jigyasu is well remembered for his book, Bharat ke Adi Nivasiyon 
Ki Sabhayata (The Civilization of India’s Original Inhabitants), published in 1937. The 
significance of this book is its passionate and elaborate discussion on the vision of an 
Indian nation and democracy – a Dalit vision – which was different from the one 
preached by the then mainstream nationalist organisations like the Congress.127 In this 
way, Jigyasu as an author and publisher, contributed immensely to the growth of Dalit 
consciousness in UP. Chedi Lal Sathi, another disciple of Bodhanand, rose to become the 
RPI’s (UP branch) first president. 
 
Similarly, Ishvardatt Medharthi, a Dalit by birth, was one of the great Sanskrit scholars as 
well as prolific writers of his times. In 1933, he wrote The Caste System Exposed, in 
which he was more forthcoming in propagating the idea of original inhabitants of India. 
In one of his booklets, ‘The Primitives and Ancestors of India and the Sant Religion’, 
published in 1939, he considered the Vedas as the unjust oppressive religious vision of 
Aryan invaders. He asserted that the 150 million Sudras and Dalits and primitive people 
of India (Adivasis), whom he called the purvajanas, were the ancient rulers of the 
country. They had been trapped into slavery by the invading Aryans. What is important to 
recognise here is that Swami Achhutanand’s Adi Hindus and Swami Bodhanand’s 
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Mulanivasi were purvajanas for him. Further, availing his Sanskrit knowledge and 
equating the purvajanas with asuras, Medharthi claims that the asuras had actually been 
named as such by the Aryans. For the purvajanas did not drink sura (wine), whereas the 
Aryans ate meat and drank wine. He even tried to give new etymological meaning to the 
word raksas, the word with which Dalits were identified. He argued raksas were the ones 
who saved others – raksa karna. The purvajanas lived an egalitarian life – there was no 
varna order amongst them and all were equal.128 Thus, in claiming that achhuts were the 
original inhabitants of India and descendants of the dasas, asurs, and dasyus, which were 
recurrent themes in the Brahmanical Hindu texts, Dalits were challenging both colonial 
and Hindu interpretations of their identity.  In other words, through these traditions and 
ideological assertions, the Adi Hindu and Buddhist movements among the Dalits not 
merely reconstituted a positive identity, but also prepared them for political struggles for 
their rights under the UPSCF.   
 
2. I. 2. United Provinces Scheduled Castes Federation (UPSCF): In the previous sub-
section, we have seen how the Dalits in UP carved an independent social space on the 
basis of their ‘acchut’ identity as well as the claim of the original inhabitants (Mool-
bharat-vasi).  Such identity claims placed them equally not only on a par with the caste- 
Hindus in the social setting, but also legitimised their claim for a share in the emerging 
political power.  We have also seen how the introduction of Communal Representation 
for the Muslims provided real opportunity for the Dalits to intensify their mobilisational 
activities for their share in the political representation. After the formation the All-India 
Adi Hindu Mahasabha, the Dalit leaders not only mobilised their own community from 
the province, but by organising an all-India Dalit conference, they tried to mobilise the 
entire Dalit community in the country.  The issues – Dalit-specific and national-specific – 
discussed in the conference clearly show that Dalit consciousness in UP was not delayed, 
but was far richer than their counterparts in other regions in the country.  My main 
objective in this sub-section is to examine the main political concerns of the Dalits in UP 
in the 1940’s and their activities under the banner of the United Provinces Scheduled 
Castes Federation (UPSCF).  
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We have seen above that the caste-based discrimination against the Dalits in education 
and employment opportunities in the urban centres and the colonial government’s 
policies and programmes led to their mobilisations and activities in the province in the 
late 1920’s.  This changed in the 1930’s and 40’s. Two trends became clearly visible 
during the late 1930’s and early 1940’s in colonial India. First, the national concerns 
came to dominate and, in fact, take precedence over the regional and local concerns. As a 
result, Dalit activities and politics in colonial UP were shaped by national trends and 
concerns during that period. In fact, national trends shaped the concerns not just in UP, 
but importantly also in the Nizam’s Hyderabad and Coastal Andhra in the Madras 
Presidency, as well as in other parts of the country, as we will see in the case of AP in 
Chapter Five.    
 
Secondly, communities increasingly began to rely on the political institutions such as the 
Congress Party and Muslim League to express their social and political concerns. A 
consequence of these features was that national leaders came to be accepted by the local 
communities.129 For instance, Gandhi had firmly established himself as the leader of the 
Congress Party for life; and despite the presence of many prominent leaders such as 
Jawaharlal Nehru within the Party, Gandhi became synonymous with the Congress. A 
majority of the Muslims lent their support to the Muslim League and came to accept 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) as their leader. Similarly, a majority of the Dalits 
saw in Ambedkar their leader, who could fight for them and secure their interests. For 
Ambedkar, with his religious and social agitations against Brahmanical Hinduism and 
with his firm confrontation with none other than Gandhi at the Second Round Table 
Conference in 1931 in London and later during the Poona Pact deliberations, he earned 
great respect and recognition from Dalit communities throughout India. Such respect and 
recognition, in turn, established him as a legitimate spokesperson for the Dalits at 
national and international forums.130 Further, the formation of the Scheduled Caste 
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Federation (SCF) by Ambedkar caused enormous changes in Dalit activism in North 
India.  This formation had become a platform to consolidate the disparate Dalit castes and 
thereby further strengthen the politicised identity of the Dalits.  In fact, the SCF had 
become a political institution for the Dalits through which they could articulate their 
social and political concerns. In UP, a branch of the Party, i.e. the United Provinces 
Scheduled Castes Federation (UPSCF) was set up in 1944, two years after the formation 
of the SCF in Maharashtra. It was through this political body that Dalit political energies 
were most effectively channelled into political mobilisations for political power.  
 
One question that particularly loomed large in the 1940’s, which was a minor concern 
during the Adi-Hindu movement in the 1920’s and 30’s, was that with a history of being 
oppressed, what would be the place of Dalits in independent India? The context of this 
question was the results of the elections that were conducted in the aftermath of the 
Poona Pact, in which most of the reserved constituencies were won by the Congress 
Party. I shall discuss the consequences of the terms of the Poona Pact later, but first a few 
words on the Gandhian programme of the achutodhhaar (Harijan uplift). In the 
introduction of the thesis, we have discussed this programme at length. The Congress, 
following the controversy over separate electorates and solid support rendered to 
Ambedkar by the Dalit community during the deliberations of the Poona Pact, had 
intensified its Harijan uplift initiatives to win ‘the hearts and minds’ of the Dalits.131 In 
this endeavour, the Party sought to give Dalits an alternative identity as ‘Harijans’ or the 
people of God, in contrast to the Adi Hindu movement’s ‘achut’ identity; and the Dalit 
emancipation was sought through the twin ideas of ‘acculturation and integration’ into 
the Hindu community.132 Although caste hierarchy was not rejected, the programme’s 
emphasis on equality of castes through temple entry satyagrahas organised by the 
Congress appealed to the Dalits. For instance, it was felt by a Dalit that “being part of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lynch, Owen. 1969. Politics of…;Jurgensmeyer, Mark. 1988. Religious Rebels in the Punjab: The Social 
Vision of Untouchables. Delhi: Ajanta Publications.  
131 Ambedkar, B.R. 1945. What the Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables. Bombay: 
Thacker & Co.; Prashad, Vijay. 1995. Between Economism and Emancipation: Untouchables and Indian 
Nationalism, 1920 – 1950. Left History, 3(1) Spring/Summer, pp: 5-30.  
132 Gooptu, Nandini. 2001. The Politics…, p. 175. 
80 
 
Congress meant breaking the barrier between castes”. Hazari, a Dalit writer, recounting 
his sense of liberation, writes “if I wore a Gandhi cap no one would ask who I was”.133  
 
However, such a sense of liberation was dubious. As Gandhian Harijan ideology with its 
emphasis on varnashramadharma did not liberate Dalits from their economic and social 
bondage to the caste-Hindus, the Gandhian cap also could not liberate them. At best, the 
Gandhian cap might have facilitated the concealment of their caste identity and allowed 
them to be somebody. In the sense, as long as they are hidden behind the veil of that cap 
they might feel safe and liberated. But once the reality, hidden behind the cap, is revealed 
they would be made to feel ashamed for pretending to be somebody else. Moreover, the 
Gandhian programme of ‘achutoddhar’ (Harijan uplift), as argued by Dilip Menon, 
identifies, “the problem in terms of an opposition between cleanliness and the lack of it, 
locating the whole issue not in terms of economic or social realities but in a physical 
state”.134 In any case, it was not the Harijan uplift programme which created a dubious 
sense of liberation among the Dalits, but the terms of the Poona Pact, which in turn 
resulted in the Congress’ success in the reserved constituencies.  
 
The Communal Award had reserved 20 seats for the Dalits in UP. But under the terms of 
the Poona Pact, those 20 seats were converted into double-member seats. According to 
this revised system, each voter in a reserved constituency was allowed to cast two votes. 
This would be done in two stages. In the first stage, which is called primary, Dalits would 
vote exclusively for Dalit candidates.135 Two candidates who secure the largest majorities 
in the primary were entitled to contest in the second stage. In the second stage, or the 
general election, the reserved seats will become general seats, by virtue of which the 
general candidates were also entitled to contest in the elections. Two votes for a voter 
allowed the latter to exercise his preference either to vote for two general candidates or 
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for two Dalit candidates or for one of each.136 Rawat notes Shankar Shastri’s explication 
of the rationale of the two votes’ mechanism that was put forward by the caste Hindu 
signatories of the Poona Pact. “The Dalits had two votes, one because of their achut 
identity and the other because they were Hindus. Similarly, Hindus exercised two votes, 
one because of their Hindu identity and the other because achuts were Hindus.”137 This 
blatant politics played by the caste-Hindus sabotaged Dalit interests during the Poona 
Pact.  In addition to the system of two votes, the electoral franchise that was defined on 
the basis of property and education also worked in favour of the caste-Hindus which in 
turn benefited the Congress Party.  Of course, Ambedkar was clearly aware of this brazen 
politics. But with Gandhi’s life at stake he did not have a choice but to accept the dictates 
of the caste-Hindus.138 
 
The distortions inherent in the electoral system, a consequence of the Poona Pact, were 
especially revealed in the 1946 elections in UP. The twenty reserved seats for the 
Scheduled Castes in UP included four urban constituencies, which were the only seats 
that SCF contested. In the primaries, nine SCF candidates were successful as against four 
from the Congress Party. However, in the general election or the second round, the 
Congress won all the seats thanks to the support of the non-Dalit votes. A most striking 
result occurred in Agra, where four SCF candidates polled 47.39 per cent of valid votes 
as against 27.1 per cent by four Congress candidates.139 In a way, the Congress swept 
away the twenty seats reserved for the Dalits. Thus, although Dalits continued their 
demand for separate electorates even after the Poona Pact, the result of the 1946 elections 
justified their demand. They plunged into accentuated political action with a demand to 
remove the ‘evil Pact’ when they realised that the Cripps Mission or Cabinet Mission 
formula was influenced by the outcome of the 1946 elections. 
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On March 24, 1946, the British government dispatched a team of three Cabinet Ministers 
to India to seek agreement on how to enact self-determination and Independence with the 
Indian political leaders.140 Two issues of major concern for the Mission were the 
formation of an interim government and principles and procedures for framing a new 
constitution for independent India. Dalits expected some kind of constitutional safeguards 
from the Mission. In fact one of the major demands of the SCF,141 since its formation in 
1942, had been separate representation by recognising Dalits as a separate community. 
Despite initial assurances and commitments made by the Viceroys, (for instance, Lord 
Wavell in a letter to Gandhi unwaveringly stated that ‘Scheduled Castes are one of the 
important and separate elements in the national life of India. That their consent is a 
necessary condition for the transfer of power to Indian [sic]’)142 the Cabinet Mission in its 
final awards on May 16, 1946 failed to provide any specific safeguards for the Dalits. By 
lumping Dalits under the general category, the Mission recognised three main 
communities in India: General, Muslims, and Sikhs for the representation in the 
Constituent Assembly. The failure of the SCF and the success of the Congress in the 
reserved seats was sufficient reason for the Cabinet Mission to recognise Dalits not as 
separate but as part of the Hindu community.   
 
Dalits’s sense of betrayal and anger against the colonial government and especially 
towards the Congress, fermenting since the Poona Pact, provided the context for 
widespread political agitations as well as a strong critique against the Mission’s award. 
Ambedkar, for instance, felt:   
It is quite obvious that the proposal for a Constituent Assembly is intended to win over 
the Congress, while the proposal for Pakistan is designed to win over the Muslim League. 
How do the proposals deal with the Depressed Classes? To put it shortly, they are bound 
hand and foot and handed over to the caste-Hindus. They offer them nothing: stone 
instead of bread. For the Constituent Assembly is nothing but a betrayal of the Depressed 
Classes […] If they are there, they cannot have a free, independent decisive vote. In the 
first place, the representative of the Depresses Classes will be in a hopeless minority.  In 
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the second place, all decisions of the Constituent Assembly are not required by a 
unanimous vote.143 
 
The SCF organised satyagrahas or peaceful protests against the Mission award 
throughout India. In these agitations while Dalits continued to put forward the demand 
for separate electorates, they called for an immediate abrogation of Poona Pact – “a 
political fraud of the Congress and caste-Hindus against them”.144 In UP, from July 
through November 1946, two rounds of satyagrahas in 23 districts (including rural areas 
near Eta, Etawa, Raizabad, Gorakhpur, Fatehgarh, Ferozabad, Agra, Azamgarh and 
Ferrukhabad) were organised by the UPSCF leadership. In the first round, on July 16, 
1946 in Lucknow, a huge demonstration with thousands of Dalit protesters, led by Tilak 
Chand Kureel, the president of the UPSCF, marched to the Legislative Assembly. In 
addition to these demonstrations, the UPSCF leadership, including Manik Chand, Faqir 
Chand, Tilak Chand Kureel, and Swami Chamanand travelled throughout UP. While 
continuing to call for separate electorates for Dalits, they asked the Congress rather 
emphatically to define the Dalits’ future position in independent India. They argued that 
“Independence would not mean freedom for Dalits, but simply replacing one tyrant (the 
British) with another (the Brahmans)”.145  
 
The second round of satyagraha was largely concentrated in western UP, especially in 
Agra. Apart from taking part in the Lucknow agitation, the leaders of the UPSCF’s Agra 
unit presented 11 demands to the Provincial government in Lucknow, which included a 
demand for reservations of government jobs for the Dalits. They also organised a massive 
parade through Agra streets against the Poona Pact, which had become ‘an act of 
defiance’ for the upper castes.146 A staunch criticism against the Congress leaders – 
Gandhi, Nehru, and Jagjivan Ram, especially against Jagjivan Ram also became part of 
these agitations. Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram were branded as ‘traitors and cheats’ to the 
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cause of the Dalits.  And not surprisingly, they used the occasion to repose their faith in 
Ambedkar and his leadership.  Ambedkar was compared favourably to ‘Ram’ and Dalits 
were exhorted to worship him as ‘Bhim’.147  Bowing down to the satyagraha pressure 
built by the UPSCF, as observed by Owen Lynch, the Provincial government awarded 17 
per cent reservations for Dalits in the government jobs as well as legislative bodies. A 
new department – the Harijan Sahayak Shakha (the Harijan Welfare Department) – was 
also established by the government.148 
 
In post-Independent India, the UPSCF continued to be an important political force 
through which Dalits in the state articulated their demands and aspirations. In a 
conference, held in Lucknow on April 24-25, 1948, which apparently was the last to be 
organised by the UPSCF, the Party emphasised on the importance of continuing their 
struggle for power. Ambedkar, who took part in the conference, stressed this stand of the 
Party in his inaugural speech. ‘What I want is power – political power for my people – 
for if we have power we have social status.’149 This statement of Ambedkar reflects the 
fears of Dalits in post-Independent India. The revolutionary gestures enshrined in the 
Constitution of India to emancipate Dalits, such as abolition of untouchability, promise of 
citizenship and facilities of protective discrimination, did not convince the Dalits. They 
were apprehensive about the genuineness on the part of the caste Hindus in realising the 
Constitutional promises. It was this state of anxiousness that propelled them to continue 
their struggle for power. In other words, until then Dalit struggle for political power was 
to secure a place for their voice in the legislative bodies and to gain economic facilities. 
But now, it was to actualise those Constitutional promises that they should continue their 
struggle for political power. The deliberations in the conference, it may be mentioned, 
filled a new vigour among the delegates and inspired them to re-dedicate themselves for 
the Dalit cause.  
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Unfortunately, Dalits in general and the UPSCF in particular could not sustain this 
vigour, for it gradually petered out mainly on account of the Congress’ tricks of enticing 
the Dalit leaders with power.  On the occasion of the first general elections in 1951-52 
many of the UPSCF leaders migrated to the Congress party. At the end of 1952, the Party 
more or less crumbled and was gradually removed from public memory. While the 
migration of the UPSCF’s leadership to the Congress Party was said to be the main 
reason for its disintegration, the inherent drawbacks of identity politics in a democratic 
framework, where support of other communities is essential to win power, was another 
reason for the failure of UPSCF in the elctions. For instance, apart from the Muslim’s 
support in few pockets in western UP, no other community or caste supported the 
UPSCF. Further, except Chamars in the urban areas in western UP, most of the Chamars 
and other Dalit castes supported the Congress rather than the UPSCF.150 Disregarding 
these limitations on the part of the Party, despite its sudden emergence and 
disappearance, the Party’s significance lies in the mobilisation of Dalit political energies 
and channelling the same to secure rights and power for Dalits, particularly in a period of 
transition that was marked by utmost confusion and enthusiasm. Had the Party not 
mobilised Dalits for their rights, the interests of the Dalits would have simply been 
washed away by the sea of Independence. In any case, the failure of the UPSCF, 
however, was not the end of the Dalit movement and its struggle for power. They had 
learned their lessons from their failure and they began to look for ways to plug in the 
limitations of identity politics. It was this search that resulted in the formation of the RPI 
in October 1957. 
 
2. II. Republican Party of India (RPI): Prelude to the future Dalit politics151 
Ambedkar, in his retrospection and analysis of the setback of the SCF in the 1951-52 
elections, arrived at two conclusions.152  First, the system of reserved seats for Dalits was 
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neither an alternative nor a substitute for the system of separate electorates. But in view 
of the unanimous rejection by the Congress members in the Constituent Assembly, 
entertaining the idea of separate electorates for Dalits in post-Independent India is purely 
utopian.  Since the system of reserved seats singles out the Dalit electorates and hampers 
their efforts to reach other social groups, the system should be abolished. In agreement 
with Ambedkar’s conclusion, the Executive committee of the SCF passed a resolution 
asking for the dissolution of the system of reserved seats.153 Secondly, any Dalit-based 
(or for that matter any caste-based) political party had less chance of success at the 
electoral level. As such, it was necessary to form alliances with other political parties as 
well as with other social groups. Towards achieving this end, the existing SCF must be 
abandoned and a new political party with broader mandate than the SCF should be 
formed.154 
 
Ambedkar, in order to set this new plan into action, encouraged Dalit activists to work 
with the leaders of other communities, and on his part he personally began to consult 
various socialist leaders, particularly Ram Manohar Lohia, P.K. Atre, and S.M. Joshi, so 
as to seek their support to form a new political party, which would be called the 
Republican Party of India (RPI). The choice for the name of the new party reflects 
Ambedkar’s long search for a viable political platform for the oppressed masses. 
“Ambedkar’s political career was,” as Gail Omvedt points out, “devoted to finding forms 
through which Dalits could exert themselves in an autonomous fashion, and at the same 
time, build an enduring alliance with non-Brahmans, Shudras, workers, and peasants.”155 
In other words, one of the main aims of the new party was to mobilise the lower caste 
groups as a ‘federation of oppressed populations,’ that are discriminated against on 
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account of their ascribed social status.156 The new party, RPI was established on April 22, 
1958,157 and a branch of the Party was immediately formed in UP, and the leadership of 
the new party was mainly drawn from the erstwhile UPSCF.   
 
With the establishment of the RPI, Dalit politics in UP, especially in western UP, was 
once again renewed by leaders like Tilak Chand Kureel,158 Chedi Lal Sathi, and B.P. 
Maurya. Among these three people, the role of the latter two is important. Chedi Lal 
Sathi was, as Jaffrelot points out,159 the main architect of the RPI in the state. He was 
born in a poor Kewat (fishing caste) family. As a young boy, he was attracted to Gandhi 
and Congress party.  For some time, he worked as a typist in UP Congress office, from 
where he went on to become secretary to Lal Bahadur Shastri and G.V. Pant, when the 
latter became Chief Minister of the state.  Apparently Ambedkar appears to have attracted 
him into the SCF in 1952, and since then he stayed loyal to Ambedkar and his political 
activism. In 1960, after Kureel, he became the president of the RPI and continued in that 
position until 1964.  
 
Although Chedi Lal Sathi was the architect of the RPI in UP, the man who stood at the 
forefront of the party and, who, indeed, popularized that party was B.P. Maurya.  He was 
born in a poor Jathav family in Khair, a tehsil in Aligarh district.   During his childhood, 
he was taught by a Catholic priest to read and write.  Just like Chedi Lal Sathi, the young 
Maurya too, as a young man, was inspired and influenced by Gandhi and the Congress’ 
slogan of swaraj.  He joined Congress in 1941 when Gandhi visited Khair.  Soon after he 
left for Agra to pursue his studies, and during his stay in the city he was involved in 
Jathav movement. Maurya’s association with Congress proved to be a temporary 
infatuation.  Later he met Dr. Ambedkar in Delhi and realised that “he was the real leader 
because he knew our problems”.160  In 1948, he resigned from the Congress and joined 
SCF.  After this development he returned to Aligarh, where he completed LLM from 
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157 Although the preparation for the formation of the new party started as early as 1954 onwards several 
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158 Tilak Chand Kureel was the founding President of the RPI in UP from 1958-60. 
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Aligarh Muslim University and became Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law in 
1960 in the same University.  While pursuing his studies in law and even after joining the 
University as a teacher, he was also actively engaged with Dalit issues as well as 
problems of the landless labourer. He mobilised the landless labourer in Aligarh for land 
and minimum wages.  In April 1957, he organised a conversion meeting, where nearly 
100,000 Jathavs converted to Buddhism.161   
 
In consonance with Ambedkar’s aims - to reach out to the wider oppressed sections and 
at the same to time to address the problems specifically pertaining to Dalits – a number of 
issues were taken up by the RPI. The Party’s 1962 election manifesto, which was at a 
later stage placed before Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in the form of ‘a charter of 
ten demands’, helps us understand the main concerns and issues of the RPI.   
1. The portrait of Babasaheb Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, ‘the Father of the Indian 
Constitution’ must be displayed in the Central Hall of Parliament.  
2. Let land go to the actual tiller of the land. 
3. Idle and waste land must go to the landless labourers. 
4. Adequate distribution of food grains and control over the rising prices. 
5. The lot of slum dwellers be improved. 
6. Full implementation of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. 
7. Extension of all privileges guaranteed by the Constitution to the Scheduled 
Castes who have embraced Buddhism.  
8. Harassment of the depressed classes should cease forthwith. 
9. Full justice for them under the Untouchability (Offences) Act. 
10. Reservation in the services to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes be 
completed as soon as possible, not later than 1970.162 
 
In addition to the above ten resolutions, two other significant demands of the UP branch 
of the RPI were: first, that Urdu should be made the official language of the state, and if 
that cannot be done, measures should be taken to teach Urdu on a par with Hindi in 
schools; and second, that taxes on shoe-makers should be remitted.  Owen Lynch 
mentions the reasons for the specific significance of these two demands.  While the first 
owes to the RPI’s electoral alliance with the Muslims in the state, especially in the city of 
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Aligarh (more on this below), the second is on account of the prominence of the 
Jatavas/Chamars in the party.163   
 
Setting aside these two specific demands, one could see in the RPI’s manifesto a range of 
issues, which were not merely concerned with the Dalits, but also the socially and 
economically marginalised communities. Indeed, the party had not just confined itself to 
passing of the resolution.  It had organised a number of mass mobilisation and protest 
movements to demand that the ruling Congress party implement the above issues. When 
the government failed to implement these demands, the RPI’s activists made several 
attempts to occupy fallow land and as many as 30,000 of them got arrested in 1964. The 
significance of RPI’s concerns and activities was that they were in direct confrontation 
with the concerns of the Congress party. For instance, while the Congress under the 
leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru considered discussion of caste distinctions to be a 
traditionalist discourse, the RPI fought to place the realities of caste discrimination 
against the lower castes at the heart of national debate. While the Congress sought to 
direct the nation towards increasing industrialisation in the 1950’s, the RPI argued for 
radical land redistribution and agricultural reform to improve the economic position of 
the lower castes.164 Through its activities and confrontations, the RPI was able to 
establish itself, although for a brief period, as a strong alternative to the Congress Party 
for the lower castes and other oppressed masses in the state.165   
 
The RPI’s greatest moments were 1962 and 1967 elections, where it made inroads into 
political power.  While in the 1962 election the RPI won one Lok Sabha seat in Aligarh 
district and two Vidhan Sabha seats, in the 1967 elections it won two Lok Sabha seats. 
Despite the fact that the state and entire country was still under the influence of the 
Congress party which won the nation her independence, the success of the RPI was no 
insignificant event.  It reflected the Dalits’ determination to take power into their hands 
and thereby change their pathetic socio-economic conditions. Of course, it must be 
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165 While the Congress managed to win all the reserved seats in the 1952 and 1957 elections, in 1962 the 
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mentioned here that it was neither the sheer determination of the Dalits to win power nor 
their activism that led to their success in Aligarh district.  The Chamars, who were main 
supporters of the party, constitute 22 per cent of the UP population and the Aligarh 
district had the highest concentration of the Chamars.  Besides, the Muslims, the other 
largest community in the state, were feeling alienated after the bifurcation of the country 
into India and Pakistan.  Their sense of alienation turned into betrayal after the Hindu-
Muslim riots in Aligarh in 1961.  The Congress leaders who had promised security for 
those Muslims who would stay back in India after the partition, did not provide any form 
of security, particularly during the riots.   
 
Most horrifically after the riots, the government was lenient towards the Hindu goons and 
did not even punish them.  It was this sense of alienation and betrayal by the Congress 
government that pulled the Muslim population in the state, especially in western UP, 
towards the RPI. On its part the RPI used the situation to its own advantage by exploiting 
the anti-Congress feeling among the Muslims. The Party has precipitated the momentum 
by coining slogans like Jatav Muslm bhai bhai, Hindu kaun kahan se aye? (Jatav and 
Muslim are brothers, where do the Hindus come from). The other slogan that was 
aggressively directed against the upper castes was, “Thakur, Brahmans, and Banyas make 
their face black”.166 It was this coalition of the Jatavs and Muslims that resulted in the 
success of the RPI in electoral politics. Ian Duncan captures the politics of the RPI 
success in the following terms:  
The important factor in many of the seats won by the RPI in UP was the informal 
alliances which the party was able to form with the Muslims in some areas of the State, 
which had been affected by communal disturbances shortly before the elections.  Three of 
the successful candidates for the Legislative Assembly were Muslims as was one of the 
successful candidates for the Lok Sabha.167 
Thus, it was the informal alliances with the Muslims and giving the party’s tickets to 
Muslim candidates that led to RPI’s success in the elections.  
 
The electoral success of the RPI, however, was short-lived and it could not win in any 
election after the 1967 Assembly elections, and thus, could never become, as initially 
hoped, either the political platform for the oppressed masses or an alternative to the 
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Congress. The reasons for the failure of the RPI experiment are many: first, the brief 
success of the RPI lies in B.P. Maurya’s engineering of a local coalition between Dalits 
and Muslims in the city and district of Aligarh. As the coalition was driven by political 
opportunism rather than historical sympathy between the two groups, the partnership did 
not last beyond the 1967 and 1969 state assembly elections.168  
 
Secondly, the RPI’s claim, both as a party of the poor as well as the party of 
‘Ambedkarites’, appeared to cause confusion among its workers and supporters. One of 
the primary aims of the party was to “organise the peasantry, the landless labourers, 
workers in factories and other wage earners”. As such the party, for those who were 
wedded to class-based politics, was supposed to be organising the labourers and workers. 
Contrary to this expectation, the Party’s manifesto described itself as an Ambedkarite 
party and its pledge was to “engage itself in organising the downtrodden masses of India, 
particularly the Buddhists, SCs, STs, and OBCs”.169 Thus, there appears to be a void in 
communication between the leadership and the workers and supporters, a gap which led 
to disappointment and departure of those sections of people that were interested in class-
based politics.  
 
Thirdly, a section among the middle class Dalits were content with the new opportunities 
thrown up by the Constitution of India, such as abolition of untouchability, reserved 
seats, and promises of economic betterment. Using these they wanted to enter the power 
structure and improve their socio-economic conditions rather than lead a movement to 
challenge the established social and political orders. Owen Lynch in his research on Agra 
Chamars observes the two Dalit groups with contrasting interests and ideals. While one 
group of Dalits, whom Lynch calls ‘the Congress conservatives’, were mostly 
businessmen, they wanted to support the Congress in order to gain patronage in the form 
of subsidies and licenses. The second group of Dalits, mostly the RPI leaders and 
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169 Duncan, R.I. 1979. Levels, the Communication of Programmes…. p. 236.   
92 
 
workers, were ‘keen to maintain a separate party, based on distinct lower caste 
identity’.170  
 
Fourthly, despite its avowed aim to combine caste and class categories and reach out to as 
many socially deprived communities as possible, the RPI could not reach out beyond the 
Chamar/Jatav caste. The reason for such a narrow concentration of the party was the 
attitude of the Jatavs towards the party, as well as other Dalit castes. For them, the party 
belonged to them and not to any other group. They hindered many attempts to expand the 
party membership and were even unwilling to give party offices to non-Jatavs.171 While 
confirming this attitude of the Jatavs, Zoya Hasan comments, ‘[the RPI’s] activities came 
to be restricted because of its identification with the Jatavs, a fact which helped Congress 
wean away other Scheduled Castes from the RPI’s influence.’172 In addition to these 
factors, the Congress Party’s methods of co-option and accommodation also largely 
contributed to the end of RPI initiative of the Dalits in UP, which is our point of 
discussion in the next chapter.  
 
Conclusion:  Against Varshney’s thesis of ‘Southernisation of North Indian politics’, and 
Pai’s ‘Delayed development of Dalit consciousness in UP’, I have tried to put forward 
two arguments in this chapter. First, it is not just the Hindu-Muslim cleavage that shaped 
the politics in North India. Caste, which has been at the centre of the politics in South 
India, has also been at the core of the politics in the northern region. I have substantiated 
my argument by an examination of Dalit mobilisation for social equality and political 
power in colonial and post-colonial UP after Independence. I have shown how the Dalits 
deployed caste in their struggle against the domination of the upper castes and how they 
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made a strong claim for political power on the basis of their separate identity.  Secondly, 
by reading about Dalit activism under the banner of the Adi-Hinduism, I have argued that 
Dalit consciousness in colonial UP was by no means delayed. By raising their voice 
against Brahmanical Hinduism and by demanding social equality on the basis of their 
claim of mula-bharatvasi, Dalit consciousness in UP was on a par with Dalit 
consciousness in southern and western India. In fact, by making a claim for political 
power, the Dalits in UP were far ahead of their counterparts anywhere in India during that 
time. It is, indeed, on account of the foundations for political power laid by Dalit activism 
during the colonial era that the Dalits in post-Independent UP could direct their energies 
to attain political power through the RPI. Of course, in a democratic set-up, securing 
political power requires support from many quarters, and this is where the Dalits failed in 
the immediate post-Independent UP.  Moreover, some of the strategies employed by the 
Congress to co-opt the Dalit leadership which we will discuss in the next chapter also 
worked against the independent political activities of the Dalits. More specifically it 
worked against the RPI.     
 
****** 
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Three……………………………………………………………………… 
Mobilising for Power:  
The Emergence of BSP and Dalit Politics in UP, 1970‐90 
 
Political power is the master-key with which you can open any lock, whether it is [a] 
social, educational, or cultural lock. 
                                                                    - Kanshi Ram173 
  
In the previous chapter, we examined Dalit mobilisations for social equality and political 
power in colonial and the immediate post-colonial UP. Mobilising under the banner of 
the Adi-Hindu movement, which was initiated by Swami Achutaanand and Ram Charan, 
the Dalits in the Province rejected the ‘untouchable’ tag. Assuming the achut identity, 
they declared themselves as mula bharatvasi (the original inhabitants of India).  On the 
basis of this new separate social identity, they demanded not just social equality, but 
more importantly, they also made a strong claim for a share in the emerging political 
matrix. The assertion of the mula bharatvasi buttressed their claim for political power. 
During the 1930’s and ’40’s while the caste-Hindus accepted the leadership of Gandhi, 
the Dalits in the state swam against the current by condemning his stand on the 
Communal Award and role in the subsequent Poona Pact. They stood firmly behind 
Ambedkar during the Round Table proceedings in London and proclaimed him as their 
only leader.  Following Ambedkar’s political initiatives in Maharashtra, the Dalits in the 
state also opened branches of the two political parties – the SCF in the ’40’s and RPI in 
the late ’50’s. Through these political parties, the Dalit leadership made every effort to 
mobilise the Dalits as well as other marginalised sections in the state for their rights and 
political power.  
 
But their efforts at winning political power did not yield any positive results as they could 
not garner the support of the caste-Hindus and others.  Apart from the inimical attitude of 
the caste-Hindus against the Dalits and their political parties, the terms of the Poona Pact 
were largely responsible for their failure in electoral politics. Further, with the Congress’ 
co-option politics, particularly since the late ’60’s, the Dalits’ independent political 
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activities shifted from a tragedy to a catastrophe. The co-option of the Dalit leadership 
herded the Dalit voters into the hands of the Congress. But how did the Congress manage 
to co-opt the Dalit leadership into its fold? Did the Congress do anything substantially to 
improve the lot of the Dalits? Did Congress’ co-option put an end to the independent 
political activities of Dalits? How did the BSP mobilise the Dalit constituency for 
political power and why did the majority of Dalits in the state support the BSP?  
 
These questions are important for one specific reason. Kanchan Chandra in her Why 
Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India attributes the BSP’s 
electoral success in UP to (a) greater representation accorded to the Scheduled Caste (SC) 
elites, especially to those of the Chamars, who constitute a majority among the SC 
category in the state; and (b) a series of electoral alliances that the Party entered into with 
the other political parties.174  She substantiates this argument on the basis of the evidence 
drawn from the BSP’s electoral failure in Punjab and Karnataka. The Party’s failure in 
Punjab’s electoral politics, she argues, was due to greater representation accorded to the 
Chamar elites, although the Chamars constitute a minority among the SCs in Punjab. 
Apart from this undue representation to one particular caste, the limited representation 
given to the non-Chamar elites among the SCs and the Party’s failure to negotiate 
electoral alliances with other political parties led to its failure in the state.  In Karnataka, 
contrary to the political situation in the above two states, the SC elites enjoy a high 
degree of representation in the mainstream political parties.  As a result, the SC voters, 
she claims, had no incentive to vote for the BSP.  
 
There is one fundamental flaw in Chandra’s argument.  That the elites among the 
Chamars in UP were given greater representation in the BSP is true.  And this might have 
provided both the material as well as psychological incentives to the non-elite Chamars.  
But that does not explain the reasons for the support extended by the other Dalits castes 
(i.e., non-Chamar SCs) to the BSP. For a lack of representation should have driven them 
away from the Party rather than within it. Following this, one interesting question that 
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arises is: why did the non-elite Chamars and other Dalit castes support the BSP? Chandra 
answers this but rather unsatisfactorily.    
 
The fact that the BSP was not born out of struggles of the Dalits at the grassroots, but 
sprang up from the activities undertaken by the All India Backward (SC/ST/OBC) and 
Minority Communities Employees’ Federation (BAMCEF) and the Dalits’ support to the 
Party, highlights an important aspect. By the early 1970’s, there was a noticeable 
economic change among the Dalits in the state. Much of this improvement is, obviously, 
due to the compensatory discriminatory provisions as well as the welfare measures for 
the empowerment of Dalits. With new assurances gained through the Constitutional 
provisions and economic advancements through the cottage industries, such as leather-
making and sandal-making, the Dalits began to assert themselves both in the urban as 
well as rural areas. Such an assertion by the ‘untouchables’, not surprisingly, became a 
cause for hatred and fear among the upper castes. In the sense, the new assertiveness as 
well as the political awareness and educational advancement of the Dalits were seen as a 
breach of tradition by the upper castes. For them, “the Jatavs, as untouchables”, as 
observed by Owen Lynch, “are getting not only out of place but also out of hand.”175 To 
show them their place in society, the upper castes resorted to the practice of 
discrimination in urban centres and unleashed violence and riots against the Dalits in the 
rural areas during the 1970’s and early 1980’s.  Although the Dalits were terrified by the 
brutality and cruelty of the upper castes, such cruelties, in turn, provided the context for 
them not only to raise their voice against the caste-based violence against them, but more 
importantly, to lend their support to the BSP. 
  
The present chapter aims to examine the history of the BSP, especially the wider socio-
economic context and the ideological features of Dalit politics that Chandra’s account 
leaves out.  I have divided the chapter into three main sections.  The first section 
examines Dalit activities prior to the emergence of the BSP.  Here, I have concentrated 
on the special relations between the Congress and Dalits. Prior to the entry of the lower 
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caste-based BSP and SP, the Congress dominated political power in the state. Moreover, 
the Congress was also the major beneficiary of reserved seats for the Dalits in the State 
Assembly and Parliament. The second section examines the history of the BSP – its 
evolution from BAMCEF to BSP. The final section analyses the mobilisation of the BSP 
and the issues it raised during its campaigns.   
 
3. I. Dalits and Congress: A Difficult Relationship: In one of its election manifestos the 
Congress party declared: “The Congress has pledged to promote with special care the 
educational, employment, and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, 
particularly the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribe, and Backward Classes”.176  The 
Dalits appeared to have believed in the Congress. A cursory look at the election results in 
seven assembly elections from 1962 to 1985 in the reserved seats (Table below) point out 
that the Dalits mainly supported the Congress party.177   
Table 3.1: Performance of the parties in the reserved (SCs) seats in UP Assembly 
Party 1962 1967 1969 1974 1977 1980 1985 
BKD - - 22 23 -- -- -- 
CPI 6 1 - 2 -- 2 -- 
CPM - - 1 - -- -- -- 
INC (I) 55 45 45 48 8 72+1* 71 
NJP (SC) -- -- -- -- -- 9 -- 
JP - - - - 79 -- -- 
LKD -- -- -- -- -- -- 12 
JS/BJS/ 
BJP 
8 24 12 13 - 3 3 
PSP 4 1 - - -- -- -- 
RPI 1 2 - - -- -- -- 
SOC 5 - - - -- -- -- 
SSP - 10 5 - -- -- -- 
SWA 5 3 1 - -- -- -- 
IND 4 2 2 2 1 1 2 
Total 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
                                            *One seat was won by the Indian National Congress (U). 
                                                   Source: Election Commission of India  
 
Interestingly, the victory of the Congress in a majority of the reserved seats is not just 
confined to UP alone. In fact, it was able to secure most of the reserved seats for the 
Dalits all over India, particularly in the 1962, 1967, and 1971 parliamentary elections. In 
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1962, Congress won 82 percent of Dalit seats when its national average of all seats was 
54 percent; in 1967 the contrast was 61 to 52 percent; and again, in 1971, the contrast 
was 66 to 64 percent.178 In all these three elections, the Congress’ proportion of the Dalit 
seats topped its proportion of all seats.  However, we witnessed a general decline in the 
Congress’ proportion of Dalit seats, particularly after 1984.  
Table 3.2: Distribution of Scheduled Castes’ Parliamentary Seats by Parties, 1971-84179 
 1971 1977 1980 1984 
 
Party 
No. of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
All 
Seats 
No. of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
All 
Seats 
No. of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
All 
Seats 
No. 
of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
SC 
Seats 
% of 
All 
Seats 
Congress 48 66 64 15 19 28 46 60 67 52 75 79 
Janata 7 10 7 45 58 55 14 18 16 1 1 3 
Communist 
parties 
8 11 9 9 12 5 7 9 8 4 6 5 
DMK, 
AIADMK & 
TDP  
6 8 4 4 5 4 4 5 3 9 13 8 
Others 4 5 16 5 6 8 5 7 6 3 4 5 
Sources: Election commission reports for 1971 -80 and provisional tables for 1984. 
Notes: The figures are for the seventeen large states only; in 1980, there were seventy-nine scheduled caste 
constituencies in all; in 1984, because there were no elections in Assam and Punjab, it was reduced. 
‘Congress’ refers to Congress ® in 1971, Congress in 1977, and Congress-I in 1980 and 1984. ‘Janata’ refers 
to the component units that united in 1977; to the pre-merger components in 1971; to the Janata, Lok Dal and 
Congress-U in 1980; and to the Janata and the DMKP in 1984.  
 
On the basis of the electoral success of the Congress in the reserved seats and the 
declarations of the Congress in its political manifestos and campaigns we come across 
two kinds of political commentaries during this time. First, the Rudolphs attribute the 
disproportionate electoral support of Dalits for the Congress in the Nehru era and for 
Indira Gandhi’s Congress to ‘a special relationship’ between the Congress and the 
Dalits.180 Secondly, terming the Dalits as a ‘vote bank’ for the Congress, Mendelsohn and 
Vicziany argue that the Dalits voted for the Congress, because of the latter’s commitment 
to act on ‘untouchability and poverty’. “In the years after Independence, the 
Untouchable’s support for the Congress clearly strengthened.  From 1952 until 1989, 
with the exception of the post-Emergency election of 1977, the Untouchables tended to 
function in both national and State elections as a vote bank for the Congress.  Their vote 
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for Congress was a vote for the party ruling the government, a party that had committed 
itself to a plan of action on untouchability and poverty.”181  As we have seen in the two 
tables above, a majority of the seats reserved for the Dalits both in the Assembly and in 
Parliament had gone to the Congress Party.  From that point of view, one may agree with 
the Rudolphs when they state that the Dalits and Congress had a ‘special relationship’ 
and also with Mendelshon and Vicziany for terming the Dalits as ‘vote bank’ for the 
Congress.  But two questions must be summarily posed here: How did the Congress 
manage to turn the Dalits into its ‘vote bank’? To ask the same question differently, why 
and how did the Dalits become a ‘vote bank’ for the Congress? And, what did their 
‘special relationship’ with the Congress do to them? In the following pages I make an 
effort to answer these two questions,182 and in this endeavour I have concentrated on two 
specific aspects: (A) Political Representation for the Dalits; and (B) Zamindari Abolition 
Act and Land Reforms.    
 
3.IA. Political Representation for the Dalits:  Until 1961 most of the reserved seats were 
in double-member constituencies, in which one of the seats could be filled only by a 
member either of the Dalit or the Adivasi category and the other was open to general 
competition.183  But in 1961, single-member constituencies were brought into force by 
abolishing double-member constituencies. Although it has been said that the abolition of 
double-member constituencies was primarily inspired by the concern of politicians over 
the expenses in campaigns in double-sized districts, in reality it was done, as has beeb 
clearly indicated by Marc Galanter, due to the well publicised resentment expressed by 
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the upper castes.184 There is another dimension in single-member constituencies. During 
the demarcation process, it appears, care had been taken to reserve constituencies, which 
had small Dalit populations.185 For instance, of the 76 constituencies reserved for Dalits 
in the 1962 elections in the state, there was not even a single constituency that had a Dalit 
majority. At the most, the Dalit population represented 10-30 per cent, which means, 75 
per cent of the population in the reserved constituency comprised non-Dalits.186 Such an 
arrangement, in turn, means that in any given constituency even if the entire Dalit 
population vote en masse for a particular Dalit candidate, he or she will not win the 
election; the one chosen by the non-Dalits would win the seat. In other words, 
constituencies might have been reserved for the Dalits, but the outcome of the elections, 
i.e., winning or losing, would be decided by the non-Dalits, (read) upper castes. But the 
politics of making and unmaking the reserved constituencies apart, what actually 
happened in the reserved constituencies?  
 
As we have noted earlier, from the very beginning, political representation for the Dalits 
has been compounded with controversy and criticism. To begin with, one of the 
remarkable contributions of political representation for Dalits is that it did provide for 
their ‘substantial quantitative presence’187 in representative bodies. The Dalit legislators, 
who have been elected under the banner of various national and regional parties, are of 
the opinion that representation for Dalits has been a great success. They claim that their 
presence in the legislative bodies not only safeguarded the interests of the Dalits, but also 
helped to check the monopoly of the upper castes over legislative bodies. Of course, such 
a claim is not shared by all the Dalits, especially the educated and poorer sections among 
them. They are of the opinion that the said measure, instead of becoming a viable voice 
of the Dalits, had become a weapon in the hands of the upper castes, with which the latter 
                                                 
184 Galanter, Marc. 1979. Compensatory Discrimination in Political Representation: A Preliminary 
Assessment of India’s Thirty- Year Experience with Reserved Seats in Legislatures. EPW, 14 (7&8), pp: 
437-454, here, p. 438. 
185 Unlike Dalits, Adivasis generally concentrate in specific areas. Due to this nature, the Adivasis’ 
constituencies comprise nearly 70 percent of their population.  
186 On demarcation in general, see McMillan, Alistair. 2005. Standing at the margins… 
187 Galanter, Marc. 1984. Competing Equalities…p.50.  
101 
 
destroyed the independent leadership of the Dalits (more details given below).188 What 
ultimately matters for them is not simply the presence, but the quality of that presence, 
which had become a rarity. For a long time, Dalit representatives did not actively 
participate in debates in the legislative bodies even if the issues concerned the Dalits and 
other marginalised strata. Such indifference on the part of the Dalit representatives 
resulted from the fact that a majority of them came not from the ordinary Dalit 
backgrounds but from extremely privileged backgrounds and did not empathise with the 
former.  
 
It is not just the individual Dalit representatives who are responsible for a lack of 
qualitative presence in the representative bodies, the upper castes and political parties are 
equally responsible for the same. As noted above, the changing of the double-member 
constituencies into single-member constituencies put the Dalit candidates at the mercy of 
the non-Dalit population and upper caste-based political parties. Given a choice between 
two Dalit candidates – one that speaks the language of the Dalits and the other that speaks 
the language of the upper castes-based mainstream political party – whose candidate 
would be chosen by the non-Dalit public? G. Narayana, who studied political elites 
among the Dalits, gives an example.  During the 1967 elections in the Sasani reserved 
constituency, a Congress-Dalit candidate was challenged by a RPI-Dalit candidate.  The 
upper castes supported the Congress-Dalit candidate, because: “He lives simply, talks 
softly, and above all, he had not forgotten his caste status. He pays due regard to all 
Brahmins and does not sit with them on the same cot.”189  Arguing on similar lines, 
Galanter notes that the representatives for the reserved constituencies were selected on 
grounds of “acceptability to others rather than by virtue of forceful representation of 
interests of the preferred groups”.190  Thus it is clear that the single-member 
constituencies put Dalit candidates at the mercy of the non-Dalit population, and voting 
for a Dalit candidate was governed by what the non-Dalit community expects or asks of 
the Dalit candidates,  that is, ‘know thy place’.   
                                                 
188 Interviews with Ram Kishore Varma, and Shyam Sunder  on December 15 &16, 2004 at Banda and 
Bojja Tarakam on 17 June, 2005 in Hyderabad and Katti Padmarao on 12 August, 2005.   
189 Narayana, G. 1974. The Political Elite among the Scheduled Castes. Journal of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Studies, Vol. 8, pp: 214-19, here p. 216.  
190Galanter, Marc. 1979. Compensatory Discrimination…, p. 446. 
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Further, as selection of the candidates is always in the hands of the Party, the Dalit 
candidates generally never argued against the Party and its upper caste-based leadership. 
Jagjivan Ram, one of the most prominent Dalit leaders of his time, admitting the reality 
of the reserved constituencies, conceded: “Since one had to depend on the non-Scheduled 
Caste votes, one went along with the fortunes of the party”.191 These two observations 
clearly reflect two foremost limitations faced by the Dalit representatives, viz, (1) 
dependency on the non-Dalit population for winning elections; and (2) dependency on 
political parties for funding. In the next section we shall see how the Dalits under BSP 
leadership managed to overcome the funding problem. But presently, what is important to 
recognise here is that the dependency of the Dalit representatives both upon the non-Dalit 
population and upper caste-led political parties is not something voluntarily sought by 
Dalits themselves but rather imposed on them through the present form of a 
representative system. Such imposed dependency undeniably turned the Dalit leader not 
just submissive, but as pointed by Kanshi Ram, turned them into the chamchas (stooges) 
of the upper caste leaders.192 Marc Galanter in his examination of the working of political 
representation for the Dalits also made the similar observation:  
The design of the legislative reservations – the dependence on outside parties for funds 
and the need to appeal to constituencies made up overwhelmingly of others – tends to 
produce compliant and accommodating leaders rather than forceful articulators of the 
interests of these groups.193 
 
Thus, the dependency of the Dalit candidates upon the political parties over a period 
resulted in the emergence of a pattern that helped to reiterate the dominance of the 
dominating political parties. For instance, as long as the Congress party remained 
dominant it captured most of the reserved seats. During the mid-80’s, when the BJP 
became a dominant party, it won in most of the reserved constituencies.194 Thus, the 
larger parties that have tended to win the reserved seats have done so without gaining 
support from Dalits or Adivasis in the reserved constituencies.  Further, some of the 
Dalits who managed to get elected independently were absorbed by the mainstream 
                                                 
191 Interview with Jagjivan Ram, cited in Frankel, R. Francine. 1989. Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: 
Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order. In: Frankel, Francine R. and M.S.A. Rao., eds., Dominance 
and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order. New Delhi: OUP, pp: 46-132, here p.83.  
192 Kanshi Ram. 1984. Struggle for Equality and Self-Respect. Oppressed Indian.  
193 Marc, Galanter. 1984. Competing Equalities…, p. 549. 
194 See, McMillan, Alistair. 2005. Standing at the Margin…  
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political parties, especially the Congress (I), by “offering lucrative and prestigious posts 
in the establishment”195 (more on this below). But, how did the Congress manage to co-
opt the Dalit leadership, i.e., RPI leadership into its fold and turn the Dalits as its ‘vote-
bank’?  
 
As the above table (Table 3.1) indicates except in the post-Emergency elections in 1977 
the Congress party had consistently secured Dalit reserved seats until 1985.  Two factors 
seem to have been instrumental in the success of the Congress. First, after the decline of 
the RPI most of the leaders were co-opted by the Congress.  For instance, one of the 
prominent leaders of the RPI, B.P Maurya, after his defeat in the 1967 elections joined 
the Congress in the early 1970’s. The rationality behind this shift is a telling story:  
I joined Congress because by the time there was no great opposition leader.  No 
socialists. I joined Indira Gandhi against certain conditions which she fulfilled later: the 
preamble of the Constitution should refer to socialism; agricultural labourers should be 
guaranteed minimum wages; land reform should be implemented. She agreed and I 
joined. She wanted me to become more civilised.  I was very rough and tough so she sent 
me to the United States. When I came back she made me a Minister. I became close to 
her. And she has been very kind to me.196 
 
Three aspects are clear from Maurya’s statement. First, since there was no ‘great’ 
opposition leader against the Congress it would be futile on his part as a leader of a small 
political party to fight against the Congress, an indication of the emergence of the weak 
leadership which was willing to make compromises with the strong political party and 
thereby, go against the grain of the interests of their own community. Secondly, his 
joining the Congress was on account of the ideology of the party. Interestingly, in his 
reference to the economic aspects like, ‘guaranteed minimum wages’ and ‘land reforms’ 
he was, like the Congress leaders of his generation, narrowing down the Dalit question to 
an economic issue. By then Maurya had come to conclude, “There is nothing like Dalit 
politics. This is a most confusing approach because Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
                                                 
195 Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2007. Reservations and the Dalits at the Crossroad. Center for the Advanced Study 
of India, University of Pennsylvania: http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/india/iit_Jaffrelot.html (accessed 
10/10/2007). Of course, even such members were eventually “ghettoised in the social welfare 
departments”.  See also, Guru, Gopal. 2002. A Subsidised Notion of Democracy. EPW, 37(1), pp: 40-41; 
Weiner, Myron. 1989. The Political Consequences of Preferential Policies: India in Comparative 
Perspective. In: Varshney, Ahutosh., ed., The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, pp: 151-175.  
196 Interview with B.P Maurya, quoted in Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. India’s silent…, p. 112. 
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Tribes are part and parcel of the entire society.”197 Such words, as observed by Jaffrelot, 
echo Gandhi’s analysis of the caste system’ they also indicate a lack of clarity among the 
Dalit leadership on the specific nature of the Dalit question. Thirdly, one does not 
understand how a rough and tough Indian person would become ‘civilised’ merely by 
going to the United States. Rather than a civilised aspect, one would certainly discern the 
material inducements thrown to the Dalit leadership by the Congress.  
 
Similarly, Chedi Lal Saathi, who had been an active member in lower caste politics and 
the Ambedkarite movement since the late 1920’s, also followed the path shown by 
Maurya. And not surprisingly, his justification for the shift is more or less akin to that of 
Maurya. While recounting the incident that led to his shift, where apparently Indira 
Gandhi herself went to persuade him, he said: ‘Mrs. Gandhi came (to him) and said – 
“We are in trouble; we are asking for socialism, so you join us, otherwise upper castes 
and the rich people will come”.198   Thus, for Sathi also, ideology was the main reason for 
his shift to the Congress. But it is obvious to those perceptive enough to see through it 
that what induced these leaders into the Congress-fold was not ideology per se, but the 
enticement for positions of power and the material benefits offered to them by the 
Congress. For instance, soon after his joining of the Party, Maurya became Minister of 
State in the Ministry of Agriculture and Industry in 1974, and Sathi became general 
secretary of the UP Congress in 1973.199 While for leaders like Maurya and Sathi, 
positions of power were cloaked in the garb of ideology, for other leaders having 
alliances with the Congress Party, it was a matter of survival. For instance, Owen Lynch 
in his study of Agra Jatavs observes:  
The conservatives consider membership in the Congress Party a matter of survival.  The 
Congress controls to some extent the financial resources and licensing offices upon which 
they (Dalits) depend…The conservatives’ main strategy can be summed up in one phrase, 
why bite the hand that feeds you?200  
                                                 
197 Ibid.   
198 Interview with Chedi Lal Sathi, quoted in  Ibid., p. 113. 
199 The other prominent Dalit leaders co-opted by the Congress were Ram Dhan, Ganpat Ram, Jai Prasad, 
Ram Pyare Suman, Baddal Ram, Mata Prasad, Dharamveer and Mahasay Masuriya Din from eastern Uttar 
Pradesh; Kanhaiyalal Sonkar, Ram Kinkar, Gaya Prasad Prashant, Tilak Chand Kureel, Chaudhury Buddha 
Dev, Bhagauti Prasad Kurel and Mewalal Sonkar in central UP and SP Gautam, Ram Lal Rahi, HL Azad, 
Kamal Dariyabadi, Chaudhury Dharam Singh from western UP.  See Kumar, Vivek. 2002. Dalit 
Leadership in India Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, p. 162. 
200 Quoted in Lynch, Owen. 1969. The Politics…p. 111. 
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In a way, while the Congress Party co-opted the Dalit leaders through the inducement of 
prestigious posts, the Dalit leaders joined the Congress for their own political and 
material survival.  But the question is, did Congress’ Dalit leaders enjoy any space in the 
Party? Before answering this question it may be noted here that except for Babu Jagjivan 
Ram, we do not find any other Dalit leader who had been incorporated within the 
Congress organisation.  Of course, at the state level some Dalits, such as Bhola Paswan 
Shastri in Bihar, and Damodaram Sanjeevaiah in AP, became chief ministers. They got 
those positions, as rightly pointed out by Frankel201 and Elliot,202 as default measures 
rather than from any concern for or in recognition of the worth of those leaders. As 
Jagjivan Ram was the only Dalit leader to reach the top of the Congress’ organisational 
structure, it is suggested that we look at his career graph in the Congress to understand 
whether the Congress’ Dalit leaders did anything towards the promotion of the Dalit 
constituency.  
 
Above we observed that the non-Dalit population voted those Dalit candidates, who 
‘knew their place’ and Babu Jagjivan Ram was one such typical Dalit politician who 
knew his place. And that was the reason why he became an ideal ‘untouchable for the 
Congress to promote through its ranks’.203  Jagjivan Ram, who belongs to the Chamar 
caste in Bihar, was fortunate to have a hardworking agriculturalist father and a brother, 
who was employed in the British army. Unlike most of the other Chamar families in the 
village, a steady income in Jagjivan Ram’s family allowed him to attend to school. After 
completing his primary schooling in his native village, Jagjivan Ram shifted to Calcutta 
to pursue his higher education.  It was while studying there that he was attracted to both 
the Arya Samaj activities among the Dalits and to Congress politics.  In 1928 he founded 
Ravidas Mahasabha with an aim to unite all the divergent Dalit castes. It was unclear as 
to why he wanted to unite the Dalits, despite giving his own caste-specific name, i.e., 
Ravidas, to the organisation. But whatever his reason, through this organisation he was 
                                                 
201 Frankel, R. Francine. 1989. Caste, Land and Dominance…’, pp: 100-2.  
202 The installation of Damodaram Sanjeevaiah, a Dalit member, as the chief minister of AP was not 
because he was democratically elected by the Congress party, but simply because he was selected as a 
consensus Harijan candidate in order to avert an impending power conflict between the two Reddy 
candidates – Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy and Kasu Brahmananda Reddy.  See Elliot, M. Carolyn. 1970. Caste 
and Faction among the Dominant Caste…In Kothari, Rajni., ed., Caste in India…, pp: 121-61. 
203 Mendelsohn and Vicziany. 2000. The Untouchables…p. 207.  
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neither proposing any radical measures against the caste system, nor caste-based 
discrimination against the Dalits.  He was simply parroting the preaching of the Arya 
Samaj, i.e, asking the Dalits ‘to give up drinking and uncleanliness’.204 
 
During the early 1930’s the Congress, under the leadership of M K Gandhi, was locked in 
a bitter fight with B R Ambedkar over the representation for Dalits in legislative bodies.  
The Congress leaders were on a desperate search for a Dalit leader, who could counter-
weigh the charisma of Ambedkar.  It was during this time that young Jagjivan Ram came 
into contact with Rajendra Prasad, a Brahmin Congress leader from Bihar, who initiated 
the former into the Congress in 1930.  Since then there was no looking back for Jagjivan 
Ram.  From 1930’s to until 1970’s he became the Congress’ symbol of ‘’Harijan’ and 
was promoted within the ranks of the Congress party. He was appointed as the secretary 
of the Bihar Anti-Untouchability League (Harijan Sevak Sangh), and in that capacity he 
accompanied Gandhi during his Bihar tour in 1934.205 In 1937 he was made a member of 
the Bihar Legislative Assembly. In 1940, he became the secretary of the Bihar Congress 
and immediately afterwards, he joined the All India Congress Committee. Such 
promotions for Jagjivan Ram were primarily for two reasons.  First, as pointed out, the 
Congress was in desperate need for a Dalit leader, who could counter-weigh the growing 
influence of Ambedkar among the Dalits.  Jagjivan Ram, with his Arya Samajist-kind of 
ideology, was a perfect Harijan. On his part, Jagjivan Ram did not disappoint his 
masters. During the time of the second Round Table conference in 1931, he requested 
Gandhi, in a telegram, to send him as the representative of the ‘nationalist’ Depressed 
Classes. And again in 1946, he led a delegation to the British Cabinet Mission in order to 
present ‘the view point of Nationalist Harijans and repudiate […] the claim of Dr. 
Ambedkar and his organisation […] to be the representative organisation of Harijans in 
India’.206 Second, unlike most of the other Dalit leaders in the Congress, Jagjivan Ram 
was a tactical politician, who could mould his position in accordance with the positions 
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of those who held power. This had become evident particularly during transition of 
leadership in the Congress in post- Independence India.  
 
After India’s Independence, Jagjivan Ram held various Cabinet portfolios, such as 
Labour Minister,207  Communication Minister, Railways Minister, Minister of Food and 
Agriculture and Defence. In all these responsibilities he proved his administrative skills 
and emerged as one of the most important power base within the Congress party at the 
national level. Some of his initiatives are worth a mention. The Minimum Wages Act, the 
Coal Mines Labour Welfare Fund and the vast network of Employees’ State Insurance 
Corporation, by and large, are the creations of Jagjivan Ram.208 As the Communication 
Minister he took a decision that “every village in India with a population of 2,000 must 
should have a post-office, and if in a particular area there was no such village within 
many square miles, then the criterion laid down was that nobody would have to walk 
more than two miles to utilise postal facilities.  Thus, during his tenure as 
Communication Minister, the vast network of post-offices increased by more than 50 
percent.’209   
 
It was when he was holding this portfolio that,210 “The various air transport companies, 
for example, the Indian National Airways, the Bharat Airways, the Airways India etc. 
were continuously showing losses and the Government had to give them generous 
subsidies year after year.  Jagjivan Ram decided to nationalise air transport.  He faced a 
lot of flak for this.  Some of the industrialists got panicky and branded him a Communist.  
Some big newspapers also came out with editorials and leading articles against the 
proposed move to nationalise air transport. But he was convinced that it would prove to 
be in the interest of the public as well as the employees. A committee was set up to go 
into the matter of compensation which was to be paid in a phased manner.  He was thus a 
pioneer in the process of nationalisation.  Air services showed marked improvement in 
                                                 
207 Appointing Jagjivan Ram as the Labour minister was also part of Congress’ tactics against Ambedkar. 
The latter was hoping to get the labour portfolio in the Nehru’s Cabinet.    
208 Sharma, D. P. 1974. Jagjivan Ram: the man and his times. Delhi: Indian Book Company, p. 84.  
209 Ibid., p. 91.  
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business soon after the take-over.  The pay scales of the employees were revised and 
pushed up.  Overtime benefits were also introduced for a lot of technical and even non-
technical employees. In December 1956, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru felt that 
Indian Railways also needed a facelift.  On December 7, 1956 he asked Jagjivan Ram to 
take over the Railways portfolio and then gave him the Transport Ministry as well.  When 
General Elections in the beginning of 1957, there were slight changes in the Cabinet and 
portfolios changed hands, but the Indian Railways, the biggest employers in the country, 
was kept under the charge of Jagjivan Ram.  He headed the Railway Ministry until April 
9, 1962.  Under him, new railway lines were laid throughout the length and breadth of the 
country.”211 With all his administrative initiatives and reforms, Jagjivan Ram became not 
just one of the significant national leaders of his time, but also an important leader within 
the Congress party. Yet despite the national significance he enjoyed or his importance 
within the party, two powerful positions in the country, that of Prime Minister or 
President, did not come to him. That was simply because of the casteist attitude of the 
Congress Party rather than for any other reason. This fact can be seen in a brief 
examination of the contest for the post of Prime Minister, after the death of Jawaharlal 
Nehru.   
 
After the death of Jawaharlal Nehru on May 27, 1964, there came the question of who 
would be the next Prime Minister of India.  Lal Bahadur Shastri from Uttar Pradesh and 
Morarji Desai from Gujarat made it clear that they were aspirants for the coveted 
position.  Kamaraj Nadar, the president of the Congress party, contacted Jagjivan Ram to 
discuss the question of the future Prime Minister of India.  But the latter suggested that 
the whole affair should be ‘postponed for two or three days’, and ‘stressed that the party 
should choose a leader after consulting as many people as possible’.212 Thus Kamaraj 
Nadar picked up the idea of consensus in the selection of the candidate for the PM’s 
position and communicated the same to the members of the party.  Given the unexpected 
nature of Nehru’s death and its impact over the country, which was passing through a 
turbulent phase in its history, the idea of choosing a candidate on the basis of consensus 
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appeared to be the right course of action.  Yet, in the above suggestion, as Devendra 
Prasad Sharma points out, Jagjivan Ram had something different in his mind.  He wanted 
to emerge as the consensus candidate, particularly in the event of conflict between Lal 
Bahadur Shastri and Morarji Desai – the two Brahmin candidates.  
 
Interestingly the leadership question was sorted out without any conflict between the two 
contenders.  This was due to three specific factors, of which the role played by Jagjivan 
Ram was also crucial.  First, Uttar Pradesh with its largest number of Parliamentary seats 
was the main deciding agency in the selection of the new leaders.  And most of the MPs 
from this state, particularly the Brahmin MPs, formed the largest single block within the 
Congress and put their weight behind Lal Bahadur Shastri. Second, the Congress 
syndicate had set themselves against Morarji Desai, for “they felt that he was too rigid a 
person and would not make a good Prime Minister”.213  In addition to the Syndicate’s 
attitude towards Desai’s candidature, Desai himself did not have a good support base 
beyond Maharashtra, Mysore and Tamil Nadu. Finally, it was stated that Jagjivan Ram 
had less support among the members from Uttar Pradesh, Bengal, Assam and Tamil 
Nadu, but enjoyed good support among members from Bihar, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, 
Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh. Apparently, some of his supporters 
suggested that Jagjivan Ram should join hands with Morarji Desai and share the two 
positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, between them.  Despite these 
suggestions and contrary to newspaper speculations, Jagjivan Ram neither stood in the 
fray for leadership, nor did he join hands with Morarji Desai. Jagjivan Ram knew that on 
his own he had less chances of winning the contest.  This was the main reason for him 
suggesting a ‘consensus candidate’. That is, he wanted to make use of an opportunity that 
would come up in the event of a conflict between the two contenders for the position. 
Further, he was well aware that either going against the powerful Congress syndicate or 
joining hands with Desai, the weak power base within the Congress would weaken his 
own base inside the Congress party. It is clear from this that in his long political career 
Jagjivan Ram generally did not act against the will of his Party bosses. In fact, the 
extraordinary longevity of his Congress career was, as remarked by Mendelsohn and 
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Vicziany “a consequence of both his competence and also his carefulness not to engage 
in dissent and controversy”.214 This exceptionality of Jagjivan Ram, as observed by Paul 
Brass, “gave his caste brothers the illusion that such a rise to power was possible”. But 
the fact has been that, “the Scheduled Caste leaders who have been given Congress 
tickets in the reserved constituencies are non-militant and have no power in the local or 
state Congress organisations”.215 But how did the Congress manage to turn the Dalits into 
its vote bank?  
 
As the Dalit leadership was co-opted through the inducements of positions of power and 
material benefits, the Dalit masses were also persuaded into the Congress-fold by 
establishing a special league, the Dalit Varg Sangh (The League of the Dalits) as well as 
extending reservations and other facilities. For instance, during the early 1970’s, 
especially keeping the 1971 general elections in mind, Indira Gandhi took many 
significant decisions that roped in a large number of Dalits into the Congress-fold. Some 
of the notable decisions were in the fall of 1969, when Buddhists became eligible for 
Scheduled Caste post-metric scholarships; in December of the same year the Constitution 
was amended to extend reservations in representative bodies for another ten years; in 
January 1970, a proposal was made by the government to toughen the Untouchability 
(Offences) Act; and in April, reservations for direct recruitment to the central services 
were raised from 12.5 to 15 per cent for Dalits.216 Further, between 1971 and 1977, a 
number of policies and programmes were designed exclusively for the rural poor, the 
landless and small farmers in the state. For the Dalits, wells were dug for drinking water 
and sites for houses and land for agriculture were distributed. Interestingly, many of these 
schemes were operated not by the state government, but carried out under the supervision 
of the central government to bring about a ‘total rural regeneration’. Through these 
policies and programmes, the Congress Party was able to effectively capture and 
integrate the Dalits within its fold.217   
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The politics of co-option and accommodation of the Dalits in the Congress Party had two 
major implications on both of them: first, the Congress was assured of securing three- 
fourths of the reserved seats at any given time and in any given election. The guaranteed 
support of the Dalits added to the support of the upper castes, especially the Brahmins 
and Thakurs, and the Muslims’ support also helped the Congress form successful 
governments in the state. Secondly, the Dalits’ support to the Congress Party did not 
benefit them beyond small measures like housing sites and wells.218The Dalits’ co-option 
into the Congress Party, in effect, destroyed the space for the emergence of a strong and 
independent Dalit leadership in post-independent India, at least for the next three decades 
after Independence. Within the Congress, the Dalit MPs and MLAs found their hands 
were tied insofar as addressing the causes of the Dalits because they did not have a 
support base: that is, they were not exclusively elected by the Dalit voters, but by voters 
from all castes and communities. In fact, there was not a single reserved constituency 
with a majority of Dalit voters. This absence of a majority Dalit constituency compelled 
the Dalit leaders to seek the support of others, the upper castes as well as other lower 
castes who were dependant on the upper castes in the form of a patron-client system.219  
 
Such practical inconsistencies of the Dalit representation led one Dalit to comment, “This 
system does the Scheduled Castes no good because the people in the reserved seats 
belong to the party in power and are often incapable persons. Although they are educated, 
they dare not speak out against the party in power. They do not represent their people to 
the party and the government, but represent the party in power to the people.”220 Indeed, 
the measure of political representation for the Dalits in practice, it has been forcefully 
observed by Kanshi Ram, assisted the upper castes to create ‘a bunch of Dalit leaders’ 
that became stooges (chamchas)221 in the hands of the former at the expense of the poor 
                                                 
218  My interview with Bablu Choudhari, Lucknow, 24 Febraury, 2005.  
219Satish Saberwal in his analysis of reserved constituencies in Punjab draws the same conclusion: ‘A 
constituency at the state-level […] would have a large majority of high caste voters, making the candidates 
less dependent upon – and therefore less responsive to – the Harijan vote. Support from high caste leaders 
is, therefore, crucial for success at this level [as well as at the level of the parliamentary constituency, one 
might argue].’ Saberwal, Satish. 1972. The Reserved Constituency. Candidates and consequences. EPW, 
7(2), pp: 71+73-80.  
220 Quoted in Shah, Ghanshyam. 1997. Consequences of Reservations. In Pai Panandiker, V., ed., The 
Politics of Backwardness: Reservation Policy in India. New Delhi: Konark Publishers, p.244.  
221 Ram, Kanshi. 1984. Struggle for Equality & Self-Respect. In: Oppressed Indian.  
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Dalits. This is one of the reasons why leaders like Ambedkar, who ventured into a long 
fight against the Congress to obtain the reserved seats, called for their abolition as early 
as 1955 itself. Since then Dalits, especially the educated Dalits have been arguing against 
political representation for the Dalits. For instance, Kanshi Ram, denouncing the Poona 
Pact that laid the foundation for the present form of representation, criticised that saying, 
“it (the Pact) was designed to make the Dalits stooges in mainstream political parties, 
especially in the Congress.”222  
 
Thus from the above discussion on the measure of political representation for the Dalits 
we can conclude that although Dalits gained access to representative bodies, that measure 
did not assist them to develop a viable voice that could firmly secure their interests.  
Instead the measure became a solid weapon in the hands of the non-Dalits, especially the 
upper castes, because to win in any reserved constituency contestants required votes from 
both the Dalits and non-Dalit constituencies. Non-Dalits have mostly preferred 
candidates, who do not forget his/her caste status, and who pay due regard to the upper 
castes.  On their part, the political parties make sure that they always pick up the right 
Dalit candidates, who could mouth the language of their respective parties in the tone of 
the common Dalits. The Congress party had been the major beneficiary of the measure of 
political representation for the Dalits. For by co-opting a majority of the Dalit leaders 
through the inducements of positions of power and material benefits, the party managed 
to keep a check, though temporarily, against the growth of an independent Dalit 
leadership. Further, through a number of welfare programmes the party succeeded in 
inducing the Dalit constituency into its fold, ultimately turning them as its ‘vote bank’.  
The Congress party might have succeeded in halting the growth of the independent Dalit 
leadership by co-opting the RPI leadership, and it might have gained political benefits by 
turning the Dalits as its ‘vote bank’, but the question is, has Congress done anything 
substantial to improve the economic condition of the Dalit constituency in UP?  I shall 
answer this question by examining the implementation of the Zamindari Abolition Act 
and Land Reforms in the state.  
                                                 
222 Ram, Kanshi. 1997. Poona Pact Denounced. In Atey, Manohar., ed., The Editorials of Kanshi Ram [Part 
– I], Hyderabad: Bahujan Samaj Publications, p. 93. 
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3.IB.  Zamindari Abolition Act and Land Reforms: On the impact of policies to eliminate 
rural poverty, such as Zamindari Abolition Act and Land Reforms by the Nehruvian 
State, we come across two sets of commentaries or views. The first view, which draws 
from the Marxian class perspective, is that there are structural forces in Indian society, 
entrenched social classes whose actions constrain the political elite from implementing 
policies against the interests of the former.223 According to the second view, the 
countryside has come under the increasing political and economic dominance of the 
landed castes. These castes have used traditional social authority and political power in 
moulding the state’s socio-economic measures to their advantage.224 Taking the cue from 
the later view and by an examination of the process of implementation of the Zamindari 
Abolition Act and Land Reforms and the kind of language used in that process, I argue 
that the landed castes, which have had been aided and abetted by the Congress Party in 
UP have deliberately kept the Dalits out of the ambit of land distribution.  
 
In UP, like in any other state in India, social discrimination and economic oppression by 
caste and class go hand in hand for Dalits.225 In the sense, the positional location of castes 
in the hierarchy corresponds with material conditions, the state of land holding and 
landlessness.226 Time and again such conditions have been consistently reinforced by the 
kind of land settlement and patterns of land distribution by governments in colonial and 
post-colonial India. During the colonial rule the land settlements made by the British 
from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century were closely 
                                                 
223 For a sample of this view see, Pranab Bardhan. 1984. The Political Economy of Development in India, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell; and also the critique by Weiner, Myron. 1986. The Political Economy of 
Industrial Growth in India. World Politics, 38(4), pp: 596-610.   
224 For a representative sample see Frankel, R. Francine. 1978. India’s Political Economy, 1947-1977: The 
Gradual Revolution. Princeton: PUP; and for two critiques of it, Kohil, Atul. 1980. Democracy, Economic 
Growth, and Inequality in India’s Development. World Politics, 32(4), pp: 623-638 and Brass, Paul R., 
1981. Class, Ethnic Group, and Party in Indian Politics. World Politics, 33(3), pp: 454-457; …., 1990. The 
Politics of India Since Independence, Cambridge: CUP, esp. chapters 8 & 9, pp: 269-335.  
225 This is not true in the case of Shudras. Social discrimination against them is not duplicated in economic 
oppression. In fact, the economic prosperity of the upper layers of Shudras, such as Jats, Yadavs, Kurmis, 
had led to their political mobilisation.  See Brass, Paul R., 1980a. The politicisation of the peasantry in a 
north Indian state: Part I. Journal of Peasant Studies, 7(4), pp: 395-426; -----. 1980b. The politicisation of 
the peasantry in a north Indian state: Part II. Journal of Peasant Studies, 8 (1), pp: 3-36.     
226 For caste-class relationship in UP, see Hasan, Zoya. 1989. Power and Mobilization: Patterns of 
Resilience and Change in Uttar Pradesh Politics. In: Frankel, R, Francine and M.S.A. Rao., eds., 
Dominance…pp: 133 – 203; Gould, Harold. 1990. Politics and Caste. New Delhi: Chanakya; Lieten, G.K., 
1994. On Casteism and Communalism in Uttar Pradesh. EPW, 29 (14), pp: 777-81.  
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connected with the positional location of castes. For instance, under the Zamindari 
system, the inequalities of status and power inherent in the caste system corresponded 
more or less to inequalities in access to and distribution of material resources.227 
Although, Indians got rid of the British in 1947, they could not get rid of the system of 
the asymmetrical distribution of material resources. Thus, at the time of Independence, 
Thakurs and Brahmins together owned 57 per cent of the agricultural land in the state.  
The intermediate castes owned another 32 per cent, the Muslims 11 per cent, and Dalits a 
mere 1 per cent.228 The Zamindari Abolition Act undertaken by the government of UP 
also did not make any difference to the existing pattern of land ownership, particularly 
for Dalits.  
 
The Zamindari Abolition Act and the subsequent land reforms were two watershed events 
in the immediate post-Independence UP. These events were important for their role in the 
dislocation (although not completely) of the upper caste Brahmins and Thakurs from their 
dominant positions – of social, economical, and political power. Those events were also 
important for placing the Shudras on the path to economic empowerment, which had a 
decisive impact on future politics. Many academic works reveal that intermediate castes 
like Jats, to a large extent, and the Shudra castes like the Yadavs and the Kurmis, to a 
small extent, were the major beneficiaries of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Indeed, with 
all its limitations, the Act, observes Zoya Hasan, “reduced the relative economic gap 
between upper castes and OBC land-owners.”229 As far as the Dalits were concerned, 
although few Dalit tenant farmers benefited by the Act, a majority of them were kept out 
of the whole project of distribution of the land. Two reasons seem to be at the heart of 
such exclusion: first, following the Abolition Act, the land was distributed among the 
tenant farmers and share-croppers only. The Dalits, who worked as agricultural labour for 
the Jats, Tyagis, Yadavs and Kurmis, do not fall in the category of the tenant farmers or 
the share-croppers. Hence, it seems that they were excluded from the process of land 
                                                 
227 Ahmed, Imtiaz and Saxena, N.C. 1994. Caste, Land and Power in Uttar Pradesh. In Sharma, K.L., ed., 
Caste and Class in India. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, pp: 171-208.   
228 Singh, Baljit and Misra, Shridhar. 1965. A Study of Land Reforms in Uttar Pradesh. Honolulu: East-
West Centre, p. 259.  
229 Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for Power: Oppositional Movements and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar 
Pradesh. New Delhi: OUP, p. 138. 
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distribution.  It must be mentioned here that the Act did not have such phraseology as 
‘landless’ and ‘agricultural labour’,230 and from that point of view, we can say that the 
entire scheme was designed to establish a system of peasant proprietorship rather than a 
system that would have ended landlessness in the state.  Second, Charan Singh, who was 
the minister in-charge to oversee the whole distribution process, was not keen on land 
distribution for the landless and agricultural labourers, especially for the Dalits. An 
observation made by Byres on Charan Singh discloses the latter’s attitude towards the 
Dalits and other marginalised sections:   
In Charan Singh’s universe the vast majority of Harijans are not members of the ‘farming 
community’ at all. They are, for the most part, landless agricultural labourers or very 
poor peasants… When asked, ‘What about those with no land at all, the landless 
peasants?’, the reply from Charan Singh was chilling and uncompromising: Well, 
landless – if a man is landless he cannot be called a farmer or peasant. Then he’s a 
labourer. If you want to give land to the labourer – well, there is no land to give to the 
labourer.231  
 
Strictly speaking, after the abolition of the Zamindari system, the land taken from the 
Zamindars should have been distributed among the landless and agricultural labourers.  
But that did not happen.  In fact, the man in-charge of the distribution did not even 
consider the Dalits for the distribution. It is one of the examples where social power in 
combination with political power results in economic power and thereby reproduces the 
power of the socially dominant classes and castes at the expense of the marginalised 
classes and castes.232 One can further substantiate this point from a field study completed 
                                                 
230 Charan Singh, a Jat by caste, pioneered the Zamindari Abolition Act and the subsequent land reforms 
and the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1953. His ‘social background’ – (Jats are located in 
the middle of the Brahmanical Social Order), as many scholars emphasised, deeply entrenched in his 
‘ways, views and attitudes’. He, like many of his caste fellows, strangely nursed a hatred for Brahmans and 
Dalits – the two castes/communities that were placed at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy.  Charan 
Singh, despite holding many important political positions – both in the state and central governments –  
until his death sustained this hatred for these two rungs of the social order.  In fact, throughout his political 
career he stood as champion and spokesman for the rich peasants, an association that led many 
commentators such as Baxter, Byres, Duncan and Paul Brass and others to describe him as ‘a representative 
of rich and middle peasantry.’ See Baxter, Criag. 1975. The rise and fall of the BKD in Uttar Pradesh. In: 
Weiner, Myron and John Osgood Field., eds., Electoral Politics in the Indian States, V. IV, Delhi; Duncan, 
R. Ian. 1979. The politics of food-grain procurement: a case study from Northern India, cited in Terence, J. 
Byres. 1993. Charan Singh, 1902 – 87: An Assessment. In: Arnold, David and Peter Robb., eds., 
Institutions and Ideologies: A SOAS South Asian Reader, Richmond: Curzon Press, pp: 265-307. 
231 Ping, Ho Kwon. 1979. The rise of the aging sun. Far Eastern Economic Review 103, 11 (23 March), 
cited in Byres, J. Terence. 1993. Op. cit., pp. 286 – 287.  
232 See Frankel, R. Francine. 1988. Middle Classes and Castes in India’s Politics: Prospects for Political 
Accommodation. In: Kohli, Atul., ed., India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society 
Relations. Princeton: PUP.   
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in 1960 by Baljit Singh and Sridhar Misra. According to them, while only 6 per cent of 
Dalit families had been able to take advantage of the reforms by purchasing land in the 
ten years after reforms began in 1951, 55 per cent of the higher caste Hindus and 61 per 
cent of intermediate caste Hindus and Muslims have purchased the land.233 Daniel 
Thorner aptly summed up this new development:  
UP Zamindari Abolition Act has provided for a new hierarchy of tenure holders in place 
of the old, but the new one too is reminiscent of the old. Zamindars have officially 
disappeared, but the same persons have been rechristened landlord of very substantial and 
very high quality tracts of land. For the bulk of the peasantry classified as sirdars, tenure 
remains virtually the same and so does rent, now collected by the government rather than 
the Zamindars. At the bottom remain the mass of landless and crop-sharers.234  
In other words, since the Dalits were kept away from the land distribution, the abolition 
of the Zamindari system made little difference to their existing economic woes. But one 
notable change was that the Dalits, who used to work for the Brahmins and Thakurs 
earlier, now began to work for the Shudras - Jats, Tyagis, Kurmis and Yadavs – the new 
owners of the land.  
 
The subsequent developments in the agricultural arena, such as the Green Revolution, 
have also substantially benefited the beneficiaries of Zamindari Abolition Act and land 
reforms rather than the landless Dalits.235 Some of the later initiatives, such as Small 
Farmers Development Agency (SFDA) and the Marginal Farmers and Agricultural 
Labourers Programme (MFAL), to rectify the limitations and class bias of land reforms 
and the Green Revolution, also could not make any inroads to eliminate rural inequities 
between castes and classes.  For, recipients of aid under these programmes were selected 
by local agencies normally dominated by the existing rural elites.236 Yet, it may be noted 
here that although the land reforms in UP did not benefit the landless Dalits, the overall 
impact and consequences of these reforms had changed the face of rural UP. As the land 
was transferred from the upper castes to the middle castes, particularly to the Shudras, it 
corroded the domination of the upper castes at the grassroots. It also ended the patron-
                                                 
233 Singh, B. and Misra, S. 1965. A Study of Land Reform…, p. 259. 
234 Thorner, Daniel. 1956. The Agrarian Prospect in India, Delhi: Allied Publishers.  
235 See Frankel, R. Francine. 1971. India’s Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs. 
Princeton: PUP.  
236 See Pandey, S.M. 1974. Development of Small Farmers and Agricultural Labourers. Delhi: Shri Ram 
Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Development; also, Joshi, B. 1982. Democracy in Search of 
Equality: Untouchable Politics and Indian Social Change. Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Corporation, esp. 
chapter 4. ‘The New Nation: Public Policy and Scheduled Caste Development’, pp: 60-85. 
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client relationships between the upper castes and lower castes. However, this did not 
mean the end of domination of one caste(s) over other castes. Indeed, the land reforms 
and the consequent empowerment of the Shudras have only added one more constituency 
to the list of already existing constituencies of oppressors. The Shudras, who came to 
own lands became exploiters of the Dalits.  
 
Of course, we should clearly recognise an economic shift that triggered many changes. 
The economic changes in the rural economy led the rural dominant and propertied castes 
and classes to invest in urban areas. Although this slowed down agriculture in the rural 
areas, it hastened developments in the urban centres. From the point of view of the rural 
Dalits, this is an important shift. For developments in urban areas have increased 
employment opportunities for them in farms, brick kilns, in construction activities and 
rickshaw-pulling. This shift is nothing but a disentanglement of the rural Dalits from their 
upper caste patrons, which in the words of Mendelsohn is, ‘historic, non-revolutionary 
transformation.’237 Of course, those Dalits who moved to the urban centres for work, 
surely disentangled themselves from the dominance of the upper castes and upper Shudra 
castes to a greater extent, but what about those Dalits who continued to live in rural 
areas? We shall answer this question in the next section.   
 
To conclude our discussion on the Dalits’ special relationship with Congress, on the basis 
of the declarations made by the Congress Party to promote the interests of the Dalits and 
also on the basis of its electoral success in the reserved seats, the Rudolphs attribute a 
special relationship between the Congress Party and Dalits.  Unlike Rudolphs, I was 
concerned with how that special relationship came to be forged between the Congress 
and Dalits and what that relationship did to the latter.  In order to understand these two 
aspects, I have examined the measure of political representation for Dalits and the 
implementation of the Zamindari Abolition Act and land reforms in the state. The 
changing of double-member constituencies into single-member constituencies changed 
the political fortunes of the Dalit constituency forever. For it placed the non-Dalits, 
                                                 
237 Mendelsohn, Oliver. 1993. The Transformation of Authority in Rural India. Modern Asian Studies, 
27(4), pp: 804 – 42, here, p. 807. 
118 
 
especially the upper castes, and the upper caste-based political parties, in an unduly 
advantageous position to decide the electoral fortunes of the reserved candidates, which 
means that the Dalits and their representative were placed at the mercy of the non-Dalits 
and their political parties. The Congress Party used this situation to its advantage by 
selecting those Dalit candidates, who would not dare to question the party’s leadership 
and its policies and programmes – even though such policies and programmes went 
against the interests of the Dalit constituency.  The non-Dalits too played their part by 
voting those Dalit candidates who would not question the dominance of the upper castes 
or the hierarchical caste system and its traditions.   
 
Apart from the single-member constituencies and the attitudes of the non-Dalits towards 
the Dalit representatives, the one particular episode that placed the Dalits and their 
leaders in the hands of the Congress was its co-option tactics. It succeeded in co-opting 
the RPI leadership through the inducements of positions of power and material benefits. 
A few welfare measures helped the Party to attract the Dalit masses too into its fold and 
ultimately turn them into its ‘vote bank’. But the Congress Party, despite benefiting from 
the measure of political representation for the Dalits and the Dalit ‘vote bank’, did little 
precious to improve their socio-economic miseries. Instead, the Party sided with the 
upper castes and other dominant sections in keeping the Dalits away from the benefits of 
land distribution and measures of SFDA and MFAL. In a way, the Congress has 
succeeded not just in weakening the Dalit leadership, but more importantly, the larger 
Dalit masses also who were now at its mercy for any form of socio-economic benefits. 
But how did the BSP mobilise the Dalits for political power? In the first place, what was 
the context in which a Dalit-based political party emerged on UP’s political arena? We 
shall examine these questions in the next section.  
 
3. II From BAMCEF to Bahujan Samaj Party 
I have argued above that the BSP’s electoral success was not on account of lack of 
representation for the Dalit elites in mainstream political parties or simply on account of 
the representation accorded by the BSP to the Dalit elite, especially Chamars, but 
primarily on account of the support rendered to the Party by a majority of the Scheduled 
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Castes. Moreover, the BSP’s arrival on UP’s political arena was not a sudden event. The 
Party grew out of the All India Backward (SC/ST/OBC) and Minority Communities 
Employees Federation (BAMCEF), a social association of middle-class Dalits - as well as 
members from other lower caste and communities - who were in government 
employment and the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (DS-4), the political wing of 
BAMCEF.  It was the efforts of these two organisations that made the BSP what it is 
today.   
 
But before we move any further one significant question is, why did this mobilisation 
happen with the Dalit employees and why had it not happened with the Dalit political 
leaders? Let’s look at the Dalit leaders and employees respectively, one after the other.  
There are two main reasons why the BSP could not be initiated by the Dalit leaders, 
especially the Congress Dalit leaders. Firstly, Dalit Congress leaders were domesticated 
by the Congress’ upper caste leaders by means of patronage; and secondly, Dalit leaders 
were not confident of winning elections on their own merit, and to win elections they 
were dependant on the banner of the Congress as well as that of the party’s machinery. 
Thus, by establishing a new party, they did not want to risk their established positions. In 
a way, it is a mindset of, ‘why bite the hand that feeds you?’ Feeding is fine, but at what 
cost? It was at the cost of self-respect as well as the complete submission to the upper 
caste leaders.  But the instances of the Dalit employees were completely different.  All of 
them were followers or at least appeared to be followers of Ambedkar, and were familiar 
with his teachings and writings, especially the two famous works of Ambedkar: 
Annihilation of Caste and What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables. 
(Of course, the Dalit political leaders are always familiar with Ambedkar’s works).  But 
what distinguished the Dalit employees from the Dalit political leaders or for that matter, 
from the Dalit masses was their independence, especially economic independence.  
Unlike the Dalit political leaders, the Dalit government employees were neither 
dependant on the upper castes for patronage or their votes, nor on the Dalit masses who 
were dependant on the upper caste landlords or owners for their livelihood. Their 
livelihood was their government job. Thus, this economic independence was a key factor 
which allowed them to give their time and money to BAMCEF’s activities.  In fact, they 
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sponsored and supported with missionary zeal almost all the programmes and activities 
undertaken by Kanshi Ram through BAMCEF and BSP, particularly during the initial 
phase of the party.  
 
It is important to throw some light here on Kanchan Chandra’s argument about the 
support rendered to the BSP by the educated Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Caste 
elite. She argues that the educated Scheduled Castes sought “careers that would give 
them better economic opportunities and higher status than their parents”238 and they could 
secure this only by, “obtaining control of the state’, for such control “presented them with 
more opportunities than the private sector”.239 It is precisely for this reason, Chandra 
argues, that the educated Scheduled Castes supported the BSP.  Similarly, the Scheduled 
Caste elite “required political clout to ensure favourable posts and promotions.  Access to 
political clout, in turn, depended on having members of their own ethnic category in 
elective offices.”240 It was this realisation, Chandra further argues, that led the Scheduled 
Castes elite to support the BSP.  But I differ with Chandra’s argument. My argument is 
that it was on account of the discrimination suffered by both the educated and the elite 
Scheduled Castes in modern spaces of opportunities that led them to support the BSP, for 
in the party they saw an agency that would end their sufferings.  
 
In the rest of the section my aim is to examine the history of the BSP – what made the 
Dalits launch a political party or what was the context in which the formation of the BSP 
took place; and how did the Party mobilise the support of the Dalit constituency, or better 
still - how did the Party construct the Dalit identity, an identity which in turn ensured its 
success in electoral politics?  I have divided this section into three sub-sections. The first 
sub-section briefly provides the social context or the social situation of the Dalits. This 
will help us understand the conditions within which the BSP emerged. The second sub-
section describes the formation of BAMCEF and its activities. The final sub-section 
describes the activities under DS-4 and the formation of the BSP.  
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239 Ibid., p. 174.  
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3. II.A. Violence against Dalits: Social context of Dalit mobilisations: The BSP’s 
electoral success was ensured, at least in its initial stage, by its mobilising the Dalit 
constituency.  How did the Party mobilise the Dalit constituency, which has been divided 
along caste and class lines? In the first instance, what was the context in which disparate 
Dalit castes came to be united under the broad category of a Dalit party? To put the same 
question differently, what was the social context that compelled the Dalits to form their 
political formation? We shall look at the first question in the next sub-section, but for the 
present, we shall examine the social context in which the formation of the BSP took 
place.  In this examination, my main aim is to show how the increase in incidences of 
violence against the Dalits at the hands of the upper castes compelled them to unite under 
the Dalit social category, which eventually led them to support the BSP.  
 
Before we proceed any further, it is suggested that we take note of the insights provided 
by Mendelsohn and Vicziany on the problem of violence against Dalits.241 On the basis 
of the actual nature of violence suffered by Dalits, Mendelsohn and Vicziany divided  
incidents of violence into two broad categories. First, there is ‘traditional violence’. That 
is, demanding sexual favours from Dalit women in return for some inducements, or 
raping Dalit women; and violence against the Dalits on the basis of their association with 
the dark forces of life, as the caste-Hindu mind would interpret it – are a few examples of 
traditional violence against Dalits. Secondly, there is violence on account of Dalits’ 
resistance against caste-based discrimination or the caste-Hindu response to the Dalits. 
The Dalits’ objection to discrimination against the practice of ritual untouchability, 
claims to social respect, agricultural land, housing sites, and payment of statutory 
minimum wages, are a few examples for the second category of violence against them.242  
This category of violence was unleashed against the Dalits during the 1970’s and ’80’s in 
UP and also in other parts of India.  
 
Although the stated violence and social oppression against the Dalits were not new 
experiences in their every day lives, by the early 1970’s, however, we witness a new 
                                                 
241 For an insightful commentary on atrocities against Dalits, see Mendelsohn and Vicziany. 2000. The 
Untouchables…, esp. chapter 2. ‘The question of ‘Harijan atrocity’, pp: 44-76. 
242 Ibid., p. 45.   
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phenomenon in its execution and in the forms of oppression.  While during earlier times, 
individual Dalits were targeted by the upper castes for any ‘wrongdoing’, i.e., breaching 
the customs imposed on them by the caste society, since the ’70’s the Dalits were 
targeted as a group even though the wrongdoing was committed by individual Dalits. We 
shall witness similar phenomenon in AP as well during the same period (see chapter 5). 
In other words, violence against the Dalits was not because of their collective 
wrongdoing, but simply because of their collective identity. Since suffering was a 
collective phenomenon, a phenomenon that is mainly because of a collective identity, a 
majority of the Scheduled Castes kept their individual caste identities aside and stood 
behind the BSP for their collective freedom by claiming the Dalit identity.243  In the 
remaining sub-section, I have provided two cases of caste Hindus’ response against the 
Dalits claim to social respect as well as their claim to citizenship rights.    
 
Case 1: ‘Serve us in glass tumblers’ – Refusing to be Untouchables in Hathras:244 Hathras 
is a small town situated close to Aligarh town in western UP. On May 18, 1980, at about 
3 pm on a hot summer day, four young men entered the cool-drinks shop of Kaushal 
Chandra Gaud. Gaud belonged to the toddy-tappers caste within the Shudra category. 
They asked for four glasses of lassi (buttermilk).  As the young men in question belonged 
to the Bhangi caste, the shop owner served them lassi in kullads (earthen cups).  
 
The young men, who were in their twenties, were frustrated and angry at being treated as 
untouchables time and again, even by a poor person like Gaud whose economic situation 
and social status was akin to theirs. They asked him to serve them lassi in glass tumblers 
rather than in ‘kullads’. Gaud’s responded by saying that would not be possible because 
they are untouchables. Seething with anger the young men said, “[B]ut we also pay the 
same price for the lassi as everyone else. So serve us in glass tumblers just like you do for 
                                                 
243 See Alam, Javeed. 1999. Is Caste Appeal Casteism? Oppressed Castes in Politics. EPW, 34(13), pp: 
757-761.  
244 Case is taken from Joshi, Vijay. 1980. Uttar Pradesh: Caste Conflict in Hathras. EPW, 15(29), p. 1211. 
During my field work interviews I realized a few facts of the incident were hidden by the author, especially 
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your other customers.”245  Although the young men did not raise their voice against him, 
Gaud could sense their anger. Without further discussion, he served them the cold drink 
in glass tumblers. The faces of the young men lit up with joy. They felt as if they had 
conquered the world. After enjoying the cold lassi, they complimented Gaud for making 
such a delicious drink. They handed him the money and after thanking him profusely, 
they were about to leave the shop.   
 
It was at this point that Brahmanical casteism once again reared its head in the Shudra 
(Gaud’s) mind. He insisted that the men should clean their glasses themselves before they 
left the shop.  The young men got angry again.  “Do you ask the savarna-log (upper 
castes) to wash their glasses? Then why are you asking us,” they questioned controlling 
their anger. “Because you are untouchables and they are the upper castes,” retorted Gaud 
dismissively.  The word ‘untouchable’ hurt the youngsters. They refused to clean the 
glasses. There followed angry exchanges between Gaud and the youths which escalated 
into physical violence.  Other shop-keepers and Dalits gathered in the shop and a full 
blown fight broke out between the shop-keepers (upper castes as well as Shudras) and the 
Dalits (mostly Bhangis). Although a sub-inspector of police came to the scene with a few 
constables, they could not control the angry mob.  They had come to blows and were 
throwing stones at each other.  Eventually the situation was brought under control after 
the arrival of a police contingent.   
 
Although both the parties stopped fighting after the police descended on the scene, they 
renewed the violence the next day.  The Bhangis, who work as safai karm charis 
(sweepers and cleaners) for the Municipality, gathered in front of the Municipal office to 
demand protection from the Shudras as well as the upper castes.  The shop-keepers, who 
were joined by the Shudras and upper castes, went to the main streets and pulled down 
the shutters of all the shops.  From there they moved to Seeal Mohalla, a neighbourhood 
mostly populated by the Dalits. The caste-Hindu mob demanded the closure of all the 
shops in that area as well.  When the Dalits objected to the demand, it triggered off fresh 
                                                 
245 My interview with Naresh Bhangi in Hatharrah on February 18, 2004. Naresh Bhangi is a social activist 
and one of the leaders of the Bhangis.  
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violence between the caste-Hindus and the Dalits. The violence spread to the Dalit 
neighbourhood of Nagla Balansha Mohalla. Questioning the audacity of the Dalits who 
had insisted they should also be served lassi in glass tumblers, the caste-Hindus looted 
Dalit houses and shops as if to give them a fitting response.  Further, they set huts on fire 
by dousing them in kerosene and went on the rampage killing the cattle owned by the 
Dalits.    
 
Case 2: Riots in Agra:246 On April 14, 1978, just as they did every year, those living in 
Jatav basti in Agra gathered to celebrate the birthday of their hero, Baba Saheb 
Ambedkar. An important event in the celebrations was a seven-hour long parade.  The 
parade kicked off in Jatav basti. The procession started after sunset and continued late 
into the night as it wound its way through the Dalit as well as upper caste 
neighbourhoods. The two main attractions of the parade were imaginatively decorated 
tableaux depicting scenes from the lives of Buddha and Ambedkar, and an elephant 
carrying a life-sized portrait of Ambedkar. A brass band that kept pace provided the 
music for the procession.  At about 11 pm, the parade was passing through the upper 
caste neighbourhoods of Pipal Mandi and Rawat Para.  All of a sudden, bricks and stones 
rained down on the crowd. As they had faced similar incidents earlier as well, the Jatav 
marchers were ready to strike back at the violence against them.  They retaliated by 
throwing back the bricks and stones at their oppressors and in the process, damaged a 
house and some shops before the police could arrive on the spot.  
 
The next day, April 15, the upper caste store-keepers, along with their leaders, wore black 
arm-bands to protest against the ‘attack by the untouchables’.247  They went to Chhatta 
police station to lodge a case against the Jatavs. On their way to the police station the 
upper castes shouted slogans such as, ‘Change the route of the parade’, ‘Death to 
Ambedkar’, and ‘Doom to the Jatavs’.248 Some of the complaints of the upper castes were 
that the police had not registered a case; that the parade caused major disturbances in 
Pipal Mandi and Rawat Para neighbourhoods; and that despite their complaints against 
                                                 
246 The case is primarily taken from Owen, M. Lynch. 1981. Rioting as Rational Action... pp: 1951-1956.  
247 Amar Ujala, April 16, 1978.  
248 Owen, Lynch. 1981. Rioting as Rational Action…, p. 1952.  
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the march and the ‘violent behaviour of the untouchables’, the route of the parade had not 
been changed. Other complaints included the amount of destruction – the shops of 
innocent owners had been looted; all the Jatav marchers were armed with dangerous 
weapons. Interestingly, the complainants denied hurling bricks and stones at those taking 
part in the march.249  
 
The Jatav leaders and leaders of the other Dalit castes met and denied all the charges 
levelled against them by the upper castes, and called for peace between all the castes. 
Further, a decision was taken to hold a peace march on April 23 against the upper castes’ 
insult to Ambedkar by wearing black arm-bands, and to pass through Rawat Para once 
again - the upper caste neighbourhood where stones were thrown at them earlier. Those 
in the peace march shouted slogans such as, ‘Gandhism is false’, and ‘Hail Ambedkar’.250 
As the parade approached Rawat Para, the upper castes clashed with the Dalit marchers. 
The upper caste members threw hot water at those in the procession and the latter 
retalaited by throwing their sandals at the attackers. As always, the police landed on the 
scene late and they tried to disperse the crowd with lathis and tear gas. There was bedlam 
as women and children were injured in the lathi charge.251  There was blood spill on the 
streets and the police arrested some of the important Jatav leaders.   
 
Five aspects are clear from the above incidents of violence between the caste-Hindus and 
Dalits.  First, having separate glasses for the caste-Hindus and the Dalits is a blatant 
practise of caste discrimination against the Dalits.  By asking the shop-keeper to serve 
them in the same glasses used for caste-Hindus, the Dalit youths were making a point that 
they should be treated as equals. Secondly, the caste-Hindus responded with violence to 
the Dalits’ demand for equality. We should note here that although the initial incident 
was between four Dalit men and a shop-keeper, a large section of caste-Hindus 
voluntarily pitched in to teach the Dalits a lesson for demanding equal treatment.  In the 
violence that ensued, the caste-Hindu mob targeted not just the four Dalit men but the 
latter’s entire caste. Another aspect of the violence against the Dalits was destruction of 
                                                 
249 Amar Ujala, April 16, 1978, cited in Ibid., pp: 1952-53.  
250 Ibid., p: 1953.  
251 Amar Ujala, April 16, 1978, cited in Ibid., p.1953.  
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property, such as houses and cattle. “Focussing on the physical properties of the Dalits 
was a motivated act by the savarnalog (the upper castes),” observes Narendra Gautam, 
“They knew that reconstructing houses and getting new livestock would be next to 
impossible for the Dalits. And in the process of rebuilding their houses and lives, the 
Dalits would not dare to question the savarnalog.”252 To a large extent, the violence 
against the Dalits was not a spontaneous act, but a carefully studied and planned one. 
 
Thirdly, public roads are open for use by the general public; and the Dalits, as part of the 
of the country’s population, have every right to use the roads.  But the upper castes did 
not want the Dalits to use the roads which was why they lodged a police complaint 
against them. What we have to understand here is that by using the public roads the 
Dalits were claiming their civil rights just like any other citizen, as it was enshrined in the 
Constitution of India. The upper caste’s objection was to obstruct the rights of the Dalits. 
Finally, the role of the police: while in the first incident most of the time they remained 
mute spectators to the caste-Hindus’ violence against the Dalits, in the second incident 
they took the side of the upper castes by beating up the Dalit protesters and arresting their 
leaders.  In a way, the state and society had united in the oppression and suppression of 
the Dalits.  It was in such a social context that the Dalits were looking for a political party 
which would take up their problems and fight for them. In the BSP they found that 
answer. But, when and how did the formation of the BSP take place? We shall answer 
this question in the next sub-section.   
 
3. IIB. Formation of the BAMCEF and its activities: The BSP which emerged from the 
BAMCEF and the DS-4, was the brainchild of Kanshi Ram, who in turn, was responding 
to the institutional discrimination meted out against fellow Dalit employees by the upper 
caste employees.  As such it is important to understand who Kanshi Ram was and what 
kind of experience led him to conceive those bodies.  Kanshi Ram, whose followers 
address him fondly as Saheb or Manyawar, and who was also generally considered to be 
                                                 
252 My interview with Narendra Gautam, a sociology graduate from Allahabad University, 10 March, 2004.  
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‘the messiah of the oppressed’ and the embodiment of Ambedkar himself,253 was born on 
March 15, 1934 in a humble Raidasi Sikh (Dalit) family in Khawaspur village of Ropar 
district in Punjab.254 He is one of the few fortunate Dalits to get an education and later, 
employment in the government sector.  After his degree, he took up a job as a researcher 
in the Explosive Research and Defence Laboratory (ERDL), an ammunitions factory in 
Pune. 
 
One of the common criticisms levelled by the Dalits against Nehruvian institutions is that 
they had become ‘Brahmin agraharams’ (Brahmin residential areas) in post-Independent 
India. Considering the presence of both the Dalits and non-Dalits in those institutions, 
such a criticism against the Brahmins is unfair. But this does not mean that these 
institutions have become non-discriminatory. In fact, these institutions were both 
Brahmanised and Hinduvised by the Brahmins and other upper castes, who constituted 
the majority there. The Dalits, who were constitutionally entitled for a representation to 
the tune of 15 percent, had always remained in a minority in those institutions on account 
of this prescribed percentage, as well as the unwillingness on the part of the upper-caste 
Hindu executives to fill up even the prescribed percentage of posts.  Such a gap in spatial 
presence between the Dalits and the upper-caste Hindus allowed the latter to take control 
and impose their ‘raj’ in these institutions.  Kanshi Ram, who was working in ERDL, 
encountered one such instance of cultural hegemony of the upper castes.  It is said that 
incident not only changed his life and work, but also the entire course of the Dalit 
movement and politics in contemporary India.   
 
The ERDL cancelled the two holidays meant to celebrate the birthdays of Babasaheb 
Ambedkar and Gauthama Buddha, and instead sanctioned a holiday on the birthday of 
Tilak and added one more day to the Diwali holidays.255 Although the Dalits were in a 
minority in ERDL, they had the courage to question the cultural hegemony of the upper 
                                                 
253 Some of the slogans of the BSP cadre testify their identification of Kanshi Ram with Ambedkar: (a) 
Baba tera Mission adhura Kanshi Ram karega pura (Baba, referring to Ambedkar, Kanshi Ram will 
complete your unfulfilled Mission); (b) Baba Saheb ka doosara nam Kanshi Ram, Kanshi Ram (Kanshi 
Ram is the second name of Baba Saheb).  
254 Teltumbde, A. 2006. An Enigma Called Kanshi Ram. EPW, 41(43&44), pp: 4531 -32, here p. 4531. 
255 Pai, Sudha. 2002. Dalit Assertion…p. 87.   
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castes. Moreover in Pune, where the ERDL was located, the young Dalits were 
continuously engaged in discussing the ideas of Mahatma Phule and Ambedkar. Dina 
Bhana, a Dalit employee in the laboratory, was enraged by the list of holidays and 
protested against the decision which led to his suspension from the ERDL. It should be 
noted here that despite the strong presence of Ambedkarite organisations in Pune, no 
Dalit organisation took up the issue.  After Ambedkar’s death, particularly in the early 
1960’s, both the Dalit movement and the politics in Maharashtra were highly fragmented 
and Dalit leaders were busy fighting each other. So much so, the cancellation of the two 
holidays appeared to be a non-issue for them.  But young Kanshi Ram was enraged by 
this blatant caste-biased decision and the high-handedness of the upper caste 
management. He supported Bhana and organised a protest against the management’s 
decision.  Moreover, he filed a case against Bhana’s suspension in a District Court of 
Law, despite intimidation by the management.  Although the case took two years, the 
Court verdict not only revoked Bhana’s suspension, more importantly, it also restored the 
two holidays. 
 
This incident seems to have had a lasting impact on Kanshi Ram as well as other Dalit 
employees in the laboratory. They felt the need for a strong Dalit organisation that would 
fight the high-handedness of the upper caste authorities in the organisation, and with that 
intention they began associating with various Dalit organisations in Maharashtra, such as 
People’s Education Society, Buddha Club, etc.  During this period, the radical Dalit 
movements, Dalit Panthers and Dalit Sangharsh Samiti (DSS), were emerging in 
Maharashtra and neighbouring Karnataka, respectively. Although Kanshi Ram and his 
colleagues at the ERDL appeared to have been aware of these movements, they were not 
attracted to them.  Instead, RPI become their choice, as they, especially Kanshi Ram, had 
been deeply influenced by Ambedkar’s call for political power, a call that was given to 
Dalits and other marginalised sections on September 24, 1944 in Madras.  Ambedkar 
declared: “Understand our ultimate goal.  Our ultimate goal is to become the rulers of this 
country.  Write this goal on the walls of your houses so that you will never forget.  Our 
struggle is not for the few jobs and concessions but we have a larger goal to achieve. That 
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goal is to become the rulers of the land.”256  Ambedkar called upon Dalits to become 
rulers of India within the parliamentary framework but not through acts of insurgency. 
Kanshi Ram too, it appears, decided to work within the parliamentary framework rather 
than outside of it. Hence, he did not associate with the emerging radical Dalit movements 
in Maharashtra or Karnataka.  
 
At this stage, the Dalit movement and politics in Maharashtra were dominated and 
controlled by self-styled Ambedkarites, who were divided into two larger groups: one 
group consisted of the RPI leaders that came exclusively from the Mahar caste and the 
other, Congress Dalit leaders who came from different Dalit castes, especially the non-
Mahars. While the former splintered into many factions, the latter group was more or less 
domesticated by upper caste Congress leaders like Y. B. Chavan.257  Although Kanshi 
Ram appeared to have been disillusioned with the state of Dalit politics, especially with 
the RPI kind of politics, he worked for the Party for nearly eight years, particularly 
during the initial phase of his activism. Working for the party had been a learning 
experience for the young Kanshi Ram.  Most of his ideas and arguments took shape 
during this stage.  He felt that the idea of true democracy under the varna-based social 
order was impossible. The Indian democracy, for Kanshi Ram, is, “rule by the upper 
castes, based upon manuvadi or the Brahmanic order.”258 Further, his close observation 
of RPI leaders and Congress’ Dalit leaders and the treatment meted out to these two 
groups by the upper caste Congress leaders, led Kanshi Ram to see them as chamchas 
(stooges) of the Congress. These ideas were later developed in his book, The Chamcha 
Age (An Era of the Stooges).  But the trigger was with the co-option of a Dalit leader by 
the Congress. Dadasaheb Gaikwad was a committed and much respected RPI Dalit 
leader. But he joined the Congress for a Lok Sabha reserved seat. Kanshi’s dream of 
political power for the oppressed masses was completely shattered by this act, and thus 
began his disassociation with the RPI.  
 
                                                 
256 Quoted in Crossette, Barbara. 1990. A Call to the Downtrodden: Break Down the Door. The New York 
Times, April 18.  
257 Pai, Sudha. 2002. Dalit Assertion…. p. 88.  
258 Ibid., p.89.  
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BAMCEF:  Disenchanted with the chamcha politics of the RPI and the Congress’ Dalit 
leaders, Kanshi Ram and his close associates at the ERDL decided to develop an 
organisation which would spread the ideas and ideals of Ambedkar and Phule. During 
this time, Kanshi Ram was joined by Kaparde, a committed Dalit employee, and together 
they began to formulate ideas for an organisation to be built up by educated employees 
from the lower castes. The idea of an organisation for Dalits was taken up by Kanshi 
Ram and his colleague passionately, a BSP activist recollects, as if it was their life 
mission.259 On December 6, 1973 they established BAMCEF260 with the object of 
fighting against caste discrimination within the civil service;261 its motto, ‘Educate, 
Organise, and Agitate’, was adopted from Ambedkar’s teachings. Through this 
association the Dalit leadership managed to establish a network of Dalit employees in 
various government services throughout Maharashtra and in the adjacent regions.  In 
1976, a functioning office of the BAMCEF was established in Delhi. The base in Delhi 
seemed to be a good move as it facilitated the spread of the organisation in Punjab, 
Haryana, UP, and MP. BAMCEF’s first unit in UP was started in 1978 in Agra, and later 
re-launched in Lucknow with Raj Bahadur, a government employee at the Central 
Telephone Office, as the founder-convenor.262   
 
A significant aspect about BAMCEF was that unlike other socio-political organisation of 
the Dalits, it was relatively free from monetary constraints. For almost all the members in 
the organisation were government employees and that enabled them to support the 
organisation’s activities with generous monetary contributions. This in turn enabled the 
organisation to undertake activities in a much bigger way.  But then, as an organisation of 
government employees, its focus was mainly two types of activities: to disseminate 
information among the educated Dalits, and to organise public demonstrations against 
injustices meted out to them. The main aim of these activities was to raise the 
consciousness of the Dalits to their plight and to press for social action. The former was 
                                                 
259 Interview with a BSP activist in Mahoba on 25th March, 2005.  
260 Prior to the establishment of BAMCEF, Kanshi Ram and his colleagues had established the Scheduled 
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Minorities Employees Welfare Association in 1971, 
see Mendelsohn and Vicziany. 1998. The Untouchables… p. 220. 
261 See, Kumar, Vivek & Sinha, Uday. 2001. Dalit Assertion and Bahujan Samaj Party: A perspective from 
below. Delhi: Bahujan Sahitya Sansthan, p. 58. 
262 Interview with Sandeep Gautham, Lucknow March 12, 2004.  
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organised through various forms of literary and cultural events, like launching of the 
journal - Oppressed Indian, celebrating Ambedkar’s birth and death anniversaries, re-
starting the ‘Ambedkar Memorial Football Tournament’ and felicitations for Dalit poets 
(kavi sammelana) on Ambedkar Jayanti. As for social action, it was held through public 
awareness programmes. One such programme was, ‘Ambedkar Mela on Wheels’. This 
was an audio-visual account of Ambedkar’s life and views, together with contemporary 
material on oppression, atrocities, and poverty of the Dalits. Apparently this ‘Mela’ 
seemed to have been one of the biggest mobilising campaign undertaken by BAMCEF in 
nine North Indian states, spread from Jabalpur to Jammu and Allahabad to Jaipur.  
 
Apart from this Mela, the other important activity undertaken by BAMCEF was 
popularising the ‘Ambedkar calendar’ that contained information on the efforts and 
events connected with the leader’s life and mission.263  It is said that between 1977 and 
1980, more than 2, 50,000 calendars were distributed in North India, a reflection on how 
the organisation was spreading its wings.264  
  
The BAMCEF’s greatest contribution, it should be noted, was the funding of its monthly 
magazine and newspaper.  Kanshi Ram and his colleagues were more than convinced by 
the fact that the mass media which was dominated by the upper castes/classes, did not 
highlight issues relating to the Dalits.  Hence it was important to have their own medium, 
not only to highlight the plight of the oppressed, but also to conscientise the oppressed.  
In the words of Kanshi Ram: “All the efforts by the oppressed Indians throughout the 
length and breadth of the country could have resulted in the building of a solid 
organisation by these people, but the blacking out of news keeps them isolated and in the 
dark. An efficient news service owned and operated by the oppressed Indians would 
                                                 
263 Some of the quotations from Ambedkar are very well chosen to awake and inspire the Dalits. For 
instance one of the famous quotes of Ambedkar in BAMCEF’s calendar that was chosen by Kanshi Ram is: 
“You must have firm belief in the sacredness of your goal.  Your aim is noble and sublime; and your 
mission glorious. Blessed are those who are awakened to serve others.  Glory be to those who devote their 
time, talents and all for the amelioration of slavery. Glory to those who keep up the struggle for the 
liberation of the enslaved, in the face of heavy odds and humiliation till they achieve their aim of securing 
rights for the downtrodden.” - Dr. Ambedkar, quoted by Ram, Kanshi in 1997. The Sacredness of your 
goal. In: Atey, M. ed., The Editorials of Kanshi Ram Part I, Hyderabad: Bahujan Samaj Publications, p. 35.  
264Ibid., p. 34. 
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bring things out into the light.”265 Towards this end, BAMCEF sponsored, ‘The 
Oppressed Indian’, a monthly magazine in English. Kanshi Ram himself wrote the 
editorials.  Since its establishment in 1973, until the formation of the BSP in 1984, and to 
an extent even in the later years, BAMCEF remained the resource body in terms of men 
and material help, especially monetary assistance.  
 
Two other most important achievements of BAMCEF were, first, the organisation 
succeeded in bringing a majority of the lower caste government employees, especially 
Dalits in UP and other North Indian states under its umbrella; and secondly, through the 
print media, it was able to spread the ideology of Ambedkar and Phule among educated 
Dalits. An important outcome of BAMCEF’s activities had been the growing popularity 
of Kanshi Ram among the educated Dalit youth in the state. They looked up to him as 
‘the messiah of the Dalits’ and began to rally around him. In fact, it was the youth who 
helped to popularise DS-4, when BAMCEF initiated this political platform in 1981.  
 
3. II.3. From DS-4 to BSP: The BAMCEF, under the leadership of Kanshi Ram, had 
always nurtured the idea of political power for the oppressed Indian.  But he could not 
have achieved his ambition by confining BAMCEF’s activities only among the middle 
class and educated Dalits. There had to be wider scope of its activities, particularly its 
political activities to reach out to rural Dalits who were really oppressed.  Towards 
achieving this end, the leadership wished to set up a parallel political organisation that 
would not only address the problems of the Dalits and other oppressed masses, but also 
stand up against the Congress’ politics of ‘domestication’.  In other words, the new 
political organisation would be the agitational wing of BAMCEF.  With these aims in 
mind, the Dalit leadership established the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharshan Samiti on 
December 6, 1981 which came to be known as DS-4.266 
 
If the BSP was an instant success among the lower castes, it was because of the activities 
undertaken by DS-4. It criticised the domination of the upper castes within the existing 
                                                 
265 The Oppressed Indian. April, 1979.  
266 For a brief description on the need for the formation of the DS-4, see Kanshi Ram. 1997. D-S4 For 
Limited Political Action. In Atey, M. ed., The Editorials of Kanshi Ram…,p. 85. 
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socio-political and cultural arenas; also, the mobilisational strategies of Kanshi Ram and 
other Dalit leaders reached its pinnacle with DS-4. A metaphor that Kanshi Ram and his 
followers often repeated was the former’s analysis of the Indian social system based on 
the analogy of a ballpoint pen: the top of the pen represents the upper castes, which 
constitute only 15% of the population, the rulers of the country; while the pen itself 
represents the remaining 85 % which continued to be the ruled.  The sketch of the Indian 
social system given by Kanshi Ram was as follows:  
Table 3.3: The Indian Social System 
 
Beneficiaries of the system 
10% to 15% 
- Brahmin                                3.5% 
 
- Kshatriya                               5.5% 
 
- Vyshya                                  6%  
 
 
 
 
Victims of the system 
85% to 90% 
 
- Intermediary Castes                 10.5% 
 
- Other Backward Castes  
(OBCs – 3743 castes )                52% 
 
- Scheduled Castes  
(SCs – 1500 castes)                    15% 
 
- Scheduled Tribes  
(STs – 1000 castes)                       7.5% 
  
Kanshi Ram’s articulations metamorphosed into slogans, which were often extremely 
aggressive and easily caught the attention of Dalits and non-Dalits alike. Some of the 
slogans were:  
 Tilak, taraju aur talwar inko maro joote char (The tilak (Brahmin), the scales 
(represents the merchant caste, the Vysya) and sword (represents Kshatriya – the 
warrior caste), hit them with shoes (shoe represents the Chamars)267    
 
                                                 
267 Ian Duncan has an interesting commentary to offer. According to him, D-S4 and BSP inherited the 
tradition of chanting slogans during demonstrations and processions from the Republican Party of India, the 
main vehicle for Ambedkarite politics in the 1960’s. Some of the election campaigns of the RPI were 
contested in the court of Law, particularly the Allahabad High Court, as the campaigners were seeking to 
win votes on the basis of caste and religion. One such slogan was Thakur, Brahman aur Lala/Kardo inka 
munha kala (Thakur, Brahmin and Banias, make their faces black). Two things are clear from this 
statement. First, it was a statement to disgrace the Hindu upper castes. And secondly, it was a statement to 
show the Jatavs’ complaining against the upper castes labelling them as black. This is emphasised by 
rhyming Lala/kala, where ‘kala’ means black and ‘lala’is a vernacular representation of the Banias. Also 
read. Duncan, I. 1999. Dalits and Politics in Rural North India: Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 27(1), pp: 35-60, here p. 57, passim 8.   
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 Vote hamara, raj tumhara, nahin chalega, nahin chalega (We have the vote, you 
have the power, this will not last, this will not last) 
 
 85 par 15 ka raj nahin chalega, nahin chalega (85 percent living under the rule of 
15 percent, this will not last, this will not last) 
 
 Jiski jitni samkhya bhari uski utni bhagidari (power should be distributed to each 
caste in accordance with its strength in population). We shall see how this 
particular slogan was put into practice by the BSP in the next chapter. 
 
Through the analysis of the Indian social system based on the analogy of a ballpoint pen 
and through the various slogans, the BSP’s message to the Dalits and other lower castes 
was clear: the Brahmins – by controlling education and occupying the highest position in 
the traditional social structure, the Kshatriyas – by controlling the land and dominating 
temporal power and the Vaishyas – by controlling trade were keeping the Dalits and other 
lower castes away from them all. Not just that. Even in Independent India, they re-
established themselves by controlling political power. In normal circumstances, in a 
democratic framework, it is the majority that rules, but the upper castes, whose 
percentage is a mere 15 percent of the total population of the country, are able to hog 
political power. The lower castes, whose percentage in the population is 85 percent, 
continue to remain the ruled, by casting their votes for the candidates belonging to the 
upper castes. Such a state of blatant injustice against the lower castes should not be 
tolerated any more. Political power in the country should be distributed among all the 
castes in proportion to their population size. In a way, the DS-4 activists were able to 
show the caste-based divisions within society, the differences between upper caste and 
lower caste society, the power and domination of the former at the cost of the latter. Not 
surprisingly, this message pervaded the ‘mind and body’ of those belonging to the lower 
castes who had been victims of upper caste domination and power, and it led to unity 
among the lower castes.  
 
The D-S4 soon began to take-up community-specific problems by organising the Dalits, 
Shudras, and minority groups through ‘cadre camps’, ‘awakening squads’, and ‘bicycle 
marches’. Two important programmes under the DS-4 were (a) Cycle march and (b) 
Denunciation of Poona Pact. In the year 1983, between March 15 and April 17, the D-S4 
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organised a 3,000 km cycle march, which was termed the ‘miracle of two feet and two 
wheels’ that covered seven states in North India.  The main purpose of this march was to 
mobilise the Dalits and the other oppressed to build their own organisations and 
movements, and “to educate the oppressed and the exploited …to build their own 
organisation and independent movement.”268 The march was also to point out the 
weaknesses of the oppressed and to explain to the Dalits how they were being exploited 
by the upper castes. To quote Kanshi Ram:  
85 per cent of the oppressed and exploited people that Dr. B. R. Ambedkar nourished for 
years have today become tools in the hands of the ruling class, to the extent that they 
never feel shame when others use them.  Whenever rallies are organised by political 
parties to show their strength, the poor SC/ST, OBC, and minority people rush there and 
are paid for it. They are happy to go and strengthen the hands of their oppressors and 
exploiters.  They neither feel shame nor do they think of the harm they are doing to 
themselves.269 
 
DS-4’s message to the lower castes was clear: the upper castes have been enjoying 
political power at the cost of the lower castes.  The lower castes, on their part, instead of 
putting an end to such exploitation, were strengthening it by attending their political 
rallies and meetings. The lower castes did not feel ashamed about it. They cared only for 
the few rupees thrown at them by the political parties comprising the upper castes.  The 
pittance thrown at them would give them temporary relief, but by their inaction they were 
only harming themselves as it would distance them further from political power.  
 
Denunciation of Poona Pact: The second major programme conducted under the banner 
of D-S4 was, ‘Denunciation of the Poona Pact’.270 A month-long programme, which 
started at Poona on September 24, 1982 and ended at Jhalundhur (in Punjab) on October 
24, 1982 was undertaken.271 This programme was organised against the Congress Party’s 
Golden Jubilee celebrations during the same period. Kanshi Ram, apart from writing 
numerous articles for the ‘Oppressed Indian’, devoted twenty-seven pages in his only 
                                                 
268 ‘Marching to Awaken the Ambedkarite Masses’, The Oppressed Indian, 5, 1, April 1983, p. 16, quoted 
in Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1998. The Bahujan Samaj Party in North India: No Longer Just a Dalit Party? 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 18(1), p. 38.  
269 Joshi, B.R. 1986. Untouchable! Voice of the Dalit Liberation Movement. Delhi: Select Book Service 
Syndicates, p. 110.  
270 See the discussion on the Poona Pact in Chapter II. 
271 The denunciation programme appeared to be so successful with the organisers having to add an extra 
thirty locations from the initially planned thirty places. See, The Oppressed Indian, November, 1982.  
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major work, ‘An Era of the Stooges’ (The Chamcha Age) in denouncing the Pact. One of 
the major criticisms levelled against the Pact was ‘making the Dalits stooges in the 
mainstream political parties, especially the Congress’. According to Kanshi Ram, “…the 
worst evil effect of the Poona Pact was when their leader Dr. Ambedkar was taking them 
to the Bright Age from centuries of living in the Dark Age, the efforts of their leader was 
being derailed by pushing the Scheduled Castes into the Chamcha Age (An Era of the 
Stooges).”272 Yet, it should be mentioned here that despite deprecating the Poona Pact, 
neither Kanshi Ram nor the other D-S4 leaders were for separate electorates for the 
Dalits. The denunciation, they argued, was to conscientise the Dalits on the historical 
injustice meted out to them Gandhi and his Congress. They wanted “to make common 
cause with the other oppressed and exploited” for their political representation.273  
 
We noted that the DS-4 was formed as an activist wing of BAMCEF that would spread 
the ideals of Ambedkar among the oppressed, particularly among the Dalits, and unite all 
the oppressed groups in Indian society, i.e., SC, STs, Minorities and Shudras. for political 
power. But it was only a quasi-political party working under BAMCEF, an organisation 
comprising government employees who were forbidden from undertaking any form of 
political activity, especially in electoral politics.  Moreover, since the formation of DS-4 
there had been differences among the members of BAMCEF.  They divided into two 
groups: one group supporting the DS-4 and its activities, the other group which wished 
that BAMCEF would remain as an organisation for the welfare of the government 
employees. Interestingly, many members in the latter group were loyal to several strands 
of the RPI and they did not want another political party for the Dalits.  In addition to 
these differences, there were also financial difficulties on account of DS-4’s thrust for 
political power.  The RPI loyalists in BAMCEF were unwilling to provide additional 
funds which resulted in the gap between the two groups within BAMCEF widening.  
Kanshi Ram, who was annoyed with the differences within the organisation took the 
plunge, and announced the creation of a new political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party in 
1984. With the formation of a new organisation, the focus of BAMCEF as well as the 
                                                 
272 Ram, Kanshi. 1997. Poona Pact Denounced. In: Atey, M., ed., The Editorials…, pp: 93-94.  
273 ‘Denunciation Over – What Next?’, The Oppressed Indian, November, (1982). 
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Dalit leaders shifted from organising the Dalits to obtaining political power. Indeed 
‘political power’ became the explicit goal of the BSP, a goal which was compared to a 
‘master-key’ by Kanshi Ram, “Political power is the master-key with which one can open 
any lock, whether it is social, educational, or a cultural lock”.274 But how did the BSP 
mobilise the support of the oppressed, especially the Dalits, and what strategies did it 
employ in its mobilisational activities? We shall answer these questions in the next 
section.    
 
3. III. BSP’s strategies in the mobilisations of the Dalit constituency  
Two strategies adopted by the BSP that played a pivotal role in mobilising the Dalits and 
other marginalised sections were its use of the print media and the Dalit mela. We noted 
in the previous chapter that the Adi-Hindu leadership used print media to propagate their 
ideas and ideologies. Mahatma Jyotibha Phule was the first person to initiate this tradition 
in Maharashtra by starting Deenabandhu on January 1, 1877.  Many Dalits were inspired 
by this initiative and between 1910 and 1930, in Maharashtra alone, nearly fifty 
newspapers were published, of which Bital Vidhwansham, Son Vanshiya Mitra, 
Nirashrit, Hind, and Nagrik are well known.275  In UP, Swami Achhutananda followed 
the tradition of printing – of pamphlets, booklets, and books – to propagate the ideology 
of the Adi-Hindu movement.  This tradition of publication was continued by many 
educated Dalits in colonial and post-colonial UP.  
 
Booklets and pamphlets constitute two other major forms of the Dalit print medium.   
Through these forms, especially through booklets, the Dalit writers began to write on a 
range of issues that pertained to their socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions.  
Not surprisingly, they adopted their own interpretation, an interpretation that has been 
termed as “a view from below” by Vivek Kumar.276  “The major objective behind these 
                                                 
274 Ambeth, Rajan. 1994. My Bahujan Samaj, Delhi: ABCDE publications, p. 32. 
275 Narayan, Badri. 2006. Women Heroes and Dalit Assertion in North India: Culture, Identity and Politics. 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, p. 51.  
276 Interview with Dr. Vivek Kumar (12th October, 2004) Dr. Kumar is a sociologist and teaches at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.    
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booklets”, as observed by Badri Narayan, “is to make Dalits aware about their rights and 
duties and to make them politically conscious.”277  
 
The importance of these Dalit newspapers and magazines should be clearly recognised 
here.  First, as most of these newspapers and magazines carried a Dalit literare section 
that criticised the limitations of the policies pursued by the governments (in both colonial 
and post-colonial India) in bettering their conditions, and the economic oppression and 
social discrimination against the Dalits by the upper caste Hindu society in their everyday 
lives, they helped not only to sensitise the Dalit masses, but also to make them conscious 
of their problems; this, in turn, facilitated the mobilisation of the Dalit masses against 
caste-Hindu oppression and injustices.278  In a way, the newspapers and magazines 
became agents of information that pushed the Dalits for transformation. Second, as the 
Dalits were both producers as well as consumers, the process of production and 
consumption of literature in the print media led to the formation of a literary group 
among them, which would continue the tradition of writing on Dalit issues.   
 
The BSP in its mobilisational activities used the available critique in the Dalit booklets. It 
also went to the extent of appealing to the Dalit writers to work on more booklets 
highlighting the problems of the Dalits, Adivasis, and OBC communities.  The Dalit 
writers appear to have been inspired by that appeal and produced a large number of 
booklets between 1991 and 2000.  The following Table provides information on the trend 
of Dalit booklets:  
                     Table: 3.4. Decade-wise trend of publication of popular Dalit booklets 
Decade Number of Booklets 
1931-40 2 
1941-50 2 
1951-60 7 
1961-70 56 
1971-80 13 
                                                 
277 Narayan, Badri. 2006. Women Heroes…,p.54. (Italics are supplied).  
278 Schwartz, M. B. 1997. Indian Untouchable Texts of Resistance Symbolic Domination and Historical 
Knowledge. In Seneviratne, H.L. ed., Identity, Consciousness and the Past: Forging of Caste and 
Communities in India and Sri Lanka. New Delhi: OUP, p. 179.  
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1981-90 26 
1991-2000 114 
2001-2006 69 
                     Total                         289 
                       Source: Dalit Resource Centre, G.B. Pant Social Science Institute, Allahabad.279 
 
As the above Table clearly demonstrates, from 1960’s onwards the number of Dalit 
booklets began to go up and by 1991-2000 (a decade) the numbers peaked. This is due to 
two simple reasons.  First, contrary to the promises made by the Nehruvian state at the 
time of Independence, it did not include the Dalits in its developmental initiatives.  By 
excluding the Dalit society, the upper caste Hindu society appropriated for itself majority 
of the developmental facilities.  On realising they were excluded, the Dalits began to feel 
disillusioned with the Nehruvian State and its promises. They expressed their 
disillusionment through the booklets.  Second, Dalit writers, who were encouraged by the 
BSP’s political mobilisations for assumption of power, began to question their place in 
society as well as in the national graph.  Such questioning led to a plethora of booklets, in 
which Dalits produced alternative narratives about the place and role of the Dalits and 
other lower castes in society and in the nationalist movement.  But which key issues and 
criticisms found in these booklets and pamphlets were used by the BSP in its 
mobilisations?    
 
As stated above, the Dalit booklets and pamphlets addressed a range of issues.  But, the 
BSP picked the stories, themes, and issues that spoke of the treachery of the upper caste 
Hindus, especially the Brahmins and Kshatriyas against the Dalits in the socio-cultural 
domain, and narratives that claimed a respectable and valiant position for the Dalits in the 
freedom struggle. Among them five themes were noteworthy: (1) The story of Shambhuk 
vadh (killing); (2) the story of Ekalavya’s tyaag (sacrifice of Ekalavya); (3) sacrifices of 
the Dalits in the 1857 Rebellion; (4) Veer Naari Jhalkaribai  (the valiant lady, 
Jhalkaribai); and  (5) Dalit ki Beti Udadevi (the daughter of Dalits/the champion of the 
Dalits).  In the following paragraphs I shall examine two stories - of Shambhuk vadh and 
Veer Nari Jhalkaribai.  
                                                 
279 Cited in Narayan, Badri. 2006. Women Heroes … p. 55. 
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The story of the killing of Shambhuk: Shambhuk, who was a lower caste person, had a 
great desire to learn and read the Vedas.  He approached the Brahmin gurus, who were 
the sole preachers of the Vedas, and requested them to teach him the Vedas.  On learning 
Shambhuk’s caste, the gurus not only rejected his request, they also humiliated him on 
account of his ‘lowly’ birth. As if this was not enough, they threw him out of the 
premises of the ashram (the school).  Undeterred by the rejection of the Brahmin gurus 
and determined to act against the humiliation meted out to him, Shambhuk began to 
meditate on the banks of the river Godavari in Dandakaranya (a forest called Dandaka).  
It must be recognised here that meditation was considered to be the highest form of 
attainment for the human mind. But that act was patented by the Brahmins under the 
caste system. Shambhuk, by the power of his meditation, acquired the skill to read and 
learned the Vedas on his own. But unlike the Brahmin gurus he never kept the knowledge 
to himself. He began to share his newly acquired knowledge with his fellowmen in the 
lower castes. Angered and horrified by Shambhuk’s deeds, the Brahmins used all the 
skills at their disposal to stop him from preaching the Vedas to the lower castes, but in 
vain. And they waited for the right moment to take revenge on him.  
 
Once there was severe famine in the kingdom of Rama.  People were dying with no food 
and water.  On learning about the calamity, King Rama asked Sage Vashishta about the 
cause of the famine.  Sage Vashishta, a Brahmin guru himself, the one who along with 
his Brahmin tribe was waiting to take revenge on Shambhuk, saw this as the right 
moment to strike at the latter. He informed Rama that the famine was caused by a lower 
caste person, Shambhuk, who against the rules of the caste system was not merely 
reading the Vedas but also imparting that knowledge to other lower caste persons.  The 
kingdom, he told the king, would come out of the famine and prosper again only if 
Shambhuk was killed.  King Rama, on hearing the words of Sage Vashishta, went to 
Shambhuk’s ashram in Dandakaranya, along with his brother Laxman. There they 
questioned Shambhuk’s activities of learning and teaching the Vedas.  Shambhuk, who 
by then had become a gnani, calmly replied that he did not commit any crime but was 
only imparting the knowledge of the Vedas to the people who had been kept in the dark 
from time immemorial. But the King harshly told him that by the law of the 
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Varnashrama Dharma, the lower castes were there only to serve the people from the 
higher castes and were not entitled to receive the knowledge of the Vedas, a knowledge 
that was the exclusive preserve of the upper castes. He added that Shambhuk by his 
learning and teaching of the Vedas had committed the worst crime and deserved death as 
punishment. Saying this, Rama killed Shambhuk and thus avenged the Brahmins gurus.   
 
From the above story, the Dalit writers and the BSP wanted the Dalit constituency to 
understand three aspects.  First, they wanted the Dalits to understand how historically the 
Brahmins were controlling education and how the lower castes were barred from learning 
and writing, and thus, from the system of acquiring knowledge. Second, the story 
portrayed the heroism of Shambhuk, as he put up with all the difficulties imposed on him 
by the Brahmins. The lower castes, the descendants of Shambhuk, also possessed the 
same qualities as Shambhuk, especially the determination to achieve something despite 
difficulties; and finally, how the Brahmins and Kshatriyas joined hands to dispossess the 
lower castes.  
 
The story of veer naari Jhalkaribhai: The story of Jhalkaribhai is famous in 
Bhundelkhand region, especially among the Koris (Koris is one of the Dalit castes in 
UP).  Jhalkaribhai lived in the fort of Rani Lakshmibhai of Jhansi at the time of the 1857 
Rebellion and took part in the mutiny by challenging the British soldiers.  Yet nowhere in 
the history written by the caste-Hindu historians has her name or role in the Rebellion 
been mentioned.280  Even in the account of foreign scholars we do not find any mention 
about her.  “Such an act of deliberate omission”, as observed by Avinash Goutham, a 
sociologist at JNU, “should not surprise us, as foreign scholars depended on the 
information given to them by the caste-Hindus, who for obvious reasons would not want 
to give a prominent position to a Dalit woman in history.”281   
 
The story of Jhalkaribhai as narrated by my informants in Jhansi is as follows:  
                                                 
280 Badri Narayan mentions one exception. Vishnu Rao Godse, who travelled Central India at the time of 
Rebellion, mentions the name of Jhalkaribhai in his book: Majha Pravas. Godse addresses her as ‘Jhalkari 
Korin’ - mentioning Jhalkaribhai’s caste identity too. See Narayan, Badri. 2006. Women Heroes and 
Dalit…p. 119.  
281 Avinash Gautham, research scholar, CSSS, JNU, New Delhi.  
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Jhalkaribhai, a beautiful Kori woman, was the maid servant of Rani (princess) 
Lakshmibhai of Jhansi.  Jhalkaribhai, who was the same age as the Rani herself, 
became a close friend of the latter.  Rani was so fond of Jhalkaribhai that she treated 
Jhalkaribhai as her own sister and taught her war skills such as archery, wrestling, and 
shooting. Soon Jhalkaribhai excelled in all these warrior skills. The Rani was extremely 
happy with Jhalkaribhai’s excellent skills, and on account of her excellence she was 
made commander of the female army of Jhansi, an army that was created by the 
princess herself.  When the British soldiers under the commandership of General Rose 
attacked the fort, Lakshmibhai was concerned about the safety of the fort as well as her 
young son.  She was completely confused and unable to decide as to which course of 
action to take.  At this crucial juncture, Jhalkaribhai came to her rescue.  She asked the 
princess to leave the fort with her son and assured her that she would fight the British in 
her place.  The Rani, who was confident of Jhalkaribhai’s abilities, readily agreed to the 
proposal and immediately left the fort with her son. Jhalkaribhai dressed as Rani 
Lakshmi plunged into war. With her excellent command in using the sword she began 
to kill the enemy’s soldiers mercilessly.  But General Rose played a trick and eventually 
captured her. The British celebrated the capture without realising that they had captured 
the maid and not the princess; and for her part Jhalkaribhai too did not reveal her 
identity for nearly a week, during which time Lakshmibhai and her son escaped to 
Nepal.  When the British realised that they had captured the princess’ maid, they were 
stunned at the bravery and the skills of Jhalkaribhai in war, and eventually freed her.   
 
It is important to note here that apart from Ambedkar, the Dalits have few leaders, 
especially among women to inspire them.  The BSP was badly in need of a Dalit woman 
leader and it began projecting Mayawati as the Party’s leader, who could fight against the 
upper castes and win political power for the Dalits. It was during that time the Party made 
use of the story of Jhalkaribhai, who valiantly fought the British. In Bhundelkhand, I was 
told that Dalit mothers told the story of Jhalkaribhai to their daughters and inspired them 
to become a leader like Mayawati.  In that sense, the Party succeeded in inspiring the 
Dalits, especially the Dalit women with the story of Jhalkaribhai.  
 
Apart from the cultural re-interpretation and establishment of Dalit heroes, some of the 
booklets also reinterpreted the cultural histories of the Dalits. Two booklets that help to 
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explain this interpretation are Mool Vansha Katha by Dr. G. P. Prashant, published in 
1994 from Lucknow; and Vichitra Parivartan by Umesh Kumar.  Prashant, while directly 
addressing his fellow Dalits in his Mool Vansha Katha, put forward a compelling 
argument: “Your history has been demolished to belittle you.  Your asuras, rakshasas, 
and daityas are now synonymous with hatred.  Who knows that asuras were vehement 
opponents of liquor consumption, that rakshas were those who opposed sacrifices in the 
yajna and guarded the rights of the people, and that daityas were the children of Diti.”282  
 
Similarly, Umesh Kumar also reinterprets the Dalit history that spans from 6000 BC to 
1995 AD as the history of the original inhabitants of India.  For him, Dalits had a golden 
age of peace and prosperity before they were enslaved by the invading Aryans.  In a 
chapter entitled Bharatiye Achambha, Umesh Kumar challenges the dominant narratives 
of mythology by a re-reading of Brahmanical scriptures and asserts his new reading as 
true ‘history’.283 Such a “process of re-writing and reading this new kind of history”, as 
argued by Narayan and Mishra, “becomes an alternative education for members of the 
Dalit community about their own Dalit heroes, their status as the original inhabitants of 
India and their past golden age which ended in a fall from glory following the violent 
Aryan invasions.”284 But how did the BSP take the stories that have been re-interpreted 
by the Dalit writers in their booklets and pamphlets to its intended group? The BSP had 
initially employed mela and Jagriti Dasta (Cultural Squad) to take the stories of Dalit 
heroes to the lower caste public, and spread the message of the BSP among the rural folk, 
especially the Dalits. The following is a delineation of those two aspects:  
 
Dalit Mela: Mela is a form of social gathering, generally organised annually for 
celebrations and for exchanges in northern India.  Although these melas are supposed to 
be neutral in terms of caste and community, in reality, they are caste and community- 
specific.  In the sense, while Hindus organise their own melas, such as Dushera; the 
Muslims have their own, such as Bakr-Id and Muharam; and so do the Dalits. For the 
                                                 
282 Prashant, G.P. 1994. Mool Vansha Katha, Lucknow: Cultural Publishers. (Cited and translated from 
Hindi in Narayan, Badri and A. R. Mishra., eds., 2004. Multiple Marginalities: An Anthology of Identified 
Dalit Writings. Delhi: Manohar, p. 74.  
283 Kumar, Umesh. 1996. Vichitra Parivartan. Allahabad: Kushwaha Publishers.   
284 Narayan, Badri and A. R. Mishra. eds. 2004. Multiple Marginalities…..p. 75.  
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space of mela, as observed by Sarah Beth, “raises questions of participation and access, 
since it is an activity occurring in the so-called ‘public sphere’, open to everyone, but 
whose participants are in actuality defined by their caste (and communal) identities where 
cultural codes of decorum, i.e., beliefs of purity and pollution – exclude the participation 
of the upper castes”285 from the lower caste melas and vice-versa.    
 
The history of the Dalit mela in UP goes back to the colonial times and the space of the 
mela was used by the Dalits to celebrate their own festivals, such as the jayantis of Kabir 
and Raidas.286  In post-colonial UP, they added to this list of festivals the jayanti of 
Ambedkar in 1957, after the death of their beloved leader.287 Since then Ambedkar 
jayanti has been celebrated with great pride by the Dalits, especially the Jatavs of Agra, 
with a day of feasting, games, political speeches, and other festivities, which generally 
culminates in taking out processions with Ambedkar’s statue or portraits to the main 
streets and localities. The BSP has used this space of the mela not only to celebrate the 
bravery of the Dalit heroes, but also to mobilise the Dalit constituency for political 
power.   
 
With the BSP, the site of the Dalit mela became the site for Dalit identity construction.  
This construction was done through various forms.  First, the BSP has added to the 
traditional list of the Dalit melas, Shahuji Maharaj mela, Periyar mela and Buddha jayanti 
                                                 
285 Beth, Sarah. 2005. Taking to the Streets: Dalit Mela and the public performance of Dalit cultural 
identity. Paper presented in BASAS Conference, University of Leeds. Italics are supplied. 
286 Apparently the Dalit mela, according to Badri Narayan, originated in Bihar in 1935, when the Dusadhs 
(one of the most numerous Dalit castes in Bihar after the Chamars), began to celebrate the heroic life of 
Chuharmal.  Chuharmal, who belonged to the Dusadh caste, was known for his strength and morality. He 
falls in love with Rani Reshma, a princess of the Bhumihars, one of the upper caste landed community in 
Bihar. Every year during the month of Chitya, the Dusadhs gather in thousands in a village called Mor, 10-
12 kms south of the Mokama station where a large statue of Chuharmal has been erected.  The celebration 
of the Chuharmal mela includes 4-5 days of singing, dancing, wrestling as well as the recitation and 
theatrical performance of the love tale of princess Reshma and Dalit hero Chuharmal.  For a detailed study 
as well as an analysis of the Dalit mela celebrating the heroism of Chuharmal, see, Narayan, Badri. 2001. 
Documenting Dissent: Contesting Fables, Contested Memories and Dalit Political Discourse. Shimla: 
Indian Institute of Advanced Study.   
287 Owen Lynch describes how Ambedkar jayanti came to be added to the list Dalit melas. Before 1957, the 
Jatavs of Kaji Para locality in Agra have had celebrated Kans mela in honour of Krishna’s defeat at the 
hands of his wicked uncle Kans.  However, in 1957 after the death of Ambedkar, “fourteen young men 
from Kaji Para decided that since Ambedkar was their acknowledged leader and saviour, he should replace 
Krishna and the date of fair should be changed to 14 April, Ambedkar’s birthday.” See Lynch, Owen. 2002. 
Ambedkar Jayanti: Dalit Reritualization in Agra. The Eastern Anthropologist, 55(2-3), p. 116.  
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mela.  With these additions, throughout the year there is one mela or the other that 
constantly brought the Dalits together and which facilitated their exchanges.  Second, it 
has also brought the Dalit leela or Dalit folk drama into the melas.  The narratives of the 
Dalit leelas were positioned in direct opposition to the narratives of the upper caste 
Hindus’ leelas. For instance, Dalit leelas include Kans leela in place of the Krishna leela, 
Shambhuk leela in place of the Ram leela and Jhalkaribai leela in place of the Rani of 
Jhansi leela. In Kans leela, the story is retold as the fall of a noble and humane king Kans 
by the greed of the Yadava king Krishna to expand the latter’s empire.  Similarly, in the 
Shambhuk leela, Shambhuk is idolised as an ascetic, and king Ram depicted as a villain; 
as he killed Shambhuk.  In a way, through such narratives, the Dalit leelas were not only 
subverting the leelas of the upper castes, but also recasting the characters of “a meta-
narrative, idealising previously demonised characters such as Ravana or Kans, and 
exposing the immoral nature of traditional heroes like Ram or Krishna”.288  
 
While the melas became the site for Dalit gatherings and celebration of the memories, 
achievements and heroic deeds of the Dalit heroes, it essentially facilitated the 
dissemination of BSP’s message. The Party used a number of other cultural platforms, 
such as theatre, to take its message to the grassroots. For this purpose, the Party has set up 
the Jagriti Dasta (Awareness Squad), which consists of writers, dramatists, poets, artists, 
and others.  The main job of this squad is to write songs, poems, plays with the BSP 
message, paint pictures of the Dalit heroes, and then transmit the same among rural Dalits 
through various cultural performances.289 During the 1990’s the Jagriti Dasta used to 
tour UP, especially the rural areas.  In their performances, the members of the Dasta 
normally pick up folk songs and popular ballads, which are specific to particular regions 
and recompose them with words carrying the message of the BSP.  In all their public 
performances, they make sure that they include the narratives that glorify the above 
mentioned Dalit icons.290   
 
                                                 
288 Beth, Sarah. 2005. Taking to the Streets…  
289 Singh, R. K. 1994. Kanshi Ram aur BSP: Dalit Andolan ka Vicharik Adhraar: Brahmananvad Virodh. 
Allahabad: Kushwaha Publication, p. 122.  
290 Ibid., pp: 1-2.  
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With the Jagriti Dasta, the theatre groups occupy a special position. Their special 
position essentially comes from the popularity they command in urban and rural areas in 
UP.  A number of Dalit theatre groups, such as Apna Theatre and Mandali, are active in 
the regions of Bundelkhand and eastern areas of UP, especially in Kanpur, Banaras, 
Allahabad, Lucknow, Bareli, Jhansi etc.  During my field work in Kanpur, I met Dev 
Kumar, a Dalit social activist and the director of Apna Theatre (Our theatre).  His first 
play was Dastaan. This play narrates the story of the cruelties by the Aryans (the 
Brahmanical upper castes) against the indigenous people (the Dalits and other lower caste 
groups). Other plays of this theatre include Bhadra Angulimaal, Chakradhari, Sudarshan, 
Kapat, Agya Etihass (based on the Udadevi Pasi), Amar Shaheed Matadin Bhangi, and 
Jamadaar Ka Kurta.291  Dev Kumar proudly informed me that through their plays his 
theatre helped the BSP mobilise support of the Dalits and other lower castes.  
 
Through booklets, cultural activities, and political campaigns, the BSP sought to make 
the Dalit community realise its condition – how they were exploited by the upper castes, 
and how they could gain their lost respect and social power by winning political power. 
As it has always emphasised, the idea of “them” versus “us” or the upper castes 
(savarnalog) versus us (bahujans), the Party could project the upper castes as the ‘other’ 
and thereby construct a broad Dalit identity for the Dalit castes and a larger Bahujan 
identity for all the lower castes and other oppressed groups; and mobilise the bahujans 
for political power.   
 
Conclusion:  I began this chapter by arguing against Kanchan Chandra, who claimed that 
the BSP in UP succeeded because of the greater representation accorded to the SC elite, 
especially the Chamars. Her argument was that since Chamars were given a majority of 
the seats, the Dalit constituency voted for the Party. It is true that Chamars, who 
constitute a majority among the SC category in UP, got a large percentage of political 
seats when compared with the percentage of seats given to the other Dalit castes.  But it is 
difficult to explain BSP’s success, especially among the Dalits, solely on the basis of the 
Party’s distribution of seats.  I argue that the BSP’s success among the Dalits is not 
                                                 
291 Field notes, Kanpur, April, 2004.  
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simply because of the distribution of seats, but more importantly on account of the 
discriminations suffered by the Dalit constituency at the hands of the caste-Hindus, 
especially the upper castes. To establish my argument I examined the Dalits’ condition 
during the Congress regime in the state.  Although Congress had been the major 
beneficiary of the reserved seats for Dalits, it did not do anything substantial to improve 
the socio-economic conditions of the Dalits. In fact, it used its power to exclude the 
Dalits from the process of land distribution and other measures meant to improve the 
economic condition in the rural areas. Although the government measures did not 
improve the conditions of the Dalits, the general development in the state did benefit the 
Dalits. It improved their economic condition and the education levels of the Dalits. This 
improvement, in turn, led them to realise their real conditions in the socio-economic and 
political arenas, and they began to assert themselves by demanding social respect and 
equality of treatment. The upper castes were enraged by such demands of the Dalits and 
decided to teach the ‘Untouchables’ a lesson and show them their place in society.  UP 
has witnessed high incidence of violence against Dalits in rural areas and discriminatory 
practices against urban Dalits in the 1970’s and early ’80’s.  
 
These conditions formed the context in which some of the educated and employed Dalits, 
such as Kanshi Ram, organised against caste-based discrimination and domination of the 
upper castes. Towards achieving this end, they also floated organisations, such as 
BAMCEF from which the DS-4 and later the BSP emerged. Through numerous political 
campaigns, literary and cultural activities, the BSP succeeded in constructing a positive 
Dalit identity and brought the hitherto divided Dalit castes under its umbrella for political 
power.  Despite failure in its earlier phase in electoral politics, from 1995 onwards the 
BSP began to win a good number of seats in both the State Assembly and Parliament, 
which enabled it to form the government in the state on four occasions.  But what did it 
do with that political power? We shall examine this question in the next chapter.   
***** 
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Four.................................................................................................................. 
Bahujan Samaj Party: 
 Social Justice and Political Practice 
 
Introduction: In the previous Chapter we examined the Dalits’ special relationship with 
the Congress, the social context of the emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party and its 
mobilisation of the oppressed, especially the Dalit constituency, for political power.  
Although BSP’s journey in Uttar Pradesh’s rough political terrain has been excruciatingly 
painful, ultimately it did achieve the long-cherished goal of the Ambedkarites, attainment 
of political power. What is interesting in the manifestation of this goal is the emergence 
of a Dalit woman, Ms. Mayawati, as a leader who led the party to the seat of power in an 
otherwise andro-centric world of politics. Not only that she became chief minister for a 
fourth-time, a record not just in UP but in any State in the Indian Union.292  Nonetheless, 
a pertinent question is, what are the consequences of gaining political power by the BSP 
in terms of improvement in the conditions of the oppressed? This is an important 
question, for the BSP’s appeal and political mobilisation around the caste axis rather than 
class orientation, and its supposedly primary aim of political power, have been criticised 
by many commentators.  
 
Two criticisms seem to be particularly relevant. First, commenting upon the party’s early 
activities Jagpal Singh remarked that “mobilisation of the rural poor is seldom done on 
the issues emanating from capitalist agriculture.”293 Looking at the BSP through similar 
lenses, Dreze and Gazdar notes that the BSP is another expression of the ‘unprincipled 
factionalism’, characteristic of UP politics, not going much beyond the “relatively narrow 
objectives such as caste-based reservations of public sector employment.”294 Secondly, it 
has been charged that the party, aside from its overwhelming emphasis on ‘political 
                                                 
292 Mayawati assumed chief ministership for the first time in 1995 and in 2007 she attained that position 
again, for the fourth time.  The details of the tenures of the BSP under Mayawati’s leadership are: (1) 3 
June 1995 to 18 October, 1995; (2) 21 March 1997 to 21 September 1997, (3) 3 May 2002 to 29 August 
2003 and, (4) 13 May 2007 to 7 March, 2012.  
293 Singh, J. 1993. Capitalism and Dependence: Agrarian Politics in Western Uttar Pradesh, 1951-1991, 
Delhi: Manohar, p. 109.  
294 Dreze, J. & Gazdar, H. 1998. Uttar Pradesh: The Burden of Inertia. In: J. Dreze & A. Sen., eds., Indian 
Development: Selected Regional Perspectives, Delhi: OUP, p. 104, also see, passim 143, p. 104.  
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power,’ does not have either a concrete programme of action or an ideology for the 
emancipation of the Dalits. The BSP, from these commentators’ perspectives, can be seen 
as a party that epitomises the growth in Dalit consciousness and yet, increasingly 
politicises caste.295 Although I am sympathetic to the observations of these critics, I think 
it is necessary to pose certain questions to counter their arguments. For example, what is 
the main aim of the BSP’s ‘politicisation of caste’? What is the meaning of ‘political 
power’ for the BSP, and what is the end goal of such political power? 
 
Another aspect that caught the attention of sympathisers of progressive politics and lower 
caste-based politics alike is the difficult relationship between the two lower caste-based 
political parties, Samajwadi Party (SP) and BSP.  Classifying all the oppressed in Indian 
society, particularly the Shudras and Dalits who have been victims of the Brahminical 
caste system, as Bahujan, the BSP tried to mobilise both the communities for political 
power.  On its part, in its mobilisation of the lower castes, especially the Dalits, the SP is 
also using the same language, the language of social justice, like the BSP. If both parties 
stood for the social justice for the lower castes, then why did the political alliance 
between SP and BSP break up? Are there any contradictions between the political ideals 
and political practices of the SP and BSP?  
 
The three main aspects in the criticism levelled against the BSP and the question of a 
difficult relationship between the SP and BSP are: (1) contradictions between the Shudras 
and Dalits, (2) the BSP did not have an ideology and (3) the BSP did little for the 
emancipation of the Dalits. Keeping these three aspects in mind, in the present chapter I 
seek to answer the following three questions:  
                                                 
295 Given the BSP’s emphasis upon caste, these observations appear to be true. For, while bringing ‘caste’ 
into the centre of democratic politics, the ‘class’ factor is apparently pushed backstage. But I do not think 
that political parties like the BSP can afford to ignore the class factor. The people, whom it claims to be 
mobilising, are not merely victims of caste discrimination, but also victims to the prevailing material 
inequalities.  In other words, the sufferers of caste are in most cases also sufferers of class.  Of course, this 
does not mean that victims of material inequalities are also victims of caste inequalities. For instance, a 
number of people who belong to the upper castes are vulnerable to material inequalities, along with the 
lower castes. However, when it comes to the social space, the upper castes, irrespective of their material 
standing, dominate the lower castes. A number of scholars clearly demonstrated the substantial 
entanglement of caste and class. For an analysis on this congruence, see Sharma, K.L., ed., 1994. Caste and 
Class in India. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. 
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(A) What are the differences between the politics of the Shudras and Dalits?  
(B) What does the BSP’s concept of social justice stand for? 
(C) What did the BSP do for the Dalits while in power?  
In order to answer these questions, I have divided the Chapter into three sections.  The 
first section very briefly examines the political ideal of the SP - social justice - and points 
out the contradictions between the Shudras and Dalits.  The second section analyses the 
BSP’s idea of social justice; and the final section attempts to critically examine some of 
the programmes pursued by the BSP while in power.  
 
4. I.  Dalits and Shudras: Natural Allies or Incompatible Partners?  
Kancha Ilaiah, in his famous work, Why I am not a Hindu,296 offers a strong 
epistemological critique of the Bahujans’297 stand against Brahmanism and culture.298 
There are two fundamental limitations in Ilaiah’s work.  First, Ilaiah romanticised the 
socio-economic relations at various levels in the grassroots, especially the lower levels.  
There has always been stiff competition between the Shudras and Dalits for agricultural 
work and land for cultivation. We have seen in the previous chapter, how Dalits have 
been kept out of the land distribution process on the pretext that they were not cultivators. 
And again, as shown previously, Shudras, on their own or working as henchmen for the 
Thakurs, have been at the forefront in the acts of violence against the Dalits.   
                                                 
296 Kancha, Ilaiah. 1996. Why I am Not a Hindu: A Shudra Critique of Hindutva Philosophy, Culture and 
Political Economy, Calcutta: Samya. 
297 The term ‘Bahujan’ literally, ‘the many’, or ‘majority of people’ means the masses ‘who have been 
devoid of humanity for centuries’ in contrast to ‘a handful who take their pleasure for granted, call 
themselves superior and live at the cost of the masses’.  The term arose in 1906 in the context of 
Satyashodhak movement in Maharashtra. Excluded from Bahujans are ‘not merely the Brahmins, but also 
the educationally advanced castes as well as the merchant castes’.  The concept has a class content as it 
‘tends to exclude the aristocratic and wealthy among non-Brahmins’, though, if the upper classes come 
from a primarily peasant or poor non-Brahmin castes, they may identify themselves ‘in terms of their social 
roots’ and culture of sentiments as part of the Bahujan Samaj. See Omvedt, Gail. 1976. Cultural Revolt in a 
Colonial Society: The Non-Brahmin Movement in Western India: 1873-1930. Bombay: Scientific Socialist 
Educational Trust, p. 4.  Although I do not have any problems with this broad definition of the term, I 
wanted to use it in popularly and academically agreed or understood definition of the term.  In recent years 
the term has come to be equated with either Shudra category or OBC category.   
298 Although I agree with many academics who do not consider Ilaiah’s work as scholarly,(See for instance, 
Kathinka Froystad in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 1, January 2000, pp: 121-122) for me, it is, 
however, one of the important works on the question of caste.  
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Secondly, although the author claims a non-Hindu identity, he does not offer his critique 
of the Brahmanical social system from the perspective of non-Hindu but as a Shudra, the 
term Shudra being part of the title of the book itself (Why I am not a Hindu: A Shudra 
Critique of Hindutva Philosophy, Culture and Political Economy). By offering his 
critique against the Brahmanical world view that essentially shaped the contemporary 
Hindu world view, he presents it not as an ‘outsider’ but as a Shudra, an ‘insider’ of the 
system. From that perspective, Ilaiah’s critique cannot be ‘Dalit-Bahujan’ (the term 
Bahujan has been used by the author as an equivalent for the terms, Shudra and Other 
Backward Castes) as he asserts, but rather simply the critique of the Shudras. For, one 
fundamental difference between the critiques of the Dalits and Shudras against the Hindu 
social order or the Brahmanical Social Order (BSO) 299 is that of their respective locations 
in that vertical social order.  While the Shudras have a place in the vertical order, 
although as the fourth varna, the Dalits did not have any place in it.  Of course, 
sometimes it has been told that the Dalits formed the fifth varna which is not part of the 
official order.  This means that the official body of the social order has completely closed 
its doors against the Dalits.  Thus, a Shudra’s critique against Brahmanism is an insider’s 
view of the system, and a Dalit’s is that of an outsider of the system. In a way, a critique 
against Brahmanism, despite certain similarities between the Shudras and Dalits, has to 
be either a Shudra or a Dalit critique, but cannot be a critique of Dalit-Bahujans.  In any 
case, what we have to recognise here is that by considering Dalits and Shudras as one 
category of people and thereby terming them as ‘Dalit-Bahujans’, Ilaiah attempts to 
project the two categories of people as an undifferentiated and homogenous category. 
Can Shudras and Dalits be lumped together under a homogeneous but abstract social 
category of ‘lower castes’ or Bahujan? Are the politics and political ends of the Shudras 
and Dalits similar? Why did the SP-BSP combine fall apart?  
 
 In what follows, I attempt to point out very briefly the fundamental incongruities 
between politics and political ends of the Dalits and Shudras. I argue that an 
undifferentiated analysis of the politics of the Shudras and Dalits is, at best, not incisive 
                                                 
299 For a range of discussions and debates on the nature of BSO and Dalit intellectual arguments, see Dalit 
Voice: The Voice of the Persecuted Nationalities Denied Human Rights. A fortnightly magazine, published 
from Bangalore and New Delhi since 1981. http://www.dalitvoice.org  
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and, at worst, seriously misleading. The reason for this is that, from the point of view of 
historical marginalisation, both the categories have similar political interests – 
Representation and Power. From a caste perspective, however, the two groups essentially 
have divergent interests – one stands for upward mobility within the caste structure, and 
the other for its alteration and, thereby, its annihilation. Moreover, the practical problems 
in sharing power apart, the socio-economic differences between the two communities and 
the divergent ideological orientations of the SP and BSP, especially on the idea of ‘social 
justice’, are what make them incompatible partners. As we will see below, SP sought 
political power in the form of social justice in order to replace the upper castes from the 
positions of power and privileges, while the BSP sought political power in order to 
democratise the social and political systems.  
 
In the previous chapter we noted that for the BSP the bahujan samaj constituted of - 
Dalits, Adivasis and OBCs (and also the religious minorities), as all of them have been 
victims of the caste-based varna, an order that was created and perpetuated by the 
Brahmins. Since all of them have that one thing in common, they have a common interest 
in rooting out the varna and ending the social, economical, cultural and political 
dominance of the manuvadis. Therefore, on account of their victimisation and the 
common interest in annihilating varna, the Dalits, Adivasis and Shudras are ‘natural 
allies’. It has been told that in joining hands with the Shudras and other oppressed 
sections, BSP’s leadership was inspired by Ambedkar’s idea of an, “autonomous Dalit 
movement constantly attempting to strike up an alliance between the Dalits and 
Shudras”.300 Indeed, one can see this inspiration of Ambedkar’s in the name of the very 
first organization floated by Kanshi Ram and others, the All India Backward 
(ST/ST/OBC) and Minority Communities Employees’ Federation (BAMCEF).301 Since 
the phase of DS-4 onwards, the party had stressed on the common interests of the groups 
in the bahujan samaj and the need for unity in order to realise their common interests and 
                                                 
300 Quoted in Omvedt, Gail. 1998. Peasants Dalits and Women: Democracy and India’s New Social 
Movements. In: Mohanty, Manoranjan et al, eds., People’s Rights, Social Movements and the State in the 
Third World. New Delhi: Sage Publications, p. 224.  
301 See Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Strategy Pays Off. Tehelka, 26 May 2007. 
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also political power. For instance, delivering a speech during an election campaign in 
Haryana in 1987 Kanshi Ram notes:  
The other limb of the bahujan samaj (in addition to the Dalit constituency) which we call 
OBCs, needs this Party (i.e., the BSP) badly.  Thirty-nine years after Independence, these 
people have neither been recognised nor have they obtained any rights.  Improvements 
have been made for the SCs and the STs, but nothing similar has happened for these 
people.  The reports of both these Commissions (Kalelkar and Mandal) were thrown in 
the waste-paper basket on the pretext that there are 3,743 castes that can be called 
OBCs…302 
 
According to Kanshi Ram, although the OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis have been victims of 
similar socio-economic deprivations, governments have taken measures, such as 
reservations and welfare schemes, to alleviate the problems of the last two groups only. 
They paid little attention to the OBC population, either in terms of welfare schemes or in 
educational and employment opportunities. Kanshi Ram was more vocal in his criticism 
of the Central government’s position on OBCs. In his opinion, the Central government’s 
non-action on reports about the OBCs revealed its unwillingness to take up the problems 
of the OBC population. Kanshi Ram might have made these observations in an election 
campaign, but they help us to understand BSP’s stand on OBCs.  And it was this stand of 
the BSP and its idea of ‘natural allies’ that led to its forging an electoral alliance with the 
SP on the eve of the 1993 elections.  
 
The State Legislative Assembly elections in UP in 1993 witnessed an unprecedented 
political amalgamation when the Dalits and the Shudras joined hands. In the coming 
together it seemed as if the theories and dreams of social revolutionaries and political 
reformers such as Jotiba Phule, Ambedkar, Ram Manohar Lohia and others had been 
realized. The BSP - whose support base chiefly comes from the Dalits and the SP - whose 
support mainly constituted the Shudras - fought the election together around the twin 
notions of social justice and opposition to communal mobilisation. This extraordinary 
alliance was exalted and received with much enthusiasm by the lower castes, Muslims 
and progressive political observers alike. It was thought that the alliance was a fitting 
response to the BJP and its Hindutva ideology, which relies “on an organic view of 
                                                 
302 Extract of a speech by Kanshi Ram, cited in Pai, Sudha. 2002. Dalits assertion…, p.122.  
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society where castes are seen as the harmonious limbs of the same body”,303 thus 
neglecting social oppression, economic exploitation and political suppression of the 
lower castes and the Dalits. The SP-BSP alliance was also viewed as an appropriate 
response to the Indian National Congress’s paternal and pseudo-secular politics.  Further, 
the alliance, it was even claimed, was the beginning of ‘real’ secular politics and unity of 
the oppressed within the state. For instance, Mulayam Singh Yadav declared: “Secular 
unity has been achieved with the formation of the SP-BSP combine.”304 Thus, the 
alliance and its formation of a joint government have been viewed as democratisation of 
the Indian democracy that was looked upon as being traditionally not egalitarian, where 
political power was concentrated in the hands of the upper castes. Thus it was the 
harbinger for the destruction of the vertical social order.   
 
If we look at the alliance between the two lower caste-based parties from the point of 
electoral gains, it did facilitate in improving their electoral tallies.305 The SP won 109 
seats and secured a share of 25.83 per cent of the votes, and the BSP won 67 seats and 
secured 11.11 per cent of the votes in the total percentage of votes polled. More 
importantly, immediately after the elections, a coalition government was also formed by 
the combine. While Mulayam Singh Yadav became the chief minister, the BSP obtained 
11 out of 27 ministerial portfolios and the coalition began with a great show of 
comradeship. However, the coalition lasted for 16 months only, from November 1993 to 
June 1995.  The split or the failure of the coalition government was said to be caused by 
personality clashes and political rivalries between the SP and BSP, but the reasons are 
more deep-rooted, well beyond those clashes and rivalries.   
 
First, let us examine the events that took place during the course of the coalition. As both 
the parties were in their formative years (Mulayam Singh Yadav left the Samajwadi 
Janata Party to form the Samajwadi Party in 1993, just before the election to the State 
Assembly), each party wanted to gain maximum leverage out of the coalition. Both 
                                                 
303 See Hansen, B. Thomas. 1999. The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India.  
New Delhi: OUP, pp: 60-89. 
304  Frontline, August 27, 1993, p. 35. 
305 In writing about the political alliance between the SP and BSP and subsequent failure of their coalition 
government, I have relied upon the work of Sudha Pai. 2002. Dalit assertion…, pp: 162-169. 
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wanted to use their current power as a launching pad for their future politics. Yadav, in 
order to strengthen his hold over the administration and party, used his position as chief 
minister to favour people from his own caste (i.e.,Yadavas) in recruitment and 
promotions in the district administration. For instance, out of 900 teachers appointed in 
Kumaon and Garhwal districts, 700 teachers belonged to Yadava caste; and in the police 
force, out of 3,151 newly selected candidates, 1,223 were Yadavas.306 The BSP and the 
Scheduled Castes Officers’ Forum criticised such acts of the SP as the Yadavisation of 
the administration, which led to major tensions between the BSP and SP.  
 
Yadav also made attempts to erode the support base of the BSP by wooing the latter’s 
support groups, especially the Muslim and lower castes, into SP’s fold. For instance, 
Muslims in the state regard Kanshi Ram as the champion of the Urdu language on 
account of his support for the teaching of Urdu language in UP. In order to take away that 
credit (of the champion of Urdu language) from Kanshi Ram and simultaneously to 
increase his supporters from among the Muslims, Yadav, it has been stated, took several 
steps for the promotion of Urdu.307 For instance, he replaced Sanskrit with Urdu under 
the three-language formula and initiated the recruitment of Urdu teachers. Further, it 
appears that Yadav never missed a chance to encourage MLAs of other parties, 
particularly those that belonged to the OBC category, even those MLAs in the BSP, to 
defect to his own party so as to strengthen SP’s position to form an independent 
government.308  In fact, immediately after the BSP’s decision of withdrawal of support to 
the coalition government, 13 BSP’s legislators who belonged to the OBC category, joined 
the SP under the leadership of Raj Bahadur.309  
 
Of course, it was also told that the BSP tried to make most out of its newly acquired 
power by interfering in the everyday functioning of the government. The resignation of 
Masud, one of the BSP ministers in the coalition government, was on the grounds of the 
dictatorial style of functioning of the BSP leadership, especially Mayawati. And the BSP 
                                                 
306 See India Today, 15 October 1994, pp: 35-37, cited in Pai, Sudha. 2002. Op. cit., p. 166, passim 8. 
307 My interviews among the Muslims in Banda city in March, 2005.  
308 See ‘Mulayam Singh seeking to win over more MLAs’, Times of India, 21 February 1995. 
309 See The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 3 June 1995. 
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also made attempts to fortify its hold among the Dalit civil servants by placing demands 
for postings and transfers of Dalit bureaucrats.310  In any case, making most out of 
political office is not unique either to the BSP or SP, or to individuals heading these 
parties. Rather, it is a game that nearly every political party and individual politician 
plays, to attain and retain political power. There exist substantive differences between the 
two social groups and the parties that they support (OBCs and Dalits), and also the 
differences that have been constructed around the concept of social justice. 
 
First, as pointed out above, unlike the Dalits, the Shudras are part of the four-fold varna 
system. It is this aspect of their ‘being part of the system’, despite holding the lowest 
position within it that affords them access to social resources. Apart from a space for 
material improvement, theoretically, Hinduism also allows them to enter the Kshatriya-
fold, the second highest rung in the social hierarchy. For instance, as god Sri Krishna 
belonged to the Yadava caste, it facilitates the Yadavas’ claim for Kshatriya status. 
Similarly, Kurmis also claim their lineage to Kush, son of Sri Rama. In addition to the 
claims made by individual Shudra castes, Hindu social reform movements that emerged 
in late colonial India, such as Arya Samaj, were also willing to bestow Kshatriya status 
on them. The Shudras’ claim for the Kshatriya status, as Ramaseshan asserts, was 
primarily to equip them psychologically to overcome their lower status in the ritualistic 
caste order.311  
 
Secondly, what started as an act of equipping themselves psychologically became the 
norm among the Shudras. Almost all the Shudras who improved on their material 
condition began to claim Kshatriya status. Apparently this claim, especially in post-
Independent India, particularly since the late 1970’s, was not to equip themselves 
psychologically, but to differentiate the Shudras from the other marginalised 
communities and castes as well as to lord over them. For instance, during the political 
rallies organised by the SP, Mulayam Singh Yadav proudly calls himself as ‘Sanatani 
                                                 
310 See Mishra, Amaresh. 1994. UP Cracks in the Alliance. EPW, 29 (30), pp: 1907-8. 
311 Ramaseshan, Radhika. 1994. Dalit Politics in UP. Seminar: The Monthly Symposium, January, Annual 
Number 425, pp: 70-74. 
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Hindu’ and his caste followers take much pride in slogans such as ‘Jai Shri Krishna’.312  
In other words, the Shudras were more than willing to inhabit the Hindu caste order.  
 
Finally, there have always been conflicts between the Dalits and the OBCs in the 
countryside.  To give one example, the land reforms after India’s Independence and 
benefits of Green Revolution created a class of small farmers from the Yadava and Kurmi 
castes within the OBC category in the state in general and in eastern UP in particular.313 
Some Dalits in this region enjoyed agricultural prosperity, which resulted in their 
assertion against the domination of the upper castes and OBCs in the region. Although 
the upper caste Rajputs, as Sudha Pai points out, were worried about the increasing 
assertiveness of the Dalits, it was the OBCs, particularly the Yadavas and Kurmis, who 
were responsible for most of the atrocities against the Dalits.314 “The backward classes,” 
Pai emphasises, “were keen to keep the Dalits under them.”315 In a report, The Times of 
India observes that in the first five months of the SP-BSP coalition government’s tenure, 
about 60 clashes took place between the Dalits and OBCs, in which 21 Dalits and 3 
OBCs were killed.316 The killing of Dalit youth who attempt to question the Shudras’ 
social dominance, murders against Dalit political and social workers, abduction of Dalit 
girls and occupation of agricultural land owned by the Dalits are some of the brutalities 
the Shudras committed against the Dalits.317  
                                                 
312 Researcher’s observations during the SP political rally in Banda, 20th March 2004. Also see Kumar, 
Pradeep., 1999. Dalits and BSP in Uttar Pradesh. EPW, 34 (14), pp: 822 – 826. 
313 Lerche, Jens. 1998. Agricultural Labourers, the State and Agrarian Transition in Uttar Pradesh. EPW, 
31(13), pp: A29-35. 
314 Pai, Sudha. 2002. Dalit assertion …, p. 167. 
315 Ibid., p. 167. 
316 The Times of India, New Delhi, 2 March 1994.  
317 While examining the contemporary conflicts between the Backward Castes and Dalits, especially in 
South India, many observers emphasised on the economic factor as the chief reason behind such conflicts. 
For instance, Janaki Nair observes: “Shrinking opportunities for even agricultural work in the rural areas 
and the restricted opportunities in the urban or service sectors may yet mean that the cleavages along castes 
lines will still be deployed in the struggle for altogether slim pickings.” – Janaki Nair. 1993. ‘Fight for 
fairness: And the changing equations, Frontline, June 4, 1993, pp: 46-48. Although the economic factor is 
an important element in the conflicts between the Shudras and Dalits, one cannot simply underestimate the 
caste element, in such conflicts. For instance, a Shudra agricultural labourer without any hesitation might 
resort to fighting against a Dalit agricultural labourer, but he would think twice about engaging in a fight 
with either a Brahmin agricultural farmer or a Thakur farmer. My interviews in Mohabadab with Dalit and 
Shudra labourers during my field work in UP in 2004 and 2005.  
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Even the SP’s concept of social justice which centres on the idea of equality, also 
demonstrates their hunger for domination. In order to understand SP’s concept of social 
justice, it may be suggested that we need to examine some of the arguments put forward 
by the proponents of reservations for OBCs during the Mandal debate.318 Drawing 
arguments from the Mandal debate is for one simple reason. The SP’s idea of social 
justice is a mere replication of the idea of social justice that was advocated by the 
proponents of OBC reservations during the Mandal debate. And whatever the arguments 
that were put forward by the SP in the later years are simply an extension of the Mandal 
concept of social justice.  
 
One important feature in the Mandal debate on the issue of social justice was that the 
reservations were demanded not as a means to rectify economic inequalities suffered by 
the OBCs, but as a means to obtain social status and power.319 For instance, Hukumdeo 
Narayan Yadav, 320 one of the chief advocates of reservations for the OBCs,  argued: “Far 
more important than economic well being is status and honour in society. When a Harijan 
becomes a government officer he is recognised by society. But even if he has money but 
does not hold a government job, no one is prepared to even sit with him.”321 What is clear 
from Yadav’s observation is that an individual’s status and honour in society comes not 
from that individual’s economic position, but from his holding a government job. It is 
important to understand here that the idea of ‘holding a government job’ does not 
exclusively relate to securing employment in the government sector. It also means, 
‘acquiring state power’. In a sense, being in charge of state power is seen as something 
that enhances the individual’s (here a community’s) social status and honour.  
                                                 
318 I borrowed aspects of the debate in Bajpai, Rochana. 2006. Redefining Equality: Social Justice in the 
Mandal Debate, 1990. In: Mehta, V. R. and Thomas Pantham., eds., Political Ideas in Modern India: 
Thematic Explorations. New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp: 326-339. 
319 Leaders of the Janata Dal (JD) repeatedly reiterated that quotas in government jobs were neither a means 
of securing basic material needs nor for improving economic well-being.  For instance, V.P. Singh, the 
leading ideologue and architect of the politics of social justice, saw in reservations the potential for 
‘changing the social order’ and creating a ‘constituency of the backward, poor and vulnerable sections’ to 
reverse the ‘adverse bias in the socio-economic and political system against the weaker sections’. See 
Mustafa, Seema. 1995. The Lonely Prophet: A Political Biography of V.P. Singh. New Delhi: Wiley 
Eastern, p. 164, cited in Bajpai, Rochana. 2006. Redefining Equality… .  
320 During the Mandal controversy, Yadav was one of the leaders of the Janata Dal.  
321 Mulayam Singh Yadav in Sunday Observer, (Delhi), 2 September 1990, quoted in Bajpai, Rochana., 
2006. Redefining Equality… 
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From the above observations, what is clear is that the caste mobilisation322 and 
deployment of the same in the political arena by the Shudras is to secure a share in the 
institutions – political, economical and educational – in which they were under-
represented. Under-representation in the institutional spaces and therefore a 
representation for the under-represented is something that the Dalits have also been 
arguing about, and from that standpoint, there is little difference between the demand for 
representation by the Shudras and Dalits.   
 
However, an important point of difference is that of ending the caste system.323 
Annihilating the caste system is important as it would lead to equality in social status 
among individuals (more on this in the next section). On the contrary, caste-based 
mobilisations of the Shudras are not to put an end to the caste structure, but simply to 
remove the upper castes from positions of power and privileges. This aspect in Shudra 
politics has been emphatically observed by Zoya Hasan: “The main purpose in the 
politicisation of caste and its employment in the competitive politics of democracy by the 
OBCs is not the abolition of the caste system, but the establishment of a political practice 
committed to the removal of upper castes from power and provisions…”324 Removing the 
upper castes from the positions of power and with the Shudras occupying those positions, 
it was nothing but the replacement of one group of individuals by another group. Such a 
replacement would certainly not put an end to structural inequalities. This understanding 
is important, for it demonstrates the crucial differences over the concept of social justice 
between the SP and BSP.  
 
Moreover, the Yadavs, Kurmis and Lodhs, and numerous other upper and middle caste 
groups within the Shudra category, were neither socially discriminated against nor 
economically exploited, but were only deprived of political power.325 Hence, from the 
                                                 
322 Zoya Hasan, writing on the political mobilisations of the OBCs in UP, both in the colonial and post-
Independence India, highlights two chief goals of such mobilisations: ‘to secure recognition for their low 
caste status from the colonial government in order to get quotas in local representative bodies’ and for 
‘reservations in post-Independence India’. See Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power…, p.121.  
323 Concept of Bahujan Samaj Party. In Atey, M. ed., 1997. The Editorials of Kanshi Ram…, pp: 155-168. 
324 Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power…, p.122.  
325 It must be established here that many so-called backward and middle castes, especially Jats and Yadavs, 
did not consider themselves socially inferior to any other castes. In fact, these groups assert their superior 
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beginning, their target was political power and mobilisation through political parties. In 
other words, the pursuit of political power dominated the concerns of the leaders from the 
Shudra category. Consequently, their aspirations were channelled through electoral and 
party politics.326 Thus, for Dalits, social justice is, in addition to securing a share in the 
political power and economic interests, a change in the alignment of social relations 
within civil society; whereas for the Shudras, it is one of the important means for 
securing a share in political power and economic interests. It is this difference that 
distinguishes these two groups and their advocacy of social justice. In fact, the policies 
for compensatory measures for Dalits are justified not on the grounds of their educational 
and economic backwardness, but on account of the extreme social discrimination they 
had suffered for centuries.327  
 
To conclude our discussion on the Shudras and Dalits in UP, I have made three points.  
First, the breakup of the alliance between the Shudra-based SP and Dalit-based BSP was 
due to opportunistic politics practised by both the partners in alliance, while in power.  
Secondly, the social outlook of the Shudras, especially their attitude towards caste is 
different from that of the Dalits.  While Dalit politics and activities aim to annihilate the 
caste system, the political and social activities of the Shudras aim to improve their social 
status by claiming Kshatriya status in the vertical social order, and thereby the desire to 
perpetuate an in-egalitarian social structure.  Finally, political power in the form of social 
justice is sought by the Shudras in order to replace the upper castes from the positions of 
power and privileges, while the Dalits sought political power in order to democratise the 
                                                                                                                                                 
social status vis-à-vis Dalits, and simultaneously, used their backwardness in relation to upper castes in 
order to gain the facilities and benefits of reservations.  
326Ram Manohar Lohia, one of the towering personalities of the Indian socialist movement, proposed 60% 
of administrative jobs to be reserved for the lower castes. With this proposal, he also advocated the idea of 
dislodging the upper castes from positions of power and administration. ‘I think that the dwijas, in special 
conditions, should not get government services.’ See, Rammanohar Lohia’s correspondence with R.L. 
Chandapuri in Mohan S. et al eds., 1997. Evolution of Socialist Policy in India. New Delhi: Janata Dal, p. 
43. Although Rammanohar Lohia’s proposal of dislodging of the upper castes from the positions of power 
was informed by certain strategic calculations, such as empowerment of the lower castes and due to the 
nature of caste system and inequalities, the notion of social justice for the OBCs appears to be informed by 
Lohia’s advocacy.  Mulayam Singh Yadav was the first politician to advocate the empowerment of the 
OBCs on the principle of exclusion of upper castes, and inclusion of Muslims and Dalits in a coalition to 
fight the upper castes. See Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest…, p.172. 
327 For a discussion on the differences in reservations for the Dalits and OBCs, see, Suri, K.C.1995. 
‘Competing Interests, Social Conflict and the Politics of Caste Reservations in India’, Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics, Vol. 2, pp: 236-7. 
161 
 
social and political system.  In the next section we shall see how the BSP proposed to 
achieve democratisation in the social and political arenas.   
 
4. II. The BSP’s idea of Social Justice328 
On March 13, 2004, Sunil Kumar, a resident of Jhalu, a small town in Bijnor district, 
travelled to Lucknow, covering a distance of 398 km, to attend a rally organised by the 
BSP.  After the rally, when he was waiting for the return train in Charbagh railway 
station, I asked Kumar why he travelled all that way to attend a half-day meeting in 
Lucknow. He responded to my question in just three words: ijjat ke liye, maryaada ke 
liye, and samaan ke liye (for respect, dignity and equality). 329 These are the three words 
that prominently came up in all my interviews with BSP supporters, most of whom were 
Dalits. Here we are painfully reminded that Ambedkar also uses the same words in his 
discussion on the ‘annihilation of caste’.330 The use of the same words by Dalits in 2004, 
which were used by Ambedkar in 1936, suggests continuous victimisation and non-
recognition of the human agency of Dalits on account of their caste.   
 
The BSP, which claimed to restore respect, dignity and equality for Dalits, had drawn its 
ideology from the writings, speeches and activities of B. R. Ambedkar. The party, in its 
Election Manifesto in 1993, announced two specific programmes pertaining to the social 
and political fields. These programmes, according to the Party, were the guidelines to 
achieve social justice in an Indian society which is caste-ridden, and the polity is 
dominated by the savarnas (upper castes). It has mapped out the following as its 
objectives of social justice:  
Five-fold struggle for social transformation 
1. Restoration of human dignity and respect for individuals  
2. To build a humane culture  
3. Strive to achieve dignity of labour 
                                                 
328 The BSP, since its formation in 1984, has been claiming ‘Ambedkarism’ as its ideology and ‘social 
justice’ as its ideological vision. From this claim one would understand that social justice forms part of 
Ambedkarism. However, the Party has been using both the terms interchangeably.  Until and unless 
specified, I shall also be using the two terms in similar fashion.  
329 Interview with Sunil Kumar, 13th March, 2004, Charbagh, Lucknow. 
330 See Ambedkar, B.R. 1989 [1936]. Annihilation of Caste. In: Moon, Vasant (comp.) Dr. Babasaheb 
Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, Bombay: Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 
pp: 23-96. 
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4. To achieve genuine pluralism  
5. To eradicate inequalities among castes and communities so as to promote bhaichara 
(brotherhood) and thereby horizontalise the vertical social order  
   
Five-fold programme for political power  
1. To unite and organise the fragmented Bahujan Samaj for political power   
2. To strengthen political democracy 
3. To provide freedom and security to religious minorities  
4. To protect the votes of the oppressed  
5. To attack and eradicate corruption 331 
 
The above ideas in the BSP’s concept of social justice could be summed up as: to 
horizontalise the vertical social order and to democratise the undemocratic political order. 
In the following, I attempt to examine these two aspects in two individual sub-sections.  
 
4. IIA. Horizontalisation of the Vertical Order: The BSP’s idea of, ‘horizontalisation of 
the vertical social order’ could be summed up in Kanshi Ram’s analogy in all his public 
meetings to a pen (refer to this discussion in the previous chapter). Kanshi Ram holds a 
pen vertically and compares it with the Hindu social order. In the next step, he holds the 
pen horizontally and asserts that, just as he has repositioned the pen from a vertical to a 
horizontal angle, the BSP’s mission is to reposition the vertical social order into a 
horizontal social order, and thereby achieve equality among the castes.  In other words, 
placing the castes on equal footing is one of the objectives of the BSP.  So, the question 
is, what did the BSP do to horizontalise the vertical social order? 
 
The BSP and its Dalit constituency employed three strategies towards achieving the 
stated objective.  The first strategy was to acknowledge caste identities in public places 
and public meetings with great pride. Caste-Hindu titles such as Pandey, Bhargav, 
Dwivedy, Thakur, Khare, Gupta, Varma, etc. were employed by the caste-Hindus both to 
identify their caste backgrounds as well as to demonstrate their social superiority over 
others. In all contexts, they used their caste titles as symbols of pride.332 Caste identities 
of the Dalits, on the other hand, were used by the caste-Hindus as words of abuse, which 
                                                 
331 ‘Concept of Bahujan Samaj Party’. In Atey, M., ed. 1997. The editorials..., pp: 155-168. 
332 The disease of displaying caste identities as symbols of pride is not confined to ordinary people. 
Academics who built their careers by theorising caste happily practise caste in their everyday lives. 
Otherwise how could one explain Bhargava in Rajeev Bhargava, Gupta in Dipankar and Pandey in Gyan 
Pandey, Kothari in Rajni Kothari, Deshpande in Satish Deshpande and Hegde in Sasheej Hegde. 
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is nothing but an act of denying the human dignity of the former. For instance, the word 
‘Chamar’ and ‘animal’ are interchangeably used by the caste-Hindus: “The upper castes 
do not make any difference between Chamars and animals” (savarna-log chamarko 
janvar samasthe). This demonstrates the upper castes’ attitude against the Chamars in 
particular, and Dalits in general. And at times, the upper castes use these terms to 
humiliate not only the Dalits, but also other people from the caste-Hindu background. It 
is because of the stigma and humiliation attached to the caste titles of the Dalits that no 
Dalit, unless forced by circumstances, would ever dare or wish to disclose his/her 
identity. “It is a way of piercing our eyes with our fingers,” i.e., using Dalit identities to 
humiliate the Dalits themselves.333  
 
But Dalits began to look positively at their identities since the ’80’s, especially after 
BSP’s work.  Mayawati in all her public political meetings begins her addresses by 
introducing herself as: Mai chamar ki beti hoo, my Dalit ki beti hoo (I am the daughter of 
Chamars, I am the daughter of the Dalits). After that, she would call the names of several 
Dalit castes, as if she is chanting a mantra - the Mahashahs, the Satnamis, the Balmikis, 
the Pasis, the Dhobis, the Koris, the Muzhabis, the Mujhwars, etc - welcoming them to 
the meeting.334 As Mayawati calls out these names, the audience is filled with happiness 
and pride, akin to that of the caste-Hindus in their caste identities, and acknowledge their 
approval by applauding throughout.  
 
At this point, one might doubt that BSP’s idea of Dalit assertions around their humiliated 
caste identities is moving away from Ambedkar’s idea of ‘annihilation of caste’. Gaya 
Charan Dinakar, a BSP MLA from Baberu assembly segment in Banda district points out 
that “the BSP’s idea of ‘equalisation of castes’ should not be treated as the party’s shift 
away from Ambedkar’s ideology.”335 The Party’s call for ‘equality of castes’, according 
to Dinakar, is in consonance with Ambedkar’s vision, and the change in focus from the 
individual to caste is only a shift in the strategy. Dinakar further explains that although 
Ambedkar’s vision of a casteless society is theoretically flawless, the strategy that he 
                                                 
333 Interview, Ram Charan, a cobbler, December 14, 2004, Lucknow,  
334 Based on attendance at several rallies and public meetings of the BSP.  
335 My interview with Gaya Charan Dinakar at his residence in Baberu (March 21-23, 2004)    
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proposed towards the realisation of such a vision has a flaw: “If individuals are part of 
castes and if those castes are part of a hierarchically organised social order, then the first 
step towards the realisation of an individual-based society would be equalisation of castes 
rather than annihilation of castes.”336  
 
What Dinakar is arguing is that caste, whether one accepts or denies it, is a reality in 
India, and in order to realise Ambedkar’s vision of equality of individuals, one must work 
with this reality rather than do away with it. Because, he argues, a lack of respect and 
dignity for an individual, especially for Dalits, is on account of his caste identity. In a 
sense, if an individual from the Dalit community is discriminated against and humiliated 
by the caste-Hindu society, it is not because of that individual’s appalling character but 
because of his caste, which is considered to be appalling for the savarnas (the caste-
Hindus). “And what we are trying”, claims Dinaker, “is to weaken that caste mindset by 
using our caste”. Thus, it is here that we witness an interesting way of using caste by the 
BSP and Dalits. Through a positive assertion of caste identities, they are not merely 
making positive their humiliated identities but equally, also subverting the caste hierarchy 
and its ideology.  
 
The second strategy has been adapting and attaching the caste titles to individual proper 
names.  Attaching caste titles/identities to individuals’ proper names has been practised 
by the upper castes and Shudras for a long time. The lower castes, especially the Dalits, 
never tried to attach their respective caste titles. The caste identity of an individual in 
society is primarily about the name of the caste to which he/she belongs.  If this is so, 
then why do only the individuals that belong to the upper castes (and Shudra community) 
attach their respective caste identities to their proper names, why not those from the lower 
castes, especially the Dalits (hum kyo nahi,  questions Ajay Kumar.337 
 
The reasons for the act of attaching or not attaching caste titles by the upper castes and 
Dalits respectively are well known to most Indians. The caste identity of an upper caste 
                                                 
336 Ibid. 
337 My interview with Ajay Kumar in Lucknow on  March 13, 2004.   
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does not simply connote only to the name of the caste to which an individual belongs, it 
also signifies many other things. To begin with, it identifies the location of the caste of an 
individual in the hierarchical social order.  ‘Location’ is a very crucial aspect, as it 
empowers upper caste individuals to demand respect from others, especially those from 
the lower rungs.  The caste identity is also a matter of pride for the upper caste 
individuals, a pride that psychologically boosts their confidence in themselves. In fact, 
upper caste identity makes the upper caste individuals feel special. Having said that, it is 
important to note here that in normal circumstances people have to work in order to have 
pride in themselves and to gain respect from others which in turn, translates in their 
feeling good about themselves and having a positive outlook.  In a way, the caste identity 
bestows on the upper castes basic psychological ingredients, such as a positive identity, 
respect and pride which are essential in making them confident individuals.  If the caste 
identity for upper castes means respect, pride and a positive outlook, then what does it 
mean for lower caste individuals, especially for the Dalits?  
 
As I have mentioned earlier, pride in one’s own identity and commanding respect from 
others are basic psychological ingredients in the making of a confident and positive 
outlook in individuals.  Dalits, who are kept at the lower rung of the social hierarchy, are 
treated with contempt by the upper castes as well as other castes which are on top in the 
social ladder.  In other words, the system of caste-fixed gradations among castes is as Dr 
Ambedkar argued, “with an ascending scale of reverence and descending scale of 
contempt”.338 And Dalits, who are to face disrespect and hatred in their everyday life, 
suffer mental agonies and lose not just confidence in themselves, but more importantly, 
their very humanness.  This is the reason why Ambedkar asserted that the Dalit battle is, 
“a battle for the reclamation of the human personality”.339 
 
In order to reclaim their human personality, the Dalits in the state, just like the caste-
Hindus, began to attach their respective caste titles to their names. For instance, Soma 
                                                 
338 Ambedkar, B.R. 1990 [1946]. Who were the Shudras? How They came to be the Fourth Varna in the 
Indo-Aryan Society? In: Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches, Vol. 7, Bombay: Government 
of Maharashtra, p. 25. 
339 Cited in Dhananjay, Keer. 1971. Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, p. 351. 
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Sunder became Soma Sunder Jatav or Soma Sunder Chamar and Naresh became Naresh 
Balmiki. It may be mentioned here that the adaptation of the title ‘Jatav’ or ‘Balmiki’ was 
not a new phenomenon among the Dalits in UP. In the late early 1920’s, during the 
heyday of Arya Samaj politics in colonial North India, some of the Chamars who joined 
Arya Samaj adapted the ‘Jatav’ title to claim their lineage with Sri Krishna. But the 
Chamars’ adaptation of the same title in the late 1980’s was in a different context, which 
entailed a different line of thinking.  There is no mention of Sri Krishna or the invoking 
of caste myths that usually link up Chamars with Brahmins. In tune with the BSP’s 
positive assertion of caste identities, the Dalits adapted their caste titles in a secular 
fashion.  
 
In a way, the strategies of suffixing of Dalit caste titles to the individuals’ names and the 
public acknowledgement of such caste identities are positive moves: they are acts of 
recognising  social identities till now unrecognised and not respected; but more 
importantly, also to claim social equality. Although BSP’s strategies are diametrically 
opposed to the strategies proposed by Ambedkar, the BSP is in complete conformity with 
Ambedkar’s idea of annihilation of caste. Whether the BSP’s strategies would result in 
the annihilation of caste is something which cannot be answered just yet, but they have 
certainly equipped the Dalits positively and paved the way for social equality between 
and among castes in UP society. We will witness similar adaptation of caste identities by 
the Dalits in AP in the sixth chapter.  
 
The final strategy is that of deflating the pride of the upper castes on account of their 
caste identities. Some of the titles and caste identities which were supposed to be an 
exclusive preserve of the caste-Hindus are being adapted by the Dalits.  For instance, 
titles and caste identities such as Choudhury, Singh, Verma, Pandey, Shukla, etc. were 
adapted by the Dalits, especially by the educated and the middle-classes among them. 
The individuals who adapted these titles justified their act on two grounds. First, they 
acknowledged that the moment they disclose their (original) names - names that do not 
contain caste tags - they are immediately recognised as people belonging to lower caste 
backgrounds and consequently, their treatment by others also changed. The use of such 
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titles was, thus, a strategy to avoid ‘constant pain of being mistreated’ by others.340 
Second, it was claimed that as long as Dalits used their ‘real’ caste titles, these had 
become weapons for the savarnas to abuse them. “Now that we have adapted their caste 
titles, despite their anger and annoyance, the caste-Hindus would have to address us with 
respect. Otherwise they would be disrespecting their own castes.”341  
 
Commenting on the importance of ritual actions in moulding hierarchical relationships, 
Chris Fuller observes:  
Ritual action in particular is the context in which hierarchical relationships – between 
castes, rulers and subjects, or men and women as well as between deities and human 
beings – are repeatedly being constructed, and even when such relationships are not 
homologous with others outside the religious domain, the former are always presented as 
a model of how the world might or even should be.342  
 
Although a small percentage of Dalits in UP either converted to Christianity and 
Buddhism or became followers either of Kabir or Ravidas Panthis, a large percentage of 
them were still in the Hindu fold. Their being part of the ‘Hindu community’, however, 
did not mean that they accepted their ‘status’ in the caste hierarchy. In fact, the most 
potent challenge to caste hierarchy and Brahmanical Hinduism came from those Dalits 
who followed Hinduism.  For instance, for the last nearly twenty years, the Chamars did 
not invite Brahmins to conduct ritual performances or marriage ceremonies. “The 
Chamars’ decision to stop calling the Brahmin priests”, observes Manuela Ciotti, “is a 
political and symbolic statement in their strategy of challenging hierarchical relations and 
touches on the essential rules of Hinduism.’343 Although this phenomenon, explains 
Vivek Kumar, was not a new one, it increased after the emergence of the BSP.344 One 
among them with knowledge of Sanskrit would be the pujari and would conduct all their 
rituals, including the marriage ceremonies.  
 
                                                 
340 Interviews with Surendar Singh, a Chamar by caste and manager of a computer centre in Lucknow, 
December 16, 2004; Ravinder Choudhury, March 11, 2004, Hathara.  
341 Interview with Raj Bhupal, March 20, 2004, Jhansi.  
342 Fuller, Chris. 1997. Introduction: Caste Today. In: Fuller, C., ed., Caste Today. New Delhi: OUP, p. 11, 
passim 8.  
343 Ciotti, Manuela. 2006. In the past we were a bit “Chamar”: education as a self-and-community 
engineering process in northern India. Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.), 12, pp: 899-916. 
344 Discussions with Dr. Vivek Kumar, Lecturer, Dept. of Sociology, JNU, New Delhi.  
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In northern India, with the emergence of Kabir and Ravidas Panthis during the medieval 
period, they urged the Dalits to realise God on their own, i.e., without the help of a 
Brahmin or a middle man, and this tradition continued during the anti-Brahmin 
movement among the lower castes and Dalits in the nineteenth century. O’Hanlon argues 
that, ‘by the end of the 1880’s, the performance of religious ceremonies without the 
assistance of Brahmans had come to occupy an important place in non-Brahman activity 
throughout the Deccan.’345 For Manuela Ciotti, such performance by the Chamars is their 
‘desire to be part of the mainstream religious culture, in contrast with their caste’s history 
of ritual exclusion.’346 It is true that Dalits have always nurtured the desire to be part of 
mainstream society. However, that does not mean they wanted to be a part of mainstream 
religious culture - a culture that did not treat them as equals. What they were doing, in my 
opinion, was inventing a religious tradition of their own - a Hindu religious tradition that 
did not involve Brahmins. If their desire was to be part of mainstream religious culture, 
they would have invited Brahmins to perform their religious as well as marriage 
ceremonies, thereby accepting the standing social order.  If the strategies of 
acknowledging caste identities in public places and meetings, attaching caste titles to 
individuals’ names, and adapting upper caste titles by the lower castes have been 
deployed by the Dalits and the BSP to horizontalise the vertical social order so as to bring 
equality among the castes, then what did the BSP do to democratise the political arena 
which has been dominated by the upper castes?   
 
4. IIB. Democratization of undemocratic Political Order: The Indian political order, for 
the BSP, is an undemocratic order for one simple reason: it denied “equality of political 
opportunity for all”. The denial, however, is not an inherent character of the order. But 
the Indian system has acquired that character on account of the control and dominance by 
the upper castes.  By virtue of such control, the upper castes have been appropriating not 
just the national resources for their own benefit, but also controlling opportunities of the 
bahujans (read the lower castes). And it is only through the realisation of political power 
by the marginalised sections, it has been argued by the leadership of the BSP, that 
                                                 
345 O’Hanlon, R., 1985. Caste, conflict and ideology…p. 301. 
346 Ciotti, Manuela. 2006. In the past …., pp: 899-916. 
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political control of the upper castes can be wiped out and social equilibrium achieved: 
that is, “restore to the majority the power to decide, by doing so we will democratise the 
political order”.347 To put the same in the words of Kanshi Ram: “Political power is the 
guru-killi (master-key), which enables its wielders to open every lock, whether social, 
political, economic or cultural.”348 But, how did the BSP propose to acquire political 
power? Before we answer this question, it is suggested that we look at the political 
situation in UP prior to the emergence of the lower caste-based political parties.  
 
Prior to the emergence of lower caste-based political parties in the 1980’s, more than 
three decades after India’s Independence, the political order in UP had been dominated 
by the upper castes. The following Table delineates the point:  
Table 4.1: Caste and Community Representation in the UP Assembly, 1952-74 (in %)349 
Castes & 
Communities  
1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1974 
Upper castes 58 55 58 45.3* 43.9* 45.8* 
Intermediate castes  3 3 2 - -- ---- 
OBCs 9 12 13 29.2 26.8 28.4 
SCs  20 21 22 --# 20.9 16.3 
Muslims 10 9 7 5.6 8.2 9.6 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
* Includes Bhumihar, Tyagi, Vyshya, Kayasth, and Khatri. 
# Data is unavailable  
 
As the above Table demonstrates, since the early 1950’s and until the mid-1970’s, the 
upper castes had been controlling political power largely, to the exclusion of the lower 
castes in the state.  The emergence of the lower caste-based political parties, both the SP 
and BSP, effectively questioned this upper caste domination and facilitated an increase in 
                                                 
347 My interview with Ram Kishore Varma, 14 March, 2004, Lucknow.  
348 Kanshi Ram as quoted in Dubey, Abhay Kumar. 2001. Anatomy of a Dalit Player: A Study of Kanshi 
Ram. In: Shah, Ghanshyam., ed., Dalit Identity and Politics. New Delhi: Sage. Also see Indian Express, 05 
January 1998. By the time I began my fieldwork in UP, Kanshi Ram was bedridden with a paralytic stroke. 
Most of my information on the idea of ‘political power’ comes from other leaders in the BSP, as well as 
from media reports.  
349 Meyer, Richard. 1969. The Political Elite in an Under-Developed Society: The Case of Uttar Pradesh in 
India. Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania, p. 89, cited in Jaffrelot, C. 2007. Caste and the Rise of 
Marginalized Groups. In: Ganguly, Sumit et al.,eds., The State of India’s Democracy, Baltimore:The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, p.76. 
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the lower castes’ share in UP’s political power structure. However, it should be 
recognised, once again here that the end logic of the politics of the Shudra-based SP is 
that of reversing the earlier situation. That is to say, while earlier it was the domination of 
the upper castes, now it became the domination by the lower castes. However, the BSP’s 
method of caste-based distribution of Party tickets, as we would see below ensured the 
presence of not just the lower castes but the upper castes as well in the power structure. 
And this form of social distribution of power was the essence of BSP’s idea of 
democratisation of the undemocratic political order. In a way, BSP’s politics is not to 
reverse the earlier situation but to infuse equality in that situation, and in what follows I 
will attempt to examine how the party sought to democratise the undemocratic order.  
    
According to Kanshi Ram, restoring power to the powerless involved two stages. In the 
first stage, the Bahujans, in the vanguard of the BSP, would capture state power. This 
would be done not by means of violence, but by means of the ‘ballot box’, i.e., by taking 
part in the electoral process. In the second stage, the Party, by making use of the state, 
would initiate programmes such as providing better wages and good working conditions 
which would empower the marginalised, thereby leading to a social transformation.350  In 
a way, the BSP sought political power for a dual purpose: (a) to secure an opportunity for 
the socially marginalised and politically voiceless to be part of the political rule and, thus, 
democratise the undemocratic political order, and (b) to use the state to empower the 
marginalised and thereby bring about social transformation. How the BSP used state 
power to empower the marginalised is the focus of my discussion in the next section.  
 
The BSP’s idea of ‘Democratisation of the undemocratic order’ may be summed up in 
one of its political slogans: jiski jitni sankhya bhari – uski utni bhagedari (representation 
on the basis of numbers). Political power should be distributed equally among all the 
castes on the basis of each caste’s weight in the total population. Indeed, caste-wise 
distribution of the Party’s tickets became a main strategy for mobilizing and involving 
every caste in the state’s political process. The table below illustrates this aspect:  
 
                                                 
350 Pai, Sudha (2002), pp: 121 -126. 
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               Table 4.2: Caste and community of the BSP MLAs (in %) (1989-2002) 
 
Caste & Community 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002 
Upper Castes   1.5 13.5 16.6 
Brahmin    1.5 4.5 6.8 
Rajput    6 6.8 
Banya     1.3 
Bhumihar    1.5 1.3 
Kayasth    1.5  
Intermediate Castes 22.8 91.4  1.5 1.3 
Jat    1.5 1.3 
OBC   44.7 42 39.7 
Yadav 7.6 16.6 14.9 1.5 2.7 
Kurmi 7.6 16.6 7.5 12 10.9 
Lodhi   1.5 1.5 4.1 
Koeri     1.3 
Shakya    1.5 1.3 
Rajbhar  8.3 2.9 3 1.3 
Saini     2.7 
Pal/Gadaria    6 2.7 
Kashyap     1.3 
Kushwaha   1.5 6 2.7 
Muraon/Maurya    3 2.7 
Nishad  8.3 1.5 4.5 1.3 
Bhagel    1.5 1.3 
Gujar     1.3 
Other  7.6 41.6 14.9 1.5 2.7 
Scheduled Castes 38.4  34.3 27.2 25.9 
Jatav    16.6 20.5 
Pasi    7.6 4.1 
Khatik    1.5  
Other     1.5 1.3 
Muslim 30.7 8.3 16.4 16.6 10.9 
Non-identified    2.9   
Source: Centre of South Asian Studies: Occasional Paper No 2, University of Cambridge.351 
 
If we pay close attention to the above Table, we can easily discern the differential rate of 
distribution of seats among various castes and communities over a period of time.  We 
see that for the assembly elections in 1989 and 1991 we do not find any representation for 
the upper castes.  A majority of the seats have been distributed between the OBCs and 
Dalits.  However, we notice a change in representation since 1993.  The upper caste also 
began to find a place in BSP’s representation, and their share in the Party’s representation 
increased from 1.5 percentage in 1993 to 16.6 percentage in 2002.  Interestingly, during 
                                                 
351 Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2005. The BSP in Uttar Pradesh: party of the Dalits or of the Bahujans – or catch – 
all-party? Occasional Paper No.2, Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge.  
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this period of gradual growth in representation for the upper castes in the Party, there was 
a simultaneous decline in representation for the OBCs.  
 
The BSP, which started to mobilise the lower castes against the manuvadis with fierce 
slogans, such as Brahmin, Bania, Thakur chhod! Baaki sab hai DS-4 (All the castes and 
communities, except the Brahmins, Banias and Thakurs, are part of the DS-4); Tilak, 
tarazu aur talwar, inko maaro jootey chaar (the Brahmins, Banias and Thakurs should be 
beaten up with the sandal), distributing its seats of representation among the upper castes 
may be a surprising development. But one should not read too much into that 
development, for any political party that wants to gain political power in a democratic 
framework ends up widening its space of representation so as to accommodate as many 
social groups as possible. Moreover, for the BSP, which has taken-up the path of caste-
based distribution of political seats in order to democratise the political space, cannot 
refuse seats of representation for the upper castes as such refusal would simply go against 
its political objective.  
 
Yet, it is important to recognise that the turn of events – simultaneous growth and decline 
in the representation of the upper castes and OBCs respectively - is not a simple one at 
that. In the previous section, we examined at length the electoral alliance between the SP 
and BSP, the reasons for the failure of the coalition government formed by the two 
parties, and the larger conflicting interests between the Shudras and Dalits. The failure of 
the coalition and the increased incidence of violence against the Dalits by the Shudras 
forced the BSP to climb down from the utopian notion of unity of the oppressed and open 
its eyes to the realities at the grassroots. The turn of events is also important for another 
reason. They facilitated a rethinking in the Party’s attitude towards various social groups, 
and thereby, in its ideology, which in turn, led to further caste-wise distribution in the 
representation of seats since 1996.  
 
Allocating the Party tickets on the basis of caste meant the Party’s earlier criticism 
against manuvadis and its slogans against the upper castes such as, ‘Brahmins, Baniya, 
Thakur, Chhod! Baki Sab hai DS-4’ were no more in the lexicon. Inviting the upper 
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castes into the fold of the BSP, Mayawati observes: “BSP is no more a caste-based party 
because it has adopted the policy of Sarvajan Hita (welfare of all castes)…the Party now 
wants to take the help of all to remove the disparities prevailing in society.”352 Starting 
from the 1996 Lok Sabha’s elections, the Party began to nominate candidates in 
proportion to the caste and community breakdown in society.  Out of 85 candidates, the 
BSP fielded 17 Muslims (20%), 20 Dalits (23.5%), 38 OBCs (45%) and 10 upper castes 
(12%) – five Brahmins and five Rajputs.353  Caste-wise distribution of the party’s tickets 
was further crystallised in the state legislative elections in 2007.  Out of 403 assembly 
seats, the BSP allocated 139 seats to upper castes (89 Brahmins, 38 Thakurs, 14 Vaishya 
and 1 Kayasthas), 110 to OBCs, 93 to Dalits and 61 to Muslims. This form of allocation 
of tickets actually led the BSP’s success in the 2007 assembly elections and helped it to 
form a government, for the first time on its own strength.  
 
The caste-wise distribution of seats of representation and the strategy of sarvajan might 
have resulted in the electoral success of the BSP, but it is important to ask: why did 
various castes join the BSP and what is the implication of this form of distribution among 
the upper caste- dominated political order in particular and the democratic framework in 
general?  Below, I will try and trace the reasons for the rallying of various castes into the 
fold of the BSP, and later, I shall comment on the larger implications of this caste-based 
distribution of political seats.  
 
Many of my Dalit respondents have confided that they do not sincerely think that those 
who joined the BSP from the upper castes did so because they genuinely believed either 
in the Bahujan Samaj or Sarvajan Samaj.354  “Had the savarnas been sincere about the 
Bahujan Samaj why would they continue to beat us and kill our people and rape our 
women,” questions Somesh Singh, a BSP worker from Banda.355 And Ram Prasad Jatav, 
                                                 
352 The Pioneer, 20 February 1998. 
353. The total number of Lok Sabha seats prior to the bifurcation of UP into Uttaranchal (later on 
Uttarkhand) and Uttar Pradesh was 85; after the bifurcation while the Uttarkhand got 5 Lok Sabha seats, 
the rest remained in UP. See The Hindu, 11 August, 1996. 
354 My interviews with Ratan Lal, Ashok Nandu, Raja Singh, Om Prakash, Pyarelala in Lucknow on 12-13, 
March, 2004.  All are BSP’s party workers.  
355 Interviews with Somesh Singh and other Dalits in Bundelkhand region, Lucknow and Delhi durng 
December, 2003, February and March, 2004.  
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a Chamar youth and a BSP activist from Chitrakoot, responds to this question: “They 
joined the BSP simply because we can make them win and through our Party they could 
get either the contracts356 or get their work done”.357  
 
The Dalits’ apprehensions about the upper castes in the BSP can be substantiated from 
different points. First, the upper castes’ previous political allegiances and the struggle for 
political power among themselves: during the early 1990’s, when the BJP was in the seat 
of power in UP, apart from the OBCs, particularly Lodhs and Kurmis, most of the upper 
castes - the Brahmins, Thakurs and Vaishya - constituted its supporting base. Despite 
competition for power among these ambitious and divergent castes, the BJP was able to 
keep them united under its banner with skillful distribution of power among them. For 
instance, in its five stints in power during 1991– 2002, the BJP reallocated power from 
time to time among the competing castes by changing chief ministers, i.e., Kalyan Singh, 
a Lodh; Ram Prakash Gupta, a Vaishya; and Rajnath Singh, a Thakur.     
 
With the electoral success of the SP and BSP, and when the BJP was reduced to a third 
position in the state, both the upper castes as well as OBCs began to migrate either to SP 
or BSP, largely to the former. Of course, this migration was also supported by these 
parties to gain electoral dividends. For instance, the SP, through Amar Singh Thakur, the 
party’s Thakur mascot, attracted a large number of Thakurs into its fold. The Party also 
succeeded in attracting a considerable number of Vaishya from the BJP through its 
Vaishya leaders like Shyama Charan Gupt, a business tycoon in the Bundelkhand region. 
Interestingly, despite the change of party, the old feuds and competition for power did not 
subside among the upper castes. In fact, such struggles for power among different upper 
castes further intensified as they joined the SP. For instance, while the Thakurs and 
Vaishya were fighting to get second-level leadership, the Yadavas – the power wielder in 
SP – felt a constant threat to their leadership as the Thakurs began to fill the rank and file 
of the Party. And of all these social groups, only the Brahmins had become ‘political 
untouchables’ due to the weakening of the BJP and a lack of presence for their former 
                                                 
356 Public works, such as laying of roads and repairing canals that would be undertaken by the private 
individuals.  
357 Interview with Ram Prasad Jatav in Chitrakoot, 24 November 2004.  
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political bastion – the Congress, from the point of electoral victories. All these socially 
dominant but politically desperate castes were left with no choice, as they could not gain 
political strength on their own. They had to join either the SP or BSP.  
 
Second, although initially some of the upper caste groups such as Thakurs and Vaishya 
joined SP, they were apprehensive about the Party’s penchant for power and its record of 
social and political goondaism, corruption and criminalisation of politics. While the 
association with a ‘criminalised’ SP may not have tainted their reputation in the long run, 
the ‘excesses’ of the SP while in power, between 1993 and 1995 and again between 2003 
and 2007 appear to have vexed all sections in UP. Thus in such a complex political 
environment, the BSP appeared to be the only political party that could serve the interests 
of the upper castes better. Of course, the Dalits were also using the political alignment to 
actualise their goals. The BSP party cadre justified the Party’s distribution of tickets to 
the upper castes from the standpoint of fighting with the system and not with the 
manuvadis. In the words of Raj Vijay, a BSP office-bearer: “Our fight is against the 
system. This is the only way the BSP can capture power on its own.”358 But these 
justifications and rationale apart, what is the significance of the caste-based distribution 
of party tickets in a caste-dominated political order in particular and a democratic 
framework in general? 
 
Although India has formally adopted the system of democracy it was functioning in an 
undemocratic fashion for several decades after Independence because of the caste system. 
The information pertaining to the caste and community of the representatives in the UP 
Assembly from 1952 to 1974 given in Table 3.1 clearly demonstrated the dominance of 
the upper castes, which constituted a minority in the overall population. The lower castes, 
despite their majority in numbers, have remained in the category of the ‘ruled’. This 
phenomenon, as pointed out by Kanshi Ram, is nothing but the rule of the minority over 
the majority under the veil of democracy. By adopting the method of caste-based 
distribution of seats in political representation, the BSP has shown a path to bring in the 
hitherto neglected and excluded castes into the process of democracy, and thereby, laying 
                                                 
358 Interview with Raj Vijay, BSP General Secretary, Mau district, 10 January, 2004. 
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a path to democratise the undemocratic order. Yet, it is important to recognise that this 
method of distribution also leads to turning away castes with small population sizes from 
the democratic process.  For instance, in UP there are 66 Dalit castes, which together 
making up 21% of the state’s population.  According to the 2001 Census, the 
Chamars/Jatavs constituted of 56% within the Scheduled Caste population. The Pasis 
constituted 16%, while the third rung comprising Dhobis, Koris and Balmikis made up 
another 15%. The fourth rung comprising Gonds, Dhanuks, and Khatiks constituted about 
5%. Of these four groups of castes, the BSP generally distributed its SC reserved seats in 
the state legislative assembly and Lok Sabha among the Chamars and Pasis.  We hardly 
see any representation for Gonds, Dhanuks and Khatiks.  
 
To conclude our discussion on the BSP’s idea of social justice, I have noted the two 
essential elements in the BSP’s rhetoric of social justice: (a) horizontalisation of the 
vertical order, and (b) democratisation of the undemocratic political order.  In order to 
horizontalise the social order, the BSP recognised and acknowledged the hitherto 
humiliated and shunned social identities of the lower castes, and on their part, the Dalits 
began to proudly attach their caste titles to their names. With these strategies, although 
the upper castes are not affected directly, they essentially puncture the pride embodied in 
the caste identities of the savarnas.  And in order to realise its second objective, the BSP 
began to distribute its party tickets to all the castes in the society on the basis of each 
caste’s weight of the population.  Although this method of distribution might reduce the 
domination of the upper castes in the representation sphere and bring the more and more 
neglected castes and communities into that sphere, it will also turn away those caste 
groups with small population sizes. The strategies of a hortizontal social order and the 
democratisation of the political order surely instilled social confidence among the lower 
castes and secured their political representation, but in addition to these two aspects, what 
did the BSP do for social transformation in general and emancipation of the Dalits in 
particular while in power?  We shall examine this question in the next section.   
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4. III Using State  
In the previous section we have discussed that democratising the undemocratic political 
order and transforming the society in which people live with dignity and respect was the 
essence of BSP’s idea of political power. We have also discussed how the BSP tried to 
democratise the political order by distributing Party seats, and thereby political power, 
among all castes and communities on the basis of their weight in the total population. But 
the question is after assuming political power what did the BSP do? To ask differently, 
how did the BSP rule the state and whether their rule led to the transformation of society, 
as it always claimed? These questions assume importance in the wake of transfer of 
political power from the hands of upper castes to lower castes and also in the wake of 
criticism against the BSP’s use of power.  For instance, Barbara Joshi, in one of her 
essays, ‘Whose Law, Whose Order? “Untouchables,” Social Violence, and the State in 
India,’ poses a question: “Is the state always a passive instrument reflecting the will of 
those who dominate society and economy, or could it be an instrument of change?”359 
The state in India, without any doubt, has been an instrument of change. But those 
changes, as observed by Pranab Bardhan, are conditioned by the state’s requirement for 
the sheen of legitimacy among the subalterns.360 This means that the changes were 
allowed by those dominating to the extent that those changes did not alter existing power 
equations. If this is so, would the lower castes and lower classes act differently if they got 
political power in their hands? 
 
Similarly, some of the programmes and policies pursued by the BSP while in power have 
become subjects of intense criticism. Two aspects of such criticism are noteworthy: the 
lack of a concrete economic policy and the state-funded statues of Ambedkar. On the 
second aspect, scholars like Sudipta Kaviraj felt that, except for giving some political 
prestige, the installation of statues of Ambedkar, “does nothing to alter the structural 
bases of privilege in education, health and other opportunities which serve to reproduce 
                                                 
359 Joshi, R.B. 1982. Whose Law, Whose Order: “Untouchables,” Social Violence, and the State in India. 
Asian Survey, 22(3), pp: 676 – 687, here, p. 678. 
360 Bardhan, Pranab. 1984. The political economy of development in India. Oxford: Blackwell.  
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the inequalities against which the politics of the lower castes is directed.”361 Although I 
am sympathetic to this argument, for me the importance of Ambedkar statues, as argued 
below, lies not to arrogate to the Dalits their political prestige or the democratisation of 
public space.  
 
On the first aspect, it was argued that the BSP, unlike most mainstream political parties, 
does not have a guiding philosophy on the economic front. Such a deficiency on the part 
of the BSP has become one of the most potent weapons of criticism in the hands of its 
political opponents, the academia and the media. For instance, Sudha Pai in her 
‘Deprivation and Development in UP: The Economic Agenda of the BSP’ has taken a 
firm stand against the Party and criticised it for the lack of an economic agenda.362 Her 
three major points of criticism are: First, the BSP, despite its claim of being an 
Ambedkarite Party, neither follows Ambedkar’s economic philosophy, i.e., ‘State 
Socialism’,363 nor devises a comprehensive alternative economic agenda for the Dalits.  
Secondly, for Pai, the BSP’s concentration on the economic empowerment of the Dalits 
while the Party was in power, is ‘doling out a kind of ‘retributive social justice’ to Dalits, 
rather than promoting general development of the State which is interlinked with the 
development of the Dalits. She asks, “Can there be sectional development in the larger 
context of under-development in UP?”364 And thirdly, the developmental programmes 
undertaken by the Party in the name of Dalits, are in practice helpful to only a section of 
the Dalits rather than the community as a whole.365  
 
For me, the first point of Pai’s criticism is not merely uncharitable, but also illogical. For, 
being an Ambedkarite party does not mean that the BSP has to axiomatically follow 
                                                 
361 Kaviraj, Sudipta. 2002 [2000]. ‘Democracy and Social Inequality’, in Frankel, R. Francine et al., eds., 
Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. Delhi: OUP, pp: 89 – 199, here p. 113. I 
am actually surprised at the sudden urge on the part of the caste-Hindu academics, working under the veil 
of Left intellectualism, to comment on the installation of Ambedkar statues. I wonder why they did not 
write anything earlier when Ambedkar statues were being demolished and humiliated by the caste-Hindu 
mob.  
362 Pai, Sudha. 2003. Deprivation and Development in UP: The Economic Agenda of the BSP. Man and 
Development, 25(1), pp: 35-54. 
363 For a critical assessment of Ambedkar’s ‘State Socialism’, see Omvedt, Gail (1994), pp: 231 - 240 
364  Pai, Sudha Pai. 2003. Deprivation…, p. 36. 
365  Ibid., pp: 35-54. 
179 
 
everything that Ambedkar had proposed or done. The historical circumstances, in which 
Ambedkar was operating, were different from those of the BSP. The dawn of 
independence had created an atmosphere of great confidence and belief, not just for 
Ambedkar but also for most of the Indian national leaders. They were all more confident 
that through Constitutional means they could undo what 200 years of British rule did to 
India and reconstruct an India of their choice.  
 
Ambedkar’s idea(lism) of ‘State Socialism’ calls for the rationalisation not only of basic 
industries but also of land and its working in collective forms, with peasants treated as 
tenants of the state. The idea of collective farming is highly impractical in the Indian 
social context of caste. And six decades have passed by, yet India is at a historical 
economic juncture, where local problems are no longer merely local, but are intricately 
connected with global problems. The idea of ‘State Socialism’, as proposed by 
Ambedkar, in the present circumstances is not only gigantic, but also a near impossible 
task. If that is so, then working for a Herculean task which is certainly unrealistic, simply 
wastes precious energy and the lives of generations of Dalits, retarding their historical 
progress. 
 
Pai’s second point of criticism can be responded from two vantage points.  First, let us 
reverse her question: since an element is a part of a whole – can the ‘whole’ be developed 
without developing a ‘part’? If the ‘whole’ is something – then that something is actually 
constituted by some (different) parts; and until and unless each part is developed, the 
whole cannot become ‘something’ or developed. Despite that partial development, if one 
were to call it development, then such development is lopsided rather than absolute 
development. Of course, I am aware that the idea of ‘absolute development’ is a myth. 
Secondly, the Dalits have been neglected for centuries and even in post-Independence 
India, if they were to become vulnerable to such negligence, one should rightly call it as 
‘intentional’ negligence rather than ‘unintentional’. Rectification of such intentional 
negligence requires some form of concerted effort to undo the historical injustice against 
the Dalits. And finally, from the point of availability of resources in UP, no state in the 
post-Independence era has sufficient resources at any given point of time. Despite 
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conditions of resource crunch, all the ruling parties until the early 1990’s have managed, 
within the limited resources, to develop upper castes. The crucial point of this 
‘management of development’ is prioritisation and the diversion of resources. And a 
consequence of it is reproduction of inequalities, whereby the Dalits are further 
marginalised. How this biased nature of development has been rectified by the BSP and 
how development of the Dalits could actually lead to universal development is the point 
of my discussion in this section. I have divided this section into three sub-sections. The 
first section is an examination of how the BSP government dealt with rural poverty. This 
issue has been explored through the examination of two programmes initiated by the 
BSP: land distribution and Ambedkar Village Scheme (AVS). The second section 
critically examines how the BSP has broken the nexus between the socially dominant and 
the state by using the latter. And the final section takes up the issue of installation of 
Ambedkar statues in UP or what the upper caste dominated English media projected as 
the ‘Ambedkarisation of UP’.  
 
4. IIIA. Rural poverty and the BSP’s measures: Rural poverty and its elimination had 
been the central concern of all the political parties and governments since Independence. 
Apart from initiating a number of empowerment programmes, the issue of land 
distribution to the landless has been taken up both by the Congress as well as the non-
Congress governments in UP on a massive scale. For instance, in 1976, the Twenty Point 
Programme was initiated by the Congress government under the leadership of Indira 
Gandhi. Under this programme, land titles for some 1 million acres were supposed to 
have been distributed to the rural poor in UP. But out of those 1 million acres, it was said 
that only 11.6 percent of the land was effectively distributed.366 The remaining land, 
although it was distributed to the poor on paper, it was under the control of the ‘village 
councils’ (gaon sabha), which were generally controlled by the upper castes or OBCs. 
Although Atul Kohli attributes such control to inertia in the administration,367 it was, in 
fact, the caste attitude of the upper caste bureaucrats that resulted in the ineffective 
                                                 
366 Kohli, Atul. 1987. Uttar Pradesh: Political fragmentation, middle peasant dominance, and the neglect of 
reforms. Kohli, Atul. ed., The state and poverty in India: The politics of reforms. Cambridge: CUP, pp: 189 
– 222. 
367 Ibid.  
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distribution of the land.368 In a way, this example suggests how the dominant upper castes 
have used the state resources to their advantage by using the machinery of the state itself.  
 
In its formative years the BSP campaigned in almost all the villages in the state to occupy 
government land. A slogan that spread the message of this campaign was: Jo zameen 
sarkari hai, wo zameen hamara hai (Government’s land belongs to us).  And when the 
Party assumed power - both in 1995 and 1997 - one of its key concerns was land re-
distribution in favour of the Dalits and OBCs, particularly the Most Backward Castes 
(MBCs). Under a special drive, it distributed some 52,379 acres of land among 81,500 
MBCs; 20,000 Dalits were given about 15,000 acres of Gaon Sabha land; and all tenants 
of more than 10 years standing were granted bhumidhari rights, a scheme under which 
many small scale farmers from the Dalit and OBC categories benefited.369 Further, the 
BSP government acquired about 1,052,000 acres of land and out of that 1,020,000 acres 
of land were distributed among the most backward castes and Dalits. About 20,000 more 
Dalits benefited when 15,000 irregular-land nominations were regularised in their 
name.370 This pattern of land distribution shows that the BSP was committed to 
improving the economic conditions of the marginalised sections. Yet, in a curious way, it 
did not distribute any land when it was in power for the fourth time, between 2007 and 
2012.  
 
Another programme of the BSP government that yielded better social and economic 
results than the land programmes is the Ambedkar Village Scheme (AVS). The AVS is a 
comprehensive programme of action for the development of Dalits in rural areas. 
Although under the AVS, initially some thirty-six developmental programmes were 
listed, there seemed to be predominant concentration on six programmes, including 
drinking water, electricity, housing, schools, primary health centres, public toilets and 
link roads. Originally, this scheme consisted of allotting special funds for socio-economic 
                                                 
368 Interviews with Ram Kishore Varma at Atarra (Banda district) on 15 March, 2004 and with Surendra 
Pal at Chitrakoot on 17 March, 2004.  
369 Pai, Sudha. 2004. Dalit Question and Political Response: Comparative Study of Uttar Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh. EPW, 39(11), pp: 1141-50, here, p. 1145. 
370 Akhtar, Mohammad Jamil. 1999. Iron Lady Mayawati. New Delhi: Bahujan Sangathak, cited in Kumar, 
Vivek. 2003. Uttar Pradesh: Politics of Change. EPW, 38(37), pp: 3869-3871.  
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development for one year to villages with 50% Dalit population. When Mayawati formed 
the government in 1995, she extended this programme to those villages with 22-30% 
Dalit population. All in all, 25,434 villages were included in the Scheme.371  
 
What is significant about these programmes is that they are basic programmes that any 
government in power is expected to undertake. And many governments in the state 
appear to be implementing them since the early 1960’s, at least on paper. For instance, in 
the late 1960’s, as a way of dealing with rural discontent, on account of the increasing 
inequalities in the post-Green Revolution period, the Congress government - under the 
scheme of its Anti-Poverty Programme - implemented similar programmes. But the 
novelty of the AVS was its emphasis upon the Dalits. Commenting on the impact of this 
scheme, Vivek Kumar observes: “Today Dalits do not need schools, hospitals, sources of 
water or roads used by the ‘upper castes’ which has thus broken the traditional shackles 
of caste relations. The whole process has saved the Dalits from facing the perpetual 
humiliation inflicted by the upper castes whenever they became angry and put restrictions 
on the use of these facilities by the Dalits.”372  Viewing the scheme through a similar 
lens, Manini Chatterjee observes: 
In Lucknow and Delhi politicians may scoff at Mayawati’s dalit ki beti histrionics, but 
spends a day in these Ambedkar villages …the most visible sign of change is the 
enthusiasm for education. In a cluster of four villages in western-central UP – Abbasganj, 
Hasanpur, Kaneri, Chatauni (in the Rae Bareli-Lucknow region) there are four primary 
and two junior schools and one high school. Almost every Dalit parent sends their sons 
and daughters to school.373  
 
From the above comments, two aspects are clear: first, basic civic facilities such as 
drinking water, primary health care, and schools had previously been under the control of 
the upper castes. Through the control of these essential resources, the upper castes were 
able to control the Dalits and other marginalised sections. It is important to recognise 
here that these civic facilities are not merely instruments of domination but also actively 
                                                 
371 When the programme was introduced, the requirement was 50% Dalit population. It was in 1995 that the 
BSP government lowered the required Dalit population from 50 per cent to 22-30 per cent, thereby 
covering more villages.  For details of the programme, see Government of Uttar Pradesh (1999) Ambedkar 
Gram Vikas Yojana Sambandhith Mahatvapoorn Shasanadesh (Report in Hindi), Lucknow: Government of 
UP.  
372 Kumar, Vivek. 2003. Uttar Pradesh…., p. 3870. 
373 Chatterjee, Manini. 2003. Maya’s Gone but in these Dalit homes the change’s for real. The Indian 
Express, September 1, New Delhi.  
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used to humiliate the Dalits, particularly the Dalit women. Whenever Dalit women went 
out to fetch drinking water from the facilities located in the upper caste areas, they were 
subjected to lustful gazes of the upper caste men and at times, abuse. But having these 
basic facilities in their locations meant the Dalits and their women would no longer be 
subjected to such humiliation. Moreover, the provision of basic amenities which they had 
been denied for centuries, instilled in them a sense of confidence and respect for 
themselves.  
 
Secondly, although some of these basic facilities are located within the Dalit locations, 
some other facilities like roads, high schools and junior colleges are for the use of the 
community and for the good of everyone. Most of the upper castes, despite their 
complaints against the BSP government for the special treatment meted out to the Dalits, 
were happy to see a road for the first time in their lives.374  
 
It may not be out of place to mention some of the achievements and failures of the BSP 
government in the social sector.375 For years, the UP state has been neglecting housing 
security to its people.  According to the National Sample Survey Organization data, while 
23% of the households in rural UP live in pucca houses, in urban slums, merely 12% 
households live in pucca houses.  This means that 77% of the households in rural UP and 
88% households in the urban slums are living in mud houses.  The BSP government has 
taken some bold steps towards improving housing security.  During 2007-10, it initiated 
three major housing schemes: Mahamaya Awaas Yojana (MAY), Kanshi Ram Sahari 
Gareeb Awaas Yojana (KSGAY), and Sarvajana Hitay Shahri Garib Awas Malikana Haq 
Yojana to benefit various sections of the population, both in the rural and urban areas. 
The Kanshi Ram Sahari Gareeb Awaas Yojana targets BPL (Below Poverty Line) 
families in urban areas.  Under this scheme, while 23% and 27% benefits go to the OBCs 
                                                 
374 Susheel Kumar Misra, a 65-year-old Brahmin told me that he always thought that he would die without 
seeing a road in his village. Now he is happy that Behenji gave a daambar (tar) road, in an interview with 
Misra on March 23, 2004 at Mahoba.  
375 Until and unless cited separately, my information on the BSP government’s achievements and failures 
comes from: ‘Achievements of BSP Government in Last 3 Years’, Information and Public Relation 
Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, published in The Hindu, 13 May, 2010, Bangalore, p. 25; 
Singh, Shyam. 2010. Three Years of the BSP Government in Uttar Pradesh. EPW, 25(38), pp: 77-81. (I 
thank Dr. Jens Lerche for directing my attention to this article).  
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and SCs respectively, 50% benefit goes to poor people in the general category. When the 
scheme was initiated, the BSP government intended to construct 1.01 lakh houses and by 
September 2010 it managed to construct 96,418 houses in the urban areas. Another 
housing scheme: Sarvajana Hitay Shahri Garib Awas Malikana Haq Yojana, also targets 
the urban poor. Under this scheme, ownership will be given to those BPL (below the 
poverty line) families that have been living in the slums on government land.  For the 
benefit of the rural poor, in addition to proper implementation of the already existing 
Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY),376 the BSP has initiated two more schemes: Mahamaya 
Awaas Yojana (MAY), and Mahamaya Sarvajan Awaas Yojana (MSAY). While the 
former provides housing security exclusively for the SC/ST communities in rural areas, 
the latter targets the non-SC/ST poor families. During 2007-10 under MAY, 3.06 lakh 
SC/ST families have benefited at a cost of Rs. 949 crore and 50,000 non-SC/ST families 
benefited. During the same period, the government has succeeded in constructing 10.3 
lakh houses by expending Rs. 3,316 crore under the IAY.  
 
In addition to the above, certain other noteworthy schemes and initiatives by the BSP 
government (during the period of 2007-10) in the arenas of social security, welfare, 
health, education and employment may be noted below:   
 In 2007, it started Mukhyamantri Mahamaya Garib Aarthik Madad Yojana. This 
scheme was to give Rs. 300 per month to those poor families excluded from the 
list of the BPL.  
 The amount of old age pension has been increased from Rs. 150 per month to Rs. 
300.  
 Financial assistance for the marriage of SC/ST girls from  Bundelkhand region 
has been hiked from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 20,000. 
 Financial assistance for medical treatment for the poor has increased from Rs. 
2,000 to Rs. 5,000.  
 For the physically challenged people:  
                                                 
376 IAY is jointly initiated by the Central and State governments. While the former gives 75% of the total 
expenditure, the latter gives the remaining 25%.  
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A. Financial assistance to purchase artificial limbs or other auxiliary 
equipment has been increased from Rs. 3,500 to Rs. 6,000.  
B. Rs. 2 crore has been earmarked to provide financial assistance for the 
purpose of marriages.  
C. Financial assistance to those people who are studying or undergoing 
training has been enhanced from Rs. 550 per month to Rs. 850 per month.  
 Mahamaya Gharib Balika Ashirvad Yojana has been initiated in 2009 to benefit 
girls born in BPL families. Under this scheme a girl will get Rs. 1 lakh by the 
time she becomes 18 years old. Through this scheme 1,01,705 girls had benefited 
by 2010.  
 Rs. 11,000 is provided to each widow if she is ready for her remarriage.  
 While the previous Mulayam Singh government had spent Rs. 224.65 per head in 
2006-07 for health measures, the BSP government had spent an average of Rs. 
290.82 per head per year on health.  
 In addition to a bicycle, a sum of Rs. 25,000 in two instalments was given to each 
girl student of 11th and 12th classes.  
 Under the Scheduled Castes Special Component Plan, certain amount of money 
has been allocated in the budget for the benefit of the SCs exclusively.  For 
instance, Rs. 5,329.2 crore was allocated for the financial year 2007-08. This 
amount was 45.7% higher than the previous Mulayam Singh government’s 
contribution in 2006-07.  In 2008-09, an amount of Rs. 7,700.52 crore was 
allocated under the same plan, which was 44.5% higher than the previous year’s 
budget.  
 Yet, in other social security areas, the BSP government paid scant attention. For 
instance, the state of heath of people is in a miserable state in UP.  Life expectancy in UP 
is one of the lowest in the country. But the BSP government did not take any measures, 
not even a single health security scheme, to improve health conditions in UP. In the field 
of education also the UP has been lagging behind in comparison with many states in the 
country.  But the BSP government did not take any noteworthy measures to improve 
education in UP.  
 
4. IIIB. Using state to protect the vulnerable sections: A number of strategies have been 
employed by the upper castes to control the Dalits and other marginalised sections. The 
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state in post-Independence India, in fact, had largely become one of the instruments 
manipulated by the upper castes to perpetuate their dominance in society. And among 
those numerous strategies, violence was one of the successful tactics to put the Dalits, 
who were ‘getting out of hand’, ‘in place’.377 In other words, Dalit resistance to comply 
with Brahmanical notions of caste - and, thus, to caste-Hindu domination - is dealt with 
violence by the upper castes.  
 
And if one were to examine the role and responsibility of the state in the event of 
violence against Dalits - from various government Orders and Acts, such as the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 (PoA Act) 
to establishing a number of police stations in violence-prone areas - it appears that the 
State has been fulfilling its responsibilities in protecting the Dalits. Yet, the continuing 
and, in fact, growing incidences of atrocities against Dalits is a marked indication that 
such attempts are being thwarted by caste-Hindus. This failure, as highlighted by many 
studies, 378 is due to collusion between the upper castes and the police.379  There are 
worse occasions wherein the state, if not taking action against the culprits, even fails to 
condemn the violence against the Dalits. For instance, in 2001, the BJP under the 
leadership of Rajnath Singh was running the government. In that year, two Dalit families 
were brutally murdered by Thakurs in Jehrana village in Western UP. In Hasanpur 
village, again in Western UP, three children and two women were brutally murdered by 
Thakurs in broad daylight the same year. In both the incidents, neither Chief Minister 
Rajanth Singh, a Thakur, nor the local MLA or the State Law Minister Radhey Shyam 
Gupta, a Bania by caste, condemned the incidents or paid a visit to the house of the 
victims.380 
                                                 
377 Lynch, Owen. 1981. Rioting as Rational Action…, p. 1952. 
378 See for instance, Human Rights Watch. 1998. Broken People: Caste Violence against India’s 
“Untouchables”, New York.  
379 Of course, this is not true in all cases of caste-Hindu violence against Dalits. There are incidences where 
the police firmly stood to protect Dalits. 
380 A number of atrocities against the Dalits had taken place during Rajnath Singh’s rule in UP.  For 
instance, in Bara Banki district, upper caste men poured acid in the eyes of four Dalits and blinded them. In 
Mirzapur district, 16 Dalits were gunned down by the police on the pretext that they were Naxalites. 
Similar atrocities have been reported from Banda, Kanpur (Rural), Unnao, Etah distrcts and Robertsganj in 
Sonbhadra district. According to figures compiled by the National Crime Record Bureau for the National 
SC/ST Commission, Uttar Pradesh tops the list of atrocities against the Dalits.  A total of 6,122 offences 
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This biased attitude by the state, however, received a setback when the BSP assumed 
power in UP. It showed how state laws and agencies could effectively be employed in the 
service of the socially oppressed communities. For instance, the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 (PoA Act), which came to be 
termed the Dalit Act in UP, assumed some “meaning whenever the Mayawati-led BSP 
was in power”.381 UP, under BSP’s rule, became the only state where it was not possible 
to casually insult a Dalit and get away with it. To refer to a Dalit with contempt—which 
caste-Hindus did as a matter of convention and traditional right—became a crime that 
could result in an FIR and booking under Section 3 (I) X of the Act. Police officers were 
given instructions to fearlessly implement the Act which was unprecedented in any other 
state under any other regime.  
 
Although the implementation of the Act was seen by the caste-Hindu society and the 
media —both used to routine humiliation of Dalits —as a means of registering false cases 
of blackmail in the name of the Dalit Act, 382 it went a long way in recognising and 
restoring a sense of self and dignity among the Dalits of UP. Interestingly, the police, 
apart from being ‘true servants of the state’ during BSP rule, also became intolerant, ‘in 
contrast to their traditional tolerance’ to the upper castes’ exploitation of the Dalits. For 
instance, Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerche narrate an incident in Jaunpur, where police 
forced the Thakurs to accept a 33 per cent wage rise for the Dalits.383  
 
Dalits were not the only section that was protected by the BSP government. In fact, with 
the arrest of Raghuraj Pratap Singh (alias Raja Bhaiya, who is also famous as the king of 
                                                                                                                                                 
were committed against Dalits in 1999, with 2,597 offences reported and 2,683 cases registered under the 
Act. ‘The objective behind all the murders’, as one journalist observes, ‘is the same – to impress [upon] the 
Dalits that the status quo will prevail.’ ‘The killings in Jehrana and Hasanpur were the fallout of tensions 
between an economically and politically empowered caste and a downtrodden community that has been 
trying to achieve self-respect. See ‘Caste Killings’, in Frontline, vol. 18, no. 14, July 07-20, 2001, p 
381 Anand, S. 2006. Fusing Phule and Ambedkar. Outlook, 14 Oct. 2006. 
382 However, none of my interviewees, especially the Dalit activists and Dalit lawyers in Lucknow and 
Banda, agree with this allegation. They insist that a majority (more than 85 percent) of the complaints are 
genuine. Field interviews in November, 2004.   
383 See Jeffrey, Craig and Jens Lerche. 2001. Dimensions of dominance: class and state in Uttar Pradesh. 
In: Fuller, C. J. and Veronique Benei. eds., The Everyday State & Society in Modern India, London: Hurst 
& Company, pp: 91 – 114. 
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Kunda in Pratapgarh district) under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)384, the BSP 
protected other castes and individuals too. Pratap Singh, who was an independent MLA, 
ran almost a parallel government in Pratapgarh district. The charges against Pratap Singh, 
as reported in a national newspaper, demonstrate the extent of his grip over the local 
economy:  
A FIR was lodged at Jethwara police station against Raghuraj Pratap Singh alias Raja 
Bhaiyya and his father for extorting money from the business community and traders of 
Derwa Bazar. Another criminal case of grabbing 170 bighas of government land and 
misusing public property has been lodged against Raja Bhaiyya, Uday Pratap, former 
Kunda SDM Jalil Ahmad Siddiqui and former Kunda tahsildar Ashok Kumar Srivastava 
at Hathiganwa police station under sections 386, 420, 466, 467, 468 of the IPC, sections 
12, 13, 14 of the Anti-Corruption Act and section 3 of the Public Property Act.385 
Despite these many charges, none of the previous governments in the state arrested 
Pratap Singh, simply because all the political parties, especially the BJP and SP, 
benefited from him in numerous ways.  The fear that Pratap Singh evoked in Kunda was 
evident: people did not even whisper a word against him, not even in private 
conversations. “Raja Bhaiyya will get to know: he has moles all over the place. Why 
invite trouble?” was the common refrain. After his arrest, a Brahmin in Kunda felt: “now 
we will vote freely according to our will, all these years we could not even see the ballot 
box or paper.”386 
In the beginning of this section, we asked whether a Dalit-based party on the assumption 
of political power acted differently from the other parties. The implementation of the 
Ambedkar Village Scheme and the daring arrest of Pratap Singh are testimonies that a 
Dalit-based political party can act differently.  The two aspects also respond to Pai’s 
criticism of the BSP.  From both these aspects it was not just the Dalits but others also 
benefited, which means that by developing parts one could develop the ‘whole’ as well.  
4. IIIC. Ambedkar statues – democratisation of public space: The caste-Hindu world’s 
denial of human dignity to the Dalits manifests itself in various forms. One form was that 
of preventing the latter from using public spaces, such as, roads, parks or land by the 
                                                 
384 Prior to his arrest under the POTA, the Gangster’s Act had already been registered against Pratap Singh. 
And during the SP’s regime some 44 criminal cases were pending against him.  
385 The Times of India, 26 January, 2003. 
386 Reported in Indian Express, 26 January, 2003. 
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former. Two aspects must be noted from this: first, in the name of ‘public’, it is the caste-
Hindus who have arrogated for themselves the public spaces. Secondly, both by the logic 
of appropriation and prevention, Dalits are denied a place in ‘public.’ From this, it is 
understood that in India, public represents the caste-Hindus and not the Dalit public. 
Disagreeing to share public space with the Dalits and preventing them from using the 
public spaces was seen as rejection of human rights as well as denial of citizenship rights 
for the Dalits.  
 
While Dalits, both in colonial and post-colonial India, had been fighting for their 
legitimate rights, the caste-Hindus were able to suppress such fights and, thereby, 
dominate the public spaces with the help of the State. This nexus between the upper 
castes and the state had not merely been challenged by the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh 
through the BSP, but was also destroyed to the extent that the Dalits had now gained their 
right to use public space, along with other citizens of India.  In the previous decades, 
Dalits’ struggle for equal use of public spaces was manifested in celebrating marriages by 
making the Dalit bridegrooms sit on palanquins (this being a ‘right’ reserved for the 
upper castes) and taking out processions on April 14 every year, the birth anniversary of 
their leader, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Such claims of the Dalits, especially since the early 
1980’s, were manifested in the installation of statues of Ambedkar in public spaces.  
 
When the BSP came to power, it tried to give a permanent physical form to the symbolic 
meaning of Ambedkar.  Apart from installing a number of Ambedkar statues throughout 
the state, particularly in every district and tehshil’s main centres, the BSP in over three 
chief ministerial terms, constructed a massive park in the state capital of Lucknow. The 
park, which is called ‘the Ambedkar Memorial Park,’ is the only site where a gigantic 
bronze statue of Ambedkar is installed like Abraham Lincoln’s statue at the Lincoln 
Memorial in Washington. The Rs. 200 crore park was dedicated to the public on January 
15, 2003.387 The BSP even issued a Government Order assigning half an acre of 
communal land in each village for the construction of an ‘Ambedkar Park’.  
 
                                                 
387 See, Frontline, 20(3), 2003.  
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What is the symbolic significance of the installation of Ambedkar statues or ‘the 
Ambedkarisation of UP’ – a phrase euphemistically used by the English media, the latter 
dominated by the upper castes? Perhaps before examining the significance of these 
symbolic gestures, it may be useful to look at some of the opinions on the 
Ambedkarisation of UP. The Ambedkarisation of UP has attracted criticisms from 
different quarters and on various counts.  Most of the rural upper castes were outraged 
and minced no words in their verbal attacks against the project. For instance, the project 
was condemned as nothing but chamarisation of UP (woh chamar logonka party ham ko 
bhi chamar bana raha hai!).388   
 
If this type of attack represents a blatant and unsophisticated rural upper caste who are 
threatened by the prospect of losing their traditional domination and control of the lower 
castes, especially the Dalits, the urban upper castes - who also happen to fall in the elite 
and middle class categories - also came up with similar criticisms, but in a more nuanced 
and sophisticated fashion. One strong point of criticism levelled against the statues of 
Ambedkar is that the BSP and Dalits should not have used public places either to 
promote Ambedkar and his ‘ism’ or to popularise the BSP. For public places, it was said, 
belonged to ‘everyone’.  Further, using indirect language it was said, “since they (the 
Dalits and BSP) are ‘encroaching’ upon public places, then they would have to bear the 
‘consequences’”.389 Two aspects are clear in this criticism.  First, the Dalits were not 
recognised as part of ‘public’ or ‘everyone’. Had their position as part of the public been 
recognised, then there would not have been any objections to the Dalits’ use of public 
places. And secondly, the Dalits ‘use’ of the public space was viewed as ‘encroaching’, 
as if an outsider was occupying territory belonging to others. Further, the word 
‘consequences’ denotes a kind of warning to the Dalits.390 And those people who did not 
want to seem as blatant as the rural upper castes and as hypocritical as the urban upper 
castes, put forward their criticism about the cost of the Ambedkar statues by arguing that 
                                                 
388 Interviews with Raghuvamsi Tripathi and Sushil Kumar Thakur in Jalaun on 10 & 11 of June, 2005.  
389 Interviews with Ravi Ranjan in Banda on 5th June, 2005. In a recently published news article, M V 
Kamath also came up with similar arguments. See ‘Dalit Future: A matter of concern’ – News Today, 3 Jan, 
2007. 
390 Nicolas, J. 2006. Learning the Use of Symbolic Means: Dalits, Ambedkar Statues and the State in Uttar 
Pradesh. Contribution to Indian Sociology (n.s.), 40 (2), pp: 175-207, passim 7, p. 182; see also, Mishra, V. 
1999. ‘The Dalit Question’, in Selected Works, Delhi; Central Office of the CPI (ML), pp. 192 – 94. 
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the BSP’s politics of Ambedkarisation of UP was a mere waste of tax-payers’ money. 
For, such a project did not benefit the Dalits in any tangible fashion.391 Although one 
would not dismiss the rationality of this criticism, one should question the narrow 
understanding of the significance of the Ambedkar statues. In any case, the upper castes 
blind to Dalits’ demand for equality, respect and dignity, are also blind to their civic 
rights to share and enjoy public space along with the other citizens.  
 
Irrespective of the above attacks by the upper castes, what we have to recognise here is 
that of the actualisation of citizenship rights by the Dalits.  In the sense, as mentioned 
above, public spaces belong to all the citizens of the country.  Yet, domination of that 
space by the upper castes by setting up statues of leaders of their castes and communities 
resulted in the exclusion of Dalits from that space.  When the Dalit-based BSP came to 
power, it set up the statues of Ambedkar, a leader of the Dalits in public places. Such an 
act not only resulted in the breaking up of upper caste domination in public spaces, more 
importantly, it gave the Dalits the right to represent themselves in those public spaces. In 
other words, it was an act of democratisation of public spaces by the Dalits through the 
BSP.   
 
The overall attitude of the upper castes against Dalits on the issue of Ambedkarization of 
public space in UP may be inimical, yet one should not underestimate the impact of Dalit 
politics in social relations. As noted above, UP society is a highly Brahmanical society, 
where discrimination against Dalits was rampant and they were treated even worse than 
animals by those in the upper castes. Some twenty years ago, Dalits were not allowed to 
enter the houses of Brahmins and other upper castes. Earlier Dalits were not invited to the 
marriage functions of the upper castes and the former would not dare to sit beside an 
upper caste person. They were forced to take up work with a stigma attached to it, such as 
attending to dead animals. But now all those caste-based social relations appear to be 
somewhat antiquated. Both the upper castes and Dalits, especially those who are involved 
in Party politics, enter each other’s houses freely and sit on the same charpai (bench-like 
                                                 
391 See, ‘Exchequer suffers as Mayawati splurges on statues of Dalit heroes’, in India Today, 28 July, 1997. 
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arrangement).392 Invitations are exchanged during weddings and other social gatherings. 
Separate seating and dining arrangements for weddings began to fade by 1990 and was 
substantially eliminated by 2007.393 By engaging in politics, the Dalits, who had been 
denied recognition and respect, acquired political power, which in turn resulted in new 
confidence among themselves and importantly, recognition from the caste-Hindu society.  
 
To conclude our discussion, in order to understand how the BSP has used the State for 
social transformation I have examined three aspects in this section. I have taken note of 
programmes like the Ambedkar Village Scheme which although meant for the 
empowerment of Dalits, actually benefited all groups in the village. I have also pointed 
out that by arresting anti-social elements, like Pratap Singh, the BSP used the State in 
giving protection to the vulnerable sections in society. Although the BSP, through the 
instrument of power, may have been successful in providing tangible economic benefits 
and had put up the statues of Ambedkar, it could not change the attitudes of the upper 
castes against the Dalits and their demand for equality in sharing public space along with 
others. Yet, political power in the hands of the Dalits changed the social fabric of UP 
society forever.   
 
Conclusion: In this Chapter, I attempted to examine three aspects of the BSP.  First, the 
BSP leadership, which was inspired by the ideologies of Jothiba Phule and Ambedkar 
and their stress on the importance of unity between Shudras and Dalits in rooting out the 
caste system and dominance of the upper castes. On the eve of election for the UP 
Legislative Assembly in 1993 the Shudra-based Samajwadi Party and Dalit-based BSP 
forged an electoral alliance and eventually formed a coalition government. However, 
within a short span of six months the coalition government had collapsed.  In my 
analysis, I argued that Shduras and Dalits were not natural allies but incompatible 
partners. For the Shudras want to oust those from the upper castes from positions of 
power, and wished to dominate the oppressed groups like Dalits. The Dalits, on the 
                                                 
392 Field observations.  
393 On this see, Devesh Kapur et al., 2010. Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market 
Reform Era. EPW, 25 (35), pp: 39-49.  
193 
 
contrary, looked at achieving equality of castes both socially and politically, and in turn, 
to realise a democratic form of society and polity.  
 
Second, I have examined the BSP’s idea of social justice. The social justice of the BSP 
constituted two aspects: (a) horizontalisation of the vertical order, and (b) 
democratisation of the undemocratic political order.  In a close examination of these two 
aspects, I have noted that some of the strategies adopted by the BSP, such as a public 
acknowledgement of them instilled a sense of social confidence among the Dalits, which 
led to their claim of equality of castes. On the democratisation front, despite the existence 
of political democracy, sections of people from the oppressed groups continued to remain 
as the ‘ruled’.  The upper castes which are small in number, were able to hold on to the 
positions of power on account of their social dominance and economic superiority.  The 
BSP tried to end the political dominance of the upper castes by providing seats of 
representation for all the castes on the basis of each caste’s weight in population size.  
Although this method of distribution might result in the inclusion of hitherto politically 
suppressed castes and communities into the political process, it would also result in the 
neglect and isolation of those castes with less or a negligible population size in the 
democratic process.  
 
Finally, in order to find out what the BSP did for the oppressed, particularly the Dalits 
while in power, I have examined the empowerment programmes pursued by the BSP 
government. Through the programme of land distribution and Ambedkar Village Scheme, 
the BSP facilitated the economic empowerment of the Dalits in the countryside. The 
Ambedkar Village Scheme not just improved the Dalits’ condition, but also provided 
civic and educational facilities for other groups in the villages as well.  On the putting up 
of the Ambedkar statutes in public places, I have noted that although the upper castes 
continued to be hostile with the Dalits, the installation of statues led to democratisation of 
public places.  In other words, the BSP has to a large extent, succeeded in destroying 
ideologies and structures of caste and also in democratising the upper caste-centred 
public spaces and political power.  
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To give a general conclusion to  the UP section, in my examination of Dalit politics in 
UP, I have primarily focused on three questions: whether the Hindu-Muslim cleavages 
have been the ‘master narrative’ of politics in northern India, or is caste also one of the 
main axis around which the politics in the region is organised; whether the BSP’s 
overwhelming representation given to the Dalit elite, especially the elite from the Chamar 
caste, was different from other parties; and whether the BSP emphasis on social justice is 
different from other parties such as the SP, and if it has done anything for the 
emancipation of the oppressed, particularly the Dalits.   
 
The Second Chapter examined Dalit mobilisation under the leadership of the Adi-Hindu 
movement in the colonial UP. By claiming the status of mula bharatvasi and assuming 
the achut identity, the Dalits demanded not just social equality they also claimed a share 
in the emerging political power structure. These demands of the Dalits clearly 
demonstrate that their social and political activities were organised around the caste axis 
rather than around Hindu-Muslim cleavage. Significantly, among all the Dalits in various 
regions in colonial India, it was the Dalits in UP that placed demand for a share in 
political power for the first time. I have dismissed Sudha Pai’s argument that Dalit 
consciousness in colonial UP was delayed due to a lack of socio-political activities on a 
par with Dalits in other parts of India and have suggested that the Dalit consciousness in 
colonial UP was far richer than other Dalit groups in rest of India.  
 
The Third Chapter challenged Kanchan Chandra’s position that BSP’s electoral success 
in UP was due to the disproportional representation given to the SC elite, especially the 
elite from the Chamar caste in the state.  In my analysis, I have examined the Dalit 
political activities under the Congress regime and noted that the Congress has been at the 
forefront in taking advantage of the Dalit political reservation both in the State and 
Parliament.  Despite taking advantage of the Dalit representation, the Congress did not 
use its office to emancipate the Dalits from their appalling socio-economic conditions. I 
have discussed the brutal discriminatory practices and violence against the Dalits by the 
upper castes, and argued that those conditions provided the context for Dalits to take up 
politics by floating a political party that could fight for the causes of the oppressed 
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communities.  The Dalits support to the BSP is, I have argued, not on account of the 
disproportional representation, but on the grounds of programmes and activities initiated 
by the party to secure equality, respect and dignity for the Dalit constituency.   
 
In the final Chapter in this section, I focused on three aspects.  First, I examined the 
electoral alliance between the Shudra-based SP and the Dalit-based BSP, and I argued 
that the failure of the alliance between the two parties goes much beyond the personal 
clashes of the leadership of both the parties.  The Shudras’ socio-political agenda, social 
domination and exclusive political power in their hands, go against the social justice 
agenda – horizontalisation of vertical social order and democratisation of undemocratic 
political order – of the BSP.  I have also discussed at length the programmes pursued by 
the BSP to actualise its social justice agenda.  Finally, I have examined the measures to 
improve the socio-economic conditions of the Dalits by the BSP while in power, and 
showed that a Dalit-based party actually acts differently not just for the emancipation of 
its constituency, but also for the improvement of the general public.  Are Dalit 
experiences and activities in AP different from those of Dalits in UP? We shall examine 
this question in the second section of the thesis.  
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Five……………………………………………………………………….. 
For Respect and Social Equality 
Dalit Activism in Telugu Country, 1917‐1950 
 
Introdcution: I have argued thus far against the claims of prominent scholars (eg. 
Ashutosh Varshney, Christophe Jaffrelot and Sudha Pai) that in addition to the Hindu-
Muslim cleavage, caste conflicts also played an important role in shaping the politics of 
North India. Further, I have suggested that in organising against caste-based 
discrimination and domination the Dalits in northern India were not behind their 
counterparts in the south of the country. In fact, caste consciousness of the former is far 
sharper than the latter: not only were the Dalits in North India involved in mobilising for 
self-respect and social equality, they also demanded a share in the emerging political 
power. In other words, they were the first to realise the importance of political power, 
give voice to their realisation and pursue the same firmly and effectively.  
 
For the purpose of the present chapter, it is important to recall Jaffrelot’s argument in 
India’s Silent Revolution: the Rise of the Lower Castes in North India. For Jaffrelot, the 
divergences in the politicisation of the lower castes in North and South India, were 
mainly due to the composition of castes in both the regions. In northern India the 
“demographic weight of the upper castes and their role in the local power structure”394 
prepared the ground for the development of Gandhian conservative ideologies in politics. 
This, in turn, led to arresting lower caste consciousness in the prison of Sanskritisation. 
On the contrary, the politicisation of the lower castes in the South, Jaffrelot argues, was 
due to the absence of a complex middle order, that is, “the warrior and merchant castes 
are often absent or poorly represented”.395  Such absence, in turn, Jaffrelot claims, has 
facilitated a strong lower caste mobilisation under the banner of Dravidianism against 
Brahmanical hegemony and domination. It may be recalled that I differed with Jaffrelot’s 
position and argued that it was not in the 1990’s but way back in the early 1920’s itself 
that North India experienced politicisation of the Dalits. In the wake of the socio-cultural 
hegemony of Brahmanism and the political domination of the upper castes, the Dalit 
                                                 
394 Jaffrelot, 2003. India’s silent…p. 9.  
395 Ibid., p. 7.  
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constituency in UP – both during the colonial as well as immediate post-Independence 
periods, especially until the late 1960’s,  built a strong socio-political movement upon the 
ideologies of Swami Achutaanand and Ambedkar for social equality and political power.  
 
Also, there are two problems with Jaffrelot’s reading of the politicisation of the lower 
castes in South India.  First, one does not understand the possible link between the 
absence of a middle order in the caste hierarchy and the politicisation of the lower castes. 
In the sense, the upper castes discriminated against the lower castes, especially against 
the Dalits, irrespective of the presence or absence of the middle order in the caste 
hierarchy; as victims, it was natural for the Dalits to organise against their victimisers. 
Secondly, Jaffrelot seems to have based his present argument upon the simple assumption 
that all the lower castes who had been the victims of a common enemy and common 
ideology, i.e., Brahmins and Brahmanism respectively, have mobilised under the 
universal category of non-Brahmins by embracing the ideology of Dravidianism during 
the colonial era. This is rather a sweeping generalisation. For all the lower castes may be 
victims of Brahmanism, yet they were (and are) not united in their fight against that 
ideology. Every caste, especially those castes that were placed at the top of the non-
Brahmin hierarchy, fought its battles against Brahmanism independently.   
 
Further, a major problem in Jaffrelot’s argument is in his understanding of the idea of 
lower castes or the non-Brahmin category and the extent of their power in the socio-
political and cultural domains. It is true that the caste system in the Hindi belt is 
traditionally organised around the varna model or at least, closest to that model with its 
four orders – Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras, and the Untouchables. The 
hold of the first three castes on the economic resources and their domination in the socio-
political and cultural domains was so complete that there was very little space available 
for the Shudras and Untouchables during the colonial and immediate post-Independence 
periods. In other words, when we say the lower castes in the Hindi belt it is both the 
Shudras and Dalits.  
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Similarly, in South India also the lower caste category includes both the Shudras and 
Dalits. But then, just as there are differences between the Shudras and Dalits – in terms of 
their position in the caste hierarchy and the availability of resources, particularly 
economic resources, there are differences within the Shudra category as well. The Shudra 
category in Southern India is essentially divided into two layers of castes. The first layer 
comprises of castes, like Kammas and Reddy’s in Andhra Pradesh, Lingayats, 
Vokkalingayats, Shetty’s in Karnataka, and Reddiyars, Mudaliars, Chettiyars, Pillais in 
Tamil Nadu. This set of castes or category of castes are also known as the sat-Shudra 
category. In terms of caste position these castes may be placed below the Brahmins in the 
social hierarchy, but in terms of their control over the economic resources and 
domination in the social and political spheres, this category of people are more powerful 
than the Brahmins or any other castes in the social hierarchy. The second layer is 
constituted with service castes like, Yadavas, Kurmis, Gollas, Salees etc. During the 
colonial as well as the immediate post-Independence periods, there was not much 
difference between this set of castes and the Dalits, particularly in terms of social status 
and availability of resources for economic and social development. The dynamics of 
these differences between the Shudras and Dalits have changed since the late 1970’s, 
which is, of course, a different matter altogether.  
 
But the point that I am trying to make here is that lack of an ample presence of the 
warrior and merchant castes in South India does not mean that there were no castes that 
occupied and controlled similar spaces of power as those occupied by the Kshatriyas and 
Vaishyas in the Hindi belt. In other words, the castes in the Sat-Shudra category have 
compensated for the lack of Kshyatriyas and Vaishyas in South India.  And as the castes 
within the non-Brahmin category were divided both vertically and horizontally, they were 
at variance in their responses against Brahmins and Brahmanism. The castes like Reddy’s 
and Kammas, who have been in positions of privilege within the non-Brahmin category, 
were not against the Brahmanical caste system per se. They were simply against the 
Brahmins, who enjoyed the highest social status and cultural privileges. To put it 
differently, the privileged non-Brahmin castes were against the privileges enjoyed by the 
Brahmins, while at the same time aspiring for the same social status and cultural 
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privileges. During the early part of the twentieth century the dislike for Brahmins that the 
privileged non-Brahmin castes nurtured reached the heights, when jobs in the British 
government in India were completely taken up by the former. It was against this 
domination and to stake a claim for a share in the job market that the Sat-Shudras 
launched the non-Brahmin movement.  
 
On the contrary, the aspirations of the lower castes within the non-Brahmin category – 
especially the Dalits - with imposed restrictions were completely different from the 
aspirations of the privileged non-Brahmin castes. Of course, the Dalits, just like the Sat-
Shudras, also condemned the pre-eminence of the Brahmins in government employment, 
and they too sought their share of jobs. But unlike the privileged non-Brahmin castes, the 
Dalits sought to destroy the system that deprived them of everything that a human being 
aspired for with dignity and honesty. In essence, the Brahmins in AP, unlike their 
counterparts in UP, were not dominant castes. It was the intermediate non-Brahmin 
castes, particularly the Reddys and Kammas. This was the main reason why that the 
Dalits in AP allied with the Brahmins rather than with the non-Brahmin upper castes; and 
this was also the main reason for the slower emergence of an independent Dalit 
movement in the state. Thus, the politics of lower cannot be understood under the rubric 
of the non-Brahmin category, a category that is not a homogenous one but a 
heterogeneous category. There are huge differences among the castes within the non-
Brahmin category, in terms of the social status, social respect they command, access to 
economic resources and in terms of their positions in the local power structures. These 
differences must be taken into consideration while studying the politics of the non-
Brahmins.  
 
The aim of the present chapter is two-fold. First, to examine and analyse Dalit activism 
under the banners of the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha of the Telugu districts in the 
Madras Presidency and the Adi-Hindu Mahasabha in Nizam’s Hyderabad during the 
colonial era. Secondly, this chapter seeks to elaborate and extend the analysis of Gail 
Omvedt on Dalit activism both in coastal Andhra and Hyderabad areas. Omvedt, with her 
wider focus on Dalit politics in colonial India at large, could not explore the local Dalit 
201 
 
politics in the Telugu belt in great detail. She presents the Dalits as one homogenous 
category without paying much attention to the caste-based differences and conflicts 
among them, particularly between the Malas and Madigas; and I have tried to fill those 
gaps in this Chapter.  
 
The Chapter has been divided into three main sections. The first section examines Dalit 
politics from 1917 to the early 1930’s in the coastal Andhra region, leading to the second 
section that pays attention to Dalit activism in the princely state of Hyderabad during the 
same period. Although the struggles in both the regions revolved around similar 
concerns, I examine Dalit activism in these two regions separately in the hope of bringing 
to the fore a nuanced analysis. Through this examination I have tried to show how the 
Dalits contested the idea of nationalism, an ideology with the help of which the upper 
castes were mobilising against colonial rule for the transfer of political power. I will also 
show how the Dalits by conceptualising a society and a nation based on equality, dignity 
and self-respect put forward alternative ideologies and their distinct approaches to Indian 
nationalism. From late 1930’s until India’s Independence in 1947, Dalit activism came to 
be hugely affected both by regional as well as national political events, especially the 
latter. During this period the Dalit leaders, both in coastal Andhra and Hyderabad, 
travelled across the regions and voiced their common concerns on each other’s platforms. 
An analysis of the Dalit activism in both these regions is carried out in the third section of 
this Chapter. 
 
Before we move any further two aspects may be noted. First, the non-Brahmin movement 
in the Telugu region, unlike in the Tamil region of the Madras Presidency, did not gain 
much ground; and wherever a weak movement existed, it was largely confined among the 
privileged non-Brahmin upper castes, especially among the Kammas, Reddy’s, Velams, 
and Rajus and to some extent Kapus. The Dalits, despite being part of the larger non-
Brahmin category, did not become part of the non-Brahmin movement in the Telugu belt, 
for they were discriminated against not only by the Brahmins but also by the non-
Brahmins. It was on account of this casteism of the Brahmins and of the privileged non-
Brahmins that the Dalits in the South, as this Chapter through its study of Dalit activism 
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in the Telugu districts of the Madras Presidency demonstrates, mobilised not under the 
ideological plank of Dravidianism, but under the Adi ideology.  
 
Secondly, during the colonial era, the Telugu belt was divided between the British- ruled 
Madras Presidency and the Nizam-ruled princely state of Hyderabad. The Telugu- 
speaking areas in Madras Presidency comprised of seven districts of coastal Andhra 
region (Srikakulam, Vishakhapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari, Ongole, Guntur 
and Nellore), and four districts of Rayalaseema region (Kurnool, Cuddapah, Chitoor and 
Ananthapur).  These were (and are) two disparate regions.  The Rayalaseema region was 
(and is) known for its continuous droughts and the resultant backwardness, which has 
rightly earned the region the epithet, kshamaseema, i.e., ‘stalking ground of famines’.  
Coastal Andhra, on the other hand, was a picture in contrast with heightened economic 
energy due to major irrigation schemes across the Krishna and Godavari rivers and the 
subsequent commercialisation of agriculture; it was primarily in this economically 
dynamic region as well as in the Nizam-ruled Hyderabad state that Dalit activism took 
place.  
 
5. I. For Respect and Equality: Dalit Activism in Coastal Andhra 
This section is an attempt to examine Dalit activism in coastal Andhra Pradesh in the 
1920’s. The Dalits in this region, before being dragged into divergent national and 
regional political forces, especially into the politics of Ambedkar, Gandhi’s Congress and 
the Communist Party from the late 1930’s, united under the banner of the Adi-Andhra 
Mahajana Sabha for respect and social equality. In activism of more than a decade that 
began in 1917 they rejected the imposed social identities such as the Panchama identity, 
and by claiming the Adi identity, they not only contested Brahmanical Hinduism but also 
the caste-based social system; more importantly, they also sought to reconstruct a society 
based on social equality, dignity and respect for individuals. During this time the Dalits in 
UP also, as seen in Chapter Two, organised themselves around the ideology of Adi-
Hinduism. Through that ideology they critiqued Brahmanical Hinduism and the 
discrimination against the Dalits in the socio-economic spheres in UP. Although Dalit 
activism both in UP and the Telugu belts expressed similar concerns – social equality, 
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respect and opportunities in the economic and political domains – and was directed by the 
Dalits themselves, there was a subtle difference between the two. The Dalit leaders in UP 
became the leaders of the Adi-Hindu movement after coming out of the Arya Samaj, thus  
emerging from the shadow of patronage of the upper castes. In other words, the Adi-
Hindu movement emerged thanks to independent efforts of the Dalit leaders without 
interference or support from outside. Contrary to this, Dalit activism in the Telugu land 
was not an outcome of the independent efforts of Dalits; it involved participation of the 
upper castes as well, especially the Brahmin social reformers. The Dalit leaders, as we 
shall see, were groomed and given the necessary support throughout the colonial era by 
those social reformers. And this is one of the main reasons why, unlike in UP, a strong 
Dalit critique against Brahmanical Hinduism could not emerge in the Telugu region. 
 
 The rest of this section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section examines 
the growth of Dalit consciousness and the agencies that helped to raise that 
consciousness; the second sub-section examines the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha-based 
Dalit activism in the same region.   
 
5. IA. Education and the growth of Dalit consciousness: Prior to the introduction of 
western education by colonial rulers, every region in India had its own system of 
indigenous education. The system of pathasaala was prevalent in Telugu-speaking areas, 
in which the schools were generally located in agraharams (Brahmin localities) and the 
students were taught by Brahmin gurus. As the location of the schools and social 
background of the teachers amply demonstrate, education in these schools was nothing 
but the recitation of Vedas, Upanishads and other Brahmanical Hindu texts. Moreover, 
access to these schools was strictly confined to the Brahmins and other upper caste Hindu 
children.  The children of lower caste Shudras, Adivasi communities and Dalits were 
barred even from entering these schools.  
 
A survey ordered by Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras Presidency (1820-27) 
confirms both the monopoly of the Brahmins as well as exclusion of the Dalits from 
pathasaalas. According to this survey in the Presidency, there were as many as 12,488 
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schools and 188,000 students in a population of 12,850,941 – roughly 1 school per 1000 
persons and 1 student per 67 persons.396  Further, it was also found that education was 
completely under the control of the Brahmin teachers. Even among the students, 
Brahmins comprised 60 to 75 per cent, far outnumbering the non-Brahmin castes.397 The 
books used in these institutions were either directly derived from the Vedas, Shastras, 
Puranas or other epic literature.398 One of the most striking findings of the survey was 
the complete exclusion of Dalits and lower caste Shudras.  However, this situation 
changed with the efforts of the Christian missionaries, the colonial State and Hindu social 
reformers. A number of schools for Dalit boys and girls were opened throughout the 
province. Education not only raised the consciousness of the Dalits about their inhuman 
social conditions and appalling economic situation, but also provided them with new 
ideas, hopes, employment opportunities and thus, new possibilities. We shall look into 
the efforts of Christian missionaries, the colonial State and caste Hindu reformers, one 
after another.   
 
(a) The Christian missionaries’ association with Telugu-speaking areas goes back to the 
fifteenth century, when two Jesuit priests began working for the emancipation of Dalits in 
Chandragiri in Chitoor district.399 From the early nineteenth century onwards, 
missionaries started schools for the Dalits throughout Madras Presidency.400 And it was 
Alexander Duff of the Church of Scotland Mission who spearheaded education among 
the Dalits in the Telugu-speaking areas. He was primarily interested in evangelism and 
believed that western education and values imparted by the missionaries through their 
                                                 
396 Minutes of Sir Thomas Munro, March 10, 1826, cited in Dharmapal. 1983. The Beautiful Tree: 
Indigenous Indian Education in the Eighteenth Century. New Delhi: Biblia Impex, pp: 248-251.  
397Frykenberg, E. R. 1986. Modern Education in south India, 1784-1854: Its Roots and Its Role as a 
Vehicle of Integration under Company Raj. The American Historical Review, 91 (1), p. 44.  
398 For instance, in schools and colleges in Rajahmundry the texts used were, in addition to the Vedas and 
Shastras, the Bala Ramayanam, Rukmini Kalyanam, Krishna Satakam, Sumati Satakam, Vasu Charitra, 
Manucharitra, Bhagavatam, Gajedramoksham etc. For details, see the Report of the Collector, 
Rajahmundry, submitted to the Board of Revenue, September 19, 1823, cited in Yagati, C.R. 2007. Writing 
Dalit History and Other Essays. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, p. 47, passim 23.  
399 Ramaswamy, Uma. 1974. Self-Identity among Scheduled Castes: A Study of Andhra. EPW, 9(48), pp: 
1958-1964.  
400 It should be recognized here that conversion of Natives into Christian faith had been the main motive of 
all the missionaries in India.  In fact, initially the missionaries aimed at Brahmins, who were supposed to be 
‘educated and intelligent’. But to their horror, they soon realised the ‘insincerity of Brahmins’, an 
insincerity that also extended to their religious beliefs. See, Dirks, N.B. 2001. Castes of Mind…p.137. 
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schools could be used as an effective instrument for evangelism.401 In other words, Duff’s 
motive in opening the schools was to spread evangelism. Yet, the missionaries did not 
practise any form of discrimination in admission to the schools. They admitted everybody 
disregarding the pupil’s caste and religion. Although Dalits availed of this opportunity by 
sending their children to these schools, the upper castes did not send their children when 
they found that Duff was against caste-based segregation of pupils in his schools.402 
Interestingly, the non-imposed exclusion of children of the upper castes from the schools 
was an advantage for the lower caste children, especially Dalits, as they could focus on 
education without interference by Brahmins and other upper caste pupils and their 
casteist behaviour. By the end of nineteenth century nearly twenty mission societies, both 
Roman Catholic and Protestant, were working for the cause of the Dalits in the Telugu 
districts. Dalits, who were discriminated against by the upper castes, were naturally 
attracted to the educational initiatives of the Christian missionaries, and in course of time, 
a large number of them converted to Christianity. 403 
 
The Brahmins and other upper caste Hindu were alarmed by this trend: Dalits’ education 
and conversion to Christianity. Although they could not come up with any substantial 
arguments against Dalits’ education, they did question the converting to Christianity. 
Sneering at converts as the ‘rice Christians’, they claimed that conversions were 
motivated by material interests rather than the ideals of Christianity. They even launched 
the Crescent newspaper in 1844 to defend, “rights and privileges of the Hindu 
community”.404 Interestingly, the missionaries did not deny that the Dalits converted to 
Christianity out of material considerations. For instance, Robert Caldwell of Tinnevelly 
                                                 
401 Richter, Julius A. 1908. A History of Missions in India. London, pp: 192-3, cited in Yagati, C.R. 2003. 
Dalits’ Struggle for Identity: Andhra and Hyderabad 1900-1950. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, p. 67.  
402 Dirks, N.B. 2001. Castes of Mind… p.131.  
403 For detailed missionary activities and mass conversion movements in Andhra region, see Fishman, A. 
V. 1941. Culture Change and the Underprivileged: A Study of Madigas in South India under Christian 
guidance.  Madras: The Christian Literature Society for India; Manor, J. G. 1971. Testing the Barrier 
Between caste and outcaste: The Andhra Evangelical Lutheran Church in Guntur district. Indian Church 
History Review, 5(1), pp: 27-41; see, also Dirks, N. B. 2001. Castes of Mind…, especially Chapter Seven: 
‘The Conversion of Caste’, pp: 127-148. 
404 Suntharalingam, R. 1967. The Madras Native Association: A Study of an Early Indian Political 
Organization. Indian Economic and Social History Review, 4 (3), p. 237. 
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mission admitted that the lower castes initially came to Christianity for protection and 
aid, “the natural outcome of the circumstances in which they are placed”. Yet he asserted:  
I cannot imagine any person who has lived and worked amongst uneducated heathens in 
the rural districts believing them to be influenced by high motives in anything they do.  If 
they place themselves under Christian instructions, the motive power is not theirs, but 
ours…They will learn what good motives mean, I trust, in time – and perhaps high 
motives too – if they remain long enough under Christian teaching and discipline; but till 
they discard heathenism, with its debasing idolatries and superstitions, and place 
themselves under the wings of the Church, there is not the slightest chance, as it appears 
to me, of their motives becoming better than they are.405  
 
Given the motives of the missionaries as well as the converted Dalits, there can be no 
denying that the work of the former among the latter was indeed commendable. For 
instance, during 1876-79 when the Madras Presidency was struck with famine, 
missionaries rendered extraordinary services among the Dalits who were the worst-hit. It 
was during this time that the Dalits perceived the contrasts in treatment between caste 
Hindus and the missionaries. While the former treated them worse than animals, the 
missionaries treated them with dignity, kindness and, most importantly, as equals. Not 
surprisingly, the Dalits were overwhelmed by the material help and the human dignity 
accorded to them, and eventually embraced Christianity. According to one estimate, 
nearly 20 percent of the Dalits in West Godavari, 32 percent in Krishna, and 57 percent in 
Guntur districts had converted to Christianity in 1931.406  
 
The work of Christian missionaries changed the Dalits in three fundamental ways. First, 
they became aware of their social and economic plights and realised the inequalities in 
the ritual hierarchy of the Hindus. Second, conversion helped them to reject their lowly 
place in Hindu society and thus, to shed imposed social identities. As Christians, they 
affirmed a new social and religious identity. This new identity did not depend on its 
acceptance and recognition by the caste Hindus. That, in turn, led to significant 
alterations in behaviour, occupation and enhancement of status.407  Finally, those Dalits 
that remained within the fold of Hinduism began to realise that the dogma of 
                                                 
405 Reminiscences of Bishop Caldwell, quoted in Dirks, N.B., 2001. Castes of Mind...,p.135.  
406 Forrester, Duncan B. The Depressed Classes and Conversion to Christianity: 1860-1960. In: Oddie, 
G.A., ed. 1991. Religion in South Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in 
Medieval and Modern Times. New Delhi: Manohar, 65-93.  
407 Pickett, J.W. 1933. Christian Mass Movements in India: a Study with Recommendations. Abingdon: 
Cincinnati, pp: 128-9, cited in Yagati, C.R., 2003. Dalits’ struggle for …p. 67. 
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untouchability which had been used to justify their miserable condition, was false and 
was not upheld by the missionaries or the British government.408 Moreover, the 
missionaries’ work among the Dalits shamed the colonial rulers and upper castes and 
focussed their attention on the plight of the Dalits.   
 
(b) The Colonial State: The Brahmin monopoly over the education system in India began 
to break down when the colonial rulers introduced Western education through the 
medium of English, in which the right to education of every individual was firmly 
affirmed.  In their dispatch of 5th May 1854, the Court of Directors argued that “no boy 
be refused admission to a Government college or school merely on the grounds of 
caste”.409 Although the principle of equal access to education was reiterated by the 
colonial government on several occasions, such affirmations remained in theory largely.  
In reality, the old dominant sections of society managed to monopolise the new 
opportunities generated by the introduction of English education, 410 and Dalits continued 
to be excluded from the schools. Moreover, the colonial government succumbed to the 
pressures of the upper castes and made compromises under the pretext that no principle, 
however sound, could be forced upon an unwilling society in defiance of social and 
religious sentiments.   
 
Of course, the colonial government initiated a few measures for the education of Dalits 
when Christian missionaries voiced strong criticism against the government’s apathy 
towards the downtrodden. For instance, in May 1891 the Madras Missionaries 
Conference submitted a Memorial to the Governor, in which the missionaries observed:  
                                                 
408 Farquhar, J.N. 1915. Modern Religious Movements in India. New York: Macmillan Co., p. 368. 
409 Frykenberg, R.E. 1986. Modern education in South India, 1784-1854: Its Roots and its role as a vehicle 
of integration under Company Raj. The American Historical Review, 91(1), p. 45. 
410 Nearly all writers on Indian nationalism have consistently noted that groups and communities that 
reaped the maximum benefits of this new education during the whole of the nineteenth century and a good 
part of the first quarter of the twentieth century were the upper castes, particularly the Brahmins.  Anil Seal 
mentions this formulation unambiguously. Noting that English education was concentrated in the three 
coastal presidencies, and here too mainly in the metropolitan centres, Seal describes how in Bengal, ‘it was 
the Brahmins, Kayasthas, and Baidyas, in Bombay, the Brahmins in solitary, perilous pre-eminence and so 
too, in Madras, they held the near monopoly of education and that they were not any class but just the same 
old wine in new bottles”, for ‘yesterday’s scholars of Persian, now became enthusiasts for English’. See, 
Seal, Anil. 1968. The Emergence of Indian Nationalism. Cambridge: CUP, pp: 11, 38-97; Brown, Judith. 
1984. Modern India: The Origins of Asian Democracy. Delhi: OUP, p. 77. 
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Though Government has proclaimed slavery to be illegal, many Pariahs are living in practical 
slavery…The mirasdars systematically oppose the establishment of schools for the education of 
Pariah children. As a result of centuries of disability and oppression, the Pariahs have now sunk into 
a condition of helpless degradation and the defects and vices of their social life give to their 
degradation a rigidity, which makes all improvement appear hopeless if they continue to be left to 
themselves.411 
 
Following the recommendations of the Hunter Commission of 1882, the colonial 
government initiated separate schools (popularly referred to as the Panchama schools) 
for the Dalits.  It offered financial assistance in the form of grants-in-aid, scholarships for 
the children and allotment of public land to construct proper schools.412  Further, in 1893 
the Madras government came up with a series of proposals, which were hailed as the 
Magna Carta of Panchama education. Some of the important measures recommended by 
the government were: establishment of special schools by local boards and municipalities 
for Dalits in all villages where they were in considerable number; allotment of 
government wastelands for Dalit schools; opening of night schools for Dalit labourers, 
special scholarships and provision for slates, books and furniture in grant-in-aid schools, 
etc.413 Education for Dalits was further encouraged by the colonial government in 1918-
19.  It instructed that the schools be shifted from agraharams (Brahmin localities) to 
other places which the Dalits could easily access and insisted that no construction of 
schools was to be undertaken unless it was certified that the locality was accessible to the 
Dalits.414 The results of these efforts were tremendous. Between 1919-20 and 1936-37 
schools for the Dalits increased by 42.2 percent, while the strength of the students went 
up by 180 percent.  This was an impressive change, and yet it must be noted that, 
compared to the total population, only 7.52 percent among Dalit boys and 1.65 percent 
among the Dalit girls benefited from school education.415   
 
                                                 
411 Memorial of the Madras Missionaries Conference to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor 
of Fort St. George, dated May 1891, Revenue Proceedings of the Madras Government, 30 September 1892, 
p. 611, quoted in Jangam, C. 2005. Contesting Hinduism: Emergence of Dalit Paradigms in Telugu 
Country 1900 – 195. Ph.D. Shool of Oriental & African Studies, University of London, London, p. 39.  
412 Vaikuntham, Y. 1982. Education & Social Change in South India: Andhra, 1880-1920. Madras: New 
Era, p.181.  
413 Yagati, C.R. 2003. Dalits’ struggle for …p. 73.  
414Report on Public Instruction for the Madras Presidency for the Year 1918-19, Vol. 1, p.12, cited in ibid. 
pp: 73-74.  
415 Figures were cited in Satyanarayana, A. 2005. Dalits and Upper Castes: Essays in Social History. New 
Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, pp: 63-64.  
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Whatever the limitations of the colonial state’s efforts in promoting education among 
Dalits, these efforts significantly affected the Dalits forever.  Firstly, the Dalits were 
introduced to the letter which was denied to them by the local state operating on the 
principles of the Brahmanical caste system.  Secondly, for the first time Dalits were 
introduced to the language of rights (for instance, access to education as a basic right of 
every individual) and the principles of equality, such as equality before the law. Thus, it 
legitimised their status as human beings and their entitlement to social respect and dignity 
in society.  
 
(c) Caste Hindu Reforms: From the late nineteenth century onwards, the caste Hindu 
society, especially the Brahmins in the Telugu belt began to respond to the criticisms of 
the Christian missionaries against the Hindu religion and social practices of caste Hindus. 
Those who responded can broadly be divided into two groups: conservatives and social 
reformers. The conservatives stood for the preservation of the caste system and the 
practice of untouchability as ancient tradition sanctioned by the Holy Scriptures and by 
divine dispensation. The reformers, who were influenced by Arya Samaj and Brahmo 
Samaj, urged their fellow caste-Hindus to do away with the practice of untouchability and 
discrimination against the Dalits. Interestingly, they did not advocate annihilation of the 
caste system – a system which is the root cause for differential treatment and the practice 
of untouchability.  
 
It may be noted here that, while in UP, caste-Hindu criticism against the practice of 
untouchability was mainly centered in the Arya Samaj, in the Telugu belt, besides the 
Arya Samaj-inspired critique against the caste system, a number of social reformers from 
the caste Hindu backgrounds persistently attacked the practice of untouchability and 
caste-based discrimination of the Dalits. They also opened a number of schools and 
hostels exclusively for Dalit boys and girls. It was precisely on account of this 
engagement of caste Hindu reformers with the Dalit issue that the Dalits’ critique against 
upper caste discrimination against them in AP was not as strong as in UP. Importantly, 
with the upper caste going soft, the Dalits were also co-opted into the Congress and 
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Communist parties as Harijans, indirectly setting the ground for dependent politics of the 
Dalits in the later years.   
 
Two people who worked for education of the Dalits in coastal Andhra during the early 
part of the nineteenth century were Kandukuri Veeresalingam (1848-1919),416 and 
Raghupathi Venkata Ratnam Naidu (1862-1939).417 While Naidu concentrated his efforts 
in Kakinada and Machilipatnam areas, Viresalingam centered his activities in 
Rajahmundry and northern Circar districts. The Maharaja of Pithapuram financially 
supported Veeresalingam’s efforts in promoting education among the Dalits. With the 
financial assistance from the Maharaja, a high school and two separate hostels for Dalit 
boys and girls were established in Rajahmundry. The Maharaja also sponsored Ram 
Manohar Roy Hostel in Kakinada for college-going Dalit students; and it was from these 
educational institutions sponsored by the Maharaja that the first generation Dalit 
intellectuals of coastal Andhra emerged.418 
 
Eventually the foundations laid by Veeresalingam and Naidu for Dalits’ education were 
further strengthened and, in fact, effectively developed by a number of other reformers, 
particularly since early 1900. For instance, in 1907, Andhra Deenajana Sangam was 
founded in Machilipatnam for the socio-economic and spiritual development of the Dalits 
through education. By 1924, through this organisation, 12 night schools and 9 day 
schools and one part-time school for girls in and around Machilipatnam were established. 
Guduru Ramachandra Rao started Sevashram for Dalit children at Gudivada in 1912.  S. 
V. Ramji Rao established Arundhati ashram for Dalit girls and Nandhanar ashram for 
the Dalit boys at Machilipatnam in 1912 to spread education among them.419  Further, 
under his own editorship Ramji Rao launched Deenabandhu, a Telugu weekly that 
                                                 
416 For a detailed biographical sketch and his activities see Ramakrishna, V. 1983. Social Reform in Andhra 
1848 – 1919. New Delhi: Vikas.  
417 Kesava Narayana, B. 1976. Political and Social Factors in Andhra, 1900-56. Vijayawada: Navodaya 
publishers; Ramakrishna, V. 1993. A Background Study to the Emergence of Caste Consciousness in 
Coastal Andhra Pradesh. In: Das, Suranjan and Sekhar Bandopadhyay. ed. Caste and Communal Politics in 
South Asia. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi &Co.  
418 Abbasayalu, Y.B. 1978. Scheduled Caste Elite: a Study of Scheduled Castes Elite in Andhra Pradesh. 
Hyderabad: Osmania University, pp: 51-52; see, also Rammurthy, Pamu. 1976. Rashtra Harijana Nayakula 
Jivita Charitra (Life histories of Dalit leaders in Andhra Pradesh), Kakindada.  
419 Krishna Patrika, 23 March 1918, p. 4.   
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exclusively addressed the problem of untouchability and the issue of socio-economic 
development of the Dalits in 1918.  Nallapati Hanumantha Rao established Srikrishna 
Ashramam in Pedapalem, Guntur district in 1913. The main intention behind this 
ashramam was to reconvert those Dalits who had converted to Christianity back to 
Hinduism.420 Thallapragada Narasimha Sharma and his wife Viswasundaramma 
established Ananda Niketanamu in Rajahmundry in 1923.421  
 
Some of the caste Hindu reformers were so committed in their efforts to ameliorate the 
sufferings of the Dalits that they were ready to fight with their own caste people for this 
cause. To take one example, Kasinadhuni Nageswara Rao set up a school in Yalakurru 
Agraharam, his native village in Krishna district.  When he began to admit the Dalit 
children into this school, the entire Agraharam, including some of the sympathisers of the 
Dalit cause, opposed the move.  Kasinadhuni, however, stood up against the opposition 
and took in the children to the school. Vemula Kurmaiah, who later went on to become 
one of the prominent Adi-Andhra leaders, and eventually the Congress’ Harijan leader, 
had received his early education in this school.422   
 
Having said that, it is important to question why the Brahmins in coastal Andhra were at 
the forefront in ‘reforming’ the Dalits.  It was during this time anti-Brahmin movements 
were organised in western India and parts of South India, that is, in Mysore state as well 
as in the Tamil area of the Madras Presidency.  In coastal Andhra also the Reddy’s and 
Kammas took up an anti-Brahmin stance. It was a fall out of the Brahmins’ concern for 
Dalits’ education and untouchability. Since the Reddy’s and Kammas were landlords and 
peasants who owned thousands of acres of cultivated land in the villages, their interests 
lay in perpetuating the caste hierarchy coupled with economic benefits for themselves. In 
effect, their ideas were diametrically opposed to the well-being or the uplift of the Dalits. 
This enmity proved to be a significant factor and explains why the Dalits distanced 
                                                 
420 Krishna Patrika, 14 June 1924, p. 3.  
421 ‘Ananda Niketanamu’, Krishna Patrika, 16 March 1935, pp: 9-10. 
422Vemula Kurmaiah, after completing his secondary education from National High School in 
Machilipatnam with a generous scholarship from Ayyadevara Kalaswara Rao, a Brahmin Congress leader, 
spent two years in Gandhi’s Sabaramathi Ashramam before joining Benaras Hindu University.  Apparently 
he was the first Dalit to graduate from that university and Jagjivan Ram was the second to do so.  
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themselves from the non-Brahmin leaders in coastal Andhra.  Further, the non-Brahman 
leaders also did not have any cultural and ideological agenda to enlist and assimilate 
Dalits into their politics. On the other hand, the Brahmins, who were disengaging 
themselves from agricultural activities, did not have any direct conflict with the Dalits. 
Thus, the trajectory of caste dynamics made the Dalits get closer to the reformist 
Brahmins than the anti-Brahmin, landholding Kammas, Reddy’s and Velamas. But what 
was the context in which Dalit mobilisation under the banner of the Adi-Andhra 
Mahajana Sabha took place?  
 
5. IB. The Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha: In Chapter Two we noted that with the ebbing 
of the nineteenth and the dawn of the twentieth centuries, while the Brahmins and other 
upper caste Hindus were ‘inventing’ an India with the Aryan theme as a tool to claim 
their superiority over the rest of the Indians, the Dalits and other lower castes were using 
the same to claim an authenticity and legitimacy to rule over the country.  For them, the 
golden age of the sub-continent was the pre-Aryan epoch, an epoch in which “social 
equality was presumed to have flourished and society on the whole was organised on 
fraternal and democratic lines”.423 In the southern part of India the pre-Aryan era was 
conceptualised as the Dravidian and Adi-Dravidian civilisation.  For instance, the Tamils 
considered the Sangam Age to be pre-Aryan, and they believed that in that era there was 
no caste/varna system and the present lower caste and untouchables were free men, 
owners of land and rulers of the people. The ideology of the Adi-Dravida extended 
throughout the southern peninsula into Adi-Kerala, Adi-Andhra and Adi-Kannadiga. We 
have noted that during the same period in Northern India, particularly in the United 
Province and Punjab, pre-Aryanism expressed itself as Adi-Hinduism and Adi-
Dharmism, respectively. It may be noted here that although Dalit concerns in both the 
regions were expressed through the Adi movements, they differed with each other 
fundamentally in one important aspect. While the Dalits in northern India claimed a 
separate origin and identity through the Adi-Hindu movement, the Dalits in South India, 
especially in coastal Andhra, did not claim separate origin, but simply a respectable status 
within the Hindu society. The main purpose of the present sub-section is to examine the 
                                                 
423 Aloysius, G. 1997. Nationalism…p. 164.  
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Dalit mobilisation and activism in coastal Andhra region under the leadership of the Adi-
Andhra Mahajana Sabha.   
 
The changes brought in by the British presence affected the face of rural-based traditional 
India forever, particularly from the late nineteenth century onwards. The construction of 
railways and canals allowed free movement of the people and goods from one locality to 
another; the spread of literacy and the growth of the press allowed ideas to be exchanged 
over greater distances; the emergence and expansion of towns as major economic, 
administrative and educational centres helped to integrate previously scattered 
localities.424 The Dalits in coastal Andhra were also, along with other castes and 
communities in Madras Presidency, beneficiaries of these developments and new 
consciousness. Moreover, as seen above, they also benefited from the special measures 
undertaken by various agencies. But towards the end of the nineteenth century they found 
themselves left out and increasingly falling back due to new administrative measures by 
the colonial government and the response of the upper castes to those new initiatives. 
Two specific events that compelled the Dalits in coastal Andhra to organise themselves 
as a group were: (a) mushrooming of caste associations, and (b) the emergence of the 
non-Brahmin movement.  
 
From the early 1900s, the Madras Presidency witnessed the growth of caste-based 
associations and mobilisation by the upper castes and lower castes alike.  At the heart of 
these caste associations were the introduction of Census, the growth of western education 
and recruitment of the natives to fill up bureaucratic jobs in the colonial government. 
Firstly, in 1901, following the British practice of attempting to fix whole caste-clusters in 
the Brahmanical varna order, a number of the castes felt that they were denied their 
‘rightful’ status. For instance, the wealthier Komatis were outraged by the fact that they 
were denied Vyshya status. They founded the Arya Vyshya Mahasabha in 1907 and 
organised many agitations against the decision of the Census Commissioner.425  
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Secondly, the political leadership of the Brahmins was, as argued by Arnold, based on 
their “near-monopoly of western education and profession”, as well as backed by their 
landed wealth and traditional social authority.426  The non-Brahmin raiyats and traders, 
who were previously disinterested in western education and profession, were beginning 
to realise the economic and political advantages in these professions.  
 
However, it was not easy for the educated non-Brahmins to intrude into these 
professions. “To succeed in these”, Washbrook argued, “they needed to develop the 
broader patterns of social linkages which could provide investment for education and 
contact for preferment…Young educated Kammas or Reddy’s required boosts of 
patronage and support if they were to get into the professions and senior 
administration.”427 One way of obtaining the required patronage and support was “by 
appealing back to caste myths and identities and by trying to strengthen their ritual 
connection with their caste.”428 Thus, we find the emergence of the Kamma Mahajana 
Sabha, under the leadership of Oxford-educated N.G. Ranga in 1910. This association 
was financed by zamindars of Chellapalle and Muktiala – both belonged to the Kamma 
caste.  The Reddy’s also, under the leadership of Cambridge-educated C. Ramalinga 
Reddy and London-educated K. Koti Reddy, found the Reddy Mahajana Sabha in 1914. 
This association was funded by the Reddy zamindars of Wanaparthy and Munagala.429 
Thus, the whole idea behind the mobilisation of the non-Brahmins around caste identities 
was to transform themselves into pressure groups and thereby “win from the government 
educational concessions, public appointments and nomination to local boards and 
legislatures”.430  
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Secondly, as mentioned in the first chapter, the entry of Gandhi into India’s political 
scenario led to a renewal of the struggle for independence throughout India.  The struggle 
for independence is, as has been asserted by Aloysius, not only a struggle for the transfer 
of power from the colonial to the natives, but it is also a struggle for power within the 
caste Hindus, particularly between the Brahmins and non-Brahmin landed gentry. In 
south India, particularly in Madras Presidency, while the Brahmins were mobilising 
around the ideology of nationalism, the non-Brahmins were mobilising around the 
ideology of Dravidianism and non-Brahmanism. In Telugu districts specifically, while 
the Brahmins were organising around Indian nationalism, the non-Brahmin landed 
Reddy’s, Kammas, Velamas and Rajus – despite differences among them - united under 
the ideology of Telugu nationalism against the domination of the Brahmins.431  
 
In 1916, when the South Indian Liberal Federation, better known as the Justice Party, was 
formed, all the non-Brahmin upper castes rallied behind its banner, and claimed to 
represent the interests of all non-Brahmins in the Presidency, including the Muslims, 
Christians and Dalits, for it was during that time that the colonial government announced 
its intention of political representation for the natives. Both the Brahmins and non-
Brahmins competed against each other to win the support of the Dalits, and as part of this 
support-seeking gimmick, they began to condemn the practice of untouchability, and 
initiated a number of measures to uplift Dalits socially and economically.  They also 
demanded representation for non-Brahmins, including the Dalits, in all the representative 
bodies and in public appointments. These relatively radical ideas and assertions of the 
Justice Party in Brahmin-dominated polity and society attracted many non-Brahmin 
castes and communities into its fold.  Dalit leaders like M.C. Rajah of Madras Presidency 
also supported the Party. Support from many quarters led to the Party’s success in the 
1920 municipal elections; and the Party used its position in the Legislative Council in 
Madras to bring a series of resolutions that aimed to give non-Brahmins a greater 
proportion of government jobs. Dirks mentions about two Government Orders that were 
promulgated in 1921 and 1922. While the first Order directed district collectors and other 
local officials to be attentive to the subject of distribution of appointments among various 
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castes and communities, the second Order echoed the mind of the government in its 
resolve to give preference to non-Brahmin and other ‘backward’ communities in its 
recruitments.432 
 
Undoubtedly, the Government Orders opened spaces for employment and representation 
in legislative bodies for the non-Brahmins, a space that had hitherto been occupied and 
controlled by the Brahmins. But in the name of representation for the unrepresented, the 
dominant upper castes in the non-Brahmin category, particularly Pillais, Mudaliars, 
Reddy’s, Kammas, Chettiyars and other castes only next to the Brahmins in the 
traditional caste hierarchy, appropriated positions in government recruitment and in 
legislative bodies. In other words, the upper caste non-Brahmins replaced Brahmins from 
positions of power. However, although the Justice Party condemned the practice of 
untouchability and demanded the representation of Dalits in representative bodies and in 
public appointments, the reality was that the Party was not genuinely concerned about 
Dalit issues. The true face of the Justice Party where Dalits were concerned was exposed 
after its possession of power in the Madras Legislative Council in 1921. The abolition of 
the labour department and the refusal by P.T. Chettiyar, one of the main leaders of the 
Justice Party to support anti-untouchability laws in 1922, provided the evidence that the 
non-Brahmin movement would neither protect nor would benefit the interests of the 
Dalits.433 It was on account of this attitude of the leadership in Justice Party against Dalits 
and their concerns that the latter distanced themselves from the Party. Criticising the 
Brahmanical attitude of the non-Brahmin leaders, M.C.Rajah observed: “Considered 
from the stand point of the depressed classes, this (Justice Party) Ministry which seemed 
to have begun well has been moving backwards under the influence of leaders (who are) 
more responsible to the vested interests, social pride and aristocratic affectation than to 
the principles of justice and democratic progress.”434 Thus, the Justice Party took up 
those issues of justice not for the uplift of the socially and politically marginalised 
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sections but to strengthen their own claim for communal representation and to justify 
their demands against Brahmins.  
 
It was against this backdrop and the struggle for power between the Brahmins and non-
Brahmin upper castes, that the Dalits of all the regions in the Madras Presidency rejected 
them and began to articulate their concerns independently around the ‘Adi’ ideology and 
began to identify themselves as Adi-Dravidian, Adi-Andhra, Adi-Karnataka. At this 
juncture, it may not be out of context to note the communication between the Dalit 
leadership both in the Telugu and Tamil districts in the Madras Presidency. The rejection 
of the Dravidian ideology of the non-Brahmin movement and its leadership by the Dalits 
in both the regions, and a demand for representation of the Dalits in the legislative 
council and local bodies on the basis of their distinct Adi identity shows that the Dalit 
leaders in both the regions were in touch with each other.435 In fact, M.C. Rajah, the 
secretary of the Adi-Dravida Mahajana Sabha in 1916, writes about the Malas and 
Madigas of the Telugu country, particularly of East Godavari district, in his The 
Oppressed Hindus.436  The year 1917 saw mobilisation of the Dalits in the coastal Andhra 
districts of the Madras Presidency under the banner of the Adi-Andhra Maha Sabha. A 
statement issued in 1917 by B. Venkatapathi Raju and Gangaraju Panthulu – organisers 
of the first provincial-level conference of the Depressed Classes Association – testifies 
Dalits’ intention to orgnise independently on a par with the other castes in the region. 
[A]s the feeling of nationalism is spreading it is producing diverse movements like 
Sanathan Dharm movement, Kshatriya, Vyshya, Kapu, Velama and Kamma caste 
movements; and the recent non-Brahman movements were reflection of that 
consciousness.  It is the same feeling which is urging us to organise Panchama Maha 
Sabha.437   
The direction of Dalit activism under the leadership of the Adi-Andhra Maha Sabha 
could be gauged when Sundru Venkaiah, a Dalit from Krishna district and one of the 
protégées of Guduru Ramachandra Rao, spoke in the conference in Vijayawada:   
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[w]hen the whole nation is awakening; we must come out of our slumber and assert that 
we are also human beings. Like everyone else, we also have a soul and body. Like other 
Hindus, we are also sons of this country. Many organisations are striving for the rights 
and self-respect of this nation like Deshiya Mahajana Sabha and Andhra Mahajana 
Sabha.  Along with these organisations, it is our bounden duty to fight for self-respect 
and development of the Hindu country and also the Andhra belt.438  
 
In the above statement one can see an internal as well as an external message. Internally, 
it is a call to the Dalits to realise that they are also human beings as any other caste 
Hindus and that their right should be asserted. For the caste Hindus, Dalits may be 
‘untouchables’, but that does not mean that they are not part of India; and as part and 
parcel of the country they, along with other sons of the soil, have a duty to fight and 
restore the lost self-respect and dignity of the country. It has an external message for the 
caste Hindus as well, that the Dalits are no longer willing to be treated as non-humans by 
a casteist Hindu society and their rights as human-beings must be respected.  Further, 
they were also informing the caste Hindu society of their willingness to take part in the 
struggle for India's Independence. It should be noted here that although the above 
statement came from a Dalit leader, who was trained in the Sevashram under the tutelage 
of a reforms-oriented Brahmin, it was clear that the Dalits were no longer willing to 
suffer caste discrimination against them by the caste Hindu society and were ready to 
fight for their rights as human beings. But what were the main concerns and demands of 
the Dalits put up by the the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha? What were the main activities 
of this association?  
 
Dalit politics between the early 1920’s and the late 1940’s revolved mainly around three 
themes/aspects: (1) Identity, (2) Social Reforms; and (3) Political representation, and in 
the following we shall examine briefly those three themes:   
 
(a) Adi-Andhrulu (The original inhabitants of the Telugu region): In 1917 Guduru 
Ramachandra Rao, a Brahmin social reformer from Krishna district, had called for a Dalit 
conference in Vijayawada, the cultural capital of coastal Andhra. Before we proceed to 
discuss the details of the Dalit conference, it may be noted that the annual conferences 
organised by the Adi-Andhra Maha Sabha are a good source to understand the concerns 
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of Dalits as well as their relationship with the non-Dalits of that time. The annual 
conferences were an outcome of the joint efforts of the Dalit and some Hindu social 
reformers. For instance, Guduru Ramachandra Rao shouldered the responsibility of 
organising the first annual conference. Madari Bhagyayya, a Dalit leader from 
Hyderabad, who was popularly known as Bhagya Reddy Varma, was specially invited to 
preside over the conference, Sunduru Venkaiah, a Dalit protégé of Ramachandra Rao, 
chaired the reception committee of the conference.  
 
But in a society where the Dalits were treated worse than animals, organising a Dalit 
conference was not an easy task. On the day of the conference the famous Kanaka Durga 
temple, among the biggest in Vijayawada, was closed down as the temple authorities did 
not want the temple to be polluted by the Panchamas and their supporters. The hotel 
owners refused to provide lodging to nearly 300 delegates - comprising both Dalits and 
caste-Hindus. Even the management of the Town Hall which had earlier agreed to rent 
out the hall for the conference refused to open the doors of the hall for the meet. 
Eventually they did open the doors following the intervention of Ayyadevara Kaleswara 
Rao, an influential Brahmin and Congress leader. Despite all these difficulties, the 
organisers of the conference conducted their first meeting on the first day of the meet.439 
Interestingly, the conference was a big success on account of what was being expressed 
by the Dalits, and also because the issues raised at the conference were discussed in 
mainstream newspapers like Krishna Patrika and The Hindu.440    
 
The Conference was originally labelled as, ‘the First Provincial Panchama Mahajana 
Sabha’ (Pradhamaandhra Desa Panchama Mahajana Sabha). But Bhagya Reddy 
rejected the Panchama identity and argued that the term in question was not there in the 
Puranas or the other Hindu scriptures, and “the so called Panchamas were the original 
sons of the soil and rulers of the country.”441 Then the delegates unanimously rejected the 
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Panchama term and embraced the Adi-Andhra identity. What was the significance of this 
identity?  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, during the early part of the 1920’s, Dalits from all over 
India were influenced by the Aryan and non-Aryan debates, and were mobilising around 
the Adi identities.  The Dalits in coastal Andhra were also mobilising on the same 
grounds by asserting that they were the original sons as well as rulers of the Bharata 
khanda (Indian continent). However, unlike the Dalits in UP, the Dalits in the Telugu 
land were not claiming a separate identity outside the caste Hindu society.  They were 
simply claiming a respectable status within Hindu society. The Adi-Andhra identity was 
to extricate themselves from the demeaning labels given to them, i.e., caste-based 
identities of Dalits, such as Madigas and Malas. They hoped that a new identity would 
earn them social respect from the caste Hindus. The other important dimension of this 
new identity was that they sought equal status - equal to that of caste Hindus within the 
Hindu society: “Like all the jatis (castes) we are also sons of this country (Hindu 
Desamu). Of this country’s population, six percent belongs to our caste.  Once upon a 
time, our ancestors held a great position in this country’s history.” 442 
 
It may be noted here that M.C. Rajah was the first Dalit leader to be nominated to the 
Madras Legislative Council, and he used the opportunity to articulate the problems faced 
by Dalits in the Presidency, securing various social and educational rights for them. It 
was on account of Rajah’s activism in the Legislative Council that the Madras 
government had issued an Order in 1922, with directions that the name Adi-Dravida 
replace Pariah and Pallar in the Tamil districts and Adi-Andhra replace Mala and Madiga 
in the Telugu districts.443 Partly on account of the Government’s direction and partly in 
their own interest, some of the educated Dalits and those Dalits who were part of the Adi 
movements in the Presidency adopted the ‘Adi’ identities, leaving behind their traditional 
castes names, such as Pariah and Madiga. Between 1921 and 1931 in the Telugu districts 
there was a striking variation in the number of Malas and Madigas.  Around 14,93,000 
                                                 
442 Krishna Patrika, 10 November 1917, p.9.   
443 Madras Legislative Council Proceedings, Vol. IV, 1922, p. 2047. 
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Malas in 1921 were reduced to 8,39,000 in the 1931 Census. Similarly, 7,37,000 Madigas 
in 1921 were reduced to 6,12,000 in 1931. In a way, more than 6,65,000 Malas and 
Madigas had assumed the Adi-Andhra identity.444  
 
(b) Questioning the practice of Untouchability: The Adi-Andhra leadership was quite 
critical of caste oppression and the practice of untouchability. They questioned the caste 
Hindus for discriminating against them and ridiculed them for worshipping dogs and 
monkeys but refusing to treat fellow human beings with equality and dignity.  
Interestingly, but not surprising, the Dalit leadership did not question the Hindu religious 
philosophy, a religion that laid the foundation for the behaviour of caste Hindus and their 
discrimination against the Dalits. And it appears that the Dalit leadership firmly believed, 
though it was not true, that the Hindu shastras did not sanction caste inequalities and the 
practice of untouchability; those evil acts were born from the minds of evil men and 
justified in the name of religion, they reasoned.  In fact, the Dalit leaders, drawing from 
their knowledge of the Hindu shastras -- knowledge acquired during their training in 
ashramas, challenged the orthodox caste Hindus to show evidence in the shastras of the 
word panchama or sanction of the practice of untouchability against them.  For instance, 
the usual justification of the caste Hindus for discriminating against the Dalits is the 
karma theory.  Contesting that theory as baseless and illogical, Kusuma Dharmanna 
questions whether God himself practices such differences:   
When we (Dalits) ask who is responsible for our oppression and troubles 
You might say I am helpless and it is your karma 
(But) what are the differences between you and us?  
Oh Sarveshwara! Tell me, does god Eswara – the omnipresent- differ on the basis of caste?  
The foolish people humiliate us as Malas 
Are the blood and flesh of Malas different from the others?  
What different kind of flesh and blood do those pure (caste Hindus) have? 
These illogical beliefs only prove their madness.445 
 
Jala Rangaswamy, another notable leader of the Adi-Andhra movement, follows suit and 
asks: ‘Did any shastras mention panchama?’446 Further, he asks the caste Hindus to 
explain to him what the Dalits have done to deserve the brutal behaviour of the caste 
Hindus against them:  
                                                 
444 Census of India, 1931, vol. XIV, Madras Part-I, Report, p. 343. 
445 Dharmanna, Kusuma. 1933. Nalla Dorathanamu (brown lordism). Rajahmundry, p. 4.  
446 Rangaswamy, Jala. 1930. Antaranivarrevvaroo?  (Who are the untouchables). Rajahmundry, p. 2.  
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Many great men were born into our community 
But we are considered low and oppressed 
Tell us what sin did we commit (against you)? 
How did this untouchability come into existence? 
What crime did we commit (against you)?447 
 
(c) Mala Shuddhi – Urging for Internal Reforms:  Most of the Dalit leaders were trained 
in the ashrama schools established by the Brahmin reformers.  When these Brahmin 
reformers joined the Congress, the Dalit leaders were also roped into the Party and were 
influenced by the ideals of Gandhi. Dalits, particularly the Dalit leadership in coastal 
Andhra, somehow came to believe that the main reason for their deplorable condition and 
the stigma of untouchability against them were because of their own social and cultural 
practices.  As such, they tried to purify themselves by abstaining from the habits that 
were considered appalling to the caste-Hindus, particularly Brahmins. The Brahmins 
identified alcohol consumption, eating meat (particularly beef), animal sacrifice and 
unhygienic habits like not taking bath, or keeping their house clean, the use of obscene 
language, smoking and illiteracy as the primary evils infesting Dalits. Thus with 
acceptance by the caste-Hindu society being their motive, the Dalit leadership made 
concerted efforts to reform fellow Dalits from their evil and sinful habits.  They even 
produced a great body of literature in the form of poetry, songs, bhajans, pamphlets and 
essays condemning the bad habits and practices and urging the Dalits to renounce sinful 
habits like beef-eating and animal sacrifice. 448  It appears that the Dalit leadership 
seemed so obsessed with internal reforms so as to gain acceptance from the caste-Hindu 
society that they went to the extent of arguing that renouncing beef would be a pre-
condition for asking for rights and equality with others in the Hindu society.  For 
instance, Jala Rangaswamy, who wrote Mala Shuddi (Cleanliness of Malas), stated:  
Let us first abolish all evil practices and ask for rights.  In the morning you go out for work and 
come back and ask for food. You do not even wash your hands and feet but will sit to eat.  Before 
eating you do not even pray to God.  You come out smoking tobacco and exhale smoke like a 
machine amidst people. Otherwise, you will eat and swallow same tobacco.  You never take bath; 
once a year you will bathe. How long will you lead such an ignorant life?  At least now you get 
awakened.449 
                                                 
447 Ibid., p. 5.  
448 For instance, Dharmanna, Kusuma. 1930. Madhyapana Nishedhamu (Prohibiting Alcohol). 
Rajahmundry: Saraswati Power Press; -------. 1933. Harijana Shatakamu. Rajahmundry: Kusuma 
Kuteeramu; China Venkaiah, Nakka. 1935. Makoddi Kallu Sara Keerthanalu (We do not want toddy and 
arrack). Nandyal: G.N. Merchant.  
449 Rangaswamy, Jala. 1930. Mala Shuddhi. Rajahmundry: Sree Anjaneya Mudhraksharashala, pp: 6-7 
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For Rangaswamy, whose ideas and ideals originally came from the Rajahmundry 
ashrams, not bathing daily, not combing one’s hair, smoking and chewing tobacco, eating 
beef, alcohol and sleeping late into the day were degenerative practices among the Dalits. 
But he did not understand that he was actually humiliating his own people on account of 
their habits which were the result of illiteracy and poverty and which in turn were an 
outcome because of their position in the caste hierarchy. Two other important aspects of 
the Adi-Andhra activism were contesting caste-Hindu nationalism and demanding their 
share in the emerging political power.   
 
(d) Makoddii Nalladoratanam (We do not want brown Lordism): From the numerous 
writings of the Dalits between the 1920’s and 1940’s it was clear that real freedom for 
them meant freedom from caste oppression, elimination of untouchability and the end of 
social discrimination.  They felt that social equality, respect and dignity were composite 
to India's independence. They preferred social equality to political freedom, and 
questioned the sincerity of the caste-Hindu nationalists in establishing an egalitarian 
‘nation-state’. They asserted that unless social equality is achieved, freedom would be 
worthless. In other words, Dalits in coastal Andhra questioned the ideology of 
nationalism espoused by the caste-Hindus, particularly from platforms like the Congress 
party, as an all-encompassing ideology with its anti-colonial rhetoric, which forced 
alternative visions of a nation and nationalism to the margins often denigrating them as 
invalid.  
 
Kusuma Dharmanna was the first Dalit intellectual in the Telugu region to challenge the 
nationalism of the caste-Hindus. It is important to note here that unlike the other Dalit 
leaders of that time, Kusuma was not a product of the Ashrams sponsored by Brahmin 
reformers and he was very sharp in his critique of Brahmanical Hinduism and 
nationalism. While Garimella Satyanarayana, who was a Brahmin, wrote the song 
denouncing British rule: maa koddu ee tell doratanam (we do not want white lordism), 
Kusuma wrote a powerful and fascinating song, maa koddu ee nall doratanam (we do not 
want black lordism).  He unleashed a strong critique against the caste-Hindu nationalist 
leaders who advocated independence from the British, but refused the same to the Dalits. 
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To quote him: “They (the caste Hindus) fight against the government for independence, 
but they refuse to give same independence to Malas; they do not allow us into temples 
and public areas.  They even do not allow us to draw water from wells! They say Malas 
do not have rights. If we do not have rights, how can they have swarajya 
(independence)?”450  By questioning the hypocritical stand of the caste-Hindus, hypocrisy 
that is a fall out of the Brahmanical ideas, Kusuma laid the foundation for a Dalit vision 
of freedom, a freedom that contrasts with the freedom espoused by the Brahmins and 
other caste-Hindus.  For the Dalits, liberation from Brahmanical subjugation is the pre-
condition for Independence, and equality of all human beings is real freedom.   
 
Vagiri Amosu was more powerful in his critique of caste-Hindu nationalism.  For him the 
Gandhi-led Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 was no more than a movement to 
bring back caste-Hindu domination to oppress the rising marginalised classes.  
Illustrating his argument he pointed out the intolerant attitude of caste Hindus: “[I]f they 
(caste Hindus) spot an Adi-Andhra in a temple, they react angrily like a snake which 
spews venom when you step on its tail, and beat him to death.  But they revere a dog as 
god!”451 He expressed doubts about the possibility of social equality and Dalits’ share in 
the governance of independent India:  
[T]hey (caste Hindus) have no ethical principle of respecting a fellow human being.  We have no 
guarantee that we will get respect in future from such unkind people.  There are many educated 
people in our community, how many of them will have a chance to govern the country along with 
caste Hindus as equals? The national movement will not offer anything for the deprived like us 
except wishful thinking.452  
 
(e) What about our ‘share’? – Demanding Representation: The publication of Montague-
Chelmsford Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms on 2 July, 1918 stirred a debate all 
over India.  In Madras Presidency, Brahmins and non-Brahmins through the Congress 
Party and Justice Party, respectively, intensified their mobilising activities to grab 
                                                 
450 Dharmanna, K.1933. Nalla Dorathanamu (Brown Lordism), Rajahmundry: Lakshminarayanamma, p.10 
451 Amosu, Vagiri. 1930. Satyagraha Udyamamu – Nimma Jatula Nirasanamu (Depressed Classes Protest 
against Civil Disobedience Movement). Bheemavaram, p. 7.  
452 Ibid., p. 5.  
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emerging political power from the colonial rulers.453  Although Dalits in the Tamil- 
speaking areas were actively involved in these activities, just like their counterparts in 
western and northern India, the Dalits in coastal Andhra were silent about political 
reforms.  It may be that they were under the assumption that their caste-Hindu patrons, 
who were also the leaders of the Congress Party, would take care of their political needs.  
However, on two occasions, they demanded their share of representation both in the 
administration as well as in political bodies.  
 
First, on May 11, 1921 the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha of the Krishna district branch at 
its district-level convention passed two resolutions: (a) it urged the government not to 
appoint ‘non-panchamas’ (non-Dalits), particularly the Christians and non-Brahmins, as 
representatives of the Adi-Andhras.  For such appointments were not only against the 
very principle of representation, but against their own interests; (b) In representative 
bodies, such as the legislative council, taluk boards, and labour boards, representatives 
were selected with education and property as the criteria for selection. Generally, such 
criteria proved to be a major stumbling block for the illiterate Adi-Andhras.  So they 
urged the government to make a special provision that would allow the entry of the Dalits 
without any financial burdens into representative bodies. 
 
In the context of the constitutional reforms and expanding representative politics, the 
resolutions of the Krishna district Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha, had some significance.  
This aspect of excluding the Dalits who had converted to Christianity from joining the 
representative bodies reflected emerging confrontations between the Dalits that 
subscribed to the broader Hindu social and religious practices and the Dalits that 
subscribed to Christianity and its way of life.  This, of course, in turn reflected the Adi-
Andhra leadership’s close ties with the caste-Hindus, who were against Christianity and 
those Dalits who had converted into that religion.  That apart, rejection of the idea of non-
Brahmins representing Dalits pointed to a radical assertion by the Dalits that they were 
capable of representing themselves.   
                                                 
453 See Eugene, F.I. 1969. Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahman Movement and 
Tamil Separatism, 1916-1929. Berkeley: University of California Press; Baker, C. J. 1976. The Politics of 
South India, 1920-1937. Cambridge: CUP.  
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Thus, since its foundation in 1917 until the late 1920’s, the Dalits under the Adi-Andhra 
Mahajana Sabha had mobilised for social equality with active support from the reformist 
Brahmin leaders. Yet, they questioned Brahmanical Hinduism and the political 
domination of the upper castes and demanded their share in the emerging political power. 
Of course, such questioning, as we have seen, was not as strong as that of the Adi-Hindu 
leaders in UP.  Even the mild criticism and Dalit mobilisation had gradually petered out 
and by the end of the 1920’s the ground lay open, only to be appropriated by Gandhi’s 
Congress and the Communists. We shall see these developments in Section Three, after 
examining Dalit activism in Nizam’s Hyderabad. 
   
5. II. For Social Equality and Political Representation: 
The Adi-Hindu Activity in Hyderabad 
 
From the early 1900’s onwards Hyderabad and Secunderabad– the two urban centres in 
the Telangana region of the princely state of Hyderabad – witnessed small but vigorous 
Dalit activity, initially for social recognition and social equality and later on, especially 
since the early 1930’s, for political representation.  Three men at the centre of this 
activity were: Madari Bhagya Reddy Varma (1888-1939), Arigay Ramaswamy (1875-
1973) and B.S. Venkatrao, all of whom belonged to the Mala caste.   
 
We have briefly noted in the first chapter that Bhagya Reddy Varma was closely 
associated with Swami Acchutanand and his Adi-Hindu movement in UP. The role of 
Bhagya Reddy Varma in Hyderabad’s Dalit activity can be equated with that of Swami 
Acchutanand’s role in UP.  By claiming the Adi-Hindu identity for the Dalits, Bhagya 
Reddy Varma was at the forefront of the Adi-Hindu movement. He initiated a number of 
social and cultural activities through which he aimed to claim equitable space for the 
Dalits in Hyderabad’s multi-cultural and multi-religious society.  Yet, these two leaders 
differed with each other fundamentally on a crucial aspect. While Swami Acchutanand 
emphasised on the Adi-Hindu identity, that is, a separate identity for the Dalits 
throughout his activism, Bhagya Reddy’s emphasis on the Adi-Hindu identity for the 
Dalits was only a strategy to integrate the Dalits into the caste-Hindu society.   As we will 
see below, on the one hand, by holding the All India Adi-Hindu Conference and by 
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establishing the Central Adi-Hindu Social Service League, Bhagya Reddy, on the one 
hand, was claiming a separate identity for the Dalits; on the other hand, by involving 
caste-Hindu organisations as Brahmo Samaj and Jeeva Raksha Gnana Pracharak 
Mandali, and by establishing Swasti Dal Volunteers Corps, which worked mainly among 
the caste-Hindus during the time of natural calamities, and by involving them in the 
promotion of Telugu nationalism, which was promoted mainly by the non-Brahmin upper 
castes, Bhagya Reddy never hid his intention of the integration of the Dalits into the 
caste-Hindu society. What is interesting about his stand was that he was not aiming at 
integrating the Dalits because they were some kind of helpless creatures who required the 
helping hand of caste-Hindus - the kind of ideology that was behind Gandhi’s idea of 
Harijans. Rather he projected them as people with merit and thus, equal to the rest of the 
caste-Hindus.  
 
The Nizam-ruled Hyderabad state was the largest princely state in the Indian sub-
continent.  It consisted of nine Telugu speaking Telangana districts (Adilababad, 
Hyderabad,454 Karimnagar, Khammam, Nalgonda, Warangal, Mehboobnagar, Medak and 
Nizamabad); five of Marathwada (Beedar, Aurgangabad, Parbhani, Nanded and 
Osmanabad); and three Kannada speaking districts (Gulbarga, Bidar and Bijapur).  Of 
these the Telugu speaking districts made up 47 percent of the total state’s population and 
represented the largest linguistic unit. Despite its territorial vastness, the Hyderabad state 
was economically one of the most backward regions in the sub-continent,455 and until 
after the First World War, the region had witnessed little development either of 
commercial agricultural or industrial in nature.456  The backwardness of the state was also 
because of its political structure and relations with its subjects.  For instance, the Nizam’s 
support base – constituted by ‘a class of landed gentry’,457 - consisted of Muslim 
jagirdars and Hindu deshmukhs and deshpandes – belonging to the Reddy, Velama and 
                                                 
454 In recent years the Hyderabad district has bifurcated into the urban district of Hyderabad, and rural 
district of Rangareddy, and thus the number of districts in Telangana has gone up to  ten.  
455 Two of the richer agricultural regions – coastal Andhra and Berar (Vidarbha), which earlier had been 
controlled by the Nizam, were annexed to the British territories.  And whatever was left to the Nizam was a 
combination of rocky and drought-prone area. 
456 Omvedt, Gail. 1994. Dalits and…p.119.  
457 Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class and Social Articulations in Andhra Pradesh: Mapping Differential 
Regional Trajectories. London: Overseas Development Institute, - Working Paper No. 179, p. 6.  
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Brahmin castes. While at the top, the state allowed its subjects hardly any civil or 
political rights, at the lower levels, the landed gentry inflicted untold sufferings upon the 
rural population, such as illegal eviction of farmers from their fields and the extraction of 
free goods and labour, which was known as vetti – mainly from the Dalits.  
 
Thus, Hyderabad state was ‘the most feudal’458  in the sub-continent, a state that denied 
any kind of dignity and self-respect to its people.  While such feudal rule was repressive 
for all the subjects, the worst hit was the Dalits.  In that respect they were caught between 
traditional, caste and feudal forms of subordination and ‘had little opportunities to move 
into freer forms of industrial or agricultural wage labour’.459 It should be mentioned here 
that while the caste-Hindu society in general had been oppressive to the Dalits, the 
Muslim society was no angel either.  It also practised social discrimination against the 
Dalits. In fact, taking advantage of political power, the Muslims also humiliated the 
Dalits in the worst possible ways.  For instance, in the Devadasi custom very often the 
Basavis or Matangis formed relations with affluent or noble Muslim men.  And when the 
Dalits stepped in to stop this custom, they experienced heightened antagonism from the 
Muslim population.460 It was against this caste and class-based subordination that the 
Dalits in Hyderabad and Secunderabad launched a small but vigorous movement for 
social equality and political representation by adopting the Adi-Hindu identity since the 
early 1900’s. But what was the specific context in which Dalit activism in the form of 
Adi-Hinduism emerged? 
 
Although by the early 1920’s the entire Indian sub-continent was occupied in the 
movement for freedom from British colonial rule, the Hyderabad state stood aloof by 
effectively repressing any form of political movement in its territory.  Even the Congress 
and Communists could not get a toehold in the state until the late 1930’s.  Yet people 
(particularly the non-Muslims), who were charged up politically, found alternative ways 
of organising through religious and linguistic movements and became part of the anti-
colonial struggle, a struggle that had both anti-Nizam and anti-Muslim undertones in the 
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459 Ibid., p. 120.  
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state.  For instance, what started as the preservation and promotion of Hindu religion and 
culture by the Arya Samajis in Hyderabad took on a political colour and fed into the 
Congress movement to give it a ‘Hindu’ nationalist tenor.461  The Muslims, who were 
threatened by such activities of the Arya Samajis, sought to promote an orthodox Islamic 
culture.  The clamour, both among the Muslims and Hindus, to promote their versions of 
culture, which had religious overtones, resulted in tearing down the fabric of communal 
harmony, and by the late 1920’s Hyderabad was witnessing frenzied polarisation on 
communal grounds. 
 
Further, although a majority of the people in the Telangana region - excluding the state 
bureaucrats, landed gentry and the Muslims - spoke Telugu,  Urdu language was used not 
only as the medium of instruction in all educational institutions, but the entire state 
business was conducted exclusively in that language. The upper castes saw such 
pervasiveness of Urdu as a form of cultural domination of the Muslims, who were 
already enjoying political power in the state through the Nizam, a Muslim.  In order to 
promote their language and culture the upper castes initiated a number of measures since 
the early 1900’s.  For instance, the Sri Krishna Devaraya Andhra Basha Nilayam – a 
library, was established in Hyderabad in 1901 under the patronage of the Raja of 
Munagala. The Sri Raja Raja Narendra Andhra Basha Nilayam was established at 
Hanumakonda in 1904; the Vignan Chandrika Mandali was established in Hyderabad in 
1906 and the Andhra Jana Sangam was established by Madapati Hanumantha Rao in 
1921.462 By the 1930’s these initiatives transformed into an effective mass-based, 
peasant- oriented forum for the articulation of the demands of the upper castes in the 
Telangana region.  It was at the height of the communal and linguistic politics and 
tensions that the Dalits began to claim social equality and political representation on the 
basis of Adi-Hindu identity in Hyderabad and Secunderabad.  
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(A) Bhagya Reddy Varma and the Adi-Hindu Movement, 1900-1930: As mentioned 
above, the three men at the centre of the Dalit activity in Hyderabad and Secunderabad 
were Bhagya Reddy Varma, Arigay Ramaswamy and B.S. Venkatrao.  During the first 
phase (1900-1930) of Dalit activity while Bhagya Reddy provided the leadership, the 
other two leaders were at the forefront in the second phase (1930-1950).  
 
Bhagya Reddy Varma, whose original name was Madari Bhagayya, was born into the 
Mala caste on May 22, 1888 to Madari Venkaiah and Rangamamba. He lost his father at 
an early age and began working while still a young boy, as butler in a Roman Catholic 
household in Secunderabad. Francis Xavier Dos Santos, a barrister who had employed 
Bhagya Reddy was kind to him. In addition to sponsoring Bhagya Reddy’s education, 
Santos also bore all the expenditure on his books and Telugu journals. Through the 
reading of these journals and books Bhagya Reddy was exposed to contemporary 
happenings both in India and the world at large. Again through these books he was 
acquainted with the activities of various social reformers and social movements, and the 
debate on the questions of Aryan and non-Aryan themes. This exposure made him 
extremely conscious of his own caste’s social standing within the Brahmanical social 
structure, and the extreme forms of discrimination against the Dalits by the caste-Hindus.  
It was this consciousness, claims Gautam – the son of Bhagya Reddy – that propelled him 
to work for the people’s uplift.463   
 
Bhagya Reddy began his career as a Dalit social activist by associating with the Jagan 
Mitra Mandali,464 a Dalit cultural organisation. The main function of this organisation 
was to organise the singing of bhajans and harikatha (folk tales) performances, mainly 
for the benefit of Dalits, as they were prevented from attending these activities in the 
Hindu temples. In 1911 Jagan Mitra Mandali was renamed first as Manya Sangam and 
later as the Central Adi-Hindu Social Service League (the Adi-Hindu League), 
                                                 
463 Gautam, M.B. 1991. Bhagyodayam – Madari Bhagya Reddy Varma (Life Sketch and Mission of 
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immediately after the Madras government accepted the Dalits’ demand for recognising 
them as Adi-Hindus in 1922.465  The Adi-Hindu League organised the first all India Adi-
Hindu Conference in Hyderabad in 1922.466 The Conference was attended by Dalit 
delegates from various parts of India, especially from Bombay, Pune, Karachi, Nagpur, 
Yavatmal, Raipur, Vijayawada, Machilipatnam, Rajahmundry and Eluru.467  This all 
India-level participation indicated both an expansion of Dalit activities in Hyderabad, as 
well as the growing influence of Bhagya Reddy as a national-level Dalit activist.  
  
Some of the resolutions passed in the Adi-Hindu Conference shed some light on the 
concerns and activities of Dalits during the 1920’s. The conference touched on the issues 
pertaining to social practices, religious rites and ceremonies of the Dalits and also urged 
them to educate their children. The following resolutions were passed at the meet:  
(1) The present demeaning names thrust on the so-called Untouchables by Aryan Hindus 
and which are in vogue should be dropped and they should be called Adi-Hindus, and 
according to the regions as Adi-Andhra, Adi-Dravida, Adi-Karnataka and Adi-
Maharashtra. Together they should be known as Adi-Hindus (the original pre-Aryan 
Hindus);  
(2) The Adi-Hindus’ should educate their children and take full advantage of the facilities 
given to them by the native States and British Government;  
(3) The States and British Government should open primary schools exclusively for the 
benefit of the Adi-Hindu children, and penalties should be imposed on the authorities of 
the middle and high schools, run both by the private organisations and government, if 
they do not admit the Adi-Hindu students into these institutions;  
(4) Marriages at very early age should be prevented; in a marriageable couple, the bride’s 
age should not be below 14 years and bridegroom’s below 19 years; 
(5) In marriages and other auspicious functions, liquor and meat (non-vegetarian food) 
should not be served and expenditure on pomp and show should be avoided; 
(6) Dedication of girls to deities as Devadasis – known as Jogins, Murlis, and by other 
names in different parts of India should be declared immoral and such a custom must be 
abolished altogether;  
(7) Adi-Hindu Acharyas (the Dalit priests) should work for the moral uplift of the 
community and dissuade them from believing in superstitions.468  
 
From the above resolutions two aspects are clear: First, there was a growing 
consciousness among the Dalits about their stigmatised social identity, standing, and 
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economic condition, especially of poverty and illiteracy; secondly, there was also a 
growing aspiration as well as assertion by them to ameliorate those debilitating 
conditions and to adopt the upper caste customs. Not surprisingly, these resolutions 
shaped the aims and objectives as well as the activities of the Adi-Hindu Social Service 
League. To mention some of the aims and objectives of the League: 
(1) To discourage the Adi-Hindus from using ignoble appellations (such as Mala and Madigas) 
imposed on them by others, and to make themselves known only as Adi-Hindus;  
(2) To generate mutual sympathy and brotherhood among the Adi-Hindus;  
(3) To remove the prevailing social evils among the Adi-Hindus, and to educate them in a 
manner which would ultimately lead to their social, moral, religious, economic and literary 
uplift;  
(4) To undertake research work on the ancient history of the Adi-Hindus and to spread 
knowledge among them by publishing books, leaflets and newspapers under the title of 
‘Ancient Indian Historical Literature Series’;  
(5) To establish the Adi-Hindu societies, schools, reading rooms, bhajan mandals, and boys’ 
scout associations mainly for their benefit;  
(6) To strive for and achieve due recognition with the help and co-operation of all classes of 
people.469   
From the above resolutions as well as aims and objectives of the Adi-Hindu League, it is 
clear that the Dalits were concerned mainly with three issues: (a) a separate social 
identity, (b) internal reforms, and (c) external reach, i.e., co-operating with the others. 
Let’s examine the Dalit activities which have centered on these three main aspects:  
 
(a) Claiming Adi-Hindu Identity: As mentioned earlier, Bhagya Reddy was influenced by 
the debates around the Aryan, non-Aryan and Dravidian identities. In addition to these 
debates, the everyday practices of discrimination against the Dalits and their extremely 
disabling socio-economic conditions forced Bhagya Reddy to conclude that the Dalits are 
a separate entity from the caste-Hindu society; and that they were not only the original 
inhabitants of India (the Adi-Hindus), but also the rulers of the country before the advent 
of the Aryans, i.e., the upper-caste Hindus. He propagated this idea of separate Adi-
Hindu identity on various platforms. For instance, in his Purana Charitramu: Bharatha 
Kanda Pracheena Jathulu (Original Communities in Ancient India: A History), Bhagya 
Reddy traced the history of Dalits to the pre-Aryan times and built a royal lineage for 
them.470  And in 1917 in the ‘First Provincial Panchama Mahajana Sabha’ in Vijayawada, 
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while standing amidst caste Hindu reformers, particularly the Brahmins, Bhagya Reddy 
boldly rejected the Panchama identity for the Dalits and gave them the Adi-Hindu 
identity.471 When Bhagya Reddy organised an All India Adi-Hindu Conference in 
Hyderabad under the chairmanship of Rau Sahib T. J. Papanna, a Dalit from Belgaon, the 
Adi-Hindu identity was once again claimed by the Dalits. One of the resolutions of the 
conference describes the Dalits as, “the descendents of the original inhabitants of this 
country who were rulers and owners of this land of their birth before the advent of 
Aryans to the country”.472  
 
Thus, by declaring themselves as the Adi-Hindus, the Dalits were claiming not just the 
historical heritage and the status as the original inhabitants of India, but more importantly 
establishing that they should be the rulers of India. In addition to this claim, on the eve of 
taking the Census in 1930, Bhagya Reddy and others in the Adi-Hindu League 
campaigned among the Dalits to identify themselves as Adi-Hindus rather than by their 
individual caste names, such as the Madigas and Malas. The Adi-Hindu League leaders 
also submitted a memorandum to the Nizam of Hyderabad to consolidate all the Dalit 
castes into one broader segment as Adi-Hindus.473 Interestingly, the Nizam responded 
positively to this request and subsequently ordered the Census Commissioner to record 
the Dalits as Adi-Hindus, and from the Census records of 1931 it became clear that the 
campaigns of the Adi-Hindu leaders were successful, as a total of 24,73,230 Dalits were 
identified as Adi-Hindus.474  But what did Dalits want to achieve by the adaptation of the 
Adi-Hindu identity? 
 
The aims behind the adaptation of the Adi-Hindu identity by the Dalits of Hyderabad 
were not fundamentally different from the Adi claims elsewhere in India during that time. 
First of all, it was to claim an independent identity from the caste-Hindu society, an 
identity that provides them not just space to remove themselves from the Brahmanical 
social structure, but more importantly, endows them with an inheritance, that is, as the 
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original inhabitants of India as well as rulers of the country before the advent of the 
Aryans, the outsiders. This would allow them to do away with the imposed and 
stigmatised identities, such as the identities of Mala and Madiga etc. Thus, the Adi-Hindu 
identity was an attempt to instill a sense of self-respect and dignity among the Dalits. 
Finally, it had the potential to bring all the Dalits as Adi-Hindus under a broad umbrella 
which in turn, helps the Dalits both to transcend their individual caste boundaries and 
forge a strong unity among themselves as one group of people.   
 
Yet, it should be clearly recognised here that although the ideology behind the Adi-Hindu 
claim of the Hyderabad Dalits was the same as that of the Adi ideologies of the Dalits 
elsewhere in India, the Dalits in Hyderabad differed fundamentally from the rest of the 
Dalits. What lay beneath the claim of the Adi-Hindu identity was not a claim of separate 
racial and religious identity, but a claim for a respectable, dignified and equitable identity 
of the Dalits within the caste structure.  Bhagya Reddy Varma’s, a Mala by caste with an 
upper caste identity, is a case in point.  He was originally Madari Bhagaiah.  But he took 
the name ‘Bhagya Reddy Varma’ in order to claim a high status – ‘Varma’ being 
Brahminic and ‘Reddy’ indicating the high status non-Brahmin.475   
 
(b) Reforming Self (Internal reforms): Bhagya Reddy and his associates, who were 
involved and influenced by the ideologies of the Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj came to 
believe that the socio-economic problems suffered by the Dalits including poverty, 
illiteracy, discrimination  as well as the stigma of untouchability was on account of their 
bad behaviour. If this so-called bad behaviour was to be corrected, then the caste-Hindus 
would treat the Dalits with respect and dignity, and above all, as equals. Four conditions 
were identified as the main reasons of the so-called ‘bad behaviour of the Dalits’: (1) 
child marriages, (2) alcohol and meat consumption, (3) practice of the Devadasi custom 
and, (4) illiteracy. Accordingly a number of activities were undertaken by the Adi-Hindu 
League under the leadership of Bhagya Reddy. For instance, Bhagya Reddy wrote songs 
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against the consumption of alcohol (Madhyapaana Nishedha Keertanalu [Songs on 
prevention of alcohol consumption]), which were dramatised and performed by the Adi-
Hindu League activists in the Dalit localities.  
 
In addition to these, Bhagya Reddy and his associates focused their energies on spreading 
education among the Dalits.  Education, for them was an important tool in the social and 
moral uplift of the Dalits. Towards this end: Bhagya Reddy established the first 
publishing house in Hyderabad under the name of Adi-Hindu Press, and started a Telugu 
fortnightly called Bhagyanagar Patrika in 1925.476 Through this newspaper he tried to 
expose the devastating conditions of the Dalits. “But major sections of the Patrika were”, 
Jangam observes, “devoted to preaching to the untouchables especially about social and 
religious reforms, abstinence from intoxicants, to discontinue the practice of animal 
sacrifice in marriages, festivals and funerals.”477 Further, the newspaper regularly carried 
short stories of those Dalits who heroically abstained from all temptations, particularly of 
women and alcohol.478 These stories were mainly from the Hindu puranas, such as the 
Mahabharata and Ramayana. Interestingly, Bhagya Reddy invited and encouraged the 
upper castes to write on the conditions of the Dalits as well as measures to be taken for 
the uplift of the Dalits.  
 
Secondly, in 1910, Bhagya Reddy, with active support from the Manya Sangam, set up 
three lower primary schools in three Dalit localities in Easamaiah Bazar, Lingampally 
and Boggulakunta. Inspired by the success of these schools, more schools were opened 
up in different parts of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. For instance, M.L. Audaiah, a 
member of the Adi-Hindu Social Service League, founded an Adi-Hindu Primary School 
at Secunderabad, which was subsequently patronised by the Resident of Hyderabad (the 
British representative in the Nizam State) and named as William Barton Boys School. 
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Gradually the number of schools started by the Adi-Hindu League in and around 
Hyderabad and Secunderabad rose to 26 and about 2500 students were studying in those 
schools. These schools were funded mainly by the Jeeva Raskhsa Pracharak Mandali or 
the Deccan Humanitarian League, and also from the donations from the public at large.479  
 
(c) External reach: Although Bhagya Reddy’s main focus had always been the Dalits and 
their socio-economic development he also tried to reach out to the caste-Hindu society by 
taking part in their socio-religious, as well as cultural and political initiatives.  Through 
these participations Bhagya Reddy not only tried to prove that Dalits were as capable as 
any caste-Hindus but also sought to create a positive impression about the Dalits among 
the caste-Hindus, so as to build bridges between the caste-Hindu and Dalit societies. In 
other words, on the one hand, Bhagya Reddy and his associates initiated internal reforms 
among the Dalits through the Central Adi-Hindu Social Service League, while on the 
other hand, both by sharing some of the concerns of the upper castes as well as taking 
part in their organisational activities, the Dalit leaders made an effort to reach out to the 
caste-Hindus with the intention of integrating the Dalit society into the caste Hindu 
society.  The Dalit efforts to reach out to the caste-Hindu society were mainly focused in 
three areas: (1) Participation in the caste-Hindu-based religious activities, (2) Social 
integration, and (3) Telugu nationalism. Let’s discuss these aspects in detail:  
 
(c1) Participating in the religious activities of the Caste Hindus:  From the early years of 
his social activism Bhagya Reddy involved with the caste-Hindu-based religious reform 
movements in Hyderabad.  For instance, he was one of the leading figures both in the 
Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj. In fact, he was one of the founders of the Brahmo Samaj 
in Hyderabad, along with Aghorinath Chattopadhyaya and N. G. Wellinker.480 And when 
the Hyderabad branch of Arya Samaj initiated a campaign against the practice of 
untouchability, Bhagya Reddy was at its forefront. Interestingly, Bhagya Reddy’s 
involvement was not confined to these religious reform associations. He knocked at the 
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door of every religion, except Christianity and Islam, to gain their confidence and social 
acceptability for the Dalits.  For instance, while organising the Dalits through the Manya 
Sangam, he preached Buddhas’ teaching and celebrated Buddha’s birth anniversary. 
Some of the Jain merchants in Hyderabad began to appreciate Bhagya Reddy’s efforts to 
ameliorate the wretched conditions of the Dalits.  And they supported his social activities 
with financial aid. Bhagya Reddy saw this help as the change of heart among the Jains 
towards the Dalits, and so he wrote several pamphlets urging them to allow the Dalits 
into their temples. One example of such pamphlets was: Jaino! Achuthonko Jaina 
Mandirome Berok Anedho! (Oh Jains! Let the panchamas freely enter the Jain temples).  
And in order to please the caste-Hindus he urged the Dalits to give up meat eating, 
perform bhajans in the temples and recite the Hindu religious mantras.   
 
Bhagya Reddy’s involvement with various religious associations, especially with the 
Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj inspired the Dalits and subsequently many Dalits joined 
these religious associations.481 Of course, it should be mentioned here that, although 
Dalits joining these associations were inspired by the presence of their leader, they often 
had a different aspiration. As these associations were founded upon the fundamental 
principle of human equality, they did not recognise any individual on the basis of his/her 
caste and, thus, the problem of untouchability did not arise.  For instance, for the Brahmo 
Samajists, every individual was a Brahmo. And Dalits felt that by being part of these 
religious associations they not only escaped the stigma of being untouchables or the 
social prejudices but, more importantly, gained self-respect and human dignity.    
 
But the Dalits’ strategy of joining religious associations in order to be given human 
dignity did not work out that way. Despite becoming Brahmos, they continued to be 
identified as panchamas and thus, continued to be discriminated against. Interestingly, 
such discrimination against the Dalits was not just by the normal caste-Hindus, but even 
by those caste-Hindus, who were members of these religious associations. P.R. 
Venkataswamy observes:  
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[I]f a Hindu was asked his caste, the questioner would not feel satisfied with the simple 
answer Hindu.  He would be anxious to know his sub-caste also. Under such 
circumstances, an untouchable should say either a Mala or Madigas or some other sub-
caste.  If a member of Brahmo Samaj was asked his caste, he would straightaway say, 
without fear of stigma, that his caste was Brahmo.  As the movement developed, the word 
Brahmo lost its significance and whoever said that he was a Brahmo was suspected either 
to be Mala or a Madiga.482  
In a way, whether outside the Brahmo Samaj or inside it, Dalits were treated as Dalits by 
the caste-Hindus, and their dream of a new identity, respect, and social amalgamation 
was thwarted by the caste prejudices against them by society at large and the caste-Hindu 
society in particular.   
 
(c2) Social Integration: Bhagya Reddy’s ideas on social integration of the Dalits with the 
caste-Hindu society were practical and far ahead in its thinking.  He evolved a three-
pronged strategy: First, he involved some of the key public persons – drawn mainly from 
upper caste and class backgrounds – in the Adi-Hindu League by offering them some 
important positions within the organisation. For instance, while Justice Rai Balmukund, a 
retired High Court Judge, was made president of the League; N. G. Wellinker, Justice 
Keshav Rao and Vaman Ramachandra Naik, prominent public persons in Hyderabad, 
were made vice-presidents of the League.  In addition to this, the League had an 
executive committee as well as an advisory board. While the former consisted of 12 Dalit 
members, who were drawn from various Dalit castes, especially from the Mala and 
Madiga castes, the latter was constituted by members drawn from various religious 
groups.  For instance, during the League’s initial years, the Advisory Board had 34 
upper-caste Hindus, one Muslim, one Christian, one Parsee and two Jains.483 However, 
the whole enterprise of integration of the Dalits with the other social communities by 
means of positions in the League seemed to be an ambitious one, which did not give the 
expected results.  Yet, it had its own benefits.  For instance, the presence of the powerful 
and prominent members of Hyderabad not only gained social recognition and respect for 
the League, it also secured financial benefits for the continuation of the organisation’s 
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activities.  For instance, Rai Balmukund not only supported the League financially, but 
also used his position to secure grants-in-aid to the Adi-Hindu schools from the Nizam.484   
 
Secondly, Bhagya Reddy, though his writings, in the form of pamphlets and essays in his 
newspaper, advocated inter-caste marriages between the Dalits and upper-caste Hindus. 
One of the prominent works of this advocacy was his Veera Suratha Manjari: Mala 
Pillanu Raakumarudu Pendliyaduta (Royal Prince Marrying a Mala Girl). It may be 
interesting to note here that acquiring power, material benefits or social elevation by 
means of marriage, especially by offering daughters to powerful people, such as kings 
and feudal lords were not unknown both in Indian history and literature.  So far, however, 
those articulations were confined exclusively to the upper castes and the literature created 
by them. But Bhagya Reddy through his fictional work was breaking the stereotype of 
marriages at that time by effectively asserting that a royal prince can marry even a Mala 
girl; and that Mala girls are as beautiful as any other upper caste girls and equally capable 
of attracting the attention of a royal prince. However, it must be pointed out that, despite 
Bhagya Reddy’s claiming of Adi-Hindu identity for Dalits, his use of Mala identity rather 
than the Adi-Hindu identity by making his subject in the story a girl from the Mala caste 
reflected his own biases against the other Dalit castes. As a Mala himself, he always 
thought that Malas were better than the rest of the Dalit castes. What is striking is that we 
see hardly any presence of the Madigas in Bhagya Reddys’ initiatives.   
 
Thirdly, a final strategy in Bhagya Reddys’ social integration was his Swasti Dal 
Voluntary Corps.  He established the Swasti Dal in 1912 with 35 volunteers, who were 
drawn from the Mala caste exclusively.  The main objective of the Dal was to provide 
relief services in times of disasters and calamities. Reports in the Andhra Patrika (a 
newspaper) inform us of the services of the Dal volunteers during times of epidemics.  
For instance, during the early 1920’s, when Hyderabad was struck by plague and cholera, 
the Dal volunteers helped the victims by distributing medicines, milk and fruits, and also 
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in disposing the unclaimed dead bodies.485 Interestingly, Sir Ali Imam, president of the 
executive council of the Nizam’s Government, in recognition of the services of the Dal 
awarded Bhagya Reddy and his team a certificate of appreciation.  
 
In addition to these voluntary services, Bhagya Reddy was also involved as the 
organising secretary of the Jeeva Raksha Gnana Pracharak Mandali, which was 
popularly known as the Deccan Humanitarian League. This League was established by 
Rai Balmukund in 1913 in order to spread the ideals of non-violence and the protection 
of animals.486 But what was the significance of these voluntary activities by Bhagya 
Reddy and his team? As we have noted, Bhagya was influenced by the ideologies of the 
Brahmo Samaj and Aray Samaj and he came to firmly believe that overcoming caste-
based restrictions against Dalits and entering the domain, both physical and non-physical, 
of the caste-Hindus wold be by means of good character and deeds. Through these seva 
activities, Bhagya wanted to prove that Dalits, who were always seen as people at the 
receiving end of the seva by the caste-Hindus, could render services to the caste-Hindus 
and thus mould their behaviour and character.  
 
(c3) Telugu Nationalism: As mentioned earlier, the power struggle between the elite 
Muslims and upper caste Hindus took the form of religious and cultural preservation and 
promotion movements. And the question of language became one of the main ingredients 
in the entire saga of the power struggle. While the Muslims insisted on the continuation 
of Urdu as the medium of instruction both in the primary as well as higher educational 
institutions, the Hindus, by forming Andhra Maha Sabha, demanded that they should be 
allowed to impart education in the Telugu medium.  Bhagya Reddy and his associates, 
who had been part of the caste Hindu-based reformist religious organisations, and who 
were funded by the caste-Hindus, naturally took the side of the latter, joined the Andhra 
movement, and were active participants in the annual conferences of the Andhra Maha 
Sabha. Besides, Bhagya Reddy had been at the forefront in promoting the Telugu 
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language by launching his fortnightly newspaper, Bhagyanagar Patrika, in which he 
campaigned for the installation of Telugu as the medium of instruction in schools.  
 
Of course, while being part of the Telugu movement, he did not deviate from his larger 
agenda of uplifting the Dalits.  In fact, he used the Andhra Maha Sabha forum to gain 
certain benefits for the Dalits from the Nizam government.  For instance, in the first 
Andhra Maha Sabha conference held in Jogipet of Medak district in 1930, he proposed 
two resolutions.  In the first resolution, he urged the Nizam government to take all the 
necessary measures for the educational needs of the Dalits, and in the second resolution, 
he condemned the Nizam’s officials for forcing the Dalits to perform forced labour (vetti 
chakiri) and requested the Nizam to intervene and stop the practice.487  Allowing the 
Dalits to use the Andhra Maha Sabha platform to put forward their concerns did not mean 
that upper castes changed their mind and began to treat the Dalits equally.  Even in these 
spaces Dalits, including Bhagya Reddy – a prominent public intellectual of his time - 
were vulnerable to caste-based prejudices and the practice of untouchability.  For 
instance, in the first Andhra Maha Sabha conference, when Bhagya Reddy reached the 
dais, members in the audience marched out of the hall shouting slogans against the 
audacity of a Dalit in getting on the dais which was the exclusive preserve of the upper 
castes.488     
 
Despite significant activities, Dalit activism under the leadership of Bhagya Reddy 
Varma in Hyderabad could not transform the socio-economic conditions of the Dalits, 
mainly for two reasons. First, both the ideas and activities of the Adi-Hindu leaders 
suffered from numerous contradictions. Most notably, the very purpose of claiming an 
Adi-Hindu identity was to move away from the Brahmanical social structure, claim a 
respectable social identity and, thus, on the basis of such identity construct a strong and 
united Adi-Hindu community.  But Bhagya Reddy Varma, the main ideologue of the adi 
ideology in Hyderabad, did not argue for the separation of Dalits from the broader 
Brahmanical social and religious life.  Moreover, he was critical of the Dalits and falsely 
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argued that, “the degeneration leading to social ostracism was due to their (Dalits) own 
apathy and ignorance”.489 He was also under the impression, again falsely, that social 
customs and bad habits among the Dalits, particularly the dedicating of girls to 
goddesses, sacrifice of animals and eating meat were the main reasons for their degraded 
social position. And so he always urged his followers to purify themselves by discarding 
these evil acts.  Such thinking was exactly in consonance with the Arya Samaj and other 
Hindu reformist organisations.   
 
Second, despite his preaching of doing away with caste identities of the Dalits, such as 
the Malas and Madigas - which were considered to be ignoble from the standpoint of 
caste-Hindus - and calling for unity of the Dalits under the banner of the Adi-Hindu 
appellation, Bhagya Reddy Varma was obsessed with Mala identity. One of the titles of 
his books was Veera Suratha Manjari: Mala Pillanu Raakumarudu Pendliyaduta (Royal 
Prince Marrying a Mala Girl).  If he were true to his Adi-Hindu identity, then the title 
should have been Adi-Hindu instead of Mala. But using the word Mala in the title, yet 
preaching the Adi-Hindu identity, suggested Brahmanical hypocrisy. Moreover, he was 
not even in favour of inter-dining and inter-caste marriages among the Dalits.  Of course, 
this is not to suggest that all the Mala leaders were equally hypocritical as Bhagya Reddy 
Varma. For instance, Arigay Ramasway, although he came from the Mala caste, adopted 
a Madiga girl and actively worked for the unity between the two castes.490   
 
5. III. Dalit Activism in Telugu Country, 1930 - 50 
During the 1930’s and 1940’s, political developments at the national level, particularly 
peasant resistance, Congress’s pro-Hindu inclinations, growth of the Communist Party 
and rise of Ambedkar as the sole leader of the Dalits, were all finding a dramatic centre in 
the politics of the coastal Andhra region as well as in Nizam’s Hyderabad. In the First 
Chapter we noted that following the entry of M K Gandhi on the political scene of the 
country, we witnessed the entry of new contestants in the struggle for power. While 
earlier, the struggle was confined to the elite and middle classes, now the masses were 
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also drawn into the game. Further, in what was an astute move by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 
the Congress signed the Lucknow Pact with the Muslim League in 1916, by which the 
Congress accepted the principle of a separate electorate for Muslims “in the larger 
interest of forging a united Hindu-Muslim front against colonial rule”.491 
 
The force of such mass-based mobilisation as well as political unity between the two 
major religious groups against colonial rule certainly had far-reaching consequences. The 
British, who were already caught up in the web of economic severities due to the First 
World War, were further threatened by these new developments. They began to initiate a 
few measures in order to assuage Indian public opinion. On August 20, 1917, Edwin 
Montague famously declared that the British government’s objective was to bring about, 
“the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the 
gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to progressively realise a 
responsible government in India as an integral part of the Empire”.492  This declaration 
was followed by the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919.  These reforms though they 
did not provide for the provision of a separate electorate for the Dalits, they did provide a 
few nominated seats for them in legislative bodies493 and thus raised the curtain for 
intense political activity by the Dalits across the country.  For the first time, the Dalit 
spokesmen were heard in political assemblies and the legislatures took an interest in the 
problems of the Dalits. The denial of access to Dalits in schools, wells and roads was 
declared illegal in various legislative resolutions and administrative orders. Yet, such 
resolutions and orders were, Marc Galanter points out, “honoured largely in the 
breach”.494 The government, on its part, began to provide land, housing, schooling, and 
government posts to the Dalits which resulted in the increase of Dalit children in schools 
and the entry of a few educated Dalits in government services. Thus, by the close of the 
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1920’s, as Eleanor Zelliot observed, “the principle of special attention (for the Dalits) 
was firmly established”.495    
 
One particular event that animated all the castes, communities and political parties for a 
heightened political activity during the end of 1920’s was the visit of the Simon 
Commission in 1928. The Commission was empowered to make recommendations for 
Round Table Conferences to create a new constitutional framework for India. While all 
the upper caste and class-based political outfits, including the Congress, Muslim League 
and Justice Party boycotted the Commission, ostensibly on account of lack of “Indian 
representation” in it, the Dalits all over India welcomed the Commission by organising 
meetings in its support.  By this time, Ambedkar had emerged as a powerful voice of the 
Dalits. As a member of the Bombay Legislative Council, he introduced Mahar Watan Bill 
against the forced performance of all forms of free labour, earlier for the so-called gram 
pramukhs (village elders) and now for the British bureaucrats. Ambedkar appeared before 
the Commission and submitted a long memorandum, which was often described as the 
“manifesto of untouchable rights”,496 in which he demanded reserved seats for the Dalits 
in legislative bodies, special educational concessions and recruitment to government jobs; 
and the Commission in its Report substantially accepted a majority of the demands in the 
memorandum.497 But the Report was finally rejected by all the major contenders, 
including the Congress, Muslim League, Justice Party and Dalits. The British 
Government, in order to arrive at a possible way out, convened a Round Table 
Conference in London and invited delegates of all parties and prominent interests groups. 
   
It was precisely at this time that the Dalits, both in Hyderabad and coastal Andhra, turned 
their attention from their earlier focus of respect and social equality to the question of 
political representation. But they were not united in their demand. They were, in fact, 
being pulled in various directions by the major forces in Telugu politics, either into the 
communist movement or into a pro-Hindu Congress or pro-Muslim politics of 
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patronage,498 in addition to a weak but sustained independent activity.  In the following 
section I attempt to examine the Dalit politics and activities, both in Hyderabad and 
Coastal Andhra. Despite internal regional peculiarities, the Dalit activities in the Telugu-
speaking areas during the 1930’s and 1940 can be analysed as a unit, for developments in 
one region had their impact on the other.499  As Dalit politics and their activities were 
influenced by three major forces in national and regional politics: Ambedkar, Gandhi and 
the Communists, I have examined Dalit activity during this period in three sub-sections: 
(a) Pro-Ambedkarite politics, (b) Pro-Gandhian politics, and (c) Pro-communist politics.  
 
(A) Pro-Ambedkarite politics: Although the Dalit leadership in coastal Andhra region did 
not show any keen interest in Ambedkar’s Depressed Classes Conference of 1930 and 
issues surrounding the First Round Table Conference, some of the Dalit leaders from 
Hyderabad did take part in a special session of the Ninth All-India Adi-Hindu Conference 
in Lucknow in 1931.  The conference, which was held on the eve of the Second Round 
Table Conference, was presided over by Bhagya Reddy.  One of the most significant and 
unanimous resolutions of the conference was recognition of Ambedkar as the sole and 
true representative to speak on behalf of 90 million Dalits.500 In addition to this, Dalits in 
Hyderabad submitted numerous memoranda to the Nizam of Hyderabad, demanding 
political representation. Subsequently, the Nizam announced the formation of a 
Constitutional Reforms Committee, under the chairmanship of Aravamudu Aiyangar on 
September 22, 1937, popularly known as Aiyangar Committee. Interestingly, the 
Committee was constituted exclusively by members drawn from the Muslim and caste- 
Hindu backgrounds. The Dalits, who constitute 18 percent in the total population of the 
state, were not included in it.  
 
Angered by such a blatant exclusion, the Dalits took to the streets and demanded the 
statutory confirmation of the fundamental rights of citizenship by the legislature,501 and 
special protection of the rights of the Dalits and other minorities in the state. In a 
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memorandum to the Nizam, they emphasised proportional representation.  It was stated 
that since the Dalits constituted 18 percent of the state’s population, 18 per cent of seats 
should be reserved for them in all the representative bodies of the state. A special 
representation for the Dalits should be given in the municipal councils, district and taluk 
boards and other organs of the government. Further, in the event of adoption of separate 
electorates by the State, the memorandum stated that there should be separate electorates 
for the Dalits:502   
[A]s the depressed classes of the state have certain specific economic and social problems they 
should be provided with adequate special representation in the council.  Till the majority community 
(Hindus) create full confidence in them, they should be provided with 10 seats in the council. These 
seats should be distributed over the 16 districts of the state …but any depressed classes’ candidate 
of any one constituency may stand for any other constituency. The above mentioned seats should be 
contested in election on the basis of separate electorates. The suffrage of the depressed classes 
should be so wide as to enfranchise a major portion of their population. In addition to the reserved 
seats, the depressed classes’ candidates must be made eligible to any other general seats in any 
constituency from any part of the state.503 
 
Although the Aiyangar Committee rejected the Dalits’ demand for separate electorates by 
equating the notion of separate electors with communal representation, it did take note of 
their concerns: “A demand has been made on behalf of Harijans that seats should be 
reserved and separate electorates formed for them. We cannot endorse the principle, 
which generally underlies communal representation.  But in the social, educational and 
economic interests of the Harijans, we nevertheless consider it necessary that they should 
be granted representation in the Legislature.”504  Accordingly, it recommended for one 
elected representative in municipal committees and town committees, one for the district 
boards and, finally, two elected representatives for legislature.505     
 
The next round of Dalit activity took place when Ambedkar declared his decision on 
conversion. In 1935 at a Bombay Presidency Depressed Classes conference in Yeola, he 
put forward the idea of moving away from Hinduism and declared, “I was born a Hindu 
and have suffered the consequences of untouchability.  I will not die a Hindu.”506 This 
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declaration, which was described as a “veritable bombshell”, triggered off a great debate 
on the conversion question throughout India. In the Telugu region also, some young 
Dalits, such as Eali Vedappalli (1911-71), organising secretary of Adi-Andhra 
conferences in East Godavari, and Geddada Brahmaiah (1912-50),507 secretary of an Adi-
Andhra Sangham in 1935, were energised by Ambedkar’s declaration. They were joined 
by Kusuma Dharmanna (1898-1948). Dharmanna was one of the important Dalit poets of 
his time. We have mentioned earlier that he was the author of the famous song maakoddu 
nalladoratanam (we don’t want a country ruled by the upper castes). He was also 
publisher for the Jayabheri newspaper. These three leaders became “a sort of mouthpiece 
for the Ambedkarite group”508 in coastal Andhra. The tenth conference of the Adi-
Andhra Mahajana Sabha was organized at Rajahmundry, East Godavari district in 1935. 
While Kusuma Venkataramayya was the president of the conference, Kusuma Dharmana 
was its reception committee chairman. This conference was inaugurated by M.C.Rajah, 
one of the prominent Dalit leaders of the Madras Presidency. After this conference, 
several district-level and two provincial-level conferences were organized under the 
leadership of Kusuma Dharmanna in 1936 and 1938. The twelfth provincial level 
conference that was organized in 1938 was presided over by Bhagya Reddy Varma. The 
discussions and debates in all these conferences focused on the demand for reserved seats 
for the Adi-Andhras in all representative bodies, sanction against those opposing the 
presence of the Dalit children into schools, job reservations and a demand for waste land. 
But the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha could not sustain its activism for a long time and 
beyond the boundaries of East Godavari district. As the popularity of Gandhi and his 
Congress began to get augmented in the Telugu districts, a majority of the Dalits began to 
drift into the Harijan fold of Gandhi and the Congress; and thus, Adi-Andhra activism 
could not make a significant impact upon the Dalits in the province.   
 
However, Dalits in Hyderabad were electrified by Ambedkar’s declaration. Given the 
growing communal tensions between the Hindus and Muslims, which were manifested 
through the dominance of the Arya Samajis over nationalist Hindus, and in the rise of the 
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Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul Mussalman politicising the ordinary Muslims, the excitement among 
the Dalits was not surprising.  For it gave them an opportunity to carve out a separate 
space for themselves, away from the Hindus and Muslims. But not all of them were eager 
to grab this new opportunity. They were divided into two major groups opposing each 
other on Ambedkar’s declaration. The pro-Ambedkarite group, which was organised by 
Venkatrao and Arigay Ramaswamy, was constituted mainly by the young Dalits. The 
other group, which was led by Bhagya Reddy, continued to believe in internal as well as 
external reforms. In 1936 the pro-Ambedkarite group was invited to attend a Maharashtra 
Untouchable Youth Conference in Poona. As Omvedt notes, they were impressed by the 
“fire-eating speeches of the Maharashtra leaders”,509 and in their return to Hyderabad, 
they organised a Youth League of Ambedkarites with Venkatrao as president and 
Venkataswami as secretary.  The main aims of the League were: “to organise the youth; 
to support Ambedkar in leading untouchables out of the Hindu fold; to enlighten people 
on the evils of Hinduism, to oppose conversion at present but search for a new 
democratic religion; and to organise a vigorous campaign on socio-economic 
disabilities.”510 
 
Soon the leadership struggle between Venakatrao and Ramaswamy rocked the League, 
and this, in turn, led to further division of the League. While Venkataswamy formed the 
Hyderabad State Depressed Classes Association in 1938 and began to lean in a pro-
Muslim direction, Ramaswamy went on to revive the Hyderabad State Adi-Hindu 
Mahasabha.  Venkatarao’s pro-Islam choice was rather surprising.  Until 1938, he never 
showed any inclination towards Islam.  Indeed he never showed any interest towards 
religious issues. His choice was influenced by his concern for the empowerment of Dalits 
and a firm belief in the ability of the Hyderabad state, a state that can rescue the Dalits 
from the clutches of the caste-Hindus and also to provide material benefits to the 
Dalits.511  For instance, after Ambedkar’s declaration on conversion, the Hyderabad state 
took several initiatives towards attracting the Dalits into the Islamic fold, such as 
employing full-time paid Islam preachers and supporting the Majlis in their conversion 
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campaigns among the Dalits.  In addition to these measures, the State also provided 
Dalits with government jobs.  It also made the anti-vethbegar legislation, which rescued a 
great number of Dalits from the virtual slavery of the caste-Hindus. Undoubtedly, all 
these measures provided the basis for the pro-Islam stance of the Dalits and their leaders 
in Hyderabad.512  
 
Although the divisions among the Dalits continued, they all attended the founding 
meeting of the Scheduled Caste Federation in Nagpur in 1942. During the meeting, 
Ambedkar advised them to compromise and organise as the Scheduled Caste Federation 
without any official affiliation to the all India body. But Venkatrao refused to work with 
the Adi-Hindu group led by Arigay Ramaswamy, Subbaiah and Venkataswamy.  On their 
return, the Dalit leaders of Adi-Hindu faction convened a general body meeting, in which 
they changed the name of their organisation as the Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF) and 
selected Subbaiah as its president and Venkataswamy as its general secretary. Beyond 
condemning the Dalits’ conversion to Islam, the SCF of Hyderabad could not do 
anything, both due to the continuous factionalism among the Dalits and the fact that 
Dalits were divided along caste lines. From Bhagya Reddy Varma to Venkatrao and 
Arigay Ramaswamy in Hyderabad, Vemula Kurmaiah and Kusuma Dharmanna from 
coastal Andhra - all the important Dalit leaders came from the Mala caste and focused 
their activism among the Malas, except Arigay Ramaswamy, who addressed the inter-
caste differences among the Dalits - especially between the Madigas and Malas - and 
encouraged inter-caste marriages among them.   
 
In coastal Andhra, a branch of the SCF was formed under the leadership of Buldas, after 
Ambedkar’s visit to Krishna district in 1944. Beyond fighting against atrocities and 
celebrating Ambedkar’s jayanti, this branch was not able to affect events very much. 
Moreover, as Omvedt observes, “In that period of turmoil, with an aroused mass of 
Dalits, this could not compete with the hard organising and real economic issues being 
taken up by the Communists or the patronage and co-opting facilities offered by the 
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Congress.”513 Thus, a pro-Ambedkarite Dalit activity was almost dead even before the 
transfer of power from the British.   
 
(B) Pro-Gandhian Politics: What is fascinating about the relationship between the Dalits 
and the Congress in the Telugu region was how the oppressor (the Brahmin) himself 
came to the rescue of the oppressed (the Dalit). While doing so, the former was able to 
retain his social hegemony and political domination and, in turn, further subordinate and 
marginalise the latter. As mentioned above, it was the Brahmins who initiated social 
reforms among the Dalits and who established schools for educating the Dalit children. 
Those efforts have, undoubtedly, benefited a section among the Dalits. Those Dalits who 
studied in these schools rose to become leaders of the Adi-Andhra movement, and it was 
from these schools that a number of Dalit literary figures sprang up and enriched Dalit 
literature and, thereby, Telugu literature.  Yet, it was also equally true that these schools 
became powerful entities in the hands of the Brahmins to contain the force of the 
emerging Dalit anger against the socio-cultural hegemony of the former. In a sense, it 
was through these schools that the Brahmins were able to capture the talented young 
Dalits and domesticate them for their own interests.  
 
In its domestication of the Dalit leadership, the Congress, under the leadership of the 
Brahmins, followed a two-pronged strategy: (1) using the aashrama-educated Dalits to 
marginalise the Ambedkarites and, (2) diverting the Dalits’ attention from the important 
issues, such as share in power, towards immaterial issues, such as temple entry.   
 
Although by the late 1920s, Ambedkar had established himself as a strong Dalit leader, 
his influence was, however, mostly confined to western India. Dalits in Telugu districts 
were unaware of his activities, at least, until the conflict between him and Gandhi over 
separate electorates for the Dalits. When some of the younger members of the Adi-
Andhra movement came to know about Ambedkar’s arguments and the counter-
arguments by Gandhi and the latter’s adamant attitude by resorting to fasting in the 
Yeravada prison, they began to shift their loyalties towards Ambedkar. It was during this 
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political heat at the national level that the seventh Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha 
conference was organised in Bezwada in August 1932, under the leadership of Vemula 
Kurmayya – another protégé of the Brahmins. The venue of the conference became a 
battleground between the Ambedkarites and Gandhians.  
 
From the outcome of the discussions, it was clear that the issue was not about separate or 
joint electorates, it was rather about the leadership of Gandhi and Ambedkar and the 
arguments that these leaders represented. It was also about the issue of legitimacy of 
caste-Hindu led nationalism and its appeal to the Dalit constituency.  As we have seen in 
Chapter 1, one of the main arguments of Ambedkar in his demand for separate electorate 
for Dalits was that they were a separate element within Indian society and hence they 
were entitled for separate electorates. Gandhi refused this by arguing that Dalits were part 
and parcel of the Hindu society, and the demand for separate electorate was nothing but 
dividing the Hindu family. Thus, while Gandhi’s fast was seen as an act to protect the 
unity of Hindus, Ambedkar’s demand was an act of separatism. All these arguments and 
issues found a centre in the discussions at the conference. The presidential address of 
Vemula was mostly devoted to the issue of Gandhi’s fast. He praised Gandhi for 
sensitising the caste-Hindu society on the deplorable conditions of the Dalits, and placing 
the abolition of untouchability in the Congress agenda.  As expected, he vehemently 
opposed Ambedkar’s move for separate electorate, for such a move would alienate them 
from the caste-Hindu society.  Interestingly, he justified his stand on the basis of the 
history of the earlier Adi-Andhra conferences, in which the Dalits conceived themselves 
as part of Hindu society rather than outside of it.  And he urged the delegates to trust the 
good judgement of the caste-Hindus, particularly Gandhi on the joint electorates for the 
Dalits, and asked them to join the Congress in its fight against the British in liberating the 
country.  Despite the young Dalits’ protests, the conference ended by declaring Gandhi as 
their leader and voting in favour of the joint electorate.514 
 
Once the question of share in political power was successfully submerged, the next step 
of the Congress was to divert Dalit energies towards the non-material issues. And 
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Gandhi’s Harijan Sevak Sangh (HSS) facilitated this diversion.  Following the Poona 
Pact, Gandhi launched the so-called ‘Harijan upliftment programme’ by establishing the 
Harijan Sevak Sangh and in 1932 Andhra branch of HSS, Andhra Rashtriya Harijan 
Sevak Sangh was established in Vijayawada.  The branch had an interesting social 
representation.  While Kasinadhuni Nageswara Rao, a Brahmin and M. Bapineedu were 
appointed as President and General Secretary, respectively; Vemula Kurmaiah and 
Naralasetti Devendrudu (both were Malas [Dalits]) were recruited as the Joint 
Secretaries.  The activities of the Sangh were mostly confined to cleaning of streets and 
roads in Dalit localities, digging drinking water wells, and establishing separate schools 
and hostels for the Dalit students. One of the important programmes that was taken up by 
the Congress leaders was the issue of temple entry for the Dalits. In several districts they 
organized satyagrahas in the name of Gandhi and secured entry forthe Dalits into the 
temples. Gandhi also made a visit to coastal Andhra to promote the programme in 1933. 
He personally led the Dalits into two temples in Siddhantam village in Krishna district.515 
M.B. Gautam, a Dalit activist and chronicler, reported the effect of Gandhi’s tour: 
“During Gandhi’s tour, lakhs of rupees were collected from the people in the name of 
Harijan biksha (fund) and he (Gandhi) earmarked funds to each district from the 
collections for providing for the needs of the boarders admitted into hostels managed by 
the provincial and district Harijan Sevak Sangh branches.”516   
 
Given the enthusiasm and activism generated by the Andhra Harijan Sevak Sangh and on 
the basis of the press reports, the programme appeared to be a success.  But that was only 
on the surface. In reality the fate of the Andhra Sangh was no different from other Sanghs 
in other parts of the country, and the entire programme of Harijan upliftment was 
“hollow”, 517 to use an evocative phrase by Sripada Subramanya Shastri, a famous Telugu 
short story writer. The temples that were opened to the Dalits were either already 
abandoned by the caste-Hindus or in a dilapidated condition. Even those temples that 
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were opened for the Dalits during Gandhi’s visit were not only closed soon after he left, 
purification ceremonies were conducted in a big way to cleanse those temples after that 
event. Moreover the Sangh activities were concentrated mainly in the town areas and 
little was done in the rural areas where untouchability and discrimination against the 
Dalits were practised as a matter of right by the caste-Hindus. Further, what is most 
astonishing about this whole facade called temple entry of the Dalits is that it was not just 
the ordinary members of the caste-Hindus that opposed the entry of Dalits into temples.  
Even some of the Congress leaders, who were at the forefront of the programme, opposed 
the Dalits’ entry in their local temples.  To cite one example, Kasinadhuni Nageswara 
Rao, the president of the Andhra Harijan Sevak Sangh did not allow the Dalits into the 
temple at Yalakarru Agraharam, his native place, where members of his family manage 
the temple.518 Thus, the pomp of the activities of the Sangh did not necessarily result in 
an avowed change of heart among the caste-Hindus, but had greatly helped the Congress 
to rope the Dalits into its fold, and use them against Ambedkarites in order to gain ground 
in the Dalit community.   
 
(C) Pro-Communist politics: Since the late 1930’s, some of the Dalits in both Hyderabad 
and coastal Andhra began to be drawn into the Communist movements. They were 
attracted to the Communists’ slogans, especially to that of ‘a classless society’. However, 
in practice, the idea of a classless society, as elsewhere, remained a utopic idea; in fact, 
the movement facilitated and secured the domination of the upper castes, especially from 
the two dominant castes, Reddy’s and Kammas. For instance, P. Sundarayya, Ravi 
Narayan Reddy and Badam Yella Reddy were all Reddys; M. Basavapunnaiah, Chandra 
Rajeswara Rao, and C. Vasudeva Rao were Kammas. More specifically, while in 
Telangana it was the Reddy’s who dominated the peasant struggles, in coastal Andhra it 
was the Kammas that led and controlled the Communist movement for land distribution 
and minimum wages for agricultural labour. It should be noted here that the Kammas and 
Reddys joined the Communist party despite caste-based social rivalries and competition 
for political power between the Kammas and Reddy’s should be understood from the 
vantage point of the domination of the Brahmins in the Congress; one significant 
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outcome of the domination of the Communist party by these non-Brahmin upper castes 
was that it secured and safeguarded the material interests not merely of these two castes, 
but the rest of the upper castes in the Telugu region.519 
 
As mentioned, the Hyderabad state did not allow any form of political activity on its soil.  
But the politically conscious upper castes organised against the Nizam and against the 
British under the veil of the Andhra Jana Sangam, a cultural organisation for the 
promotion and propagation of Telugu language and Telugu culture.  Later, the Andhra 
Maha Sabha was formed, wherein Congressmen, Socialists and Communists all found a 
place in it.  In the late 1930’s, it split into two movements, one led by Congress and the 
other by the Communists.520 When the group led by the Communists began taking up 
issues such as the abolition of vetti, protection of tenants and the demands of ‘land-to-the 
tiller’, the Dalits, along with the other lower castes, were attracted to its activities and 
accepted the leadership of Ravi Narayana Reddy and Bagam Yella Reddy.   
 
In the 1940’s, the Andhra Maha Sabha under the leadership of the Communists, 
mobilised the rural peasants and landless labourers against the Nizam and against dora 
(feudal lords). This struggle was by far the largest peasant and landless revolt in Indian 
history.521 Mao Tse-tung’s On the Protracted War and Guerilla War fare became popular 
references in the Telangana struggle. Mao’s slogan land to the tiller became the slogan of 
Telangana.522 During the Telangana struggle, the Communists established a parallel 
government in the rural areas of the Nalgonda and Warangal districts. They also 
organised people’s courts, which decided cases and punished ‘enemies of people’ – the 
landlords, patels and patwaris, informants and government spies.523 
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The Telangana struggle provided the Communists with a rare historical opportunity 
towards ending the gap between the rich and poor, and thus, establishing their long-
cherished goal of a ‘classless society’. But the casteist mind of the Communists leaders, 
as argued by U. Sambasivarao,524 prevented them from seizing the opportunity. During 
the course of the struggle a great amount of land belonging to the Brahmin-Karanam, 
Reddy and Velama doras was occupied by the Communists in order to redistribute it 
among the peasants and landless labourers. It was in the redistribution of the land that the 
caste-based upper caste bias of the Communists was visibly revealed.  In each village a 
committee called panch committee was established for the redistribution. In the name of 
revolutionaries these committees were primarily occupied by members belonging to 
Reddy and Kapu upper castes. Dalits were completely denied any role either in the 
formation of the panch committees or any say in the redistribution of the land. “While the 
lands of the doras were distributed among the Reddy and Kapu farmers and tenants, the 
common pastures and wastelands became the lot of the landless Dalits and other lower 
castes.”525  
 
The Dalit experience with the Communists in coastal Andhra was not so different from 
their counterparts in the Hyderabad state. By the late 1920’s the Kammas in coastal 
Andhra found themselves at loggerheads with the Brahmins for social equality and 
political power. Interestingly, in their confrontation with the Brahmins, the Kammas were 
divided into three groups. The first group was constituted largely by rich landlords 
(zamindars). They were fighting against the Brahmins, first as the anti-Brahmins 
movement and later on by dominating the Justice Party.526 The second group was 
constituted by the Kamma ryots and peasants.  They associated themselves with N.G. 
Ranga and struggled for dominance in the Congress. As the N.G. Ranga group was 
operating within the Congress, their activities among the Dalits were inspired by the 
Gandhian idea of Harijan. During 1934-35 Ranga formed ‘Harijan Seva Dal’ with the 
                                                 
524 My interview with U. Sambasivarao, Hyderabad 20 January, 2005.  Also see, May Seventeenth 
Comrades. 2001. What should be done in India? (in Telugu), Hyderabad: Dalita Bahujana Sraamika 
Vimukti.  
525 Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class and Social Articulations…, p. 6.  
526 The Non-Brahmin movement and Justice Party were not exclusively dominated by the Kammas.  Some 
other Zamindars and rich landlords from the other upper castes, especially the Reddys and Rajus were also 
part of these forums.  
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active support of his wife as well as notable social reformers from among Brahmins, 
especially Unnava Lakshminarayana, author of Mala palli (Mala village), and Guduru 
Ramachandra Rao. The third group was constituted by the educated youth of the 
Kammas. This group, which was inspired by Marxism and the Russian Revolution, was 
at the forefront in the formation of a Communist Party unit in coastal Andhra. Although 
the landless Dalits never supported the anti-Brahmin movement, they oscillated between 
the Congress-based N.G. Ranga group and Communists led by B. Basavapunniah, C. 
Rajeshwar Rao and others. Both the groups fought against each other for control of the 
peasant movement and competed to organise landless labourers and Dalits.527   
 
By the late 1930’s, many young Dalits, such as Guntur Bapaiah, K. Surya Prakash Rao 
and Nutakki Kotayya, were increasingly becoming impatient with the Congress-led 
Harijan activities. They were inspired by the Communists’ mobilisation of the 
agricultural labourers for minimum wages and for wasteland. They joined the 
Communists and actively participated in their mobilisation of the rural landless and 
agricultural labour. When the Agricultural Labour Union was formed, Guntur Bapaiah 
and K. Surya Prakash Rao were elected as the Union’s general secretary and president, 
respectively.  While the issue of minimum wage pertains to all the agricultural labour - 
irrespective of caste -, the Communists initiated certain specific programmes for Dalits, 
which are different from Congress’ tokenism towards Dalits. For instance, they initiated 
anti-untouchability measures in rural areas and even supported the temple-entry of the 
Dalits.   
 
Undoubtedly, the Dalits, along with the other landless agricultural labourers, were the 
main beneficiaries of the Communists struggle for minimum wages. Yet, their association 
with the Communists and their movements did not liberate them from the clutches of the 
caste. They did not even provide any ‘ideological alternative’ to the Congress. 528  By 
accepting the term ‘Harijan’ for Dalits, despite strong opposition against the term by 
Ambedkar and other Dalit leaders, they showed a clear unwillingness to accept any kind 
                                                 
527 See, Sheshadri, K. 1967. The Communist Party…., pp: 396-397. 
528 Omvedt, Gail. 1994. Dalits and the Democratic…, p.291.  
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of alternative or autonomy for the Dalits.  In fact, they went to the extent of calling the 
Scheduled Caste Federation as a ‘communal organisation’. Such an anti-Ambedkar 
stance by the Communists alienated some of the dedicated Dalits from the organisation.  
For instance, in 1944, when the Agricultural Labour Union in one of its resolutions 
described the Muslim League as a ‘political party’, but called SCF as a communal 
organisation, K. Surya Prakash Rao left the organisation by circulating a dissenting note 
against the resolution.  In the same note he emphasised the “economic and social 
degradation of Dalits and the need for unity of the toiling masses, arguing finally that 
social uplift was even more important than economic betterment.”529 Further, the 
Communists’ involvement in the ‘anti-untouchability’ campaigns was not undertaken as a 
part of party policy or theorised as a crucial aspect of the Indian revolution. In a way, 
their lack of systematic analysis and understanding of the issue of caste and Dalit 
concerns reveals their blindness to the entirety of the Dalit question.  
 
In conclusion, in this chapter I have attempted to examine Dalit activism in the Telugu 
region since the early 1920’s. Despite emerging from the platforms provided by the 
Brahmin social reformers in coastal Andhra and the upper caste benefactors in 
Hyderabad, Dalit activists powerfully voiced their concerns. Inspired by the ‘Adi’ 
ideology, they launched the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha and Adi-Hindu League in 
coastal Andhra and Hyderabad respectively. Mobilising under these associations, Dalits 
claimed respectable and equal social status along with the other castes in the Hindu social 
structure. Of course, they also claimed their share of power in the emerging political 
structure. But such a claim was not as powerful as that of the Dalits in UP, in the sense, 
the former did not make consistent efforts for political power as they did in their demands 
for social equality and respect. Further, Dalits in the Telugu belt were never able to move 
away from the shadow of the caste-Hindus, and indeed, their concerns and claims were 
shaped under that shadow. It was precisely on account of this that the Dalits in the Telugu 
region, unlike their counterparts in UP, could never give vent to their ire against the 
Brahmanical caste society and oppression by the upper castes.  
 
                                                 
529 Ibid.   
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Since the early 1930’s although the Dalits got an opportunity, in the form of Ambedkar, 
to move away from the shadows of the upper castes, they chose to remain in upper caste 
patronage and thereby, continued to dance to the tunes of the upper castes rather than 
reconstituting themselves as an independent force.  This, in turn, facilitated the upper 
castes and their political parties to divert the Dalit energies away from the demand of 
political power.  In a way, the above examination and analysis of the Dalit activities and 
politics in the Telugu region during the late colonial period clearly differed with the 
claims made by Pai, Jaffrelot and Omvedt.  In the sense, Pai argued that Dalit 
consciousness in the northern region during the colonial period was not developed on a 
par with the Dalit consciousness in other regions of India, particularly the southern and 
western regions of India during the same period. But our analysis shows that Dalits in the 
South were behind their counterparts in the North, for while the former was confined to 
the demands for social equality and respect, the latter went to the extent of demanding 
their share of political power on the basis of their independent identity.   
 
Our analysis also rejects Jaffrelot’s claim that lower-castes in the southern region had 
mobilised around the Dravidian ideology.  The Dalits, who are part of the lower-caste 
category, were not influenced by Dravidian ideology but by the Adi ideology of the 
Dalits. Our examination also clearly points out the gaps in Omvedt’s presentation of the 
Dalits and their socio-political activities. It brought forth the caste-based prejudices of the 
Mala leaders against the Madigas and how the former suppressed the latter. In a way, 
caste-based political antagonism among the Dalits, particularly between the Madigas and 
Malas in contemporary Andhra Pradesh were rooted in the prejudices of the Mala leaders 
against the Madigas during the colonial period. Further, the seeds for contemporary 
domestication and marginalisation of the Dalits in the political sphere by the Congress 
with its Harijan slogan and socio-cultural assimilation agenda, and the Communists with 
their economic agenda, were sown during the colonial period. But what have been the 
Dalits’ activities and politics in post-Independence Andhra Pradesh? We shall answer this 
question in the next Chapter.  
 
****** 
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Six………………………………………………………………………........ 
From Demands for Respect and Social Equality to a Quest 
for Power: Dalit Movement and Politics in AP, 1950 ‐ 1990 
 
In the previous Chapter, we have seen the contributions of the Christian missionaries, the 
British colonial state and the Hindu social reformers towards the growth of Dalit 
consciousness in the Telugu region. A majority of the Dalit leaders in the early 1920’s 
were educated in schools established by these agencies. Although they were inspired by 
the ideologies of the schools in which they studied, the Adi ideology had a strong 
influence over them. This influence, in turn, resulted in the formation of the Adi-Andhra 
Mahajana Sabha in the coastal Andhra region and the Adi-Hindu League in Nizam’s 
Hyderabad. Under the leadership of these organisations they have assumed the Adi-
Andhra identity in coastal Andhra region and Adi-Hindu identity in Hyderabad; and on 
the basis of their Adi identity, the Dalits in the Telugu region demanded not just respect 
and social equality, but also a share in the emerging political power.  
 
The entry of Gandhi and Ambedkar into national politics and Dalit activities had far-
reaching implications on the Dalits’ activities. Indeed, the entry of the leaders 
reconfigured Dalit politics and activism both at the national as well as regional levels. 
Those regional Dalit forces that agreed with Gandhi and his ‘ism’, had become moderate 
in their outlook, and thus posed no real threat either to the caste system or the socio-
economic and political domination of the upper castes. But those regional Dalit forces 
that agreed with Ambedkar and his ideas rejuvenated their activism and thrust their 
demands for social equality and a share in political power more forcefully. Obviously, 
this had posed a real threat to the domination of the upper castes and the caste system, the 
social system that facilitated their domination in the economic and political spheres.  
 
The Dalit leaders in the Telugu region, unlike the Dalit leadership in UP, were groomed 
by upper caste social reformers. On account of this grooming Gandhi’s Congress and his 
Harijan Sevak Sangh became their natural destinations, for their benefactors were already 
part and parcel of those organisations. In a way, the Dalit leaders were willing to do 
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anything that their benefactors wanted, and follow their path unquestionably. It was on 
account of this blind faith in their upper caste benefactors that the Dalit leadership in the 
Telugu belt missed an historical opportunity, in the form of Ambedkar, to move away 
from the shadow of the upper castes and emerge as an independent political force. This 
missed opportunity, in turn, led to their domestication and marginalisation in the political 
realm by the upper castes in post-Independence Andhra Pradesh.  
 
The present Chapter seeks to: (a) understand the Dalit relationship with the two dominant 
political parties in the state, namely the Congress Party and the Communist Party of 
India; (b) examine Dalit activism under the leadership of the APDMS; and (c) analyse the 
Dalit activities at the electoral politics through the BSP. I place two arguments in this 
Chapter: first, the Dalit leadership in AP, unlike their counterparts in UP, did not focus on 
the idea of political power. Their concentration on the notions of social justice and 
equality certainly conscientises the Dalit and non-Dalit constituencies in AP to a larger 
extent, but could not prepare the ground for the independent political mobilisation of the 
Dalit constituency in the state; second, unlike UP, where unity within the Dalit social 
constituency and between the Dalits and other lower castes led for the success of the BSP 
and SP in electoral politics, in AP, a lack of unity not just between the Dalits and other 
lower castes and also within the Dalit segment, resulted in the failure of the Dalit-based 
political parties in electoral politics. Towards an exploration of these objectives and 
arguments, I have divided the Chapter chronologically into three main sections. The first 
section examines Dalit activities since the formation of the state of Andhra Pradesh in 
1956 to until the late 1970’s and their relations with the two political parties mentioned 
above. The second section analyses the formation, ideology and activities of the APDMS 
in the 1980’s; and the final section examines and analyses Dalit mobilisation through the 
BSP for political power in the mid-1990’s. It is expected that this examination and 
analysis of Dalit politics in contemporary AP would add to the existing literature on 
Dalits and their politics in AP. Before we jump on to the first section, I would like to 
touch briefly on the formation of the state of Andhra Pradesh in 1956.  
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Formation of Andhra Pradesh: In the previous Chapter, we noted that the Telugu 
speaking areas were divided between the British-ruled Madras Presidency, and the 
Nizam-ruled princely state of Hyderabad. While the Madras Presidency had seven 
districts of coastal Andhra region and four districts of Rayalaseema region in its control, 
nine districts of the Telangana region were under the control of the Hyderabad state.  
Owing to the Tamil Congress leaders’ practice of discrimination against Telugu-speaking 
Congress leaders, there was a demand for a separate Andhra state comprising of the 
Telugu speaking regions of the Madras Presidency.  After India’s Independence, the mass 
mobilisation for a separate state intensified and the Telugu-speaking people in the Madras 
state, setting aside all sorts of differences and divisions and took part in the mass 
agitations. In a way, the demand for the separate state, as noted by Harrison, “became in 
its final stage a mass expression of the regional patriotism of all Telugus.”530  Yet, the 
Central government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru did not consent to the 
demand of the Telugus; instead, it appointed a Commission under the leadership of S.K. 
Dar.  The Commission did not favour the demand.  
 
In 1949, the Indian National Congress appointed a Committee, consisting of Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Seetaramayya, popularly known as the JVP 
Committee. Although the Committee did not favour the creation of new states on 
linguistic lines, it did suggest the formation of the Andhra state, provided that the Telugus 
give up their claim over the Madras city. The Telugus did not agree with this suggestion 
and continued to press their demand. Meanwhile Potti Sriramulu from Nellore took up a 
fast-unto-death on October 19, 1952 in Madras for a separate Andhra state; and on the 
58th day of his fasting, i.e., on December 15, 1952 he died. As the death of Sriramulu 
sparked off violence in all the Telugu-speaking areas in the Madras state, the Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on December 19, 1952 announced a separate Andhra state 
consisting of seven districts of coastal Andhra and four districts of Rayalaseema.  On 
October 1, 1953 the Andhra State with Kurnool as its capital city finally came into 
existence.  
                                                 
530 Harrison, S. S. 1960. India: The Most Dangerous Decades. Princeton: PUP, p. 110.  
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During this time, the Hyderabad State was also undergoing rapid political changes. After 
India’s Independence, the last Nizam of Hyderabad resisted the Indian government’s 
efforts to merge Hyderabad state into the Indian Union. He wanted to become 
independent by making Hyderabad state as the third dominion. He even approached the 
United Nations for recognition of Hyderabad State as a separate country.  In his ambition, 
the Nizam was supported by the Majlis-i-Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen (MIM – Association for 
Muslim Unity), which began to advocate establishment of permanent Muslim dominion 
in Hyderabad.  The Nizam’s para-military wing, the Razakars, joined the State army and 
police and unleashed a reign of terror against those people, organisations and parties, 
especially against the Communists, who were fighting for the liberation of Hyderabad 
from the Nizam’s rule.  The Communists in the Telangana region took to armed struggle 
and established a parallel government in parts of Telangana, which was popularly known 
as raat-ki-sarkar (rule at night).  It was at this time the Government of India launched a 
‘Police Action’ against the Nizam in September 1948, and the Indian military captured 
the Hyderabad state with little effort within five days of launch of its operation. Although 
this capture led to the merging of the Hyderabad state into the Indian Union, this actually 
raised the curtain on a different demand.   
 
There had been a demand by the Telugus, particularly from coastal Andhra, for the 
creation of Vishaalaandhra (Greater Andhra) comprising of seven districts of coastal 
Andhra, four districts of Rayalaseema, nine districts in Telangana region and Telugu 
areas in Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Mysore. In December 1953, The Government of 
India set up the States Reorganisation Commission, with Syed Fazl Ali as the Chairman.  
Although the Commission was convinced of the advantages of Vishaalandhra,531 it 
favoured the formation of a separate Telangana state. The Congress High Command, 
however, favoured the idea of Vishalaandhra and prevailed upon the leaders of Andhra 
State and Telangana. Eventually, in 1956, the Andhra state (comprising of coastal Andhra 
                                                 
531 The Commission opined that the “Advantages of a larger Andhra State including Telangana are that it 
will bring into existence a state of about 32 millions, with large water and power resources, adequate 
mineral wealth and valuable raw materials. This will also solve the difficult and vexing problem of finding 
a permanent capital for Andhra, for the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad are very well-suited to 
be capital of Vishalandhra.” See Singh, K. S. 2003. People of India: Andhra Pradesh. New Delhi: 
Government of India, Vol. XIII, Part-I, pp: 11-12. 
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and Rayalaseema regions) and the Telangana region was politically integrated on a 
linguistic basis in order to constitute the state of Andhra Pradesh.    
 
6. I. Struggling for space: Dalit activities in AP, 1956-82 
Immediately after India’s Independence and during the process of the formation of AP, 
the politics in the Telugu region underwent massive changes, and the majority of the 
tendencies and issues that are unfolding in today’s AP politics could be seen in 
embryonic form in the early 1950’s.  The emergence of four major trends could be noted: 
first, the emergence of the Indian National Congress and the Communist Party of India as 
two major political parties in the state, and of the two, emergence of Congress as the 
single dominant party; second, the end of the domination of the Brahmins, and the 
emergence of the Reddy’s as the dominant caste group inside the Congress Party; third,  
caste-based competition for political power through the political parties, i.e., Reddy’s 
through the Congress and Kammas through the Communist Party  began to compete for 
political power. Three other upper caste groups – Kapus, Velamas and Goudas – also 
joined this competition, especially since the 1980’s; and finally, marginalisation of the 
Dalits in the political arena.  For the present, two pertinent questions should be posed 
here: what is the relationship between Dalits and the two major political parties? Was 
there any Dalit activism outside the sphere of upper caste competition for political power 
through the Congress and Communist parties?  We shall answer these questions in this 
section. I have divided the section into four sub-sections. The first two sub-sections 
examine Dalit relationship with the Congress and Communist parties respectively.  The 
third sub-section concentrates upon the activities of the Dalit-based political party, the 
Republican Party of India; and the final sub-section examines Dalit activities outside the 
political arena.   
 
6. IA. Dalits and the Congress (1957-82): After the formation of the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, the Congress Party remained dominant in state politics for more than two 
decades.  During its period of dominance the Congress won in all the elections held for 
the Parliament and Legislative Assembly in the state; and it remained as the ‘citadel’ of 
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the Party even when the Congress ‘system’532 began to break down elsewhere during the 
1960’s, especially when the non-Congress parties were forming governments in several 
states in 1967. How did Congress manage to achieve its pre-eminence in the state’s 
political domain? Of the several reasons, one specific reason that helped the Congress to 
dominate the political scene in Andhra Pradesh was, to my mind, the presence of the 
Reddy’s and the Dalits in the Congress party. To specify, the Reddy’s as the wielders of 
the Congress steering wheel and the Dalits as its vote-bank, enabled the Party to remain 
in power for a long time. If this is so, how did the Reddys come to acquire that power, 
and how did Dalits become the Congress vote-bank?  
 
The Reddys, who belonged to the Sat-Shudra category in the traditional Hindu social 
structure, constitute about 8% to 10% of the State’s population and are spread throughout 
the three regions of AP: Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra. In fact, the 
integration of Andhra and Telangana regions led to a preponderance of Reddy’s in the 
power structure of the party and of the State. Bejawada Gopal Reddy and Neelam 
Sanjeeva Reddy were the two main Reddy leaders that built the political strength of the 
Reddys in the State. In the early 1950’s the Reddy’s found themselves in fierce 
competition for top positions in the Congress Party against the Brahmins, who were in a 
dominant position both in the Party as well as the government.533 To note one such 
instance, at the time of Independence the elections to the office of the President of the 
Andhra Provincial Congress Committee (APCC) were held, and this election provided an 
occasion for a trial of strength between two rival groups.  One group was led by 
Tanguturi Prakasam, a Brahmin by caste and who was popularly known as Andhra 
Kesari – the Lion of Andhra.  He supported the candidature of N.G. Ranga, Kamma by 
caste, for the post.  The other group was led by Pattabhi Sitharamayya, another senior 
Brahmin Congress leader, and he supported Sanjeeva Reddy for the post.  In the fight 
Ranga was defeated by Sanjeeva Reddy, a defeat that led to the exit of Tanguturi and 
Ranga from the Congress.  Such an exit was seen as the end of the Brahmin dominance in 
the Party and also as a turning point in the Reddy-Kamma rivalry that was emerging in 
                                                 
532 Kothari, Rajni. 1964. The Congress ‘System’ in India. Asian Survey, 4 (12), pp: 1161-1173. 
533 Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class and Social Articulation…, p. 9.  
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AP in the post-Independence period.534 And on November 1, 1956, Neelam Sanjeeva 
Reddy became the first Chief Minister of the enlarged state. Thus by mid-1950’s the 
Reddy’s had succeeded in wresting the reins of the Congress Party from the hands of the 
Brahmins. From then onwards until today they continue to steer the wheel of political 
power in the state through the Congress Party. Not surprisingly, domination of the 
Reddys led the critics to view the Congress as ‘Reddy Raj’,535 and the following table 
substantiates the argument:  
                 Table 6.1:  Caste backgrounds of Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh 
S.No. Name Party Tenure Caste 
1 N. Sanjeeva Reddy Congress  01-11-1956 – 10-01-1960 Reddy 
2 D. Sanjeevaiah Congress 11-01-1960 – 11-03-1962 Dalit-Mala 
3 N. Sanjeeva Reddy Congress  12-03-1962  - 28-02-1964  Reddy 
4 K. Brahmananda Reddy Congress  29-02-1964 – 29-09-1971 Reddy 
5 P.V. Narasimha Rao Congress  30-09-1971 – 18-01-1973 Brahmin 
 President’s Rule   18-07-1973 – 10-12-1973  
6 J. Vengala Rao Congress  11-12-1973 – 05-03-1978 Velama 
7 M. Chenna Reddy Congress  06-03-1978 – 10-10-1980 Reddy 
8 T. Anjaiah Congress  11-10-1980 – 24-02-1982 BC 
9 B. Venktram Reddy Congress  24-02-1982 – 20-09-1982 Reddy 
10 K. Vijay Bhaskar Reddy Congress  20-09-1982 – 08-01-1983 Reddy 
11 N. T. Rama Rao TDP 09-01-1983 – 16-08-1984 Kamma 
12 N. Bhaskararao TDP  16-08-1984 – 15-09-1984 Kamma 
13 N. T. Rama Rao TDP 16-09-1984 – 02-12-1989 Kamma 
14 M. Chenna Reddy Congress  03-12-1989 – 17-12-1990 Reddy 
15 N. Janardhan Reddy Congress  17-12-1990 – 08-10-1992 Reddy 
16 K. Vijay Bhaskar Reddy Congress  09-10-1992 – 12-12-1994 Reddy 
17 N. T. Rama Rao TDP 12-12-1994 – 31-08-1995 Kamma 
18 N. Chandra Babu Naidu TDP 01-09-1995 – 11-10-1999 Kamma 
19 N. Chandra Babu Naidu TDP 11-10-1999 – 14-05-2004 Kamma 
20 Y.S. Raja Sekhara Reddy Congress  14-05-2004 – 02-09-2009 Reddy 
21 K. Rosaiah  Congress  03-09-2009 – 24-10-2010 Vyshya 
22 N. Kiran Kumar Reddy Congress  25-10-2010 - Reddy 
               Source: Srinivasarao, K., 2002. Telugu Verdict 1952-2002: Fifty Years Political Analysis (in Telugu), 
               Hyderabad: Prajasakthi book House. 
Table 6.2: Caste-wise break of CM’s of AP 
S.No. Caste 
1 Reddy –     8 
2 Kamma -    3 
3 SC-(Mala) – 1 
4 Brahmin -   1 
5 Velama -    1 
6 BC        -    1 
7 Vysya    -     1 
      Total            -    16 
                                                 
534 Suri, K.C. 2002. Democratic Process and Electoral Politics in Andhra Pradesh, India, working paper 
180, London: Overseas Development Institute, p. 13.  
535 Prasanna K. A. ed., 1994. Andhra Pradesh Government and Politics. Delhi: Sterling Publishers, p.158. 
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As has been clearly reflected in the above two Tables, political power in AP since its 
formation in 1956 until today has largely been controlled by the elite classes that 
belonged to the Reddy and Kamma castes through the two main political parties in the 
state: Congress (I) and Telugu Desam Party (TDP), respectively. We shall discuss the 
Kamma politics through the TDP in the next section.  But how did the Reddy’s 
consolidate political power and how did they continue to hold on to that power? Political 
power, creation of new institutional structures, and some of the techniques employed by 
them while in power, especially the technique of accommodation, are said to be the 
forces that worked in their favour and helped consolidate power and facilitated their 
continuous domination in the political sphere.  In other words, the possession of power 
through the Congress Party is the key factor that led to the Reddy’s deploying that power 
for their perpetuation in the domain.  
 
Of all the policies and programmes undertaken by the Congress Party in post-
Independence India, the most important policy was land reforms. In addition to land 
reforms, another programme specific to AP in this period was the introduction of the 
Panchayati Raj system towards decentralisation of governance at the grassroots under the 
leadership of Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy in 1957.  It was by using both the land reform 
policies and the new administrative structures that the Reddy’s succeeded in 
consolidating their power in the political firmament of the State. One of the crucial 
aspects in the entire process of consolidation is that of the preservation of the socio-
economic and political powers of the dominant castes. For instance, the maximum land 
allowed per family under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act of 1972 was 10 acres of 
cultivable land and 25 acres of uncultivable land.  But the Agricultural Census of 1988 
revealed that there were 2000 upper caste farmers in the State holding 100 acres and 
above.536 Further, as reflected in the Table below, the land in the possession of small, 
semi-medium and medium farmers during 1955-71 had decreased, while the number of 
medium and larger farmers had increased.   
 
                                                 
536 Ratnam, K.Y. 2008. The Dalit Movement and Democratization in Andhra Pradesh. Washington: East – 
West Centre, working paper, No. 13, p. 7.  
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Table 6.3: Changing Structure of the Agrarian economy in Andhra Pradesh: The Percentage 
Distribution of Operational Holdings by Size Class, 1956-2006 
Year Share in Number of Holdings Share in Operated Area  
Marginal Small Semi-
Medium 
Medium Large Marginal Small Semi-
Medium 
Medium Large Avg 
Size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1955-56 38.6 18.3 17.7 16.7 8.7 7.9 9.7 16.1 28.1 38.2 2.43 
1970-71 46.0 18.5 17.4 12.7 4.3 8.0 11.3 19.2 30.8 30.7 2.51 
1977-77 46.6 20.3 17.4 12.2 3.4 9.3 12.8 20.8 32.3 24.8 --- 
1980-81 49.3 20.9 16.0 9.1 2.1 13.1 16.2 23.3 28.7 18.7 1.94 
1985-86 54.2 20.8 15.2 8.0 1.8 14.5 17.3 24.0 27.3 16.3 --- 
1990-91 56.0 21.2 14.5 6.9 1.3 16.4 19.6 25.2 26.1 12.8 1.50 
2000-01 60.9 21.8 12.4 4.3 0.6 21.6 24.8 26.4 19.8 7.5 1.25 
2005-06 61.6 21.9 12.0 40 0.5 22.7 25.8 26.5 19.0 6.1 1.20 
Note: 1. Marginal – 0 to 1 hectare; small – 1 to 2 hectare; semi-medium – 2-4 hectare; medium 4-10 
hectare; and large -10 hectares and above. 2. Avg – Average size of the holding in given hectares. 
Source: Human Development Report 2007: Andhra Pradesh. Hyderabad: Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, p. 
64.537 
 
Such decrease and increase of the number of small and medium farmers, respectively, 
clearly indicate two things. First, the beneficiaries of land reforms in the State, as 
elsewhere in India, were farmers or peasantry, but not the landless labourers.  It is 
important to recognise here that when we say farmers, we imply the members that belong 
to the non-Brahmin upper castes, particularly the Reddy, Kammas, and Kapu castes.  
Majority of the lower castes, especially those castes that come under the current category 
of the Most Backward Castes (MBCs), and almost the entire Dalit category were landless 
labourers, particularly in the duration of the land reform process. 538  It may be mentioned 
here that while the upper castes have been allowed to appropriate thousands of acres of 
cultivable and uncultivable land by the Congress government under leadership of Reddy, 
the landless Dalits who were cultivating the wastelands were forcefully evicted even from 
those wastelands. In fact, their crops were destroyed by the upper castes with the help of 
the police.539  Second, land reforms by removing the gross and wide differences between 
the landed gentry and the peasantry have, as argued by K. Srinivasulu, brought about a 
certain “homogenisation of agrarian propertied classes”.540 And it is this homogenisation 
                                                 
537 See also, Mangala Gowri, C and Venkata Ramanaiah., 2008. ‘Land Reforms and agrarian conditions in 
Andhra Pradesh during Post-Independence Era’, in Social Science Research Network, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1304527 accessed on 30 November, 2012; Sambi 
Reddy, C. Jojaiah, Venugopala Rao and N. Narasaiah., 2012. Land and Income Inequalities in Rural 
Andhra Pradesh. The Marxist, 28(2), pp: 50-74. 
538 Ram Reddy, G. 1989. The Politics of Accommodation: Caste, Class and Dominance in Andhra Pradesh. 
In: Frankel, R. Francine and M.S.A. Rao., eds., Dominance and State Power…, pp: 293-94.  
539  Ratnam, Y.K. 2008. The Dalit Movement…, p. 7. 
540 Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class and Social Articulation.., p. 8.  
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that led the other rich peasantry, particularly the Kamma and Kapu castes, to become the 
core supporters of the Congress Party under the leadership of the Reddys.  
 
If land reforms facilitated homogenisation of the upper class base of the upper castes, 
which in turn led to their becoming the core support base for the Reddy-dominated 
Congress Party, the Panchayati Raj system paved the way for the penetration of their 
(Reddys’) power into the grassroots. The Panchayati Raj system has a three-tier 
structure, consisting of the village Panchayat at the bottom, the Panchayat Samithi in the 
middle (the block/taluk level) and the Zilla Parishad at the top (district level).  This 
system is, for our purpose, significant for two main reasons.  First, it had become a fresh 
avenue of power and prestige for the upper castes in general and Reddy’s in particular.  
The political aspirants from the Reddy castes were accommodated through this system.  
For instance, an examination of the first three Panchayati Raj elections conducted in 
1959, 1964 and 1970 reveal that the Congress Party captured all Zilla Parishad 
chairmanships (except that of Nalgonda in 1964, which went to the CPI) and most 
Panchayat Samithis. It is important to note here that all the chairmen of the Zilla 
Parishads were handpicked by chief ministers, thus perpetuating the domination of the 
Reddy’s.541 A study on the social backgrounds of the leadership at the level of Panchayat 
Samithis in the Telangana region indicated that in 1970-76, out of 112 Samithi presidents, 
the proportion of the upper castes, particularly from the Reddy and Kamma castes, was 
92.4 percent.542 Second, as the system had become a mechanism to provide access to 
funds and control over their distribution for development, the Reddys (and other upper 
castes) utilised the government machinery, resources and patronage in exercising control 
and commanding loyalty from the lower castes, which eventually became the ‘traditional 
vote banks’ for the Reddy-dominated Congress Party.543  If the Reddys could possess 
state power through the Congress party and deploy the same power for their perpetuation 
in that domain, what were the Dalits doing inside the Congress? Or to ask differently, 
what was the relationship between the Dalits and the Congress Party?  
                                                 
541 Narasimha Reddy, A. 1979. Congress Parties and Politics. In: Ram Reddy G., and B.A.V. Sharma. ed., 
State Government & Politics: Andhra Pradesh. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, pp: 193-255, here p. 210.  
542 Ram Reddy, G. 1989. The Politics of Accommodation…, p. 307.  
543 Gray, Hugh. 1968. Andhra Pradesh…, pp: 399-431.  
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We have seen in the previous Chapter that that through the Harijan Sevak Sang Gandhi 
and his Congress succeeded in diverting the energies of the Harijan leaders towards non-
material aspects, such as the temple entry programme, and thus, succeeded in 
marginalising the emerging Ambedkarites forces. Vemula Kurmayya, Damodaram 
Sanjeevaiah, Raghavulu, Kota Punnaiah, Goka Ramaswamy, and B.S. Murthy were some 
of the Congress’ Harijan leaders.544 After India’s Independence and following the 
formation of an independent Andhra Pradesh state, these Harijan leaders became the 
natural choice for the Congress in the reserved constituencies. Later on, some of the SCF 
leaders, such as Arigay Ramaswamy and Butti Rajaram, were co-opted by the Congress, 
thus improving its list of the Harijan leaders. A cursory look at the party performance in 
the reserved seats for Dalits in the AP state legislative assembly, as shown in the Table 
below, clearly demonstrates that the Congress has been winning more than half of these 
seats in any given election.   
Table 6.4: Party-wise Performances in SC Seats in AP Legislative Assembly (1957-2004)545 
Year/Party INC RPI PDF SWA CPI CPM JNP STS TDP BJP TRS IND Total 
1957 13 01 03 - - - - - - - - 01 18 
1962 33 - - 01 08 - - - - - - 01 43 
1967 24 02 - 07 02 01 - - - - - 04 40 
1972 36 - - - - - - 01 - - - 03 40 
1978 30+2  -- - - - 06 01 - -- - -- 39 
1983 09 - - - 02 - - - 28 - - - 39 
1985 02 - - - 03 02 01 - 30 01 - - 39 
1989 25 - - - - 03 - - 08 01 - 02 39 
1994 02 - - - 03 05 - - 28 - - 01 39 
1999 08 - - - - - -- - 29 01 - 01 39 
2004 24 - - -  02 - - 07 - 06  39 
INC: Indian National Congress; RPI: Republican Party of India; PDF: Peoples Democratic Front;  
CPI: Communist Party of India; CPI (M): Communist Party of India (Marxist); JNP: Janata Party;  
STS: Sampurna Telangana Praja Samithi; TDP: Telugu Desam Party; BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party;  
TRS: Telangana Rashtra Samithi; IND: Independent  
 
With the Congress co-opting Dalit leaders, it led to the destruction of an independent 
Dalit voice, but such a move, Ratnam argued, not only resulted in awareness among the 
Dalits about the government’s developmental programmes, but also provided an avenue 
through which Dalit leadership could work for the betterment of the Dalit community. 546  
In a sense, in order to stabilise and strengthen their own position in their respective 
                                                 
544 Ratnam, K.Y. 1998. Dalit Movement in AP: A Study of Political Consciousness and Identity. Ph.D. 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, p. 3. 
545 See Statistical Reports of Assembly Elections for AP, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.  
546 Ratnam, K.Y. 1998. Op. cit., p.4.  
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constituencies, the Congress’ Dalit leaders consistently informed the Dalit public about 
the state administration, its policies and programmes. This helped the Dalits to take part 
in various developmental programmes. Further, those Dalit leaders that were given 
ministerial positions used their positions to effectively bargain for better allotment in 
budgetary allocations and consistently pressured the government to take measures for 
education, housing and employment facilities for Dalits.  It may be true that the Congress 
provided an avenue for the Dalit leaders to help their community by informing them 
about the government’s developmental programmes, and also to bargain for the 
budgetary allocations. Such efforts, however, ultimately helped not so much the Dalits, 
but the Congress mainly.  The party transformed the Dalits into its vote-bank, and used 
that vote-bank to dominate and control the State’s politics for more than two decades. In 
other words, if AP had become “the citadel of the Congress”, it was largely due to this 
solid vote-bank. 547    
 
Further, whatever the awareness gained by the Dalits, such awareness could not help the 
Dalits to gain from those developmental programmes in any substantial way. For 
instance, in 1960 the government of AP passed a Bill on, ‘the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on 
Agricultural Holding’. The two main objectives of this Bill were: to reduce the 
concentration of land, and redistribute land among the agricultural labourers. But the Bill 
was never implemented with any seriousness, and in almost all villages, the Congress 
leaders, through the State administrative machinery, assisted the upper caste Reddys and 
Kammas to retain hundreds of acres of excessive land in their control. Even when the 
Dalits and other marginalised sections moved to use the wastelands for cultivation, they 
were all arrested and summarily sent to jails.548   
 
Also, Dalits’ experience with the Land Reforms Act was no different from their 
experience with the Bill on ‘the Ceiling on Agricultural Holding’. In 1972, the State 
                                                 
547 Ram Reddy, G. 1976. Andhra Pradesh: The Citadel of the Congress. In: Narain, Iqbal., ed., State 
Politics in India. New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan, pp: 1-29; see also, Hanumantha Rao, V. 1993. Party 
Politics in Andhra Pradesh, 1956-199. Hyderabad: ABA Publications.  
548 The arrest of the Dalit agricultural labour was raised in the Assembly by Vemula Kurmaiah, a Dalit 
MLA from Krishna district. According to him 174 Dalits in Adilabad, 502 in Krishna, 1044 in Guntur and 
1818 from Warangal were arrested by the police.  ‘Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Debates, March 
4, 1970’, cited in Ratnam, K.Y. 2008. The Dalit Movement…, p.37, passim 2.   
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government passed the Land Reforms Act, in which it was stated rather emphatically that 
the maximum land allowed per family was 10 acres of cultivable land and 25 acres of 
uncultivable land. It was estimated by the government that, through the Act the state 
government would get nearly 10 lakh acres of land for distribution among Dalits and 
landless sections from the marginalised categories. But only 5.94 lakh acres of land was 
actually distributed to the Dalits, Adivasis and Backward Class.549 Further, it has been 
pointed out that wherever the land redistribution took place, the title deeds (pattas) were 
distributed only for namesake, as those lands were still controlled by the upper castes.550 
Moreover, the distributed land was unproductive and unfit for cultivation.   
 
It should also be mentioned here that, while the Dalits were being used by the Congress 
as the vote-bank so as to firmly establish itself in the State’s politics, the Congress used 
its Harijan leaders to contain factionalism within the party. One instance of the latter 
aspect deserves mention. We have noted that domination of the Reddy’s inside the 
Congress party, and that domination, over a period of time, led to factionalism in the 
Party.  By the early 1960’s the factions that emerged as strong contenders for power were 
the one led by Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy and the other by Kasu Brahmananda Reddy, the 
two most powerful Congress leaders that the State had ever seen.  In 1960, when they 
both took up competition for the position of chief minister as a matter of prestige, the 
Congress leadership in Delhi brought in Damodaram Sanjeevaiah, who was a Mala, 
rather than powerful leaders from the other upper castes like the Kamma, Raju and 
Velama, and installed him as the chief minister of the State.551 Damodaram was the first 
Dalit to become chief minister in any Indian state. Although the selection of Damodaram 
as CM of the State was a great surprise, such selection was not without reasons.  First of 
all, he was chosen as a consensus Harijan candidate in order to avert an impending power 
conflict between the two Reddy candidates – Neelam Sanjeeva Redday and Kasu 
                                                 
549 See Rangarao, S.P. 1996. Land Reforms and Scheduled Castes. Paper presented at the National Seminar 
on the land reforms and Dalits at Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, December 16.  
550 Ratnam, K.Y. 2008. The Dalit Movement…, pp: 7-8. 
551 See Bernstorff, Dagmar. 1973. Eclipse of “Reddy-Raj”? The Attempted Restructuring of the Congress 
Party leadership in Andhra Pradesh. Asian Survey, 13 (10), pp: 959-979.  
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Brahmananda Reddy.552 Second, a Harijan CM would bring the numerically large social 
groups of the marginalised sections, especially the Malas and the Madigas, into the 
Congress-fold and thus, gradually erode the Communists’ influence among these 
groups.553 
 
Interestingly, although the intention of the Congress in installing Damodaram as the CM 
was to use him until the dust settled in the power conflict between the two Reddy 
candidates, Damodaram used the opportunity for a different purpose.  Soon after his 
installation, he made an effort to consolidate the representatives of the marginalised 
sections within the Congress party, especially the Dalits, religious minorities (Muslims 
and Christians) and Backward Castes.  He instructed the Department of Development to 
earmark 15 percent of funds to be spent exclusively for the welfare of these communities.  
He also issued a government order that until suitable persons from the Dalits and 
Adivasis were found, the positions that were reserved for them should be kept vacant. 
Further, he tried to extend the reservation benefits to many Shudra castes by including 
more Shudras in the State list of the Backward Castes.554 The welfare policies and 
programmes favouring the Dalits and marginalised sections of Damodaram were, 
however, vehemently opposed by the Reddy’s and other upper castes inside the Congress 
party.  What the upper caste-dominated Congress wanted, as Ratnam argued, was not the 
empowerment of the Dalits, which would ultimately facilitate the latter to question the 
domination of the former, but the subordination and further marginalisation of the Dalits 
and other oppressed sections, so as to perpetuate the upper castes’ own domination.555 A 
majority of the MLAs that belonged to the upper caste backgrounds, irrespective of their 
caste and faction within the party, rebelled against Sanjeevaiah and agitated until he was 
removed from the position of chief minister in 1962. Thus, in post-Independence AP, 
while the Dalits were used as vote-banks by the Congress, their leaders were used as the 
facilitators for the upper castes to gain and control political power.   
                                                 
552 See Elliot, M Carolyn., 1970. Caste and Faction among the Dominant Caste: The Reddis and Kammas 
of Andhra. In: Kothari, Rajni. ed., Caste in Indian Politics…, pp: 121-61, here p. 152.   
553 Suri, K.C. 2002. Democratic Process…, p. 18. 
554 See Reddy, Ram G. and BAV Sharma. 1979. State Government…; Innaiah, N. 1986. State Government 
and Politics: A Study of Andhra Pradesh Politics 1885-198. Hyderabad: Hyderabad Scientific Service.  
555 Ratnam, K.Y. 1998. Dalit Movement … p.6.  
273 
 
6. IB. Dalits and the Communists:  In the previous Chapter we have noted that the Dalits 
- both in Telangana and coastal Andhra regions - were attracted to the Communist 
slogans of ‘classless society’ and ‘social equality’. In practice, however, these slogans 
remained empty promises. For the Communist movement, under the leadership of the two 
dominant non-Brahmin upper castes – the Reddy’s and Kammas – not only sidelined the 
caste question but also marginalised the Dalits within the rank and file of the party 
organisations. Even in post-Independence Andhra Pradesh, the Communists’ position and 
attitude against the Dalits and their specific problems did not change.  Yet, in electoral 
politics, just like the Congress, the Communist Party also used the Dalits in order to swell 
their own position in the state legislative assembly.  In this sub-section my main aim is to 
examine the Communists’ relationship with the Dalits, and how the former dealt with the 
caste question in post-Independence Andhra Pradesh.  
 
One of the significant aspects of the leadership of the two main political parties in the 
state - the Congress and Communist Party of India - is that of polarisation around caste-
lines. While the Reddy’s, as observed by Harrison, “gravitating almost by default, had 
cornered the market (the leadership of the Congress) on the bulk of the (Congress) party’s 
non-Brahmin patronage”,556 the Kammas have outnumbered others, especially the 
Reddys, in the Left parties.557 An important characteristic of this leadership was that a 
majority of the Kammas that occupied the party leadership were either rich landlords 
themselves or sons of rich landlords. It was estimated that the Kammas owned 80 per 
cent of the fertile delta land.558  And it was precisely this caste and class position or, in 
the words of B. T. Ranadive, the ‘wrong social base’ of the party leadership that 
decisively shaped the party’s direction in the State.  Interestingly, the Communist 
leadership, as observed by Harrison, “had made no secret of their ‘rich peasant’ policy 
                                                 
556 Harrison, S. S. 1956. Caste and the Andhra Communists. The American Political Science Review, 50(2), 
pp: 378-404, here p. 384. 
557 It may be interesting to note here that of the two main Left groups in the state, while the group that 
chose the parliamentary path, was dominated by the Kammas (Chandrasekhara Rao, Chandra Rajeswara 
Rao, Makineni Basavapunniah, Ch. Hanumantha Rao were notables in this group), the other group which 
chose the revolutionary path was dominated by the Reddys (Puchhalapalli Sundaraiah, Kondapalli 
Seetharamayya, Tarimela Nagireddy were notables in this group). 
558 Harrison, S. S. 1956. Op. cit.,  p.381.  
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within the party”.559 In fact, the leadership explicitly declared on this point in a 1948 
programme report for the Indian Communist Politburo which stressed on two major 
tactical rules of thumb:  
1. In delta areas the pressure of population would be heavy, and as such slogans should be raised for 
the distribution of lands belonging to rich ryots among poor peasants and labourers… 
2. Propaganda should be carried on to convince the ryots about the just demands of the workers, and 
we should also affect compromises with such of those ryots who would follow us.  Assurance 
should be given that we should not touch the lands of rich ryots.560 
 
Two aspects are clear from the above rules of thumb. First, they illustrate the devious 
means adopted by the Communist party to mobilise the poor peasants and labourers. 
Here, one might argue that the means may be devious but those means were adopted in 
order to achieve the Party’s ultimate goal: the goal of establishment of a classless society. 
The idea of a classless society may be true, but nowhere were they talking about the 
distribution of land to the landless, even after the seizure of power. Besides, how do they 
seek to establish the classless society? Secondly, from the second rule of thumb, it was 
clear that on the pretext of ‘sympathisers of the Communists’, the Communists were not 
going to seize the land that belonged to ‘the rich ryots’.   
 
It may not be irrelevant to pose two questions here: first, can those rich ryots be called 
Communists especially after they decided to retain their land and continued to join the 
struggle to establish “a classless society”? Secondly, how could the Communists establish 
a classless society without transforming the structures that are at the root of class-based 
inequalities? From these, we can conclude that the upper castes had been using the 
Communist party not only to pacify the angry landless poor, but also to continue their 
dominance over the structures that produce and reproduce the class-based inequalities. 
Unfortunately, the landless believed the Communist leadership’s empty slogan of 
distribution to the landless, despite the fact that both the perpetuators of the feudal system 
and the party leaders that were talking about ending that system came from the same 
upper caste backgrounds. And the upper caste Communists exploited the trust that the 
landless labourers placed in them in order to win the elections.  
                                                 
559 Ibid., p.391. 
560Self-Critical Report of the Andhra Communist Committee, January 1948 – February 1952, - a party 
document not intended for publication, quoted in Ibid., p. 391, see also, passim 46, p.391. 
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One distinguishing feature of coastal Andhra region from the other parts of the State in 
the early 1950’s was its high population density, particularly the high percentage of 
landless labourers. The population density ranged from 900 to 1200 persons per square 
mile in coastal Andhra, as compared with 316 in the rest of the state, and more than 37% 
of the total agricultural population in coastal Andhra was landless labourers,561 a majority 
of whom were Dalits. As mentioned above, from the beginning, the Communists 
attempted to organise Dalits, especially the Madigas, Malas and Adi-Andhras in coastal 
Andhra; and on their part the Dalits had become the bulwark for the Communists. This 
explains the electoral successes of the Communists both in 1946 as well as in the 1951 
assembly elections, especially in the latter. For the 1951 assembly elections, six of the 31 
seats won by the Communists in coastal Andhra were reserved for the Dalits.562   
 
Although in the name of the landless labourer the Communists took advantage of the 
Dalits in the reserved constituencies, they did not address the caste problem of the 
Dalits.563 In fact, they advanced several arguments in order to avoid that question. 
Interestingly, it is not that the Communists did not recognise the existence of caste. For 
instance, Devulapalli Venkateswararao, one of the important Communist ideologues in 
the state, observes: “In every county we see the existence of religion and old customs and 
traditions in public life. In addition to these, we have caste in our country. Caste is a 
vestige of feudalism, and caste will wither away as soon as we destroy feudalism. This is 
only possible through revolution.”564 Thus, the Communists did recognise the existence 
of caste. Yet, for them, caste is almost insignificant and, hence, it is not wise to wage any 
struggle for its annihilation. Of the several, three important arguments of the Communists 
on the question of caste are: (1) Unity of the proletariat/workers, (2) Land Distribution, 
                                                 
561 Ibid., p.386. 
562 Ibid., p.387. 
563 I am not saying that the Communists did not talk about the caste-based specific problems of the Dalits.  
Indeed, a number of Communist leaders did talk about the Dalit conditions in their writings.  Some of the 
notables are: T. Nagireddy’s Takattulo Bharatadesam, P. Sundarayya’s Telangana People’s Struggle and 
its Lesson, (Calcutta: CPI (M), and D. Venkateswararao’s Telangana Porata Charitra. It must be, however, 
noted here that in these writings the Communist leadership simply did talk about the Dalit problems, but 
they did not address the caste question and did not have any discussion or programme of action about its 
annihilation.  
564 ‘Comrade Devulapalli’s Court Statement’, quoted in Sambasivarao, U. 1990. ‘Annihilation of Caste – 
Communists’ Standpoint’ (in Telugu), Edureeta, July, p. 8. 
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and (3) Automatic withering away of caste in the capitalist economy.565 Let’s examine 
these three arguments in the below:   
 
(1) Unity of the proletariat/workers:  It has been argued by the Communists that the caste 
question should not be taken up before the achievement of revolution (i.e., achieving 
political power by the Communists), for such undertaking would destroy the unity of the 
proletariat/workers.566 For instance, Vemulapalli Venkatramayya argues:  
[I]n our country the proletariat is constituted both by the upper castes as well as lower 
castes.  And if we have to wage the struggle against the caste before the revolution, then 
that would lead to disunity among the proletariat, especially the upper castes would move 
out of the (Communist) party.567  
Venkatramayya seems to be mainly concerned with the upper caste proletariat. It may be 
correct that the struggle against caste would result in the exit of the upper castes from the 
party.  But can the lower caste proletariat remain in the party if the party does not take up 
the caste question? How would the party unite the proletariat that has been divided 
around caste and class lines?  
 
Devulapalli Venakateswararao’s response to the second question is: 
[A]lthough people (the proletariat) are divided on caste lines, they could be united on the 
basis of their common problems…. Caste divisions on their own are not dangerous, but 
casteism is very dangerous and this has grown to unprecedented levels in the last 35 
years.568  
Two important elements in this argument are: first, irrespective of their position in the 
caste hierarchy, all the proletariat are victims of class inequalities and can be brought 
together on the basis of this common suffering.  Secondly, by arguing that caste divisions 
are, on their own, not dangerous, Devulapalli seems to be separating casteism from that 
of caste divisions.  Indeed, casteism is the end-product of caste divisions. That is to say, if 
there were no caste divisions then there won’t be any place for casteism. In any case, 
even if we agree with Devulapalli that caste divisions are not dangerous but casteism is 
dangerous, then the big question would be how would the Communists unite the 
                                                 
565 For the Communists’ response on the caste question, see Nageswararao, Edpuganti, Balaramamurthi 
Etukuri and Pattabhiramarao, Parakala. eds., 1992. Bharata Desamlo kula vyavastha (Caste System in 
India), Communism, the special edition on caste, Vijayawada.  
566 See Nageswararao, Bollimunta. 1981. ‘O Rijarv Panchayati katha’ (The Story of a Reserved 
Panchayat), Praja Sahiti, 43 (3), pp: 13-15.  
567 Vemulapalli Venkatramayya, quoted in May Seventeenth Comrades. 2001. What should be done in 
India?, Hyderabad: Dalita Bahujana Sraamika Vimukti, p.45. 
568 ‘Comrade Devulapalli’s Court Statement’,…, p. 7. 
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proletariat who are the embodiment of casteism? In other words, can the Communists 
unite the proletariat without eliminating casteism among them?  
 
(2) Land Distribution: Equating the caste problem with the class problem, the 
Communists argued that the caste problem of the Dalits would disappear with the re-
distribution of land.  Two important elements of this main argument are: first, in his 
‘Agrarian Revolution,’ Pucchalapalli Sundarayya argues: “What is the main problem of 
the Harijans and Backward Castes? In reality, their main problem is that of lack of 
land….Without uprooting feudalism and without achieving the agrarian revolution on the 
principle of ‘land to the tiller’, it is almost impossible to provide justice to them (the 
Harijans and the BCs).569 Arguing along similar lines, Devulapalli Venkateswararao also 
states: “There is an organic interconnection between the destruction of feudalism and 
annihilation of the caste system. The section of people that have been perpetuating the 
caste system will be automatically uprooted once we uproot feudalism, and such 
uprooting is possible only through an agrarian revolution.”570  
 
Although stated differently the essence of the above two arguments is the same. They tied 
the caste problem with the economic problem, i.e. land, and posited that as soon as that 
economic problem was sorted out, the caste problem would disappear on its own. This is 
however, as Tarakam termed, a ‘baseless’ argument.571 The poverty of the Dalits is 
definitely on account of their impoverished minds, the handiwork of the Brahmanical 
caste system. But economic empowerment itself does not solve the caste problem, for 
even the economically well-off Dalits have also been the victims of the caste-based 
discrimination of the upper castes – not just the upper class upper castes but even the 
lower class upper castes.  As such the solution to caste does not lie in the distribution of 
land.  
 
(3) Automatic withering away of caste in the capitalist economy: Arguing that caste will 
automatically wither away in a capitalist economy, Devulapalli observes: “Once we enter 
                                                 
569 Pucchalapalli Sundarayya, quoted in Sambasivarao, U. 1990. Annihilation of Caste…, p. 8. 
570 ‘Comrade Devulapalli’s Court Statement’, quoted in Ibid., p.10. 
571 Tarakam, Bojja. 2002[1996]. Caste and Class (in Telugu), Hyderabad: Hyderabad Book Trust, p. 77. 
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into a capitalist economy there won’t be any room for a Brahmin to remain as Brahmin 
and a Kamma as a Kamma”.572 For me, this is an escapist argument by the Communists.  
What Devulapalli was suggesting was that there is no need for a separate struggle against 
caste.  For India will certainly enter into the capitalist economy and by its nature, the 
capitalist economy forces people from their traditional enclaves and caste-based identities 
to embrace professionalism.  In other words, people would be known by their professions 
(what they do) and not by their caste-based identities (who they are). 
 
The above clearly demonstrates not just the escapist argument of the Communists, but 
more importantly also their gross misreading of the social trends, their overestimation of 
the capitalist forces and underestimation of the Brahmanical forces and the casteist mind 
of the Indian society, especially the upper castes. It may be true that capitalist economy 
allows people to become professionals, but that does not necessarily mean that those 
professionals grow out of their casteist mindset.  For instance, Ramoji Rao, a Kamma by 
caste, is one of the biggest capitalists in AP. To his credit, he has a film studio that 
spreads over 5000 acres of land in Hyderabad, Eenadu, the largest newspaper in the state, 
TV channels in 13 Indian languages, and various other businesses. According to one 
estimation, he and his family alone command nearly 25 to 30 per cent of businesses in 
AP.573  To have such a vast business empire, he should have talented professionals, 
irrespective of caste identities of those professionals.  But apparently, it is Ramoji Rao’s 
personalised policy that 80-90 per cent of the employees in his outfits should be drawn 
exclusively from the Kamma caste, a policy which is strictly adhered to.574  
 
Further, one of the main pillars of the caste system is marriages within the caste. It may 
be true that inter-caste marriages are taking place, but a vast majority of the marriages are 
taking place not outside but within the castes, even in today’s India which has more or 
less entered a capitalist economy. In conclusion, this sub-section attempted to examine 
the Communists’ relationship with the Dalits in post-Independence Andhra Pradesh.  The 
Communist parties led by the upper caste Kammas and Reddy’s used the Dalits for their 
                                                 
572 Devulapalli Venkateswararao in Andhra Jyothi (Telugu newspaper) 3 June, 1984.  
573 Interview with B.S. Ramulu, Social Activist and writer, Hyderabad – 4 February, 2005.  
574 Interview with S.V. Subbarao, reporter Eenadu newspaper, Hyderabad - 23 February, 2005. 
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own political interests, but avoided rather skilfully in addressing the caste-specific 
problem of the Dalits.  
 
6. IC. The Republican Party of India (RPI) in AP: In the previous chapter, we have noted 
that some Dalits - both in Hyderabad and coastal Andhra - accepted Ambedkar as their 
national leader and followed his activities since the early 1930’s. In 1942, when 
Ambedkar established the Scheduled Caste Federation, they have also opened branches 
of SCF in their respective regions and organised Dalits for their share in the emerging 
political power. Although prior to the first general elections in 1952, none of the branches 
managed to win in any election, they did voice Dalit concerns during the twilight of 
colonial rule. Interestingly, in the first general elections in 1951, the SCF won five 
assembly seats and one Lok Sabha seat from Hyderabad State.575 It is important to 
recognise here that the success of the party was neither on account of increased political 
consciousness nor due to increased political activity by the Dalits. They felt threatened 
and alienated after the annexation of Nizam’s Hyderabad State by the Indian Union in 
1948. They could trust neither the Communists, who during the Telangana revolt raised 
the slogan of ‘land to the tiller’ to the Dalits, but distributed land among the upper caste 
Reddys as well as Shudras, especially of Gouda, Kurmi, Padmashali and Yadava castes; 
nor could they place their trust in the Congress, which sent the Indian army into the 
Hyderabad state. The army saw Dalits as sympathisers both of the Razakars as well as 
Communists, and wrecked their lives by killing Dalit men and children, raping Dalit 
women and by burning down their huts.576  
 
After the formation of RPI in 1957 in Nagpur, the two SCF branches in AP (one in 
Hyderabad, and the other in coastal Andhra) decided to merge into one. Under the 
chairmanship of Eali Vadapalli, a state-level conference was organised in Secunderabad 
in 1958, where the merger of the two branches was formalised. The new party was named 
as the Andhra Pradesh Republican Party of India. In the same conference, B V 
                                                 
575 ‘Statistical Report on General Election, 1951 to the Legislative Assembly of Hyderabad, Election 
Commission of India, New Delhi, http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/SE_1951/StatRep_51_HBD.pdf, 
accessed 19 December 2007.  
576 Interview with Ganumala Gnaneswar, General Secretary, RPI, Hyderabad, 26 Feb. 2005. 
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Ramanaiah from East Godavari and J. Eswaribai from Hyderabad were elected as the 
party president and general secretary respectively. Some of the prominent Dalit leaders 
that took part in the conference were: Bojja Appala Swamy, Subbarao, Lakshmi 
Narayana and Konda Surya Prakasarao.577  
 
It may be recalled from Chapter One that during the early 1960’s the RPI initiated nation-
wide demonstrations with ten demands, including land to the tiller, distribution of waste 
and idle land to the landless labourer and full implementation of the Minimum Wages 
Act of 1948. The RPI branch in AP also organised a number of demonstrations in front of 
the Legislative Assembly and offices of the District Collectors (Magistrates). Several 
party workers and supporters courted police arrests during those demonstrations. The 
Congress-led government in the state did not concede to any of the RPI’s demands. Yet, 
the RPI gained respect in the political domain; particularly the Dalit constituency 
recognised it as the party with “some substance” and a “committed leadership for the 
welfare of the downtrodden”.578 The successful organisation of mass demonstrations 
resulted in newfound confidence among the RPI leadership, and with that new confidence 
they contested in eleven reserved seats in the 1967 assembly elections. Although many of 
the candidates lost their deposits, the party did win in two reserved (SC) seats (B. V. 
Ramanaiah from Amalapuram constituency and J. Eswaribai from Yellareddy 
constituency).579    
 
Of all the forty Dalit MLAs in the 1967-1972 Assembly,580 only the two RPI candidates 
were assertive in voicing Dalits’ concerns in the Assembly. Some of the demands placed 
by the RPI MLAs were: declaring Ambedkar’s birthday as a state holiday, an increase in 
the wages of agricultural labourers, and housing facilities and employment opportunities 
                                                 
577 Narasimharao, M.L. 1994. Sahasamoorthi: J. Eswaribai (Life History of J. Eswaribai), Secunderabad: 
SJES Trust, p.30.   
578 Interview with Bojja Tarakam, President, RPI, Hyderabad, 27 Feb. 2005.  
579 See Statistical Reports of Assembly Elections (Andhra Pradesh for 1962, 1967 and 1972 elections), 
Election Commission of India. http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp, accessed 19 
December, 2007. The RPI lost in all the eighteen seats it contested in 1962 assembly elections, and again in 
all the nine seats in 1972 assembly elections.   
580 The distribution of Dalit MLAs during the 1967-72 Assembly were: Indian National Congress (INC) – 
24; Swatantra Party – 7; RPI – 2, CPI – 2, CPI(M) -1, and Independents: 4.  
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for the Dalits and other marginalised sections.581 On a number of occasions the RPI 
leaders have also questioned the government on its indifference to the mounting atrocities 
against the Dalits, and its lack of sincerity in the distribution of land to the landless. To 
give one such example, in July 1968, questioning the government for delay in the 
distribution of government land to the Dalits and backward classes, Eswaribai asked: 
“Thousands of acres of banjaar lands were available in every village. Once in a while the 
Honourable Minister for Revenue announces that the government is distributing those 
lands to the Harijans and other poor people. But so far he has never informed the 
assembly the details of the distribution.  Whenever we raise the issue, the Minister always 
finds some other excuse to not reveal the details. We demand that the government should 
immediately release the details of land distribution in every Taluk. …Most of the lands 
that were distributed among the Harijans were unsuitable for cultivation.”582  
 
Besides the political activity, the RPI leadership also started a newspaper and a 
fortnightly in order to spread the ideas and ideals of Ambedkar. In 1972, Ramanaiah 
started ‘Republican Jyothi’ – a fortnightly, and ‘Jai Bheem Patrika’ under the editorship 
of B. H. Tirupathi. They have also established the Ambedkar Memorial Society in 
Hyderabad. The Society sponsored translation of some of the major works of Ambedkar, 
including the ‘Annihilation of Caste’.   
 
Although the RPI’s activism both inside and outside the Assembly was impressive, it was 
short-lived. By the early 1970’s there was steep decline within the party, and by the mid-
seventies the party became almost non-functional in the state. The party’s decline was 
partly to do with the functioning of the RPI in Maharashtra as well as the change in the 
interests of the local leaders. First, much to the chagrin of the Dalits, the RPI in 
Maharashtra entered into an electoral alliance with the Congress in the 1976 elections 
which became the starting point for future splits within RPI. It was the Dalits who were 
not in favour of the alliance with the Congress who organised themselves under the 
leadership of B.D. Khobragade. The AP branch rejected the RPI-Congress alliance and 
                                                 
581 See Bhaskar Rao, N. 1968. The Politics of Leadership in an Indian State: Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada: 
Bharat Publications, pp: 60-64.  
582 Narasimharao, M.L. 1994. Sahasamoorthi…, pp: 46-47.  
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declared Khobragade as its national leader.583 But the Dalit supporters in the state were 
disappointed not just with RPI’s alliance with the Congress (their main enemy both in the 
national and state politics), but also with the constant splits within the party. Second, the 
Congress government used every possible means to dissolve the RPI in the state. For 
instance, during the early 1970’s it consistently used police force against the RPI 
leadership and its activists.584 Finally, we mentioned that Easwaribai, with her activities 
both outside and inside the assembly, became the face of the RPI in the state. But she was 
attracted to the separate Telanaga statehood in 1970’s and diverted her attention from RPI 
to the activities of the ‘Telangana Praja Samithi’. With her departure the party lost its 
credibility among the Dalits and by the mid-1970’s, the party workers began to join other 
political outfits, especially the CPI (ML), and some others, including the Dalit youth who 
began to mobilise under the banner of the Ambedkar Yuvajana Sangam (Ambedkar’s 
Youth Association).  
 
6. ID. The Ambedkar Yuvajana Sangams:585  After the decline of the RPI, its activists, 
especially the young Dalits rallied around the leadership of Bojja Tarakam.  Tarakam, 
who was an advocate in the AP High Court, had a political background. His father, Bojja 
Appalaswamy, was one of the SCF leaders in coastal Andhra, and was elected twice from 
Amalapuram constituency in East Godavari district in 1951 and 1955. Tarakam was 
‘disappointed and annoyed’ with the functioning of the RPI in Maharashtra and the 
decline of the party in the state. But he did not want the decline of the RPI to mean the 
end of Ambedkarism and Ambedkarites’ activities in the state. With a strong motive to 
continue with their activities and to spread Ambedkarism particularly among the Dalit 
youth, in 1971 Tarakam started Ambedkar Yuvajana Sangam in Nizamabad district in 
Telangana region. 586   
 
                                                 
583 Narasimharao. M.L. 1994. Sahasamoorthi…, pp: 30-31.  
584 Ratnam, K.Y. 2008. The Dalit Movement…,p.16. 
585 Some of the information in this section is, apart from other sources, also drawn from Tukaram, 
Bhakta.1992. Andhra Pradesh-lo Dalita Udyamam – Oka Pariseelana (Dalit Movement in Andhra Pradesh), 
Nalupu, 4 (2), pp: 4-7.  
586 Interview with Bojja Tarakam, Hyderabad, 26 Feb. 2005.  
283 
 
One of the initial activities of the Sangam was to organise the beedi workers for 
minimum wages in Nizamabad district.  A majority of the Dalits and other marginalised 
sections in Nizamabad were beedi workers.587 Despite consistent demands from the 
workers, the upper caste owners of the beedi factories denied minimum wages. The 
Sangam organised several demonstrations in front of the taluk offices and before the 
office of the district collector for twenty-five days. On the twenty-six day, the 
government conceded the demands of the Sangam and agreed to take measures for the 
proper implementation of the ‘Beedi and Cigar Workers Act’. Soon news of the success 
of the Sangam spread to other districts in the state and Dalit youth invited Tarakam to 
launch branches of the Sangam in their respective districts. At the beginning of the 
1980’s every district had a branch of the Sangam.   
 
The 1980 decade in AP, as elsewhere in India, started with increased upper caste violence 
(more on this below) and caste-based discrimination and humiliation of the Dalits.588 
What is important to note here is that it was not just the ordinary Dalits who were 
subjected to upper caste violence and humiliation, even the Dalit politicians were also 
subjected to the same treatment. For instance, Masala Veeranna, a Congress Dalit MLA 
was denied entry into temples in the state.589 Angered by this instance the Sangam 
initiated public action in the form of demonstrations against the upper caste Congress 
leaders and the police for their inaction. The Sangam also wanted to use the occasion to 
inform the public, especially the Dalit public about the casteist and undemocratic attitude 
of the upper caste politicians, the nexus between the upper castes and the police. In 1982, 
the Sangam observed the two national days, Independence Day and Republic Day as 
Black Days. On the eve of the celebrations of those two occasions, the Sangam members 
expressed their protests by wearing black shirts and hoisting black flags throughout the 
state.590   
 
                                                 
587 It appears Tarakam was first approached by Dalit youth from Nizamabad and invited to start a youth 
association. Interview with Pratap in Hyderabad, 28 Feb. 2005.   
588 See Human Rights Watch. 1999. Broken People: Caste Violence against India’s “Untouchables”, New 
York: Human Rights Watch.  
589 See Ratnam, Y. K. 2008. The Dalit Movement…, p. 17.  
590 According to Eenadu, a Telugu newspaper (27 January, 1982), some 50,000 Dalits with black flags were 
gathered near Ambedkar’s statue in Hyderabad against the Congress government.  
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These public demonstrations and activism apart, the Sangam took certain measures 
towards spreading Ambedkar ideas and ideals among the Dalits in the state.  First, the 
Sangam, along with the Scheduled Castes Employees’ Welfare Association, started night 
schools for the slum dwellers in Hyderabad and Secunderabad.  According to J. B. Raju, 
a member of the Sangam, over a period of five years nearly 220 people benefited from 
the night schools.591  Secondly, they restarted Jai Bheem Patrika. P.V. Rao, who later on 
became the president of the Mala Mahanadu, was its editor. Under a new column called 
Raktaasruvulu (Tears of blood) in the Patrika, he chronicled the atrocities against the 
Dalits. Bojja Tarakam contributed several articles, in which he exposed how the upper 
castes and their politicians had been using the state machinery both to perpetuate their 
domination and to marginalise the Dalits. Thirdly, the Sangam initiated installation of 
Ambedkar statues in every village, town and district headquarters.  While in the villages 
and towns the statues were installed in Dalit localities, in the district headquarters they 
were installed in the main centres. These statues were, as Ratnam pointed out, “intended 
to create a strong effect not only on the Dalits but on every onlooker, reminding them of 
Ambedkar’s three mottos: ‘educate, agitate, and organise’.”592 It should also be noted 
here that the installation of Ambedkar statues in the city’s main centres signifies the 
consciousness of Dalits about their right to share public space along with the caste- 
Hindus.  
 
To conclude our discussion, in this section I have made an attempt to examine the Dalit 
relationship with two of the upper castes-based dominant political parties in the State, the 
Congress and the Communist Party, and their socio-political activities since the formation 
of AP. Congress had been the major beneficiary of the facility of political representation 
for Dalits, and used the Dalit leaders, especially Damodaram Sanjeevaiah to avert 
political conflict between its two powerful factions. But it neither addressed the question 
of caste nor used its political power to ameliorate the impoverished socio-economic 
conditions of the Dalits. In fact, it used political power to destroy the Dalit-based RPI. 
The Communist Party also used the Dalits and their political representation to its 
                                                 
591 My interview with J. B. Raju, Hyderabad, 22 December, 2005.  
592 Ratnam, K.Y. 2008. The Dalit Movement …, p.17.  
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advantage, despite mouthing worthy slogans.  It did accept the existence of caste, yet it 
did not want to fight against the system of caste for ‘tactical’ reasons.  In other words, 
both the parties took advantage of Dalits, yet they used political power and party space to 
marginalise the Dalits. The Dalits tried to organise themselves outside these two political 
parties, through RPI and later through Ambedkar Yuvajana Sangams. Through these 
platforms the Dalit leadership tried to voice Dalit concerns and problems.  Although in 
the initial stages they seemed to make a mark, in the long run they could not sustain their 
activism due to strong opposition by the ruling Congress party, and also due to lack of 
material resources.  But what were their concerns and activities in the 1980’s, particularly 
after the emergence of Telugu Desam Party in the state’s political arena?  We shall 
examine this question in the next section.   
 
6. II. Against Brahmanism and Domination: The APDMS  
Two significant events that took place in the early 1980’s in AP were the formation of the 
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the emergence of the Andhra Pradesh Dalit Maha Sabha 
(APDMS). The TDP emerged from among the Kammas, the APDMS came from among 
the Dalits; while the former questioned the political domination of the Reddy’s,593 the 
latter questioned the socio-economic and political domination of the upper castes. 
Further, these formations not only defined the politics and Dalit activism in the state 
during the 1980’s and ’90s but continued to shape them as well, even today.  Although 
caste biases and the question of domination are at the base of these two formations, they 
neither represented one social base nor belonged to one stream of thought. Indeed, they 
represented two opposing social bases - upper and lower layers in the hierarchical social 
structure - and two ever conflicting and never converging streams of thought – 
Brahmanism and Ambedkarism.  
 
In Chapter Three we noted that Dalit activism emerged in the 1970’s from the context of 
the social oppression suffered by them in the hands of the upper castes. We have also 
noted that in order to arrest the emerging Dalit consciousness, the upper castes mobilised 
                                                 
593 Neither NTR, the founder of the TDP, nor any other leader of the TDP used the language of ‘Reddy 
domination’. It had been articulated as ‘Congress Rule’, ‘Congress Domination’.  See Prasanna K.A. 1994. 
Caste and Political Leadership. In: Prasanna K. A. ed., Andhra Pradesh….   
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en masse and committed atrocities against the Dalits indiscriminately. In their response 
against the upper castes’ deployment of caste, the Dalits also deployed caste as the basis 
for their mobilisation. In a way, caste had become a focal point around which the 
atrocities were organised and mobilisations against them were initiated. During that 
period we also witnessed a similar phenomenon in AP. The two dominant castes in the 
state – the Kammas and Reddys – organised two most brutal massacres against the two 
Dalit castes – the Madigas and Malas – in Karamchedu on July 17, 1985 and Chunduru 
on August 6, 1991, respectively. Against this upper caste carnage, the Dalits in the state 
organised through the Andhra Pradesh Dalit Maha Sabha (APDMS), and between 1985 
and 1993 they led a protracted struggle for justice and social equality; and caste had 
become the rallying point in Dalit mobilisation.  
 
During the course of the struggle, the Dalits have, by rejecting the identities imposed both 
by the Brahmanical social structure and the state in post-Independence India, and by 
claiming Dalit identity, put forward a strong critique against the ideology of Brahmanism 
and the socio-cultural domination of the upper castes. My main aim in this section is to 
examine the context of the emergence of the APDMS in the ’80s and analyse Dalit 
activism under its leadership and the Dalit critique of Brahmanism and upper caste 
domination.  I also analyse the ideology of the APDMS for a society based on equality 
and justice.  I have divided this section into three sub-sections.  While the first sub-
section examines the context of the formation of the APDMS, the second sub-section 
analyses the ideology of the APDMS; and the final sub-section is an examination of Dalit 
activism under the leadership of the APDMS.  
 
6. IIA. Carnage in Karamchedu: Context of the Formation of the APDMS: As mentioned 
above, one of the significant events that took place on the state’s political theatre was the 
formation of the TDP in March 1982.  It was founded by N.T. Ramarao, a Kamma by 
caste and a famous Telugu film actor.  Although the Kammas, along with the Reddys, 
were the main beneficiaries of the land reforms in the state and more or less equally 
represented in the Legislative Assembly, they always resented the fact that they were not 
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offered the highest political position in the state – that of the chief minister.594  But in 
other avenues, the Kammas proved to be more enterprising than the Reddy’s. They were 
in the forefront in utilising the ‘Green Revolution’ facilities. By using high-yielding 
variety seeds, chemical fertiliser and the easy availability of capital for agriculture 
through the nationalised banks, the Kammas amassed great wealth. They reinvested their 
agricultural wealth into commercial activities such as rice mills, tobacco and sugar 
production, film industry, hotels, newspapers etc. This changing economic base 
strengthened their social status and political power at the grassroots, and also helped them 
gain additional ministerial positions in the Reddy-led Congress governments. Yet, 
“Kammas continued to resent the failure of Indira Gandhi to appoint a Kamma chief 
minister in the state. Of the nine Andhra Pradesh chief ministers before Mr. N.T. Rama 
Rao, six were from the Reddy community, and none from the Kammas”.595 “The growing 
disjuncture”, as observed by Atul Kohli, “between economic power and the failure to 
capture the highest political office – with all the symbolic and the real gains – alienated 
the Kammas” from the Congress. 596 When NTR made his move from the silver screen to 
the political stage, a majority of the Kammas, irrespective of party affiliations, 
ideological differences and class positions, rallied behind him and wrested political 
power from the hands of the Reddys.597  
 
The TDP’s assumption of political power had far-reaching effects on all aspects of social 
life, particularly over the way in which the Kammas saw themselves (i.e., the self-esteem 
                                                 
594 Representation of Reddys and Kammas in the Assembly and the ministry before and after TDP came to 
power (in percentages) 
Year               Representation in Assembly  
                     ----------------------------------- 
                         Reddys                 Kammas  
Composition of Ministries 
--------------------------------- 
Reddys               Kammas 
 
1978                  24.1                      14.6 
1983                  25.9                      16.0            
27.3                    15.2 
26.7                    20.0 
 
Source: Vaugier-Chatterjee, Anne. 2009. Andhra Pradesh: A Two-Dominant Caste Socio-Political System. 
In: Kumar, Sanjay and Christophe Jaffrelot., eds., Rise of the plebians? The Changing face of Indian 
legislative assemblies. New Delhi: Routledge, pp: 277-309, cited in K C Suri., 2004. Telugu Desam Party: 
Rise and Prospects for Future. EPW, passim 2, p.1490.  
595 Kohli, Atul. 1991. Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability. Cambridge: 
CUP, p. 67.   
596 Kohli, Atul. 1988. The NTR Phenomenon in Andhra Pradesh: Political Change in a South Indian State.  
Asian Survey, 28(10), p. 996. 
597 Gundimeda, S. 2009. Dalits, Praja Rajyam Party and Caste Politics in AP. EPW, 44(21), p. 53.  
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of the Kammas) and their relations with the Dalits. Their newly assumed political power 
added to their already existing social dominance and economic power. It was, in fact, as 
observed by Padmarao, strengthened the caste arrogance of the Kammas, and “almost 
every Kamma in the state virtually felt that ‘the Kamma state’ (Kamma rajyam) had been 
established.”598  With the state power in their hands, the Kammas in the rural areas began 
to harass Dalits, Adivasis and other marginalised sections. Particularly the Kamma youth 
pestered the young Dalit girls and women for sexual favours. When they were rejected, 
the youth would go to the extent of going directly to the houses of the girls and raping 
them right in front of the eyes of the parents or husbands. For instance, in Karamchedu 
village, prior to the Kammas’ massacre of the Madigas, Venkatesh, a Kamma man, 
directly went to the house of Tirupataiah, who belongs to Erukula (Adivasi) community, 
and raped his young daughter. When Tirupataiah went to lodge a case against the Kamma 
man, the police refused to file the case.599 It was in the context of the amalgamation of 
social power with political power that the Kammas organised the carnage in Karamchedu 
village.    
 
Karamchedu is a very prosperous village located 7 km from the busy commercial town of 
Chirala in Prakasam district. The total population of the village in the 1980’s was around 
13,600, of which the Kammas comprised 6,000. The two Dalits castes: Madigas and 
Malas, constituted the next major castes with a population of 1,100 and 900 respectively. 
Among the rest, Upparas, Dasus and Muslims were quite significant in number. The total 
cultivable land in the village was 9,000 acres. Most of this land was owned and 
controlled by the Kammas, who also owned another 2,000 acres in neighbouring villages. 
Benefiting from the paddy and tobacco cultivation, the Kammas, since the early 1970’s, 
diversified their wealth into business, rice mills, contracts, transport operation and film 
production. A significant proportion of the Kamma farmers regularly migrated to far-off 
districts in the state and even to neighbouring states. They had a significant presence in 
Karimnagar and Nizamabad districts in Telangana region and Bellary district in 
                                                 
598 Katti, Padmarao. 2005. Karamchedu O Charitraka Malaupu (Karamchedu: A Historical Turn). In: 
Sambasivarao, U. ed., Dalita Rana-ninaadam (Battle Cry of the Dalits), Hyderabad: Edureeta Publications, 
pp: 2-9.  
599 Interview with Koti James, a Dalit leader in Chirala 13 January 2005.   
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Karnataka, where they cultivated tobacco, cotton and other commercial crops on leased 
or purchased land.600  
                             Table 6.5: Percentage of Scheduled Caste Population in AP 
Year Population (in M) Percent in Total Population 
1961 4.9 13.8 
1971 5.8 13.3 
1981 7.9 14.9 
1991 10.6 15.9 
2001 12.3 16.2 
Source: Human Development Report 2007: Andhra Pradesh. Hyderabad: Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, p. 132. 
 
                      Table 6.6: Principal Sources of livelihood among the SCs in AP 
Sector HH Type 1993-94 2004-05 
 
 
Rural 
SENA 5.9 7.5 
AL 69.1 60.7 
OL 9.2 11.5 
SEA 11.8 11.6 
Others 4.0 7.5 
Total 100 100 
 
Urban 
SE 20.0 24.5 
RW/SE 48.6 40.1 
CL 26.8 28.9 
Others 4.7 6.5 
Total 100 100 
               Note: SENA – Self-employed in non-agriculture; AL – Agriculture labour;                                                            
               OL-Other labour; SEA – Self-employed in agriculture; SE- Self-employed;  
               RW/SE – Regular wage or salaried; CL- Casual labour. 
Source: Human Development Report 2007: Andhra Pradesh. Hyderabad: Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, p. 136. 
 
The economic condition of the Dalits, who comprised the bulk of the agricultural labour 
force, contrasted sharply with the Kammas. Indeed, it was not just the case of the Dalits 
in Karamchedu. As reflected in the above table, more than 60 percent of the Dalits in the 
state had been agricultural labourers. While the annual payment for a paleru (farm 
servant) was just Rs. 2000, the daily wages paid to male and female agricultural labourers 
were Rs.10-12 and Rs.6-8, respectively. These wages were much lower than the 
minimum wage rates legally prescribed. Over the course of time, some of the Dalits, 
especially the Madigas, improved their economic condition by cultivating the land of the 
Kammas as tenants. Their changed economic situation allowed the Madigas to send their 
children to schools and by the early 1980’s some of the youth acquired jobs outside the 
agricultural sector. The changed economic circumstances and education among the 
                                                 
600 Murali, K. 1995. Upper Caste Violence on Dalits: Case Studies of Karamchedu and Chundur 
Massacres. M.Phil. University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.  
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Madigas gave them self-respect and made them socially conscious. They began to 
question the practice of untouchability and sexual exploitation of their women by the 
Kammas. In the backdrop of this questioning, the emergence of the TDP was seen as an 
opportunity both by the Madigas and Kammas. The former saw the party as “a clear 
Kamma party”,601 and felt the need to stand up against the emerging political power of 
the Kammas, and the latter saw it as the harbinger of their political domination, a 
domination that perpetuated their already existing social dominance.  
 
Until the formation of TDP, the political contest in Karamchedu had been organised 
within the Congress Party (I).602 But with the birth of the TDP, the scenario underwent a 
major change, wherein the Kammas in the village, as elsewhere in the state, shifted their 
loyalties to the TDP, while the Madigas continued allying with the Congress. The 
Kammas did not expect that, as they thought the Madigas whose economic survival 
depended on them, would simply listen to them. This led to some tension but did not 
escalate into a major conflict. Yet, as observed by Srinivasulu, “it caused sufficient injury 
to the cultivated pride of the dominant Kamma caste”.603  After the 1983 Assembly 
election the Kammas in the village were waiting for a pretext for retaliation and that 
pretext was a trivial incident that happened on July 16, 1985.  
 
At about 3.30pm on July 16, a Kamma youth bathed his buffalo on the steps of the water 
tank that belonged to the Dalits. He sullied the water in the tank which was the source of 
drinking water for the Dalits in the village.  Watching this was a lame Madiga boy who 
immediately objected to the act.  The Kamma youth reacted angrily to that and whipped 
the Madiga boy with a cattle leash. A young Madiga woman, Suvaratha, who had come 
to fetch water from the tank, protested when she saw the Madiga boy being whipped. 
When the arrogant Kamma youth turned to beat her as well, she retaliated by threatening 
to throw the water pot at him.. This act of courage by a Madiga woman infuriated the 
                                                 
601 My interviews with the survivors of Karamchedu massacre, Chirala 23 January 2005.  
602 Incidentally, until the early 70s the Kammas in the village were strong supporters of the Communist 
parties. See Ajay, Gudavarthy. 2005. Dalit and Naxalite Movements in AP: Solidarity or Hegemony?, 
EPW, pp: 5410-5418. 
603 Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class…., , p. 38.  
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Kamma youth, but he could not do anything as another Madiga man had come to their 
rescue.604      
 
The Kammas in the village, instead of rebuking the youth from their community for his 
misbehaviour with the Madigas, turned their ire against the woman for taking on a 
member of their fold. “Why do we call ourselves superior if we cannot teach these 
Madigas a lesson and put them in their place,”605  was the general reaction of the 
Kammas. The news of their humiliation at the hands of the Madigas spread through the 
Kamma community in the neighbouring villages and they were asked to join hands to 
avenge the humiliation.”606 More than 200 Kammas gathered from seven neighbouring 
villages, and an attack was meticulously planned and executed on the morning of July 17. 
It was stated that the attack was planned by Daggubati Chenchu Ramaiah, father of N.T. 
Ramarao’s son-in-law Daggubati Venkateswararao.607 Armed with axes, crowbars, spears 
and clubs, the Kamma mob attacked the Madigapalle (Madiga locality) from all 
directions. They took revenge in the most debased and brutal form by smashing the heads 
of the Madigas with axes, breaking their limbs, digging spears into their groins and 
pushing sticks into female genitals.608   
 
Apart from the Karamchedu carnage, several other assaults were organised by the upper 
castes against the Dalits in the state in the 1980’s and ’90s. In fact, the period 1983-91, 
for which there is detailed information, saw regular attacks on the Dalits. The following 
Table illustrates the point in question: 
 
 
 
                                                 
604 Fact Finding Team (1985) Karamchedu. Salaha: Hyderabad, p.5.  
605 Katti, Padmarao. 2005. Karamchedu: A Historical Turn…, p.4.  
606 Interview with Padmarao, Venkatasubbaiah, Ponnuru, 26 January 2005.  
607 Daggubati Chenchu Ramaiah was one of the key accused in the massacre, and subsequent to the 
massacre he was killed by People’s War Group. See, ‘SC convicts 31 in Karamchedu Dalit massacre’, 
Times of India, (Hyderabad), 20 December, 2008.  
608 My interview with Koti James, Dalit activist, Chirala, 24 January 2005. See also, Balagopal, K. 1987. 
Karamchedu: Second Anniversary. EPW, 22 (33), pp: 1378-1381.  
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Table 6.7: Major incidences of violence against Dalits during 1983-91609 
Place of occurrence Date of 
occurrence 
Nature of the incident 
Padirikuppam (Chittor) 5 January 1983 Four Dalits killed and 80 families rendered homeless 
following an attack by upper caste TDP supporters 
Karamchedu (Prakasam)  17 July 1985 Six Dalits killed and three dalit women raped in a mass 
assault by hundreds of upper caste men of the Kamma 
caste 
Hasnanpur (Adilabad) 13 June 1985, 
 8 July 1985 
Reddy landlords, closely related to the Adilabad MLA 
killed two youth of the Dhobi and Barber castes on two 
days respectively, for refusing to procure a prostitute on 
their demand  
Avdhapur (Medak  17 January 1986 Landlords belonging to the TDP set fire to 30 houses of 
Dalits  
Neerukonda (Guntur) 15 July 1987 One elderly Dalit man murdered in a mob attack by men 
of the Kamma caste 
Gudiada (Vizianagaram) 15 July 1987 One Dalit labourer killed in a dispute over a small patch 
of tank-bed land by a mob of backward caste farmers led 
by upper caste (Rajus) Congress party leader  
Chirala (Prakasam) 13 August 1987 A principal witness in the Karamchedu violence was 
murdered by the Karamchedu killers  
Dontali (Nellore) 27 August 1987 One person of a backward caste was killed in an assault 
by a gang of upper caste men 
Bandilapalli (Nellore) 27 August 1987 Four Dalits beaten and stabbed to death in an assault by 
a group of upper caste men 
Kodavatikallu  2 February 1988 Dalit labourer murdered by a landlord 
Beernakallu (Nellore) 19 January 1989 A Dalit deputy-president of the village killed by TDP 
landlord  
Gokarajupalli  16 January 1989 A Dalit labourer killed by a landlord  
Tangutur (Prakasham) 3 March 1989 A Dalit woman raped and burnt to death by an upper 
caste TDP strongman  
Jabbergudem (Ranga 
Reddy) 
27 April 1989 One Dalit killed in a mass assault by the henchmen of a 
TDP landlord  
Pippara (West Godavari) 4 June 1989 One Dalit killed in a mass assault by upper caste men led 
by village deputy- president  
Kanchikacherla (Krishna) 19 March 1990 Dalit farm servant killed by the youth from a landlord’s 
family 
Gutlapadu (West Godavari) 19 May 1990 Two Dalits killed in a mass assault by forward caste men 
Kothapulavandla Palli 
(Ananthapur) 
6 June 1990 A Dalit burnt alive by upper caste men  
Chillakallu (Krishna) 28 November 
1990 
A Dalit SI of Police shot himself dead due to casteist 
harassment from the CI 
Moodurallapalli (Karnool) 18 March 1991 A Dalit labourer beaten and stabbed to death by a mob 
of upper caste men 
Timmasamudram 
(Prakasham) 
January 1991 Dalits driven out of the village by an attack of forward 
caste men owing allegiance to a TDP leader  
Chundur (Guntur) 6 August 1991 At least 8 and up to 20 Dalits killed in a mass assault by 
forward caste men of six villages.  
Gokarajupalli (Krishna) 3 August 1991 Dalit labourer killed by upper castes.  
                                                 
609 Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, 1991, cited in Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class…., p. 43; 
also see Balagopal, K. 1991. Post-Chundur & Other Chundurs. EPW, 26 (42), pp: 2399-2401 + 2403-2405.  
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The Dalits’ response against the Karamchedu massacre, which was unprecedented in the 
history of the state, was spontaneous. Thousands of Dalits from all over the state gathered 
in the nearby town of Chirala, to which the victims of the carnage had fled. In Chirala, 
the ‘All India Dalits Co-ordination Committee on Karamchedu’, was immediately 
constituted under the leadership of Katti Padmarao and Bojja Tarakam. These two leaders 
were well known and respected in their own right over years, and they took the lead in 
fighting against the Karamchedu carnage. Padmarao, a Mala by caste, was a Sanskrit 
lecturer in a college in Guntur district. He belonged to the tradition of organised 
rationalism that had long been a significant movement in South India. At the time of the 
Karamchedu incident, Padmarao was one of the leading rationalists in coastal Andhra, 
and within the rationalist movement, he was a spokesman for the Marxist approach to the 
criticism of religion.610 Tarakam, as mentioned earlier, was a government lawyer and was 
the founder of the Ambedkar Yuvajana Sangams.  Earlier he was closely associated with 
the Communist movement, and for some time he was an activist in Virasam (the 
Revolutionary Writers’ Association of AP).611 Soon after the massacre, Tarakam resigned 
his lawyer’s job and Padmarao, more or less, suspended his teaching activities. They 
organised the victims of the carnage, who refused to go back to their village, and built a 
colony for them in Chirala. Gradually, the protest against the carnage built itself up into a 
movement - the APDMS - whose formation on September 1, 1985 in Chirala was 
attended by about 300,000 Dalits and sympathisers.612  
 
In the first APDMS convention at Tenali on February 16 and 17, 1986, Katti Padmarao 
and Bojja Tarakam were elected as general secretary and president, respectively.613 
Under their leadership the APDMS mobilised not only the Dalits, but also the other 
marginalised sections, especially the Adivasis, the lower Shudra castes (the Most 
Backward Castes [MBCs]), and women of all castes and communities, against the caste-
based violence and discrimination.  With the aim of achieving social equality and social 
                                                 
610 My interview with Padmarao, Lumbinivanam, Ponnuru, 21 January 2005.  
611 My interview with Tarakam, Hyderabad, 29 January 2005.   
612 Balagopal, K. 1987. Karamchedu…, p.1378.    
613 It may be mentioned here that the stage on the APDMS’s formation day was kept exclusively for the 
Dalits.  No one from the upper caste backgrounds, however sympathetic to the Dalits, was allowed to share 
the dais. At this point of time the Dalits did not want any upper caste person to speak on their behalf; they 
expressed the confidence that they could manage on their own.  See Ratnam, Y.K., 2008. Op. cit., p. 21.  
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justice for the marginalised, the APDMS mounted a strong critique of Brahmanism and 
domination of the upper castes. Also, drawing from the philosophies of Charvakas, 
Buddhist Sangha dharma and indigenous socio-cultural movements such as the Bhakti 
movements, and by synthesising the ideologies of Marxism and Ambedkarism, the 
APDMS offered alternatives in the socio-cultural domains.  In the rest of the section I 
focus upon the ideology and activism of the APDMS.  
 
6. IIB. Ideology of the APDMS:  In February 1986, the APDMS held its first state-level 
conference in Tenali town (Guntur district).  In this conference, it launched, ‘the Dalit 
Manifesto’, in which it took up issues with various political parties, especially with the 
Congress and Communists, for their evasion of the caste question. It also spelled out the 
objectives of the Dalit struggle and strategies to be employed in order to achieve those 
objectives. Since then the Manifesto had become not just an ideological bible for the 
movement, but also a lighthouse that guided Dalit activism. I attempt to engage with the 
three major aspects of the Manifesto: (1) Dalits and political parties, (2) Identity, and (3) 
Objectives of the Dalit movement. In this engagement, apart from the text of the 
Manifesto, I have drawn from various arguments put forward by the Dalits, arguments 
that appeared in their writings,614and also from the debates and discussions that have 
taken place around these arguments. 
    
(a) Dalits and Political Parties: The two main political parties targeted in the Manifesto 
were Congress and Communists.  Taking up issues with the Congress, the Manifesto 
observed that during the colonial period, the sudden concern of the Congress for the 
Dalits in the name of Harijans was the result of Ambedkar’s demand for the Dalits’ share 
in the emerging political power. Instead of giving their due share, “Gandhi’s Congress 
transformed them from being social servants to political servants through the Poona 
Pact”615 In this way, the Congress merely evaded caste questions, and more importantly, 
                                                 
614See, for instance, Padmarao, K. 1990. Kulam Punadulu (Foundations of Caste). Ponnuru: Lokayata;..., 
1992. Kulam-Pratyamnyaa samskruti (Caste and Alternative Culture). Ponnuru: Lokayata; Kancha, Ilaiah. 
1989. Kula Nirmulana – Marxist Drukapatham (Caste Annihilation and Marxist Perspective). Hyderabad: 
HBT; Bojja, Tarakam. 1996. Kulam – Vargam (Caste and Class), Hyderabad: HBT; Devarapalli, M., 1997. 
Dalita Dasabdam (Decade of Dalits), Ponnuru: Lokayata.  
615 ‘Dalit Maha Sabha Dalita Manifesto’, in Sambasivarao, U. ed., 2005. Dalita Rana…, p.13. 
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destroyed the emerging independent leadership among the Dalits. The Manifesto further 
pointed out that in post-Independence India the socio-economic betterment measures 
espoused by the Congress for the Dalits, were undertaken not with the intention of 
transforming their socio-economic conditions but with an aim to grab the votes. 
“Whatever its aim”, it was further criticised, “those measures, especially land 
distribution, land reforms Act, minimum wages Act  and abolition of Untouchability – all 
remained paper tigers and were never implemented honestly.”616  
 
One charge levelled against the Communists was their negligence of the social 
inequalities suffered by the Dalits.  The Manifesto points out: “For them (the 
Communists) the class is the base. Changes in the economic structure automatically result 
in changes in the social structure.” This argument, the Manifesto stated, can be said to be 
true in the western society, but cannot be true in the Indian context, where caste is the 
foundation. “The sheer negligence of the caste factor by the Communists was simply 
because its leadership came from the upper castes”.617 If the Communists, it was argued, 
want to bring any changes in the economic structure, then they should have started with 
the social structure.   
 
(b) Identity: Since the formation of the ‘All-India Dalits’ Co-ordination Committee on 
Karamchedu’ that was constituted in the Chirala Shibiram, both Tarakam and Padmarao 
– the two main leaders of the APDMS - urged all the Dalits to give up their caste-based 
identities, such as Madigas, Malas, Rellis and other imposed identities such as Harijan, 
and Scheduled Castes, and take up the Dalit identity. The uniform Dalit identity was not 
only to forge unity among the lower castes, as a people that belonged to one community, 
it was also to reject the identities that were imposed on them by the Brahmanical society 
and its ideologues, especially Gandhi. “The claiming of Dalit identity”, as stated by 
Padmarao, “was a symbolic rejection of the upper castes authority over them.”618    
 
                                                 
616 Ibid., pp: 13-14.  
617 Ibid., p.14.  
618 Interview with Katti Padmarao, Ponnuru, 22 January 2005.  
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Although at the time of the Chirala Shibiram the term Dalit was narrowly defined to 
incorporate the Scheduled Castes, at the time of the first state-level Dalit conference, the 
APDMS leadership expanded the boundaries to welcome all the marginalised sections 
under the Dalit nomenclature. Such a shift was reflected in the broader redefinition of the 
term Dalit in the Manifesto: 
All those people who have been victims of social oppression for centuries are Dalits. 
Dalits are not those people that belonged to one particular caste or religion….The slaves 
who were oppressed by their masters in slavery, the agricultural labourer and landless 
labourer oppressed by their feudal lords, the workers oppressed by the capitalists, and 
those people who are victims of social oppression in the caste system – all are Dalits.619  
 
It is clear from the above definition that the Manifesto reflects the influence of Marxism, 
and that ‘caste’ not ‘class’ has been taken as the central focus of the movement. Of 
course, that does not mean that the APDMS was not going to take the caste factor into 
account.  In fact, what it did was simply to add the category ‘caste-oppressed’ into the 
category of ‘class-oppressed’, and thus tried to expand the boundary of the latter.  In 
other words, the broader definition of the term Dalit reflects that unlike the Communist 
leaders who come mainly from the Brahmin, Kamma, Reddy and other upper caste 
backgrounds and who are generally considered pseudo-Marxists by the Dalits and those 
oppressed in Indian society - the Dalit leadership tried to strike a balance between the 
Marxist and Dalit perspectives. That is to say, while the Marxist perspective with its 
central focus on class aims at ending class exploitation by paving the way for the 
annihilation of class only, the Dalit objective, on the other hand, was annihilation of 
caste. But in Indian society we have both class-based as well as caste-based oppression, 
and the fight against these two forms of oppression cannot be exclusive to each other. It 
is precisely what the Manifesto tried to do - blend the questions of caste and class. 
Reflecting on this Padmarao observes:  
If the Dalit movement has a caste(ist) perspective, it would instead of doing well, in fact, do harm. 
The movement should bring about a social revolution and incite casteism. In the process of 
resolving social contradictions, we must formulate a class perspective; those who want to destroy 
caste would not hang on to caste.  To annihilate caste, the existence of caste should only be 
recognised.620  
 
                                                 
619 ‘Dalita Maha Sabha Dalita Manifesto’…p.11.  
620 Katti Padmarao, quoted in quoted in Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class…, p. 46. 
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In conformity with this position the manifesto argued that the Dalit movement was a 
movement for land and livelihood (boomi kosam, bhukthi kosam), and should learn from 
the oppressed people’s history of struggle.  Further, it has also been stated that to 
understand the oppressed class, it is necessary to understand the theories of social 
revolutions and apply them to contemporary society. This could be read as a clear 
reference to the thought of Karl Marx. It thus said: “the theories, struggle sand practice of 
Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar must be breathed into the movement. At 
the same time the class struggle theory which has emancipated the oppressed of the world 
must be balanced with.” 621 
 
(3) Objectives of the Dalit movement: The blending of the Marxist and Ambedkar 
perspectives is further reflected in the APDMS objectives that were spelled out in the 
Manifesto:  
 Annihilation of casteism  
 Removal of untouchability 
 Ending caste contradictions within the oppressed classes 
 Preparing the oppressed classes for social revolution  
 Making the cultural revolution a success 
 Continuing the struggle for nationalisation of land and property 
 Enlightening people about the exploitative policies of the ruling classes so as to advance 
people’s struggle 
 Making social revolution a success, and  
 Striving for Dalit and human rights  
 
It is clear from a cursory look at the above objectives that the Dalit leadership, in their 
attempt to blend the caste and class perspectives, was influenced by Ambedkar’s 
arguments in his highly influential work: Annihilation of Caste. By placing annihilation 
of casteism as Number One in their list of objectives, the Dalit leadership, just as 
Ambedkar did before them, were arguing in clear terms that in India no revolution is 
possible until and unless caste is annihilated. But how did they propose to annihilate 
caste? How did they propose to prepare the oppressed for Social Revolution? What did 
they mean by Cultural Revolution and how could that be achieved?  
 
                                                 
621 ‘Dalita Maha Sabha Dalita Manifesto’, p.7. 
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The second question - preparing the oppressed for a Social Revolution - is connected with 
the first question - annihilation of caste.  In a sense, we find victims of class across the 
caste hierarchy. Yet we do not find them uniting to fight against class oppression.  In fact, 
we see the class-based oppressed joining hands with the oppressor in further victimising 
the oppressed, if the latter happens to belong to the caste of the former. The carnage in 
Karamchedu amply demonstrates this point. 
 
Thus, what was preventing the oppressed from forging a united front against the 
oppressor was the caste factor, and if ‘caste’ were to be removed, then the way would be 
paved for unity among the class-based oppressed.622 But how do we remove caste? The 
Dalit leadership reiterated what Ambedkar had said:  
Caste is not a physical object like a wall of bricks or a line of barbed wire which prevents 
the Hindus from co-mingling and which has, therefore, to be pulled down. Caste is a 
notion, it is a state of mind. The destruction of Caste does not therefore mean the 
destruction of a physical barrier. It means a notional change.623 
 
Thus, for Ambedkar, and also for the APDMS, caste is not a physical objective that can 
be removed physically. It is in fact, a state of mind, whose destruction requires effecting 
changes in the way caste is understood by its practitioners. The ideas, such as purity, 
pollution, upper, lower etc., are pillars upon which the caste system has been built, and if 
those pillars are destroyed then the system automatically crumbles. And it is the Shastras 
of Hinduism that have been inculcating the ideas of caste. Therefore, “[T]he real remedy 
is to destroy the belief in the sanctity of the Shastras.”624 But how does one destroy the 
Hindus’ faith in the Shastras? Ambedkar showed the way by converting to Buddhism.  
He also urged his fellow Dalits to follow the same path for, “If the new world has to be 
realised that is very different from the old, it must have a religion and if the new world 
needs a religion far more than the old world does, then it can only be the religion of 
Buddha.”625  In other words, Ambedkar by converting to Buddhism not only wanted to 
free himself and fellow Dalits from the ideological enthral of Hinduism, but importantly, 
                                                 
622 See Tarakam, B. 1991. Dr. Ambedkar – Social Revolution (in Telugu). Nalupu, 2 (20-24), pp: 31-36. 
623 Ambedkar, B.R. 1989[1936]. Annihilation of Caste. In: Vasant Moon (com.) Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: 
Writings and Speeches, Vol. I. Bombay: Education Department, Govt. of Maharashtra, p.68.  
624 Ibid.  
625 Sangharakshita, 1986. Ambedkar and Buddhism, Glasgow…, quoted in Omvedt, Gail. 2004. Ambedkar: 
Towards…., p. 148.  
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he also aspired to construct a new society built upon the foremost Buddhist principle of 
Equality.  
 
The APDMS leaders, following Ambedkar, also opted for Buddhism.  Interestingly, they 
did not emphasise on the conversion aspect, but rather the idea of constructing an 
alternative culture. Padmarao was convinced that violence and inhumane treatment meted 
out against the Dalits and other marginalised sections in the Indian society were due to 
the hegemony of the Hindu culture.  And that culture can be changed by replacing it with 
an alternative Dalit culture, a culture that draws from Charvaka’s materialism, Buddhist 
humanism and its Sangha philosophy which recognise the fundamental ‘human equality, 
fraternity and dignity’.626  
 
6. IIC. Activism under the APDMS: As mentioned above, between 1985 and 1993, the 
APDMS mobilised the Dalits and other marginalised sections against upper caste 
atrocities and for justice and social equality.  It may be pointed out here that prior to the 
formation of the BSP, an uninterrupted Dalit activism in UP was sustained first under the 
leadership of the BAMCEF and later through the DS-4.  Dalit activism in AP, on the 
contrary, was not continuously organised. It came in waves, primarily in response to the 
atrocities against Dalits, especially in Karamchedu and Chunduru (more on the second 
given below), as well as in response to casteism articulated by the upper castes through 
the anti-reservation agitations in the early ’90’s. A lack of sustained Dalit activism was 
one of the main reasons why the Dalit movement in AP, unlike in UP, failed to transform 
itself into a political party and, thus it led to the eventual failure of Dalit politics in the 
electoral arena. My main concern in this sub-section is to examine Dalit activism after the 
Karamchedu carnage and until the entry of the BSP into AP politics in the early 1990’s.   
 
The first wave of Dalit activism took place after the Karamchedu carnage.  Immediately 
after the carnage, a majority of the Madigas from Karamchedu fled to the nearby town of 
Chirala. A church in Chirala opened its gates to the victims. But as sympathisers began 
pouring in, the victims were re-located to a different place which had famously been 
                                                 
626 See Padmarao, K. 1995. Caste and Alternative Culture. Madras: The GL Theological College, p. 143.  
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called as Shibiram (a hut or a place for gathering). An important point that needs to be 
emphasised here was the moral support that came from the other Dalit castes, especially 
from the Malas. As soon as the Dalit villagers around Chirala town came to know about 
the carnage, all the Dalits, irrespective of their individual castes, came to the Chirala 
Shibiram. One of the visitors belonging to the Mala caste emotionally stated, “[t]his 
brutality of the Kammas is not just upon the Madigas, it is upon the entire Scheduled 
Caste community.”627 This kind of identifying the victims as part of the entire SC 
community eventually resulted in the consolidation of all the individual castes as one 
group and their assertion as Dalits.  In order to look after the immediate needs of the 
victims, an ‘All-India Dalits Co-ordination Committee on Karamchedu’, under the 
leadership of Katti Padmarao, was formed.  
 
One of the first things that this Committee did was refusing to accept charity either from 
the upper castes or from the government in any form.628 “Every time the upper castes kill 
our people or rape our women, the government comes up with the offer of money as the 
solution…The government of the upper caste vultures has put a price for our lives and for 
our bodies. For the murder they give us Rs. 10,000 and for the rape Rs. 2000. No, not this 
time… We will not allow the upper caste-led government to put a price tag on our men 
and women.”629   
 
The second thing that the Dalit activists did was preventing the politicians, including the 
Dalit politicians (whom they call ‘Dalit brokers’ (Dalita dalarulu) of any party from 
entering the Shibiram. They even refused to meet chief minister N.T. Ramarao, who at 
the time of assembly elections declared himself as the ‘Harijan among Harijans’. 
Viramma, a Madiga woman, refusing to accept a basket of oranges offered by NTR said, 
“Ever since you became the chief minister of the state, every Kamma in the village 
(Karamchedu) is behaving as if they are the chief ministers.  Your relatives raped our 
women and your relatives killed our men.  Don’t you have any shame to offer us fruits? 
                                                 
627 Interview with Subbaiah, a Mala from Ponnuru on 13 December, 2005.  He was one of the first Malas 
from Ponnuru, along with Katti Padmarao, to visit the victims in Chirala.  
628 Taraka, B. 1990. July Padihedu Karamchedu (17 July Karamchedu). Nalupu, 2 (2), July 16-31, pp: 9-10.  
629 Ibid, p. 9.  
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…We do not want your fruits.  What we need is not fruits but justice…justice that is what 
we want.”630 Inspired by Padmarao’s call for, ‘one meal, one street’ (putako peata), 
Dalits in Chirala town and the nearby villages came forward and offered food both to the 
victims and the gathering.631 The Karamchedu Coordination Committee, apart from its 
immediate response of assisting victims by providing food, shelter and moral courage, 
organised several mass protest rallies, dharnas, and road blocks, with the demand of 
immediate arrest of the culprits of the carnage and justice for the victims.  
 
Owing to the massive agitations organised by the Karamchedu Coordination Committee, 
the state government, on behalf of the victims, filed a case in a district court.  Yet, it 
failed to produce the culprits in front of the Court of Justice.  One of the main reasons for 
that was, apart from the fact that the culprits were members of the Kamma caste, 
Daggubati Chenchu Ramaiah, a prime accused in the carnage was a relative of NTR. 
Chenchu Ramaiah’s son, Daggubati Venkateswarlu, was married to N.T. Ramarao’s 
daughter, Purandheswari. Against this gross injustice which was inspired by nepotism (by 
the chief minister) and casteism (of the Kammas), the APDMS filed a private case 
against 165 Kammas, including Chenchu Ramaiah.632 After Alisamma, a Madiga woman 
from Karamchedu, deposed before the court how her son (Duddu Vandanam) was axed to 
death by the Kamma mob right in front of her own eyes, the APDMS and the victims of 
the carnage were almost certain that they would get justice. But Alisamma was murdered 
by unknown people in Chirala, and after dragging the case, the Court cleared all the 
suspects. The Judicial Inquiry Commission headed by Justice Desai stated it could not 
find any clear reason as the main motive behind the massacre633  – another classic 
example of how the state and state institutions, which are dominated and controlled by 
the upper castes, can go to the extent of killing witnesses to deny justice to the Dalits.634  
                                                 
630 Karamchedu (Report on Karamchedu Carnage), Hyderabad: Hyderabad Book Trust, 1985, p.3.    
631 Interview with Padmarao, Ponnuru, 23 January 2005.   
632 Salaha, a voluntary organisation on legal matters, rendered a great help to the APDMS in filing the case 
in the Court of Justice.  
633 See Tarakam, B. 1989. Rendu Hatyalu – Rashtra Prabhutvam (Two murders and State Government), 
Nalupu, 1(6), pp: 9-10.  
634 In December 2008 the Supreme Court of India, after 23 long years, delivered its final verdict on the 
Karamchedu massacre case.  It awarded life sentences to the main accused and three years of imprisonment 
to 30 others.  ‘SC convicts 31 in Karamchedu Dalit massacre’, Times of India, (Hyderabad) 20 Dec. 2008.  
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The second wave of Dalit activism took place in 1989-90, when the Janata Dal 
government under Prime Minister V.P. Singh, announced plans to implement the Mandal 
Commission’s recommendations of OBC reservations in education and public service 
appointments.635 Inspired by the upper castes-based anti-reservation movement in 
northern India, the students from upper caste groups like Kammas, Reddy’s, Velamas, 
Brahmins, Komatis and Rajus organised themselves under the banner of the ‘Anti-
Reservations Front’ (Jana Chaitanya Samithi) against the reservations.636 Arguing that 
reservations would destroy merit, the upper caste students destroyed public property and 
burned buses, trains and government offices. They also expressed their protest by acts 
that humiliated the lower castes and their professions. For instance, the upper caste 
students sat in buses and railway stations and polished the shoes of passengers, swept 
public roads and symbolically took out a funeral procession of the ‘merit’ concept, 
conducting its last rites in a public place. By these acts, the upper caste students were 
making a point that: firstly, the lower castes were fit only to polish the shoes of the upper 
castes and clean public roads and toilets, and were not entitled to education and 
employment;  secondly, if the lower castes, who are supposed to earn their livelihood by 
serving the upper castes, take the place of the chosen people (the upper castes) in 
education and employment, then they do not have a choice but to do the jobs that were 
exclusively reserved for the lower castes; thirdly, ‘merit’ is the ‘inherited property’ of the 
upper castes,637 and that is being destroyed by the government by giving education and 
employment opportunities to the lower castes.  
 
In response, the lower caste (backward castes) students mobilised in favour of the 
reservations. Dalits and Adivasis, under the leadership of the APDMS, also joined the 
struggle for reservations. The lower castes, unlike the upper caste students, did not 
destroy buses or burn trains. They simply organised pubic hartals and dharnas.638  When 
the media, led by the upper castes, refused to report on the protests and arguments put out 
                                                 
635 For details, see Bayly, Susan. 1999. Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to 
the Modern Age. Cambridge: CUP, pp: 266-305.  
636 ‘Rejarveshan-la-pai ragada’ (Brawl over Reservations). Nalupu, 2 ( 9), September 16-30, 1990, p. 3.  
637 Ibid.   
638 See Kancha, Ilaiah. 1990. ‘Pratibha numdi praanahuti varaku’ (From Merit to Self-Immolation), Nalupu, 
October, 16-31, pp: 22-24.  
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by the pro-reservationists, the lower caste intellectuals, especially Devarapalli Mastanrao, 
Katti Padmarao, Bojja Tarakam, U.Sambasivarao, Ghanta Chakrapani, B.S. Ramulu, 
Kancha Ilaiah and others wrote extensively on reservations in journals, such as Dalit 
Rajyam, Edureeta and Nalupu.639   
 
Of the many arguments put forward by the pro-reservationists against ‘merit’ and 
‘national unity’ of the upper castes, the argument that reservations for the Dalits, 
Adivasis and other lower castes would lead to annihilation of caste is worth mentioning 
here. Kancha Ilaiah, in a brilliantly written essay, ‘Struggles of Reservations – Student 
Movement’ (Rijarveshan-la Poratam – Vidhyarthi Udyamam)640, made this point by 
examining the students’ struggles over reservations comparatively.  First, he analysed the 
intentions of the upper caste students in polishing shoes, sweeping streets and washing 
clothes. What the upper caste students were in effect saying, Ilaiah argued, was that “if 
the reservations were to be implemented then they will have to polish the shoes, broom 
the streets and clean the toilets.”641 Secondly, he brought forth the intentions of the lower 
caste students who were mobilising for reservations. What the lower caste students were 
saying was that, “hereafter they are not going to simply stick to the caste-based 
occupations imposed on them by Brahmanical Hinduism”. In a way, one of the main 
reasons for the continuation of the caste system was the continuation of caste-based 
occupations. While the upper caste students were trying to preserve that system, the 
lower caste students were determined to break it. “As long as the Brahmins continue to 
teach and as long as the Madigas continue to sew a sandal, the caste system will survive 
                                                 
639 For instance, Devarapalli, Mastanrao. 1989. Rejarveshan-lu, (Reservations), Ponnuru: Purogami 
publications; Sambasivarao, U. 1990. ‘Rijarveshan-la samasya’ (The Question of Reservations), in 
Edureeta, October, pp: 15-19; Kancha, Ilaiah. 1990. ‘Rijarveshan-lu vaddanadam samanjasamaa? (Is it 
justified to say no to reservations), Nalupu, 1 (15), pp: 14-16; -----, 1990. ‘Paranna bhukkulu pratibha 
gurimchi matladutunnayi’ (The Parasites (upper castes) are talking about Merit), Nalupu, 2 (9), September 
16-30, pp: 10-14.  Some of the progressive people from the upper castes, particularly Balagopal, K., D. 
Narasimha Reddy, Cyril Reddy and others also joined the lower castes and contributed at leanth to the 
reservation debate. See Gundimeda, S. 2006. Brahmanatva Malatvamaa…? Manavatva 
Ambedkaratvamaa…? – Vargeekarana samasya-pai charcha (Brahmanical Mala casteism or Humanitarian 
Ambedkarism? Debate on the question of Categorization), Hyderabad: Rajyam Publications.  
640 Kancha, Ilaiah. 1991. Struggles of Reservations – Student Movement (Rijarveshan-la Poratam – 
Vidhyarthi Udhyamam), Nalupu, 2 (19), March 16-31, pp: 6-9.  
641 Ibid., p.6.  
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and only perpetuate itself. The caste system can be annihilated only when the Madigas 
give up their needles for the pen.”642  
 
The Mandal episode was the one occasion where all the lower castes, irrespective of their 
caste status within their own hierarchies, united and raised their voice against upper caste 
domination in education and employment. The APDMS was at the forefront in organising 
the lower caste students in their struggle for reservations. Although the massive and 
united mobilisation of the Dalits, Adivasis and Backward Castes provided a glimmer of 
hope for the progressive politics in the state, it was soon destroyed by the strategies of the 
upper castes-based political parties and Brahmanism among the lower castes (we shall 
discuss these developments at a later stage).   
 
The third and final wave of Dalit activism under the APDMS took place when the 
Reddy’s organised a massacre in Chunduru village against the Malas.  On August 6, 
1991, a mob of about 400 persons belonging to the Reddy’s caste attacked the Malapalle 
(the locality of the Malas) in the most brutal manner. The incident that triggered off this 
attack was trivial - like the one that triggered off the attack on Madigas in Karamchedu. a 
It was a minor altercation between youth of the two castes (the Reddy’s and the Malas) in 
a cinema hall in the village.  The Reddy’s who were in political power,643 took offense to 
a Mala boy’s feet accidentally touching a Reddy youth. They hacked ten Malas to death 
and threw the dead bodies into the Tungabhadra Canal.644  
 
Once again, the leaders of the APDMS, Tarakam and Padmarao, plunged into action.  
They were joined by two former leaders of the People’s War Group (PWG) - K. G. 
Satyamurthy and U. Sambasivarao. Some of the civil and revolutionary organisations, 
such as the CPI (M-L) Liberation, CPI (M-L) Praja Pantha, UCCRI (M-L) Jana Shakti, 
Marxist-Leninist Centre, Indian People’s Front, and Organization for the Rural Poor also 
                                                 
642 Ibid., p. 7.  
643 The political power of the Reddys through the Congress party was symbolically demonstrated when 
Anil Kumar, a key witness in the incident, was shot dead by the police within days of the massacres.  
644 See, Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Council: ‘Fact Finding Report on Chundur’, Hyderabad, 1991. The 
reality of the violence was so ghastly that the doctor who performed the post-mortem committed suicide 
soon after.  See, Indian Express, 28 August, 1991.  
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joined the APDMS. Together they formed a committee called Andhra Pradesh Chundur 
Porata Samithi (APCPS – the Andhra Pradesh Chundur Struggle Committee).  
 
Two of the significant activities of the Committee worth mentioning here are: first, we 
noted that the victims of the Karamchedu carnage had fled the village en masse. But this 
time, the Dalit leadership did not want the victims to leave the village. They launched 
their struggle for justice from the place in which their people were hacked to death.645 
Most audaciously, they buried the ten dead people in a central area in Chunduru village 
and named the place Raktakshetram (land of blood).  The grave would serve as “a grim 
reminder of the barbarity of the attack in the village – to those who lived through the 
violence, the generations that followed and to all the visitors.”646 Secondly, through a 
determined campaign, they made the government of AP not just set up a special Sessions 
Court under the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, but more importantly, shift the 
venue of the court proceedings from the AP High Court to Chunduru. As Kalpana 
Kannabiran observes: “For people who have undergone enormous suffering and loss, 
when required by the court to recount the loss in accordance with norms that are 
completely alien to them, norms that do not make space for trauma of the experience or 
the retelling of that experience, the physical location of the court becomes vital in 
reassuring survivors.”647 
 
One of the significant aspects about the Chunduru massacre was the Dalits’ realisation of 
the nexus between social dominance and political power and perpetuation of the former 
with the help of the latter. When Kammas organised carnage against the Madigas in 
Karamchedu it was the Kamma-led TDP that was ruling the state, and again, when the 
Reddy’s killed the Malas in Chunduru, it was the Reddy-led Congress that was in power.  
In both the incidents, the state organs, especially the politics, were used by the ruling 
castes not only to harass the victims, but also to protect the aggressors. Further, it must be 
recognised here that what provoked the upper castes to unleash violence of such a brutal 
                                                 
645 Kranthi, 1992.  Aa roju chunduru ghatana oka-rojulo jaragaleadu (Chunduru incident did not happen in 
one day). Edureeta, August, pp:12-13.  
646 Kalpana, Kannabiran. 2007. Chunduru: On the Road to Justice.  EPW, 42 (39), p.3915.  
647 Ibid., p. 3916.  
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nature against the Dalits was not the traditional demand of the economically exploited for 
higher wages, but a “demand to live with dignity and honour, and the assertion of their 
rights to be treated as social equals”648 by the socially subjugated.  Even this basic right 
was denied to the Dalits by the upper castes with the aid of the state, the so-called 
guarantor of liberal rights to its citizens. This recognition of the connection between 
political power, social dominance and social subjugation led the APDMS to shift focus 
from culture to the realm of political power. We shall discuss this shift in the next 
section. 
 
6. III. Questioning the Domination: Dalit Politics through the BSP in the 1990’s  
In Chapter III we have noted that even before the emergence of the DS-4 with the slogan 
of vote hamara, seat tumhara – nahin chalenge, nahi chalenge ‘political power’ has been 
one of the key aspects in the BAMCEF campaigns. In a way, since the formation of 
BAMCEF until the emergence of the BSP, the limitations in the existing political 
representation for Dalits and the idea of political power have been communicated to the 
Dalits by the BAMCEF missionaries and later on by the DS-4 activists.  These 
exhortations resulted in political consciousness among the Dalits and other marginalised 
sections in UP society and set the ground for the future success of the lower caste-based 
political parties in the state.   
 
By contrast, Dalit activism in AP since the formation of the APDMS revolved around 
questions of ‘social equality’ and ‘cultural revolution’. The idea of political power 
remained outside the boundary of ‘the Dalit manifesto’, at least, until the Chunduru 
massacre in the early 1990’s. It was only after experiencing the effective use of political 
power by the upper caste Kammas and Reddy’s in further victimising the victims of the 
Karamchedu and Chunduru massacres that the Dalit leadership began to clearly focus 
their energies on the idea of political power. It should also be mentioned here that, apart 
from their own recognition of the importance of political power, they were also inspired 
by the electoral success of the SP – BSP combination in UP assembly elections in 1993.  
 
                                                 
648 Srinivasulu, K. 1994. BSP and Caste Politics. EPW, 29 (40), pp: 2583-2586. 
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The assumption of political power by the lower caste-based political parties in UP 
suddenly got the marginalised sections in AP (as elsewhere in India) enthused. And when 
the BSP entered the political arena of AP during the 1994 assembly elections, the lower 
castes were almost certain that the BSP would repeat its electoral success in UP  earlier, 
in AP as well. Even some of the political commentators predicted the BSP’s success in 
the elections. However, contrary to the aspirations of the lower castes and predictions of 
the political commentators, the BSP failed rather miserably in the electoral arena. Why 
did the Dalits in AP, unlike their counterparts in UP fail in the electoral politics? My 
main aim in this section is to answer this question. I, therefore, attempt to examine the 
entry of the BSP into the political arena of AP and explore the causes for the failure of 
the party in the electoral arena.   
 
Although, since its inception, the APDMS had focused its energies around the issues of 
‘social equality, ‘social dignity’, ‘land’ and ‘livelihood’, by the late 1980’s, it began to 
shift its focus to the question of political power.  This change in focus was due to some 
important developments in the national picture.  The BSP which gathered momentum in 
north India, sowed the seeds of political ambitions among certain sections of the Dalit 
leadership in the state. The visits of Kanshi Ram to AP in 1987-88 to establish contacts 
with Dalit leaders in the state had an impact on Dalit politics.649  
 
The question of participation in electoral politics which was not central to the initial 
manifesto of the APDMS came up in its second state-level conference in 1988 in Chirala.  
The movement, whose chief objective was, building a ‘social and cultural movement’, 
shifted its focus to political power. Bojja Tarakam and Katti Padmarao were the 
facilitators of this shift. Apart from the lessons taught by the caste-based atrocities against 
the Dalits, they were profoundly influenced by the writings of Ambedkar.  Following 
Ambedkar, they, like Kanshi Ram in UP, came to the conclusion that the Dalit problem is 
a political problem and that political power is the master key that can open any lock. 
However, they differed with each other on the idea of BSP - the entry of a North Indian 
party in AP politics. 
                                                 
649 Interview with Mandapati Ramarao, a BSP activist, in Vijayawada, 20 June, 2004. 
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Tarakam welcomed Kanshi Ram and the BSP. Some of the notable Dalit organisations 
backing him were the Dalit Kala Mandir, Dalit Writers, Artists, and Intellectuals United 
Front (DWAIUF), and Ambedkar Youth Association.650 Padmarao, on the other hand, 
boycotted the BSP and characterised it as a dalita dalari (Dalit broker or middleman).  
He argued that the Dalit movement needed to remain autonomous from all political 
organisations, and work as a front for ‘social revolution’ through agitations rather than 
transforming itself into a political party to take part in parliamentary elections.651  
Interestingly, Padmarao eventually changed tracks and formed the Poor People’s Party 
(PPP) on the eve of the state assembly elections in 1989.652 But his party’s defeat in the 
elections compelled him to shift allegiance to the BSP in the early 1990’s.653  
 
This internal squabbles apart, the crucial phase in the history of the decade-old Dalit 
movement was the entry of the BSP into the electoral arena on the eve of state assembly 
elections in 1994, and the ‘wave’ it appeared to have created.  As soon as it made up its 
mind to contest in the 1994 state assembly elections, the BSP organised a number of 
rallies and meetings in all the main cities and towns.  Kanshi Ram, who had been the 
chief attraction as well as key speaker in those rallies and meetings, simply deployed the 
political slogans that were adopted in the UP context.  Two key aspects of the BSP 
campaign were: (a) its strategy of mobilisation and (b) its discourse on the idea of 
political power.   
 
First, it may be recalled that the BSP in UP, despite its Bahujan agenda, initiated its 
campaigns around the Dalit identity. After strengthening its Dalit base, it moved to 
mobilise the other marginalised sections around the Bahujan identity. But when the party 
started its campaign in AP it started with a dual advantage: firstly, the APDMS through 
its decade-long activism had already constructed and strengthened the Dalit identity. And 
so the party had to simply build on those already constructed and strengthened identities. 
                                                 
650 Gudavarthy, A. 2005. Dalit and Naxalite Movements in AP: Solidarity or Hegemony? EPW, 40 (51), 
p.5412. 
651 Ratnam, K.Y. 1998. Dalit Movement…,  pp: 111, 117 & 119.  
652 See Manda, Janaiah. 1999. Dalit Politics in Andhra Pradesh: A Case Study of Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP). M.Phil. University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.  
653 See Aatma rakshna numdi raajyaadhikaaram varaku (From Self-defense to political power’) (editor), 
Dalits Rajyam, May-July (1996).  
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Secondly, in the 1993 UP assembly elections the party succeeded as a party of the 
bahujans, and this success facilitated it to claim or identify itself outside UP less as a 
Dalit-based party and more as the party of the bahujans.   
 
When the BSP entered into the electoral arena in AP, it was completely aware of this dual 
advantage.654 And the party’s strategy of mobilisation revolved around two main 
identities: the savarnas and bahujans, or the oppressor and the oppressed.  The party, in 
its narration of Indian history and society, identified the three upper castes or varnas: 
Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vyshyas as the oppressors and the rest of the Indian society as 
the oppressed. It is important to recognise here that this division of the Indian society into 
two clear-cut groups was not defined in terms of the socio-cultural and economic 
standing of these two groups, but primarily in terms of the ‘humiliation’ suffered by the 
bahujans at the hands of the savarnas, both historically and contemporarily.655 “This is,” 
as observed by Srinivasulu, “presumed to be a feasible and practically workable strategy, 
given the fact that the bahujans cannot be united on any other plank because of the 
absence of commonality or uniformity in their socio-economic profile or cultural identity, 
which is further compounded by linguistic variations in India.”656 
 
Secondly, in Kanshi Ram’s argument of, “political power is the master key with which 
any lock can be opened”, the concept of political power is seen as a control over the 
means of production.657 From that perspective, the affluence of the upper castes was due 
to their possession of political power, and the economic deprivation of the lower castes  
was on account of the absence of political power which could only be addressed by 
capturing political power.658 Interestingly, in Kanshi Ram’s discussion on political 
power, there was no discussion as to whether political power rescues the lower castes 
from humiliation. 
 
                                                 
654 Interview with U. Sambasivarao, editor, Edureeta, February 2005.  
655 Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class…,  pp: 53-54.  
656 Ibid., p. 54.  
657 ‘BSP Evarikosam, endukosam’ (BSP, For Whom and Why), pamphlet released by APDMS on the eve 
of 1994 AP assembly elections.  
658 See Devarapalli, Mastanrao. 2001. Bahujanan voice (in Telugu), Ponnuru: Purogaami Prachuranalu. 
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One particular slogan that was particularly received by the Dalit and the lower castes in 
AP was: vote hamara, seat tumhara – nahin chalenge, nahi chalenge.  While in UP, the 
Brahmins and Thakurs had been Kanshi Ram’s target groups, the Kammas and Reddys 
had become his target groups in AP. He drew a parallel between political power in the 
state and the game of football, with Kammas and Reddys as the two players, while the 
rest of the population was confined to being in the audience. The political power either 
rested in the court of the Kammas or that of the Reddy’s, and no other community and 
caste was allowed to participate in it. He insisted that political power should be 
distributed among all sections and that caste should be the basis for such a distribution. 
The rationale behind use of caste, it was stressed, was not only to annihilate the caste 
system, but also to contain the onward march of Hindutva. 659 
 
Besides its mobilisation strategies and political slogans, by distributing assembly tickets 
on the basis of caste, the BSP sent a message to other political parties in the state.  As 
recourse to the dominance of the upper castes in the power structure, no tickets were 
allotted to upper castes. However, more than 50 per cent of the tickets, numbering around 
150, had been given to the BCs, covering more or less all castes in that category.  Some 
80 tickets were given to Dalits and Adivasis; Muslims and Christians together were given 
45 seats and 20 seats were left to the SP.660 Huge turnouts at the BSP gatherings and its 
system of distribution of tickets, as commented by Shatrugna,661 sent jitters among the 
mainstream political parties and forced them to emulate BSP’s political tactics.   
 
For instance, the Congress undertook certain unprecedented measures and activities. The 
Kapus, a middle caste between the dominant upper castes (Kammas and Reddy’s) and the 
backward castes such as Gouda’s and Padmashalis, had been demanding for over twenty 
years that the government should include them in the state’s list of Backward Castes. 
Although the demand was never even heeded to by the previous governments, the 
Congress Party, as if waking up from a deep slumber, suddenly conferred the ‘backward 
                                                 
659 Padmarao, K. 1994. Ambedkar taatvika raajakeeya sakaarambham (The dawn of a new Era), Dalit 
Rajyam, 1 (5 & 6), pp: 4-6.  
660 Shatrugna, M. 1994. Caste Factor in Andhra Polls. EPW, 19, pp: 2958-59.  
661 Ibid. pp: 2958-59. 
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caste’ tag on the Kapus and Muslims. Of course, rejection of the status in the High Court 
of AP was a different matter altogether. Further, contrary to its earlier pattern of ticket 
distribution, the party had chosen 50 per cent of its candidates from the combined group 
of BCs, Dalits, adivasis and religious minorities. The social base of the TDP candidates 
was also interesting. Of the 200 candidates (for whom the details are available), the 
break-down was: Reddy’s- 38, BCs -35, Kammas- 27, Dalits -25, Kapus -9, Velema - 9, 
and Adivasis - 8.662  
 
What was significant by the BSP’s entry into the political arena of the state was that the 
presence of caste in politics and in the power structure was, for the first time, explicitly 
acknowledged by the people in power.  They gave up their earlier pretence that they had 
been dominating politics by virtue of sheer merit.  And the Dalit and Backward Caste 
leaders in the ruling Congress and opposition TDP began to talk openly about the 
injustices done to the lower castes. Interestingly, the Brahmins held meetings in three 
main cities in the state, i.e, Vijayawada, Nellore and Hyderabad, and one of their main 
demands was that they should be given tickets in certain constituencies in which there 
was a sizeable Brahmin population. The Kammas in Congress, who had always felt 
overwhelmed by the dominance of the Reddy’s in that party, held a meeting and resolved 
that all castes should be given tickets in proportion to their importance and not based on 
the strength of population. The word ‘importance’ is the key, because it translated to 
economic power. Such significant changes in the political fabric of the state led 
Balagopal to comment, “Bahujana politics had achieved the first victory that any rebel 
movement aspiresfor; to force the dominant groups to dump their myths and 
acknowledge the hidden aspects of reality.”663  
 
The BSP, through its caste-based mobilisations and distribution of tickets, was able to 
successfully create some kind of euphoria in the political arena of the state that forced the 
upper caste-led mainstream political parties to give up their earlier patterns of ticket 
                                                 
662 39 seats were left to the alliance partners, with CPI and CPI (M) sharing 37 seats and the Janata Dal 
getting 2. And there was no major shift in the social base of the CPI and CPI (M) candidates.  For further 
details, see Ibid., pp: 2958-59.  
663 Balagopal, K. 1995. Elections: What Happened and What Did Not Happen. EPW, 30(3), pp: 136-139.  
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distribution and include more candidates from the marginalised groups. Yet, it utterly 
failed at the electoral level. K.Srinivasulu, in his analysis of the election results, 
summarises:  
[T]hough the BSP has the potential of really becoming an alternative political force on 
the basis of Dalit-Bahujan concept, it failed mainly because of non-availability of 
political activists at the village level, lack of organisational structures and internal 
political feuds. It could not prepare a political economic plan keeping in view the 
experience of new social forces on the basis of the principle of political representation 
…(and on their part)  the ‘mainstream’ ruling class parties could easily manipulate the 
caste/class contradictions in favour of those parties.664  
 
 The following are the four main reasons/causes for the failure of the BSP at the electoral 
level: first, the BSP at the time of its entry in AP had not done a proper assessment of the 
situation of various deprived communities, the political potential of the Dalit movement 
and the way various castes and communities were entrenched in mainstream political 
parties. By the time Bojja Tarakam, one of the leaders of the APDMS, tried to initiate a 
debate on the issue of converting the APDMS into the BSP, the leadership at the local 
level was not properly organised.  
 
Second, the BSP’s ideology that had evolved in the UP context was simply transferred to  
AP, without any effort to modify it to suit the consciousness of the various social groups 
that have emerged as part of the Dalit movement in the state. On their part, the social 
groups also did not engage critically with the BSP ideology. For instance, Bojja Tarakam, 
one of the leaders of the BSP in the state, had his roots in Ambedkarite thought, his 
activism in civil liberties and was a sympathiser of the radical Left movement.  K.G. 
Satyamurthy, another leader of the BSP, was a prominent member of the People’s War 
Group (PWG). And when he came out of the Group, he, along with U.Sambasiva Rao, 
another prominent PWG member, formed the Marxist-Leninist Centre.  It was at the 
Centre that both these individuals tried to combine the ideologies of Marx and Lenin with 
that of Ambedkar so as to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of Indian society with 
a view towards social transformation. Another prominent leader of the BSP, who had a 
Naxalite background, was Kolluri Chiranjeevi. And Katti Padma Rao, who was at the 
                                                 
664 Srinivasulu, K. 1995. Andhra Pradesh Ennikala Vishleshana (Review of Elections in Andhra Pradesh), 
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forefront of the APDMS, was a prominent member in the Andhra Pradesh Rationalist 
Organisation. Thus, the leadership of the BSP, though hailing from a common social 
background, joined the party while working in organisations which had different 
ideologies. The lack of co-ordination among these leaders was at the core of BSP’s 
failure in the elections. Further, despite their incorporation into the party, none of these 
leaders were accommodated in the official structure of the party nor were they given any 
clear-cut responsibility.665  
 
Third, livelihood resources of the majority of the people that explicitly or implicitly 
formed the support base for the BSP were still controlled by the two dominant castes in 
the state. Undoubtedly, there was an upsurge in Dalit consciousness, but because of their 
dependency upon the upper caste-controlled resources, they could not facilitate their 
freedom from the clutches of the upper castes. Of course, this did not mean that all the 
marginalised sections of the state were under the spell of the upper castes. A small 
section among the marginalised enjoyed education and access to modern jobs in urban 
areas, and were able to remove themselves from the bondage of the upper castes. And it 
was this section that constituted the voting base of the BSP, and not the mass workforce 
which was bonded to the upper caste.  
 
Finally, the one factor that was at the heart of the electoral debacle of the BSP was the 
dark reality of casteism among its victims.  Unlike in UP, the BCs in AP did not become 
part of the Party because joining a party of the Dalits and working under the leadership of 
the Malas was seen as not becoming of their caste status. 666 Even the Dalits, whose 
supposed social mission was to establish a casteless society, were caught up in caste 
competitions and antagonisms. The state leadership was predominantly drawn from the 
coastal Andhra region, neglecting the other two regions of the state. Even in the coastal 
region the leadership was given to one caste among the Dalits, i.e., the Malas, excluding 
another major Dalit caste, i.e, Madigas. Despite the presence of the Malas in the BSP’s 
leadership structure in the state, majority of the Malas did not join the Party. They saw it 
                                                 
665 Balagopal, K. 1995. Elections…., p137.  
666 Manda, Janiah. 1999. Dalit politics…, p. 86.  
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was a party of the Madigas and not of the Malas (Madigas, whose traditional occupation 
was leather-making, were equated with the Chamars, who were also engaged in the same 
work in North India).667 Interestingly, the Madigas, who were kept away from the party’s 
leader slots, also stayed away from the Party.  Thus, the BSP’s poor show in the 1994 
elections had a dramatic impact on the Dalit movement. The move away from the earlier 
stand that the Dalit movement is a movement for social transformation which did not get 
involved in electoral politics, where a different logic is operative, did enormous damage 
to the movement.  The direct participation of the Dalit activists in the political campaigns 
led the Dalit masses to believe that their social leaders were being absorbed into electoral 
politics. This, in turn, led to a credibility crisis for well-known Dalit leaders. It may be 
noted that in UP we did not experience any such credibility crisis for the Dalit leadership. 
That was largely because unlike the AP Dalit leadership, in UP, the Dalit leaders, from 
the initial years of their activism, had focused on the idea of political power. In other 
words, the debacle of the Dalits in electoral politics was due to the failure of the social 
movement to transform itself into a movement for political power.  
 
In conclusion, in this Chapter my main aim was to examine and analyse Dalit activism in 
the social and political arenas and its relationship with the two dominant political parties 
in the State. Although there was independent Dalit activism in the immediate post-
Independence AP, a majority of the Dalit leaders and so the Dalit constituency remained 
loyal supporters of the Congress and Communist parties in the state. The Dalit 
leaderships in those parties tried to carve out space for themselves, but the presence and 
the leadership of the upper castes in those parties prevented them from doing so. Despite 
taking advantage of the facility for Dalits in the political representation, both the parties 
did not pay attention to the concerns and problems of the Dalits in any substantive 
manner. In fact, the Congress used its power to suppress activities of the Dalit-based RPI, 
and on their part the Communists, in the name of unity of the proletariat, evaded the Dalit 
question completely. Scholars like Gail Omvedt, who examined the Dalit movement and 
politics in AP did not pay much attention to Dalits’ relationship with the two dominant 
                                                 
667 Ibid., p. 100. 
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political parties, and it is expected that my examination and analysis will fill the gaps in 
what already exists.  
 
In the early 1980’s when the Kamma-based TDP gained political power, the social 
relationship between and among various castes and communities underwent dramatic 
changes, particularly the Kammas in the rural areas began to harass the marginalised 
castes and communities. When the Dalits in Karamchedu village questioned the social 
dominance and highhandedness of the Kammas, the later responded by unleashing 
violence in which several Dalits were brutally massacred. In the backdrop of this carnage, 
the Dalits organised through the APDMS for justice and equality. This is one of the most 
important contrasting points between Dalit activism in UP and AP.  We saw that during 
the 80’s in UP. The Dalits mobilised for political power, whereas in AP, Dalit activism 
focussed on the ideas of justice, equality and cultural revolution. It was not that the Dalits 
in UP did not focus on the questions of social justice and equality, but they consistently 
focused on the idea of political power for Dalits. For it has been argued that political 
power is the master key with which the locks of equality and social justice can be opened.  
Such a focus on political power led them to the seat of power in that state. Of course, in 
the early ‘90’s the Dalit leadership in AP changed their path and tried to mobilise the 
Dalits and other marginalised castes for political power, first through the PPP and later 
through the BSP. In both the occasions they did not succeed in either bringing the 
marginalised sections under one umbrella or to draw them into electoral politics; and 
thus, Dalit activism in the state entered a crisis. It is from out of this crisis and gaining 
strength from the impasse in the movement that there emerged the Madigas’ caste-
specific movement for SC classification, for the purpose of reservations.   
 
 
******** 
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Seven................................................................................................................. 
Social Justice and the Question of Sub‐Classification of 
Dalit Reservations: The Dandora Debate in AP in the ‘90’s  
 
In Chapters Three and Four we have seen that since the early ’90’s Dalit activism in UP 
under the leadership of the BSP had concentrated on the idea of political power and thus 
directed all their energies at winning electoral battles. Once they assumed political power, 
the party leadership used that power to effect changes at various levels.  In AP, however, 
after the BSP’s electoral defeat in the Assembly elections in 1994, Dalit activism took a 
completely different path. The Dalit movement and politics in the state have since then 
been caught up in activism oriented towards reservations. On the one hand, there are 
certain Dalit castes such as the Mala and Adi-Andhra, who, owing to their proximity with 
the Hindu upper castes and having enjoyed reforms by Christian missionaries as well as 
Hindus, as well as the government’s welfare efforts – both in colonial and post-colonial 
India, have acquired education, become socially and politically conscious and gained 
employment opportunities in the formal economy.668  It is this group of castes that has 
been availing most of the reservations for Dalits in the state and has become dominant 
among the Dalits. On the other hand, there are Dalit castes such as the Madigas, Rellis 
and others which have not got the same opportunities and advantages as the Malas and 
Adi-Andhras, and are too poorly equipped to take advantage even of facilities extended 
through the policy of reservation. This has, in turn, resulted in their continuous 
incarceration in the traditional, caste-based socio-economic relations and occupations.  
 
In order to counter this under-representation which is evidently one of the primary reason 
for their overall marginalisation, the Madigas organised under the banner of the Madiga 
Reservation Porata Samithi (MRPS) in the 1990’s.  Through the MRPS they questioned 
the over-representation of the dominant Dalit castes in the quota for SC reservations and 
demanded caste-based re-distribution or sub-classification of that quota. This method of 
classification was to enable every caste within the Dalit category to access their due 
                                                 
668 On this point, see Ramaswamy, U. 1984. Preference and Progress: The Scheduled Castes. EPW, 19 (30), 
pp: 1214-1217; ..., 1985. Education and Inequality. EPW, 20 (36), pp: 1523-1528; …. 1986. Protection and 
Inequality among Backward Groups. EPW, 21 (9), pp: 399-403. 
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share.  But the Malas and the Adi-Andhras rejected this demand on the grounds that 
raised serious concern: first, they argued that the Madigas lacked the merit to compete 
against the Malas; and second, that the classification would destroy the unity of the Dalit 
community. They even formed the Mala Mahanadu, a counter-caste association, and 
organised a “no holds barred”669 campaign against the MRPS.   
 
This Chapter is an attempt to understand the Dalit activities and politics in AP, 
particularly after the electoral defeat of the BSP in the state Legislative Assembly 
elections in 1994. By examining and analysing the emergence of the MRPS and Mala 
Mahanadu, and the debate around the question of sub-categorisation, I will show how the 
Dalits in AP, unlike their counterparts in UP where political power has been deployed to 
transform the socio-economic conditions of the Dalit constituency, are caught in the web 
of sub-categorisation; and I will also show how the Mala Mahanadu’s rejection of the just 
demand of the MRPS not just augmented caste-based rivalries among the Dalits, but 
more importantly, also destroyed space for Dalit unity in the state.  By an examination 
and analysis of the sub-categorisation debate between the Malas and Madigas, the current 
Chapter once again highlights the earlier argument that the Dalits are not a homogenous 
category; they are also divided on the basis of caste and sub-caste. It is expected that this 
Chapter will give more inputs to existing literature on the Dalit movement and politics in 
AP in general, and on the question of sub-categorisation in particular. It is also expected 
that this Chapter helps us understand Dalit activities in AP and UP comparatively and the 
importance of a marginalised community having or not having political power. 
 
Before we move any further, I suggest that we note three correlations of caste-based 
mobilisations launched by the Madigas and Malas around the question of classification.  
First, as the economic gap is continuing to grow between the dominant and marginalised 
Dalit castes (Malas and Madigas in this case), the former is continuing to become more 
dominant among the Dalits, while the latter is further marginalised.  Second, as every 
Dalit caste is affected by the classification issue for the past fifteen years, the social 
community of Dalits is divided against itself, and thus is wasting precious energies – both 
                                                 
669 Balagopal, K. 2000. A Tangled Web…, p. 1078. 
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human and material. Third, politically, the caste-based conflicts have been a great blow to 
Dalit unity.  That is to say, while Dalits have always been a marginalised group in the AP 
political scenario, the caste-based rivalries have further fragmented Dalit politics, which 
have, in effect, delivered the Dalits more clearly into the hands of the upper caste-led 
political parties, particularly into Kammas-led Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the 
Reddy’s-led Congress (I). While the TDP absorbed the Madigas by extending its support 
to the classification demand, the Congress (I) has absorbed the Malas by accommodating 
them in positions of power. For example, Jupudi Prabhakara Rao, leader of the Mala 
Mahanadu, was made a member of the AP Legislative Council. Such developments 
compels one to argue that such incorporation and accommodation has taken Dalit politics 
back to the pre-1980’s phase, turning the Dalits, once again into vote-banks for the upper 
caste-led political parties. 
 
Brief Background: What are main reasons for the Malas having an advantage over the 
Madigas in availing opportunities for reservation?  There are 60 Dalit castes in AP. On 
the basis of traditional caste occupations and affiliations with each other, these 60 castes 
can be broadly divided into four major groups: Malas, Adi-Andhras, Madigas and Rellis. 
The ability of the former two castes, in comparison with the latter two, in availing 
opportunities for reservations is largely attributable to their traditional occupations and 
geographical spread.670  AP is divided into three distinct geographical regions: coastal 
Andhra, Telangana and Rayalaseema. Despite being one of the developed states in India, 
AP has great differences within its three regions and the socio-economic progress of the 
communities is invariably determined by their location in these three regions. This is 
more so among the Dalits, who were dependent on the landed castes. Rayalaseema, 
where a 6 per cent of the Madigas and 5 per cent of the Malas live, is a zone of precarious 
rainfall – the annual average being 69 cm.  As the monsoon often fails in this area, it has 
long been known as the ‘stalking ground of famines’ (kshamaseema).  The Reddy’s are 
the most dominant caste in this region. They virtually control all walks of live in the 
                                                 
670 More on this, see Suri, K. C. 2001. Dialectic of Social Justice: The Struggle of the Madigas for 
Categorisation of Scheduled Caste Reservations in Andhra Pradesh. In: Balasubramaniam, R., ed., Social 
and economic dimensions of caste organisations in South Indian states, Chennai: University of Madras; G. 
V. Siva Reddy. 2002. Competition and Conflict among the Dalits: Madiga Dandora Movement in Andhra 
Pradesh. In: Shah, Ghanshyam. ed., Dalits and the State, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. 
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region.  Both the Madigas and Malas used to earn their livelihood, at least until the early 
1980’s, by working for the Reddys as agricultural labourers and tenants.  
 
Coastal Andhra, where the Malas and Adi-Andhras are predominant, has historically 
been prosperous as well as culturally and politically active. The region was under British 
rule for nearly two centuries, during which major irrigation projects on Krishna and 
Godavari rivers were constructed.  As a result of these projects the region had witnessed 
enormous development in the agricultural sector, which led to developments in other 
areas, particularly in the field of education.671 In Chapter Four we noted that some of the 
Brahmins, such as Kandukuri Veeresalingam Pantulu in Rajahmundra and Kasinadhuni 
Nageswara Rao Pantulu, became concerned about the plight of the Dalits.  They launched 
numerous social reform movements that aimed at the emancipation of Dalits and other 
marginalised strata in the early 1920’s. Throughout the region they opened a number of 
schools for the education of the Dalit children, both boys and girls, with free boarding 
and lodging facilities. These schools were famously known as Panchama schools. Most 
of the Dalit leaders in the state who emerged towards the end of the colonial era and at 
the dawn of Independence were products of these schools.672 
 
In addition to British rule and efforts of the upper caste social reformers, the presence of 
Christian missionaries also helped the Dalits in this region. In 1895, the Government of 
Madras passed a bill, which was called the ‘Magna Carta of Panchama education’, 
allowing the Dalit children to study in government-aided schools. Apart from this bill, the 
British government had also introduced reservation facilities for the Dalits in government 
employment. The Christian missionaries, apart from converting a good many Dalits to 
Christianity, provided educational opportunities for them. They opened a number of 
schools exclusively for the Dalits in the region, and even offered employment 
opportunities for those passing out from the schools. These initial training opportunities 
given to the Dalits, particularly the Malas and Adi-Andhras in the region, prepared them 
                                                 
671 Omvedt, Gail. 1994. Dalits and the Democratic…, pp: 114-118.  
672 Sundru Venkaiah, Kusuma Venkatramaiah, Kusuma Dharmanna and others were products of these 
schools.  See Gautam, M.B. 1976. The Untouchables’ Movement in Andhra Pradesh. In: State Harijan 
Conference Souvenir, Hyderabad: Government of Andhra Pradesh, pp: 10-12.  
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well even before the implementation of reservation opportunities for Dalits in post-
Independence India. Once those opportunities came into effect, the Malas and Adi-
Andhras were the first to reap the benefits from them.  
 
The Rellis, the most marginalised Dalits in the state, are, in addition to the Malas and 
Adi-Andhras, also concentrated in the coastal region, particularly in the two 
underdeveloped districts in the region – Srikakulam and Vizianagaram. Unlike the other 
Dalit castes, the Rellis did not have an assigned caste occupation. They took to selling 
fruits for a livelihood and moved to various urban centres. In the absence of North India’s 
Bhangi-like caste in the state, some of the Rellis have settled in as sweepers and cleaners 
in public and private organisations.673 
 
The Telangana region, where the Madigas predominate,674 was a part of the erstwhile 
Nizam’s Hyderabad state. Given the historical specifics of Nizam’s rule, the nature of 
socio-economic change and political trajectory in the region took a different turn.  We 
noted in Chapter Four a class of landed gentry consisting of Muslim jagirdars (holders of 
land awarded for services rendered to the Nizam) and Hindu deshmukhs (revenue 
collectors-turned-landlords) belonging to the Reddy’s, Velama and Brahmin castes 
constituted the support base of Nizam’s rule. In sharp contrast to the Presidency areas 
(coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema) the people in this region hardly enjoyed any civil or 
political rights during Nizam’s rule. The landed gentry inflicted suffering on the rural 
masses through the illegal eviction of farmers, the extraction of free goods and services 
(known as vetti) and much more significantly, the denial of dignity and self-respect.675 
The Madigas, who are placed at the bottom of the Hindu hierarchy, have been the worst 
victims of the socio-economic and political dynamics of the region.  It was these 
dynamics that were largely responsible for the disadvantages the Madigas faced, in 
comparison with the Malas and Adi-Andhras.  
                                                 
673 See Justice Usha Mehra. 2008. National Commission to examine the issue of sub-classification of 
Scheduled Castes in Andhra Pradesh - A report submitted to The Ministry of Social Justice and 
Empowerment, New Delhi; Government of India, p. 37.  
674 Ramaswamy, U. 1974. Scheduled Castes in Andhra…, p. 1158.   
675 Srinivasulu, K. 2002. Caste, Class…, pp: 17-19.  
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In addition to these regional variations, the traditional occupations followed by the 
Madigas and Malas also resulted in differential development between them. The 
traditional occupation of the Madigas had been leather goods work, removal of carcasses 
from the village, grave-digging, making footwear and drum-beating. Thus, though they 
were in a subordinate position, they were more integrated into village life. The Malas, 
mostly engaged in weaving and agricultural labour, were not as much part of the ‘patron-
client’ relations, as the Madigas. The decline of weaving as an occupation forced sections 
of the Malas to look out for alternative sources of employment, such as agricultural 
labour, even during British rule. Further, the Malas who were faced with the uncertainties 
inherent in the field of agriculture, as well as stiff competition from the other lower 
castes, as pointed out by Uma Ramaswamy, “took more readily to formal education than 
the Madigas who were secure in leather work”.676 The Madigas, in contrast to the Malas, 
both due to the specialised nature of their occupation as well as the ritual pollution 
involved in leather work, were secure in their source of livelihood. “If one may hazard a 
generalisation”, to quote Balagopal, “it is the very existence of a secure source of 
livelihood, for which other castes cannot compete even if low in the hierarchy, that is a 
factor inhibiting the exploitation of secular opportunities for mobility.”677  
 
Sub-Classification of SC Reservations: The Dandora Debate678 
In this section my main aim is to analyse the arguments and counter-arguments 
concerning classification of SC reservations in the debate between the Madigas and 
Malas. While the former was represented by the Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi 
(MRPS), which is also popularly known as Dandora,679 and the latter was represented by 
Mala Mahanadu. The main argument of the MRPS had been that Dalit reservations were 
not distributed equitably among all the castes within the Dalit group. A majority of the 
                                                 
676 Ramaswamy, U. 1974. Scheduled Castes in Andhra.., p. 1158. 
677 Balagopal, K. 2000. A Tangled Web…, p. 1078. 
678 For an extended discussion on this, see Gundimeda, S. 2006. Brahmanatva Malatvamaa?...Manavatma 
Ambedkaratvamaa? Vargeekarana samasyapai charcha (Brahmanical Mala Casteism or Humanistic 
Ambedkarism? Discussion on the Question of Categorization), Hyderabad: Rajyam publications. 
679 Dandora, which is literally ‘announcing’ in Telugu, was one of the traditional occupations of the 
Madigas.  Before the entry of modern forms of communication, the Madigas were employed to make 
announcements either about the new policies or programmes of the government or any kind of new activity 
in the villages.  And Madigas make their announcements by going around the village while simultaneously 
beating their drum and shouting out the announcements.   
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opportunities were garnered by the already advanced castes, especially the Malas and 
Adi-Andhras. Such injustice against marginalised Dalit castes should be rectified by 
making four-fold sub-divisions of the Dalits in the state, and apportioning the 
reservations to the four sub-groups in proportion to each group’s population. The Mala 
Mahanadu vehemently opposed this demand, surprisingly on the basis of similar 
arguments that had been used by the upper castes to oppose reservations, preferring the 
continuation of the existing pattern of group-based distribution of Dalit reservations. I 
have organised the debate into four key themes, with each theme analysed in a separate 
sub-section. In my analysis, I shall situate myself between the two contending parties and 
try to argue their case from their perspective. Eventually, however, I shall take the stand 
of the MRPS and argue for classification of the SC reservations as an effective means of 
distributing reservation opportunities among all castes within the Dalit category.  
 
What was the context in which the Madigas placed their demand for classification of the 
SC reservations? Since the early 1990’s India has aggressively pursued a new path of 
liberalisation in the economic sphere.680 In what started as India’s response to the crisis of 
‘balance of payments’, the State has pursued a number of policies with “single-minded 
determination”681 in reforming trade, financial and industrial investment sectors. 
Conspicuously, no attempts have been made to revive and improve sectors such as the 
rural economy, agriculture, non-agricultural employment, and social security.682 Such a 
biased focus has led commentators to describe the process variously, for instance, as a 
“revolt of the elite”683 and “elite politics”.684 Christophe Jaffrelot sees the single-minded 
determination from a different perspective. Complete domination of the upper caste in 
those sectors in which the reforms have been concentrated, and evidently an absence of 
                                                 
680 A number of theories have been put forward by scholars on why and what compelled the Indian state to 
abandon its old path, a path that was influenced by the ideology of the makers of the Constitution of India, 
and jump onto a new path—a path that was laid out by the Bretton Woods institutions and endorsed by 
indigenous business houses. See, for instance, Bhagwati, J. 1993. India in Transition: Freeing the 
Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
681 Varshney, Ashutosh. 1999. Mass Politics or Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in Comparative 
Perspective. In: Jaffrey D. Sachs et al, eds., India in the Era of Economic Reforms. Delhi: OUP, p. 249. 
682 For a different view point on liberalisation see, Kapur, Devesh et al., 2010. Rethinking Inequality: Dalits 
in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era. EPW, 45 (35), pp: 39-49. 
683 Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1997. The general elections in India. Government and Opposition, 32 (1), pp: 3-24.  
684 Varshney, A. 1999. Mass Politics …., p. 248.   
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reforms in sectors where a majority of the workforce come from the Dalit and Adivasi 
constituencies, led him to paraphrase the process in caste terminology. He sees 
liberalisation as part of an ongoing conflict between upper castes and Dalits in the 
political and social realms, and notes how the former saw in liberalisation a new 
opportunity where they alone could succeed:  
The upper castes are losing ground in the political sphere and in the administration but 
liberalisation of the economy – which coincided with the implementation of the Mandal 
Commission Report – has opened new opportunities for the upper castes in the private 
sector, and hence they may no longer regret their traditional monopoly over the 
bureaucracy being challenged.685 
 
Though there is no clear evidence to suggest that the upper castes have opted for the 
course of liberalisation, especially after the Mandal episode, it clearly provided them with 
a new avenue to maintain their economic dominance. Liberalisation offered enormous 
and profitable employment opportunities in the private sector, where reservation quotas 
have not yet been implemented. Moreover, this means that the upper castes alone can 
accrue the benefits from the new opportunities. In a way, the policy of liberalisation 
marks a significant departure from the past. As P.G. Jogdand observes: “The much 
cherished principles of growth with justice, social responsibility and accountability, 
equity and self-reliance have been rendered obsolete with the new slogans of 
‘liberalisation’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘competitiveness’.’’686 Prevailing social prejudices, the 
absence of reservation quotas in the private sector, and the state’s sudden departure from 
its old path all caused great apprehension among educated Dalits,687 who equated the 
liberalisation of India’s economy with “the retreat of the state” from the Constitutional 
promise of affirmative action.688 
 
While the policies of liberalisation became a matter of grave concern for the educated 
Dalits in general, for the Madigas in AP they have a different meaning. Until the early 
1980’s a majority of the Madigas were eking out their livelihood as agricultural 
labourers. This livelihood was threatened by the slowdown of agricultural growth when 
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governments, both at the centre and in the states, began to neglect the agricultural sector 
and concentrate their energies on the industrial sector.689 These developments forced the 
Madigas to search for avenues of livelihood outside the agricultural sector. They were 
threatened by the sudden retreat of the State and an abrupt shrinking of employment 
opportunities in the public sector; they worried that without the reservation quotas it 
would be almost impossible for them to gain entry into the private sector.690 It was in this 
economic context that Madigas had placed their demand for categorisation. Of course, it 
must be mentioned here that although the economic context served as the basis for the 
classification demand, it was actually triggered off by the casteist behaviour of the Malas 
against the Madigas.    
 
In the previous Chapter we have noted that the BSP, whose coalition with the Samajwadi 
Party on the basis of an explicitly anti-Hindutva campaign in 1993, led to its astonishing 
victory in UP, had created a storm among the upper castes and euphoria among the lower 
castes when it entered the political arena of AP in 1994. One of BSP’s chilling slogans, 
Vote hamara, raj tumhara, nahin chalega, nahin chalega, i.e., ‘We (Dalits and the lower 
castes) vote, whereas you (the upper castes) hold the power. This cannot continue, this 
cannot continue’ – had a strong impact among the lower castes with regards to how their 
votes were helping the upper castes - their historical oppressors - to consolidate power. 
The other slogan: Jiski jitni sankhya bhaari, uski utni bhagidaari, i.e., the share in power 
should be in direct proportion to the vote bank strength, raised great expectations among 
the lower castes in the state.691 Yet, contrary to the expectations of many political 
commentators, the Party failed rather miserably in the 1994 state assembly elections.  
Previously we noted that one fundamental factor that was at the heart of this electoral 
debacle was the dark reality of casteism among its victims. Despite the presence of the 
Malas in the state BSP’s leadership structure, a majority of the Malas did not even join 
the party, let alone vote for it.  For it was the party of the Madigas and not of the 
                                                 
689 On the decline of agricultural sector, see Bardhan, Pranabh. 1998. The Political Economy of 
Development in India. Delhi: OUP.  
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Malas.692 In a way, the BSP was seen in AP as the party of the Madigas and its electoral 
defeat was largely on account of this reason.  
 
It was this casteist sentiment of the Malas against the Madigas that forced the latter to 
rethink the very idea of ‘the Dalit share’ in the political power of the country. Two 
questions appear to have set the agenda for future mobilisation and the politics of the 
Madigas: first, when there is no equality among the Dalits themselves, what is the moral 
basis for demanding equality with the upper castes?; second, in the eventual realisation of 
political power for the Dalits, would the power be distributed equally among all the Dalit 
castes or simply usurped by the Malas, as they had been doing in the case of SC 
reservations? The Madigas were convinced that the demand for political power for the 
Dalits should be preceded by internal equality within the Dalit category. Moreover, such 
equality would be realised only when there is equitable distribution of reservations 
among all the Dalit castes on the basis of the classification principle.693 It was with this 
conviction that the Madiga youth in Edumudi village in Prakasam district launched the 
MRPS for classification of SC reservations on July 7, 1994, under the leadership of 
Krishna Madiga and Krupakar Madiga. In the rest of the paper I shall focus upon the 
Dandora debate on the classification of the Dalit reservations between the MRPS and the 
Mala Mahanadu.  
 
1. Representation versus Merit: One of the key ideas around which the MRPS based its 
sub-classification demand was representation. It was argued that although reservation 
opportunities had been provided for the Dalits as a matter of representation, the Madigas 
were singled out by their under-representation in those opportunities. In all their 
pamphlets and political speeches, the leaders of the MRPS based their demand by 
presenting data pertaining to opportunities in education, employment and political sectors 
availed both by the Madigas and Malas. The data suggests over-representation of the 
latter and the under-representation of the former in reservation opportunities. Although 
the accuracy of the data in the field of education and employment is questionable, the 
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data on political opportunities, especially in reserved seats in the State Assembly as well 
as Parliament, as this researcher verifies, clearly establishes the over-representation of 
the Malas. A pamphlet distributed by the MRPS in one of its mass mobilisation 
gatherings in Ongole town in 1995, presents the following statistics relating to political 
reservations for the Dalits in the state:  
Table 7.1: Distribution of Reserved Assembly Seats between Madigas and Malas (1952-95) 
Total SC seats 39 Total number of SC seats in the first ten 
Assembly elections 
390 
As per population Madigas 
share of seats 
24 Madigas share in the total number of SC members 
in the State Legislative Assembly 
240 
Number of seats that 
Madigas actually got 
12 Number of seats that Madigas actually got 120 
Malas share in seats as per 
their population 
15 Malas share in seats as per their population 150 
Number of seats Malas 
actually got  
27 Number of seats Malas actually got  270 
Source: Madiga Rights – pamphlet distributed by the MRPS, Ongole, 31 May, 1995. 
 
Table 7.2: Distribution of Reserved Lok Sabha seats between Madigas and Malas (1951-95) 
Total SC seats 6 Total SC seats in the first nine Parliaments 54 
Madigas share in the total seats 4 Madigas share in the total seats 36 
The number of seats Madigas actually got 2 The number of seats Madigas actually got 18 
Malas share in the total seats 2 Malas share in the total seats 18 
The number of seats Malas actually got 4 The number of seats actually gained by the Malas 36 
Source: Madiga Rights – pamphlet distributed by the MRPS, Ongole, 31 May, 1995. 
The statistics in Table 1 were taken from the total number of Dalits elected to the first ten 
state Legislative Assemblies over a period of forty-five years. Of the 39 reserved seats, 
the Malas have been represented in 26 seats, while the Madigas have held a mere 12 
seats. “If these seats were to be distributed between the Madigas and Malas on the basis 
of each caste’s demographic weight”, the pamphlet argued, “the Malas would get 15 seats 
and the Madigas would obtain 24 seats. Injustice had been done to the Madigas in the last 
forty-five years to the tune of 120 assembly seats”.  
 
Table 2 presents the number of available reserved seats in Lok Sabha for the Dalits in the 
state and their distribution. Of the 54 seats (during the nine General elections between 
1951 and 1995), while the Madigas represented 18 seats, the Malas succeeded in 
obtaining 36 seats. But, had these seats been distributed proportionally, the share of the 
Madigas and Malas would have been 36 and 18, respectively. “The under-representation 
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of the Madigas”, the pamphlet claimed, “is gross injustice against the Madigas and other 
similarly placed Dalit castes, an injustice that is against the equality principle of 
democracy”.694 In a similar argument Krishna Madiga, one of the two main leaders of the 
MRPS, observed:  
Of the 59 Dalit castes in the state, only the Malas, with their population of 45 percentage 
in the total Dalit population have appropriated 75 percent of the reservations, whereas the 
Madigas, whose percentage of population among the Dalits is 55 per cent, did not even 
get 25 percent of reservations. This is gross injustice against the Madigas and other 
unrepresented Dalit castes. When would we get our share in the reservations? We want 
our representation in the reservations.695 
Two aspects are clear from this. First, injustice has been conceived in terms of under-
representation of the Madigas in accordance with their proportionality in the 
opportunities accorded to the Dalit group. Second, proportional representation of the 
under-represented Madigas in these opportunities is associated with democratic equality, 
which in turn is envisioned as social justice.696 Before we discuss these ideas let’s 
examine the Mala Mahanadu’s counter-argument.  
 
The Mala Mahanadu’s response against the argument of under-representation was 
grounded on the notion of merit. Two claims made by the members of this group are 
noteworthy. First, it was argued by the Mala youth that, “the Madigas eat beef, drink and 
loaf around, whereas we work hard”.697 Second, C. R. Sekhar, writer and a staunch 
activist of the Mala Mahanadu justifies the over-representation of the Malas as follows:  
The dominant presence of the Malas in the SC reservation is because of their self-respect 
and social conscience […] The Madigas were under-represented in the reservations 
because they neither have self-respect nor social conscience. This in turn endowed the 
Malas with intellectual ability and power not merely to recognise the social injustices but 
gave them the required courage to fight against those injustices… We have developed 
merit and power as part of our ongoing struggle against social injustices.698 
                                                 
694 ‘Madiga Rights’ – Pamphlet distributed by the Dandora in a mass demonstration in Ongole, Prakasam 
district, 31 May 1995. 
695 Krishna Madiga in Vaartha (The News), a Telugu newspaper, 10 October, 1997.  
696 During the Mandal debate a similar argument was put forward by the supporters of the reservations for 
the OBCs.  For details, see Bajpai, Rochana. 2004. The legitimating vocabulary of group rights in 
contemporary India. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, especially chapter 4: ‘Social Justice and Quotas 
in Government Jobs for “Other Backward Classes”: The Mandal Debate, 1990’ pp: 182-229.  
697 Quoted in Balagopal, K. 2000. A Tangled Web… p.1081. From the point of sociology of caste it may be 
interesting to note here while the caste Hindus sometimes justified their discrimination against the Dalits on 
the basis of the latter’s practice of ‘beef eating’, the same argument has been put forward by the upwardly 
mobile Dalit castes to claim their superiority over the marginalized Dalit castes. 
698 Sekhar, C.R. 2005. Dalita shakthini amtamondinchea raajakeeya kutrea vargeekarana: pavulugaa 
marina Dandora nayakulu (Sub-classification - A political scheme to destroy Dalit Power: Dandora 
Leaders – Pawns in the scheme) – Hyderabad: Bahujana Vignana Kendram, p. 22.  
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Two underlying elements in this argument are: first, self-respect and social conscience 
are equated with merit, and second, over-representation and under-representation of the 
Malas and Madigas, respectively, in the reservation opportunities were justified from the 
standpoint of possession and non-possession of merit by the two castes in question.  
 
In the context of being beneficiaries of reservations, the Malas’ merit claim is most 
astounding. But let’s examine their argument. The claim of merit, as Satish Desphpande 
succinctly argues, is a moral claim on society. “It is simultaneously a claim in the sense 
of an assertion about myself (my capabilities, my competence, and at the broadest level 
my moral worth); and a claim in the sense of an expectation or demand addressed to the 
rest of the world.”699 From the point of moral claim, the merit argument of the Mala 
Mahanadu provides sufficient justification for their over-representation in the reserved 
opportunities. But how does one acquire merit and how do we measure it, or to frame the 
question in a different light, are there any indicators to measure merit? Deshpande, 
drawing from Marc Galanter, points out three indicators of merit: (a) economic resources 
(education, training, materials, freedom from work, etc); (b) social and cultural resources 
(networks of contacts, confidence, guidance and advice, information, etc); and (c) 
intrinsic ability and hard work. It is the combination of these conditions that allows 
people to acquire merit.700 When the Malas justify their over-representation from the 
stand point of merit, what is being justified is that economic and cultural resources are 
not important, but it is differences in intrinsic ability alone that make for differences 
between the Madigas and Malas. Such a position, however, cannot be defensible. For 
there is nothing called intrinsic ability or intrinsic disability, they are shaped and 
determined by availability or non-availability of access to economic and cultural 
resources.  
 
Interestingly, what the Malas did not recognise is that their merit claim actually provides 
a strong case against themselves. For this could potentially exclude them from the 
                                                 
699 Deshpande, Satish. 2006. Exclusive Inequalities: Merit Caste and Discrimination in Indian Higher 
Education Today. EPW, 41(24), pp: 2438-2444, here, p. 2442. 
700 Ibid., p.2443. 
329 
 
purview of representation.701 For one of the considerations in the institutionalisation of 
reservation opportunities for Dalits is that apart from compensating for historical 
inequalities heaped upon them by the caste system, it helped to eliminate inequalities so 
as to equalise their socio-economic conditions in relation to the upper castes.702 Whether 
or not the Malas have improved their socio-economic conditions so as to be on a par with 
the caste Hindus, their very claim of merit implies that they already have improved 
themselves in comparison with the other members in the Dalit category. This means that 
the difference is not in merit, but in educational access, and principally this should take 
away the reverse discriminatory advantage that Malas receive. Otherwise, with their 
improved situation, they will continue to entrench themselves in reservation opportunities 
and thus minimise the opportunities available for the marginalised castes.703  
 
Now let us examine the MRPS’ argument. The issue of “under-representation of certain 
categories of people”, according to Anne Phillips, “is often so stark that its injustice 
seems beyond question”.704 However, if one were to disaggregate injustice from under-
representation and examine the latter on its own terms, the general claim that a lack of 
equal or proportionate caste presence in the administration constitutes an injustice as 
Rochana Bajpai argues, could be  refuted on three grounds.705 First, it might be argued 
that a certain group of people in comparison with some other group of people is under-
represented in the administration because its members lack the education and required 
                                                 
701 Khasim, a researcher from Osmania University, Hyderabad makes an interesting observation against the 
merit argument of the Malas: ’While the upper castes have been chanting the merit mantra for the last fifty 
to sixty years, today the Malas have joined this congregation. …According to this meritorious people (both 
the caste Hindus and the Malas), whoever have merit will have seat and employment. Then what is the 
need for the reservations at all? Let’s discontinue with the reservation system, and let’s allow the 
meritorious to get the seat and employment. Are the Malas ready for this?’ (Khasim in Panthukala’s film: 
Dandora).  
702 For a detailed discussion on the reservation provision for the Dalits and other backward groups, see 
Bajpai, Rochana. 2002. Minority Rights in the Indian Constituent Assembly Debates, 1946. QEH Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper number 30. 
703 Personally I do not suggest the idea of blocking of the Malas from availing reservation facilities. Except 
a small percentage among them, most of the Malas are equally poor as the Madigas. 
704 Phillips, Anne. 1998[1995]. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 21; ----, 2005[1991]. 
Engendering Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press; see also, Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. The Concept of 
Representation. Berkeley: UCP; George Kateb. 1981. The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative 
Democracy. Ethics, 91(3); Will Kymlicka. 1996. Three Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenship in 
Canada. In: Benhabib Seyla., ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. 
Princeton: PUP.  
705 Bajpai, Rochana. 2004. The legitimating vocabulary of group rights…pp: 182- 229.  
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skills for particular jobs. Second, it may be argued that the claim that a group’s 
representation in the administration must be commensurate with that group’s 
demographic weight is based on the assumption that members of the group share an equal 
desire for bureaucratic jobs. It is possible, however, that a group’s members do not share 
a preference for the same jobs. In such a situation, “disproportionalities in group presence 
in the bureaucracy would reflect the diversity in preference between groups, rather than 
any injustice”.706 Third, it might be argued that since administrative jobs comprise mainly 
middle-class jobs, a group’s under-representation in those jobs does not constitute 
injustices against that group. The bureaucracy would mirror the demographic profiles of 
the social groups, as suggested by Rosenbloom, “only if all major social groups are 
distributed equally, in proportional terms, along the social stratification system”.707  
 
The above three arguments, however, could be contested both from the point of view of 
social justice and democracy. To begin with, from the standpoint of social justice, first: in 
any given society, if one section or group of people lacks the requisite education or skills 
for administrative jobs in comparison with other groups or sections of people, that in 
itself constitutes structural injustice. In order to remedy such injustice, a structural 
solution, which ensures the presence of the disadvantaged group(s) in administrative jobs, 
is necessary. Second, an individual’s choice or preference in any given society is always 
formed both on account of “what has been set as a norm”,708 and in consonance with the 
opportunities available to him or her. By conferring inferior occupations on the lower 
castes as well as by making their culture seem inferior, the caste Hindu society not 
merely misrecognises the human agency of the lower castes, but also damages the 
confidence that lower caste members acquire through their culture.709 Furthermore, 
outside the boundaries of reservations, the opportunities available for the lower castes are 
so meagre that occupations beyond their traditional caste occupations are hard to 
imagine. It is the combination of structurally confined opportunities and socially moulded 
                                                 
706 Ibid., pp: 194-5. 
707 Rosenbloom, D.H. 1977. Federal Equal Employment Opportunity, Politics and Public Personnel 
Administration, pp. 38-39, cited in Bajpai, Rochana. 2004. The legitimacy … p. 195. 
708 Sunstein, C.R. 1991. Preferences and Politics. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20/1, cited in Phillips, 
Anne. 1998[1995]. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 44. 
709 For an excellent theoretical discussion on the politics of recognition and misrecognition see Taylor, 
Charles. 1994. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: PUP.  
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inferiority complex that destroys the motivation and confidence needed for lower castes 
to aspire for prestigious positions in employment and education. Moreover, “to take 
preference as given”, as Bajpai observes, “would be to ignore the possibility that 
differences in preferences along group lines might be reflective of patterns of structural 
inequality, patterns that are themselves the product of the interaction of cultural and 
economic injustices, of the injustice of recognition and injustices of distribution.”710  
 
Third, while the number of prestigious positions in any administrative set-up is limited, 
the dominant presence of members of certain groups and a lack of presence of the 
members of other social groups clearly provide evidence of injustice against the latter.711 
In any case, what must be clearly recognised here is that the system of reservation is a 
“representational mechanism” to mirror the proportion of Dalits and Adivasis in society 
in the domains of educational and employment opportunities and legislative bodies.712 
And sub-classification of that representation is simply extending this concept of mirror 
representation within the Dalit category.  
 
2. Caste-based Justice versus Group-based Justice: The second key theme of the Dandora 
debate is what I call the unit of justice. The MRPS demanded sub-classification of the 
Dalit reservations taking caste as the main qualification, for every caste in the Dalit 
category to have an opportunity to access its legitimate share. The Mala Mahanadu 
strongly objected to the caste qualification, and favoured group-based justice or 
continuation of existing patterns of distribution of Dalit reservations.  
 
In its demand for caste-based distribution of Dalit reservations, the MRPS has argued that 
although quotas were provided for Dalits as a group, Malas have been ‘monopolising’ 
those opportunities. As a consequence, marginalised castes like Madigas and Rellis were 
deprived of their legitimate share in common opportunities; and such deprivation, in turn, 
                                                 
710 Bajpai, Rochana. 2004. The legitimating…, p.195; also see William, Melissa. 1999. Voice, Trust and 
Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failing of Liberal Representation, Princeton: PUP, pp: 16-17.  
711 Incidentally, Amitabh Kundu who chaired the second expert group to “examine and determine the 
structure of an Equal Opportunity Commission” argues that if a community (even if a minority) is already 
over represented in a given institution, it cannot claim any benefits. See, Kundu, Amitabh. 2008. ‘Report of 
the Expert Group on Diversity Index’, submitted to the Ministry of Minority Affairs, Govt. of India.  
712 Tharu, Susie et al., 2007. Reservations and Return to Politics. EPW, 42 (49), p. 40. 
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resulted in their further marginalisation. For instance, Dr. P. Muttaiah, a member of the 
Madiga Intellectuals Forum argues: “[E]ducationally, the Madiga caste is far behind the 
Mala caste […] First generation educated [Madiga] youth will find it difficult to make a 
mark in the competition for reserved posts. It is time that this issue is considered in all its 
aspects and entry of the less advanced among SCs and STs should be enabled through a 
policy of Special Discrimination in their favour.’713  
 
Two crucial aspects of the above argument are: (A) Caste is the crucial factor both in the 
monopolisation and deprivation of opportunities (for evidence see Table 6.3 below); as 
such, caste should be the basis for any re-distributional measures. For this would 
facilitate marginalised castes access to their legitimate share in the reservations. (B) 
There is a perceptible gap between the abilities of the dominant and marginalised Dalit 
castes. While the Malas, who have been garnering opportunities, are equipped with the 
required skills for competition, the same is not true for the Madigas who have just begun 
to enter the arenas of education and employment. Thus continuation of the existing 
patterns of distribution would continue to keep the most marginalised castes away from 
opportunities. In addition to these two, it may be recognized here that in the sub-
classification demand there is no demand for justice/compensation for what the 
marginalised castes have been losing on account of the appropriation of opportunities by 
the dominant Dalit castes. They are only seeking justice in the present and future 
distribution of the Dalit quota.  
        Table 7.3: Representation of the Malas and Madigas in the total (state-level) SC Opportunities 
 Malas Madigas 
Population 51.39 lakhs 60.74 lakhs 
State Public Sector Undertakings 61.8% 31.0% 
Educational Institutions 57.2% 38.18% 
AP State Secretariat 59.5% 34.4% 
IPS Officers in the State 76.92% 23.0% 
IPS Officers in other States 86.21% 13.79% 
Office of Deputy Collector 78.13% 21.18% 
Magistrates 86.21% 13.79% 
                Source: Mehra, Usha. 2008: Report of the National Commission to examine the issue of Sub-classification of              
                Scheduled Castes in Andhra Pradesh. 
                                                 
713 My interview with Dr. P. Muttaiah, Madiga Intellectuals Forum, Hyderabad on October, 23, 2006. 
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Mala Mahanadu put forward two arguments in its opposition to caste-based reservations. 
First, as Venkatarao Mallela, justifying Mala Mahanadu’s position on the grounds of 
‘distributional dynamics’ of social justice, argues: 
Social justice operates in stages. In the first stage, justice in the form of social equality, 
wealth and power must be distributed between the exploiter castes and proletariat castes; 
and the second stage is that of distribution among the oppressed castes. This is also a 
stage in which the internal inequalities of the oppressed will be sorted out.714  
 
In his own theory of social justice, Mallela divides the Indian society into three primary 
groups: exploiter, proletariat and oppressed; and argues that the distribution of power and 
wealth among these three groups should be undertaken in a phased manner. In the first 
stage, the distribution of justice should be confined to the exploiter and the proletariat. 
Once such distribution has taken place, there comes the second stage, where the 
oppressed will be given their share of justice; this is also the stage at which the internal 
problems of the oppressed will be sorted out.  
 
It is a plain fact that in order to ignore inequalities and differences within the Dalit group 
and to evade the MRPS’ claim of caste-based justice, Mallela rather cleverly employs the 
idea of class-based groups and does not even acknowledge the existence of caste. Such an 
approach is nothing more than a strategy designed to reinforce the dominance of the 
Malas in reservation opportunities.715  
 
Second, P V Rao, President of the Mala Mahanadu, rejecting the caste-based re-
distribution of reservation opportunities as an erroneous and dangerous trend, argues: 
It may be true that the Malas enjoy a lion’s share in the SC reservations. However, it is 
not correct to categorise Dalits into four groups and thereby divide the reservations into 
four shares. This is for two reasons: one, after sub-classification, the fruits of the 
reservations will be snatched away by the ‘developed castes in each group’. Two, since 
the developed castes anyway would grab the reservations, differences within the same 
group are bound to occur, and this, in turn, would compel the under-developed castes to 
demand yet another categorszation. Once we begin the sub-classification process we 
                                                 
714 Mallela Venkatrao. Vargeekaranato dakkeadi vatti-vistari (Empty plate with categorization), in Andhra 
Jyothi 19 December, 2004.  
715 This argument is simply similar to the grounds of objections made by the Brahmins and other Hindu 
upper castes both in colonial and post-Independence India. A great body of literature is available on this. 
For a representative sample, see Eugene, I. 1969. Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-
Brahmin Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1916-1929. Berkeley: UCP, pp: 218-74; for a compelling 
discussion on Mandal debate see, Dirks, N. B. 2001. Castes of Mind… pp: 275-302. 
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would have to continue this process until the end of human race. Therefore, sub-
classification is not only an erroneous principle but also a dangerous trend.716 
Two main points of this argument are: first, sub-classification benefits the advanced 
sections within the marginalised castes; and second, sub-classification sets a dangerous 
precedent, for it creates space for further sub-classification demands. 
 
Interestingly, this was not the first time that the argument that reservations benefit a few, 
especially the privileged sections within the group, was made. Initially this argument was 
made during the Constituent Assembly debates,717 and later on during the Mandal 
debate.718 Even the second point in P V Rao’s argument was made during the Constituent 
Assembly debates by members like Damodar Swarup Seth and Pandit Hriday Nath 
Kunzru in order to oppose the policy of reservations.719   
 
In any case, the argument that fruits of sub-classification will be appropriated by the 
advanced sections within the marginalised castes applies equally to Malas’ own case. In 
this sense, the Malas, along with the other Dalit castes, have been the victims of the 
caste-Hindus’ practice of untouchability, political oppression and economic exploitation. 
Yet, if we compare the socio-economic and political standards of the Malas and Adi-
Andhras with any other castes within the Dalit category, their standards are higher than 
other Dalit castes, and thus constitute the advanced castes within the Dalit category. 
Evidently, it was on account of their advanced position that they have at the forefront in 
appropriating the common opportunities of the Dalit group for themselves. In other 
words, the opportunities available for the Dalit category are limited, and even those 
limited opportunities were usurped by the advanced castes, a usurpation that forced the 
                                                 
716 My interview with P V Rao, President of the Mala Mahanadu in Hyderabad, May, 2004, Hyderabad. 
717 For Krishna Chandra Sharma argument, see Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report (CAD), 
(1946-1950), Delhi: The Government of India, Vol. VIII, p. 516; and for Brajeshwar Prasad, CAD, Vol. IX, 
p. 629.  
718 Responding to Rajni Kothari’s defence of the caste-based reservations for the OBCs during the Mandal 
debate, M. N. Srinivas, A.M. Shah and B.S. Bavaskar argued that caste-based quotas for OBCs would 
provide new avenues of exploitation for the elites: ‘the ploy of caste-based reservations, encouraging caste-
based politicisation, is not the solution […] For all we know, this will benefit only the rich and the 
influential in all the castes and leave the poor and weak where they are’.See, M.N. Srinivas, A. M. Shah, 
and B.S. Bavaskar. 1990. ‘Kothari’s Illusion of Secular Upsurge’, Times of India, Letter to editor, October 
17, quoted in Dirks, B.N. 2001. Castes of Mind…p. 287; for Kothari’s arguments, Kothari, Rajni. 1990. 
Caste and Politics: The Great Secular Upsurge, in Times of India, op-ed. piece, September 28.  
719 For Damodar Swarup Seth, see Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report (CAD), (1946-1950), 
Delhi: The Govt. of India, Vol. VII, p. 516; and for Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru, see CAD, Vol. IX, p. 629.  
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marginalised Dalit castes, such as the Madigas and Rellis, to demand caste-based 
redistribution of reservations.  Undoubtedly, this pattern of usurpation of opportunities by 
the advanced will be repeated even after categorisation; for as there are advanced castes 
within the Dalit category, there are advanced sections or classes within every caste.720  
But this cannot be the justification for the continuation of the existing, category-based 
distribution of reservations. Because without the caste-based sub-classification of 
reservations, even those advanced sections, let alone the marginalised sections, within the 
marginalised castes would not be able to access the reservation opportunities which are 
their due share. While the castes that had been appropriating opportunities will continue 
to appropriate them, the marginalised castes will continue to be excluded.721  
 
Arguably, the Mala Mahanadu’s claim that sub-classification would only result in 
reproducing similar injustices is a valid argument, since the immediate beneficiaries from 
sub-classification would almost certainly not be the most disadvantaged among the 
marginalised. This is, in fact, one of the main concerns of the Madigas themselves. For 
instance, the Madigas of Telangana region have been expressing concern over the 
disproportionate advantage taken by the Madigas from coastal Andhra in the event of 
categorisation, since the latter already enjoys better educational opportunities than the 
former.722 Similar concerns are also expressed by the Madiga women:  
Madiga women constitute half of the Madiga population. Of the total reservation benefits 
received by our men, we do not get even one percent of those benefits. As women we 
face triple discrimination against us, and that should be taken into consideration in the 
distribution of the reservations [...] we demand sub-classification of reservations on the 
basis of caste and we also demand sub-classification on the basis of gender.723  
 
From this statement, it is clear that while the Madigas of the Telangana region, who are 
disadvantaged both on account of caste and regional backwardness, are seeking justice on 
these grounds, the Madiga women, who were disadvantaged on account of gender, caste, 
and class, demand that these three aspects should be taken into account in the distribution 
                                                 
720 For an interesting analysis on classes within castes, see Chaudhury, Pradipta. 2005. Does caste indicate 
deprivation?, Seminar, No. 549.  
721 My conversations with Srinivas Gurram, research scholar, Department of Sociology, University of 
Hyderabad, 10 January, 2004. 
722 Interviews conducted by Pantukala Srinivas in his Dandora – a documentary film on sub-classification 
of the SC reservations.  
723 My interview with Mary Madiga, President of the Madiga Mahila Samakhya, 4 May, 2006, Hyderabad. 
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of opportunities. This is neither the first nor the last time that we encounter this sort of 
demand from the marginalised sections, for, as Iris Young observes, “we live in a society 
with deep group oppressions… complete elimination of which is only a remote 
possibility”’.724  
 
However, as a way out of this impasse we have two options. First, simply follow the 
advice of the Mala Mahanadu and do not take any action. In a sense, if oppression of 
groups is a permanent phenomenon, any initiative to redress those injustices would result 
in further injustices and thus, in either case we will continue to live with injustice. 
Second, we could constantly engage in finding ways to redress injustices, and thus strive 
to construct a just society.  And if we were to follow this latter line of action, how would 
we ensure justice to the marginalised Dalit castes? Here there is no need to labour or 
discuss anymore the issue of why caste should be the basis for social justice, since it has 
already been concluded that if the basis of discrimination is caste then the “basis of 
preferential policy in favour of the lower castes needs to be based on caste”.725 In the 
following I shall probe the Mala Mahanadu argument that the present demand for sub-
classification leads to several other such demands, and I tackle the issue with the help of 
the concerns expressed by Telangana Madigas and Madiga women.726  
 
If categorisation of the SC reservations were actualised, the Madigas would, on the basis 
of their population proportionality within the Dalit group in AP, secure 7 per cent of the 
Dalit opportunities. As the State is divided into three regions (coastal Andhra, Telangana 
and Rayalaseema), to ensure that Madigas in each of these regions get their share of 
opportunities, the total Madigas share of 7 per cent will be divided into three shares. 
While coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions will be given 2 per cent each, the 
Telangana region will get 3 per cent, simply because a majority of Madigas live in this 
region. We need to combine the gender aspect in the regional distribution itself, that is – 
the share of the regions should be divided into two equal shares between Madiga men and 
women. Such distribution means that we have taken three aspects of backwardness into 
                                                 
724 Young, I. Marion. 1989. Polity and Group Difference…p. 262.  
725 Thorat, Sukhdeo. 2006. Paying the Social Debt. EPW, 41 (24), p.2345. 
726 I thank Matt Nelson for clarifying my thinking on this point.  
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account: caste, region and gender. In future, if rural Madigas, who are disadvantaged by 
lack of opportunities (educational and employment) in comparison with their counterparts 
in urban areas, demand further categorisation, then each region’s share of opportunities 
would be divided into two equal shares. Thus, a further sub-classification of existing 
opportunities means dividing the share into four shares, where one percent of 
opportunities would be equally divided between Madiga men and women in urban areas 
and the remaining one percent to be distributed equally between the Madiga men and 
women in rural areas. In the future, even after such distribution, if some Madigas were to 
make a demand for sub-classification on the basis of a just cause, unequivocally that 
cause should be taken into account and further sub-classification executed. If one were to 
add a fifth element of difference or backwardness to the already existing four elements - 
that is, caste, region, gender, rural and urban differences -- the half a percent of 
opportunities would be divided into two quarters, a further addition in the existing list of 
differences means dividing the quarter share of opportunities into two equal shares. Thus, 
each additional element would reduce the share of opportunities and finally we would 
arrive at a stage where group differences would be replaced by individual differences, 
and this means each person will stand for his/her opportunities. Thus, the argument that 
one sub-classification sets a norm for other categorisations in future is logically valid. But 
unlike the Mala Mahanadu, I would like to treat this as a path towards a solution for 
tackling inequalities among Dalits rather than as a barrier.727  
 
3. Modern Opportunities versus Traditional Occupations: The third key theme in the 
Dandora debate concerns opportunities for economic empowerment. While the MRPS 
grounded its demand for sub-classification on the idea of accessing modern opportunities, 
the Mala Mahanadu countered such a claim by suggesting that Madigas should be given 
economic assistance in order to develop their traditional occupations, especially sandal-
making. Vara Prasad, a MRPS campaigner, maintains:  
 
                                                 
727 A similar proposal has been made by Justice Rajinder Sachar Committee. See, Sachar, Rajinder., 2006. 
‘Report on Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, New Delhi: 
Government of India; for an analysis of this report, see Khaitan, Tarunabh., 2008. Transcending 
Reservations: A Paradigm Shift in the Debate on Equality. EPW, 43(38), pp: 8-12. 
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Just like the Malas or any other caste in society we also want to send our children to 
schools, colleges and universities. […] Unlike most of the Madigas, who toil throughout 
the year as agricultural labourers or sandal repairers, at least some of our children would 
have the opportunity to go to colleges, become educated and get some jobs.728  
 
Prasad’s observation mirrors a genuine aspiration of a community of people who have 
been historically disadvantaged on account of the systemic oppression inflicted upon 
them by the caste-Hindu society, to access modern opportunities and improve life 
conditions. Before we examine the justification of this argument, let’s examine the Mala 
Mahanadu’s counter-argument.  
 
The response of the Mala Mahanadu is typical. “Since the Madigas were into leather-
making,” it was argued by C R Sekhar, “the best way for their empowerment was to give 
them help so as to develop their traditional occupations, especially the leather work.”729 
On the surface, this is an argument for economic assistance.  But deep down there is a 
casteist argument as well.  Let’s examine these two aspects below: 
   
The Mala Mahanadu’s economic assistance argument is problematic for three reasons.  
First, it was true that leather-making was the caste occupation of the Madigas.  But that 
was during pre-Independence, when society was heavily dependent on agriculture. As 
agriculture required various leather instruments, the Madigas developed the making of 
leather goods as a cottage industry. But as society advanced and with the development of 
modern agricultural practices as well as modern leather technologies, the Madigas lost 
their cottage industry and joined the other Dalits and lower castes as agricultural 
labourers. Second, although some of the Madigas have survived by skinning dead cattle, 
tanning and repairing footwear (sandals) in post-Independent India, this has not liberated 
them from the clutches of poverty.  As leather work gives poor rewards, the Madigas who 
work with leather are continuing to live in wretched economic conditions.   
 
Moreover, recognising the profits in the business of footwear, the Kammas in the state 
and Marvadis from Rajasthan and Gujarat have set up huge leather industries throughout 
                                                 
728 My interview with D. M. Vara Prasad, a sitting Congress (I) MLA - Tadikonda constituency, Guntur 
district, 13 July, 2006. 
729 See, Sekhar, C.R. 2005. Sub-Classificaiton: A Political scheme to destroy Dalit Power…’ p. 22.  
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the state, especially in coastal Andhra districts. As these industries were able to produce 
fashionable sandals cheap, consumers turned to these factory-made sandals. And this led 
to the Madigas have completely lost their traditional occupation. Interestingly, despite 
leather-making being their caste’s occupation, it was not the Madigas who joined these 
factories but, rather, the Malas, who joined as leather workers.730This was due to the 
socio-economic development of the Malas. As the Malas among the Dalits in the state 
had been the first to take to education and move to urban centres, they became aware of 
the opportunities available through these factories. In a way, the Madigas lost their 
cottage industry to the upper caste capitalists and lost their traditional occupation to the 
advanced Malas.    
 
Second, of the 80 lakhs (or eight million) Madigas in the state, as Venkatesh Madiga 
informs,731 only 1 percent Madigas engage in their caste occupation.  But this 
engagement with the caste’s occupation does not mean that they own footwear shops.  
They are just cobblers, repairing old or broken sandals.  If the government assists the 
Madigas to develop their caste-based occupation, only this 1 percent of Madigas will 
benefit from such assistance. By implication the remaining 99 percent of the Madigas, 
who are not engaged in the caste’s occupation, are left out from this economic assistance, 
thus, resulting in the further marginalisation of the entire caste. Finally, making footwear 
manually is definitely a skill and an art.  Yet, there is no due recognition accorded to it in 
a society whose attitude towards work in general, and leather work in particular, is 
derived from the Brahmanical notions of purity and pollution. Thus the Madigas skill in 
making footwear carries a stigma. Therefore, economic assistance, instead of liberating 
the Madigas from the clutches of a traditional occupation - and by implication from 
Brahmanical ideology - will victimise them in that inherited occupation and imposed 
ideology. Further, it must be recognised here that the economic assistance argument is 
one of the most potent casteist arguments. Balagopal retorts, “Uplift them from their 
poverty and give them economic assistance to improve their traditional occupations […] 
but do not breach our preserve of expanding knowledge and the status and opportunities 
                                                 
730 My field interviews with some of the leather workers in those factories in Vijayawada, 26-29, October, 
2004.  
731 My interview with Venkatesh Madiga in Vijayawada, 3 May, 2005.  
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it carries.”732 In other words, the premise of Malas’ arguments is that while they should 
work their way out of the structure of caste-determined occupations, Madigas should 
continue to live within the structure.  
 
Problems and inconsistencies in the arguments of the Malas aside, the Madigas’ 
argument of sub-classification of SC reservation in order to access modern opportunities 
is a justifiable argument.  This can be supported from the arguments put forward in the 
Constituent Assembly debates.733 The provisions of reservations in educational and 
employment opportunities for the Dalits and others were justified on the grounds of 
fairness and welfare, which are fore-grounded on the notion of equality.  On the idea of 
fairness, it was argued that without some form of special provisions it would be 
impossible for historically disadvantaged groups to access educational and employment 
opportunities. Without their participation in these opportunities, the constitutional 
provisions of equality of opportunities for all citizens would remain mere paper 
declarations. Here, a distinction was being drawn between formal and substantive 
equality of opportunity or as supporters of reservations put it, between ‘paper’ and ‘real’ 
equality. In other words, the idea behind this argument was that equality cannot be 
achieved between a group that was advantaged by its historical monopoly of access to 
opportunities and a group that was disadvantaged by lack of access to opportunities. 
Reservations were essential not only to rectify the structural forms of discrimination but 
also to overcome persisting practices of discrimination, even after such practices were 
outlawed and equality of opportunity had been formally instituted. 
 
The welfare type of argument was found in K. T. Shah’s observation:  
…any special discrimination in favour of (Scheduled Castes and ‘backward’ tribes) may 
not be regarded as violating the basic principles of equality for all classes of citizens in 
the country. They need, and must be given, for sometime to come at any rate, special 
treatment in regard to education, in regard to opportunity for employment and in many 
other cases where their present inequality, their present backwardness is only hindrance 
to the rapid development of the country.734  
                                                 
732 Balagopal, K. 2000. A Tangled Web…’, p. 1078. 
733 I have taken these arguments from Bajpai, Rochana. 2002. The conceptual vocabularies of secularism 
and minority rights in India. Journal of Political Ideologies, 7 (2), pp: 179-197. 
734 See CAD, Vol. VII, pp: 655-56.  
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Thus, in the above argument, justification for reservations as a matter of general welfare 
was made at two levels. First, the reservation measures were a necessity so as to reduce 
the vast socio-economic disparities between groups. Second, although reducing 
inequalities among groups was in itself a necessity, the tackling of inequalities was an 
essential pre-condition both for national integration as well as general progress and 
development of the country.735  
 
Two key ideas in the above two justifications for the system of reservation in the debates 
of the Constituent Assembly are: (a) tackling historical disadvantage, and (b) 
empowerment of the marginalized for the larger progress and development of the 
country. Let’s look at Dandora’s demand for sub-classification in order to access modern 
opportunities in the light of these two ideas.    
 
First, as has been shown above, although both the Malas and the Madigas had been part 
of the larger Dalit category, there has been a huge gap between the two castes in terms of 
socio-economic conditions and access to modern opportunities, which include 
educational, employment and political. Here one should not label the Malas villains for 
taking advantage of the reservation opportunities earmarked for Dalits as a group as their 
advantage was initially determined both by historical reasons as well as the occupations 
imposed on them by the caste system. Similarly, the present disadvantage of the Madigas 
was determined by the initial disadvantage in the form of their physical location in the 
Telangana region and occupations pursued by them on account of their social location in 
the caste hierarchy.  In a way, the present advantage and disadvantage of the Malas and 
the Madigas, respectively,  were not of their own accord, but simply on account of certain 
historical as well as socio-structural factors. Yet, those factors came to determine their 
present abilities and inabilities in accessing the opportunities for reservation.  Hence, 
there is need to take these factors into account and in this respect, the Madigas’ demand 
for sub-classification to access modern opportunities is justified.  
                                                 
735 For further analysis on the questions of political representation and reservations in employment for 
minorities in the debates of Constituent Assembly, see Jha, Shefali. 2002. Secularism in the Constituent 
Assembly Debates, 1946-1950. EPW, 37(30), pp: 3175-3180; --------, 2004. Representation and Its 
Epiphanies: A Reading of Constituent Assembly Debates. EPW, 39 (39), pp: 4357-4360. 
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Second, based on the idea of empowerment of a certain caste/community for the larger 
development of the country, the Madigas’ demand for sub-classification in order to 
access modern opportunities can be justified on two grounds: (a) as the Madigas are one 
of the most disadvantaged castes among the Dalit category, they cannot be empowered 
unless every part of it is empowered; and (b) as the Dalits are also part of the country, 
any progress and development of the country is contingent upon the progress and 
development of the Dalits. In other words, unless the Madigas are empowered the 
country cannot be developed. From the standpoint of the larger goal, the Madigas 
demand is also further justified.  
 
4. Unity versus Uniformity: Two other key ideas in the Dandora debate are: unity and 
uniformity. While the Mala Mahanadu rejected the sub-classification from the point of 
view of Dalit unity, MRPS, on the other hand, built its demand for sub-classification 
upon the idea of uniformity of the Dalit group. First I shall analyse the Mala Mahanadu’s 
arguments, followed by the MRPS.   
 
The Mala Mahanadu, in its rejection of categorisation, had conceived four arguments 
around the notion of Dalit unity:  
1. Malas and Madigas are all Dalits; all are oppressed and exploited in the Brahmanical caste system. 
The Manuvadis (the upper castes) are jealous of our unity, and sub-classification is their political 
conspiracy to divide and rule Ambedkar’s family.736 (Gutam Swamy, a Mala Mahanadu activist). 
 
2. …at present, whenever there is any incident of atrocities against any caste among the Dalit 
community, all the Dalit castes together face the tyranny of the upper castes and agitate against 
such incidents unitedly. However, after the castes are divided into groups, members of other castes 
or groups will not come forward to protect the victims if the latter do not belong either to the caste 
or group of the former.- (Mala Mahanadu in a memorandum to the National Commission for SCs 
& STs, 1998).   
 
3. ...after sub-classification people would give their vote to their caste’s candidates only…there will 
be unprecedented political competitions, which will lead to social animosities among Dalits as 
every Dalit caste would field its own candidate in the reserved constituencies. - (Suryarao 
Gollapalli, a Congress MLA).  
 
                                                 
736 Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, who was a Dalit himself, was at the forefront in fighting against caste 
discrimination against the Dalits in modern India; and as the chairman of the drafting committee of the 
Indian Constitution, he was instrumental in getting reservations for the Dalits.  As such Dalits all over 
India, irrespective of their caste affiliations regard him as ‘the Father of the Dalit jati (nation)’. 
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4. Fighting for sub-classification is a sheer waste of energy.  Madigas, Malas, Rellis, Adi-Andhras 
and other Dalit castes should join together to demand reservations in the private sector. -  (Jupudi 
Prabhakara Rao, in Andhra Jyothi, 14 April, 2005).  
 
Four aspects are clear from the above arguments. First, both the Malas and Madigas are 
considered part of the Ambedkar family (Dalit category), and the Madigas have nothing 
to do with the demand for categorisation, as it was a political conspiracy by the upper 
castes to destroy the unity of the family. Second, two negative consequences of Dalit 
disunity are: (a) all the Dalit members would not be obliged either to protect the Dalit 
victims or protest against atrocities if the victims do not belong to their caste or sub-caste. 
In other words, sub-classification would trick Dalits into thinking and acting towards 
realisation of narrow, caste-based interests rather than the lofty goals of the larger group; 
and thus, such lack of obligation will adversely affect the security of individual Dalit 
castes; (b) disunity among Dalits would perpetuate the rule of the upper castes. Third, it 
has been assumed that sub-classification results in unwanted political competition and 
social animosities among Dalit castes. This implies that such competition and animosities 
did not exist among Dalits prior to the sub-classification demand.  Finally, all the Dalits, 
irrespective of their individual caste backgrounds, are urged to join the movement for 
reservations in the private sector.   
 
Interestingly, the MRPS also used the language of family and Dalit unity. For them, 
however, unity will be achieved only when the reservation opportunities are equally (i.e., 
proportionally)737 distributed among all the ‘children’ of Ambedkar. The MRPS put 
forward three arguments on the notion of uniformity among the Dalits:  
1. Ambedkar, a father-figure to both Madigas and Malas, advocated that property should be equally 
distributed between two sons rather then appropriated by one son. -  (Krishna Madiga).738  
 
2. First and foremost, distributive justice must be done to the Madigas and its sub-castes, Rellis and 
its sub-castes. Distributive justice among all the castes is an indispensable step before we join 
other Dalit castes for political power. We recognise the importance of Dalit unity to fight against 
social and political Hindutva ideologies; and Madigas would certainly join the Malas and the other 
Dalit castes in that fight provided the Malas support the sub-classification demand.- (Krupakar 
Madigas).739  
                                                 
737 In the Dandora debate, the words ‘proportionality’ and ‘equality’ have been used inter-changeably. 
Although conceptually they are two different terms, nevertheless, I shall also use them inter-changeably. 
738 Krishna Madiga, in his address to the Dandora activists in Ambedkar Bhavan, Hyderabad, 20 February, 
1999 - Participant observation of the researcher. 
739 Krupakar Madiga’s interview in Pantukala Srinivas’s Dandora – a documentary film on categorization. 
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3. How is it possible for a person at the ground level to join hands with another person standing on 
the terrace to forge friendship, unity, or work together or even fight against the Manu dharma? Is 
unity possible between two unequal individuals? […] Unity is possible between equals and not 
between unequal.-Jupaka Subhadra.740  
 
In the above three statements two arguments put forward by the MRPS in its support of 
the sub-classification are: (a) equality in distribution, and (b) Dalit unity to fight against 
the Hindutva/Manu Dharma.741 In his argument Krupakar Madiga unequivocally 
recognises the importance of Dalit unity in the fight against the forces of Hindutva, both 
in the social and political realms. But such a fight for him needs to be preceded by justice 
for all castes in the Dalit group. Jupaka’s argument has also similar elements. First, she 
points out the common enemy, i.e, the Manu dharma of both the Madigas and Malas; 
second, she recognises the need for a united front against that common enemy; and third, 
she emphasises the conditions required for unity. Unity can only be achieved between 
two equal parties. Thus, both the Mala Mahanadu and Madiga Dandora have sought Dalit 
unity on similar grounds, i.e., to fight the common enemy and to secure common interests 
through political power. The one crucial difference between them is that, while the latter 
asks for the sorting out of any internal problems before taking common action, the former 
sees such action as unnecessary. For them, the enormity of the threat posed by the enemy 
is sufficient condition for seeking unity.  
 
Now let us analyse the normal claims involved in concepts of family and unity. First of 
all, we need to recognise that what is being claimed in the concepts of the Ambedkar 
family and Dalit unity is in the self-interest of both the Malas and Madigas. This can be 
explained from two perspectives. First, both the Madigas and Malas, as the castes at the 
bottom of the caste hierarchy, are vulnerable to caste-based atrocities and discrimination 
against them by the caste-Hindus. No caste can fight against the upper castes on its own 
strength, and support of the other Dalit castes is sine qua non.  Interestingly, it may be 
mentioned here that whenever the upper castes commit atrocities against Dalits, it is 
                                                 
740 Interview with Jupaka Subhadra, in Pantukala Srinivas’ Dandora – a documentary film on sub-
classification of the SC reservations. Anveshi – Research Centre for Women’s Studies, Hyderabad. 
741 Although there is great difference between Hindutva and Manu Dharma, most Dalits tend to equate one 
with the other. While Hindutva does not recognise caste identity and thus caste occupations, the Manu 
Dharma strictly wants people to observe caste and practice the occupations assigned to them. 
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always strategically against an individual Dalit caste rather than Dalits as a group. For 
instance, in Karamchedu village, despite the presence of the Malas and Madigas, the 
Kammas organised a massacre against the Madigas alone; and in Chunduru it was against 
Malas alone. Thus, unity between both castes serves the interests of each caste.   
 
Second, on the political front also unity is in the common interest of all Dalit castes. As 
Anne Phillips points out, “partly this is no more than efficiency: to change the world we 
need the weight of numbers”.742 No individual Dalit caste on its demographic weight 
alone can win elections. Phrases such as Dalit family and Dalit unity, are simply veils of 
social courtesy designed to hide the ugly face of self-interest. Of course, it is true that 
sometimes ‘members of families are bound by ties of sentiment and affection and 
willingly acknowledge duties in contradiction to self-interest.’743 But in the case of the 
Madiga Dandora and the Mala Mahanadu, it is not affection for an individual family, but 
for their own socio-political interests. Third, it is difficult to see any rationale in the Mala 
Mahanadu’s argument that sub-classification leads to competition, inter-caste rivalry and 
animosity among Dalits. In fact, the prevailing inter-caste animosities are due to the 
domination of one caste or few castes over the reservation opportunities provided to the 
group as a whole. To my mind, sub-classification should lead to amity in the group, to 
camaraderie rather than competition or animosity. In other words, competition among the 
Dalit castes is due to disproportional appropriation of opportunities by a few castes, and 
if that condition is eliminated, there is no reason for inter-caste rivalries and 
competition.744  
 
Finally, on the question of reservations in the private sector: With the economic 
liberalisation there is a shift in emphasis from public to private sector, which has vastly 
reduced employment opportunities in the public sector. This has, in turn, reduced the 
employment opportunities for the Dalits, Adivasis and Other Backward Castes 
                                                 
742 Phillips, Anne. 1993. Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 23. 
743 Rawls, John. 2006[1958]. Justice as Fairness. In: Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. eds., 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell publishing, p. 187. 
744 I am aware that the initiation of sub-classification at one level seals the inter-caste competitions, but 
opens up the intra-caste competitions and rivalries among them. But this cannot be sufficient justification 
for the rejection of categorisation. In future, if there is going to be intra-caste competitions as a result of 
categorisation, we need to find a way to work this out. 
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(OBCs).745 Obviously this condition forced the Dalits and other marginalised castes and 
communities to demand reservations in the private sector. Two principles upon which 
this demand has been grounded are: part of the whole and discrimination. The Dalit 
nation is part of the larger Indian nation, and as part of the whole they are, like anybody 
else, entitled to equal opportunities (education, employment), resources and political 
power. But on account of discrimination against them by the upper castes, the Dalits are 
unable to access the common resources. This could be rectified by carving out a portion 
in proportion to the demographic weight of the Dalit nation from the nation’s common 
portion, i.e, resources.746 While the entire Dalit community is eager to take part in the 
new movement and gain reservations in the private sector, a majority of them are 
simultaneously concerned about what will happen to the Dalit portion once that portion is 
realised. 
 
On this issue, we come across two types of response. On the one hand, we have self-
proclaimed Ambedkarites without an understanding of what Ambedkar stood for, and 
Dalit associations like Mala Mahanadu that completely ignore the internal differences 
and inequalities within the so-called Ambedkar family and wh oppose any measure aimed 
at rectifying these inequalities. On the other hand, we have the Dalit middle class, a class 
that is essentially constituted by the elites of the dominant Dalit castes. This class, which 
has amassed a great amount of wealth primarily through reservation opportunities, 
arrogantly thinks that it has a ‘larger vision’ than the grassroot Dalits. The latter has, in 
the opinion of the former, a ‘limited view of things’, and hence, they turn out to be ‘a 
liability for the Dalit movement’.747 This group of elites, who are eager to become 
capitalists, wants to become the commander-in-chief of the Dalit movement so as to 
demand a share in the private sector. Now, whatever the pretensions of this class, can it 
mobilise all the Dalit castes for reservations in the private sector, especially the 
marginalised, without a prior understanding of what would eventually happen to that 
                                                 
745 According to the Report of the Working Group on the Empowering SCs appointed by the National 
Commission on SCs, the Dalits lost about 1,13,430 job opportunities in the central government during the 
period 1992-97, constituting a decline of 10.07 percent.  See Louis, Prakash. 2004. Affirmative Action in 
Private Sector. EPW, 39 (33), p: 3691-92.  
746 Thorat, Sukhadeo and Katherine S Newman., 2007. Caste and Economic Discrimination: Causes, 
Consequences and Remedies. EPW, 42 (41), pp: 4121-4124. 
747 Prasad, Chandrabhan. Problems over roots. The Pioneer, 7 March, 2004.  
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Dalit share? Would that share be shared equally among all the Dalit castes or would it be 
appropriated by the dominant Dalit castes? Answers to these questions do not require any 
experience. Our experience with the present reservations in the public sector is enough to 
say that reservation opportunities in the private sector will be monopolised by the 
dominant Dalit castes, and thus the marginalised Dalit castes will be left out even from 
the opportunities through the private sector. In other words, the experience with 
reservations in the government sector will be repeated in the private sector.   
 
In conclusion, this chapter was an attempt to examine the Dandora debate on the sub-
classification of Dalit reservations in AP.  The debate took place between the MRPS and 
the Mala Mahanadu. While the former, based on the evidence of over-representation of 
the Malas and Adi-Andhras in reservation opportunities for the entire Dalit group, 
demanded sub-classification as a measure of social justice for the marginalised Dalit 
castes, the latter vehemently rejected that demand mainly on the grounds of the idea of 
merit.  In addition to providing the background and context in which the MRPS placed 
the sub-classification demand, I have critically examined the four key themes around 
which the Dandora debate revolves.  While the MRPS justified its sub-classification 
demand on the grounds of ‘representation’, ‘caste as the basis for social justice’, 
‘accessing modern opportunities’ and ‘uniformity within the Dalit group’; the Mala 
Mahanadu rejected those grounds with the notions of ‘merit’, ‘category as the basis of 
justice’, ‘opportunities in the traditional occupations for the under-represented’, and 
‘unity of the Dalit group’. In my analysis, I have placed myself between the two 
contending parties and argued their case from their respective perspective. Eventually, 
however, I have taken the stand of the MRPS argument for sub-classification of the Dalit 
reservations on the basis of caste.  Drawing from the arguments of Sunstein and Bajpai 
and others, I argued that the dominant presence of certain groups and a lack of presence 
of the members of other social groups in any administrative set-up clearly provide 
evidence of injustice against the latter. In other words, sub-categorisation of SC 
reservations on the basis of caste is an effective way of distribution of reservation 
opportunities among all castes within the Dalit group.  
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In conclusion, this Chapter is an attempt to interrogate the issue of social justice and the 
question of categorization of Scheduled Caste reservations in Andhra Pradesh. Through 
that interrogation it aimed to bring-forth paradoxes in the system of positive 
discrimination for the Scheduled Castes in India.  In order to understand and analyse the 
Dandora debate on the question of categorization in Andhra Pradesh critically, I have 
situated myself between the MRPS and MMN and argued their cases from their 
perspectives. Eventually, however, I have taken the stand of the MRPS and argued for 
categorization of the Scheduled Castes reservations as an effective method of distributing 
reservation opportunities among all the castes within the Dalit category.  I have also 
noted the replication of the existing situation in the private sector, if the demand for 
Scheduled Caste reservations in private sector actualizes without the categorization of the 
existing reservations. This Chapter, apart from analysing the question of sub-
categorisation, highlights a sociological phenomenon of caste and sub-caste based 
divisions within the Dalit category, a phenomenon that has so far been neglected by 
social scientists. Also, the analysis presented in the Chapter was helpful not just in 
understanding Dalit activities in AP, it actually placed us in a better position to 
understand the current Dalit engagement in AP and UP comparatively. This, in turn, 
helps us to understand the importance and consequences of having and not having 
political power by a marginalised social category like the Dalits.  
 
****** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
349 
 
Eight………………………………………………………………………...... 
Conclusion 
In retrospect, this thesis aims to analyse Dalit politics in contemporary India. The politics 
of the Dalits, both in colonial India or post-Independence India, has been shaped by their 
position in the Brahmanic hierarchical social system, the Chaturvarna vyavastha. As the 
very name of the system clearly demonstrates, the system comprises four varnas only, 
and Dalits have neither a designated space nor a recognised position within it. Such 
systemic exclusion means that the Dalits have to live in the margins or outside the 
boundaries of the varna order.  This exclusion, in turn, resulted in their exploitation in the 
economic arena, oppression in the political arena and a lack of recognition of their 
humanness in the cultural arena.  How did Dalits respond to these systemic exclusions 
both in colonial and post-Independence India? This is precisely what this thesis has set up 
to answer. It is an attempt to understand the contours of Dalit politics and their 
mobilisations for social equality and political power in contemporary India. It sets for 
itself three principal axes of enquiry: (i) comparatively, by looking at the situation in both 
North and South India, (ii) historically, by looking at the anti-caste movements and Dalit 
protests from the late 19th century onwards and (iii) thematically focusing on caste, 
domination and democracy. On the basis of the trajectories of Dalit mobilisations this 
thesis recognised three stages in Dalit politics: (1) colonial, (2) post-Independence until 
1970’s, and (3) politics since the 1980’s. In order to capture the nuances of Dalit 
mobilisations cross-regionally, this thesis examined Dalit politics in UP and AP from an 
Ambedkarite perspective.  
 
As noted, the Ambedkarite perspective quintessentially draws from Ambedkar’s ideas of 
caste oppression and degradation of the marginalised in all walks of life - democracy, 
equal rights, the State etc. Yet, at the same time, an Ambedkarite perspective does not 
necessarily confine itself to the ideas of Ambedkar, ideas that had evolved in a particular 
socio-political or economic context. It involves a dynamic and critical re-interpretation of 
Ambedkar’s ideas in any given context.  Such an active re-interpretation is definitely not 
retrograde in nature, but is an enlargement of the democratic space and the 
democratisation of society at large.  
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I 
The British colonial government’s proposal for the devolution of power to Indians 
propelled heightened political activism, wherein the Indian political arena witnessed 
unprecedented mobilisations around caste, community and religious identities.  Political 
scientist Varshney, who argued that politics in northern India was exclusively organised 
around the religious identities or what he calls the ‘Hindu-Muslim cleavage’, was largely 
blind to the significance of caste in North Indian politics.  As in the politics of the South 
and West of the country, in the politics of North India also the role and position of caste 
were, and still remain very important. The politics of the lower castes, especially the 
Dalits, was mostly organised around their caste identities, and any study on the politics of 
North India that does not take the ‘caste’ factor into its analysis will be inadequate. 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century Dalits in northern, southern (and western) India were 
organising themselves with two demands: recognition and representation. While the idea 
of representation means a share in the emerging political power, the idea of recognition 
contains two aspects: recognising the Dalits as people with some self-worth and social 
equality.  The Dalits’ claim of achut identity in colonial UP, ‘Adi-Hindu’ in Nizam’s 
Hyderabad and ‘Adi-Andhra’ in the coastal region of Andhra signify the emergence and 
embracing of that ideology by Dalits across the regions. It also signals the similarities in 
their demand for recognition and social equality. But the demand for recognition is not 
simply for social equality or for recognition of their self-worth, rather it is a demand by 
the Dalits to recognise their difference from others, particularly with the other castes or 
with the ‘Hindu community’.  Recognising their difference is important as it was the only 
way through which they could claim their share of representation in the emerging 
configurations of political power.   
 
It is important to recognise here that the Dalits were placing the twin demands of 
recognition and representation at a time when the Brahmins and other upper castes in the 
Indian National Congress were claiming their right for power on the basis of their Aryan 
origin. This was an ideology that sought to exclude the Shudras, Dalits and Adivasis from 
the emerging power. The Dalits’ invention of the Adi-Hindu ideology is a fascinating 
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moment in the history of Dalit assertions.  By claiming adi identity – mula bharatavasi 
(original inhabitants of India) the Dalits not merely sought to project the Brahmins and 
other upper castes as outsiders – thereby disqualifying  them from ruling the country, but 
also, more importantly, they put forward their own strong claim to rule the country. 
 
We have seen the assertions of independent Dalit activism under the leadership of Swami 
Achutaanand of the Adi-Hindu movement in UP and Bhagya Reddy Varma of the All 
India Adi-Hindu Conference in AP in the early decades of the twentieth century. But that 
situation changed with the entry of Gandhi and his formation of Harijan Sevak Sangh. 
This placed Dalit activism and their demands in the above two regions in two separate 
tracks. It was not that Ambedkar’s ideas and his struggle for separate Dalit representation 
in the emerging political institutions and power did not influence the course of Dalit 
activism in the two states. But between Ambedkar and Gandhi, whom did the Dalits in 
those respective states choose? This decided and set the agenda of their activism and laid 
the foundation for the future course of Dalit politics in UP and AP.   
 
Drawing inspiration from the Adi-Hindu movement and its agenda, the Dalits in UP 
acknowledged Ambedkar and his leadership during the proceedings of the Round Table 
Conference and during the course of the Poona Pact and followed his mode of politics in 
their region. They also established a branch of Scheduled Castes Federation. Thus, the 
idea of political power was strongly rooted in their activism and politics.  In AP, although 
some of the educated Dalits were influenced by Ambedkar and his activism, they were 
handicapped by the fact that they were few in number.  A majority of the Dalit leaders in 
the state were mainly operating under the shadow of the Brahmins, especially the 
Congress Brahmin benefactors. They were drawn into the politics of social reform and 
could do precious little for their share in the emerging power.  It was as if the Brahmins 
would look after them forever and sort out everything on their behalf.  The patronage of 
the Congress Brahmins resulted in the induction of the Dalits and their leaders into the 
Harijan Sevak Sangh and turned them into activists of the temple-entry campaign.  Thus, 
the idea of social equality and the demand for representation that had been forcefully 
articulated through dalit activism was pushed to the bottom of the Dalit agenda.  The 
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differential importance given to the idea of political power by the Dalit leaders of UP and 
AP led them on different paths and gave results which become clearly visible in the post-
Independence UP and AP.   
 
II 
The second phase of Dalit activism took place in post-Independence India. In this phase 
Dalit politics and activism can be analysed broadly in two periods: (1) from India’s 
Independence to until the late 1970’s, and (2) from the early 1980’s to the late 1990’s. In 
the first period we can see two important aspects about politics in post-Independence 
India. Firstly, there was the establishment of Congress dominance in most parts of India, 
including UP and AP. Due to the dominance of the Congress in the first stage, Dalit 
political activities were organised around the reference point of the Congress regime in 
these two states; it was organized in terms of being either for or against the dominance of 
the Congress. Secondly, political representation for Dalits in post-Independence India, 
just as it was in colonial India, had become a farce due to the inherent drawbacks in the 
system. A majority of the Dalit candidates that won in those seats of representation 
belonged to the Congress Party and so the Congress was the major beneficiary of political 
representation for the Dalits. Yet, there was a small but strong presence of the RPI in UP 
and AP and the Dalit leadership also sought to ally with the Muslims in UP and the other 
lower castes in AP.  But the RPI could not continue for a long time, especially after the 
1967 elections, due to the politics of co-option by the Congress. With the co-option of the 
Dalit leadership into the Congress-fold, independent Dalit politics experienced a long 
hiatus.  
 
The Congress has primarily followed two strategies in the appropriation and 
marginalisation of Dalit leadership.  First, for the reserved constituencies it selected those 
Dalit candidates who do not speak their mind, or who simply parroted the language of the 
Congress. In fact, they were “non-militant and ha[d] no power in the local or state 
Congress organisations.”748 Secondly, it appropriated the Dalit leadership from the RPI 
                                                 
748 Brass, R. Paul (1965) Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 105.  
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by providing material benefits, such as sending B.P. Maurya to the USA.  By doing so the 
Congress not merely weakened the independent Dalit leadership, but also made the    
“numerous organisations in Uttar Pradesh for the advancement of the Scheduled Castes 
and “depressed classes” ... content to serve as agencies for the distribution of Congress 
patronage.”749  
 
Meanwhile social relations have undergone a huge change. To a large extent this is due to 
the developmental activities in the State.  Two of the most important activities that 
affected a permanent change in rural India in general and rural Uttar Pradesh in particular 
were a) the Zamindari Abolition Act and subsequent land reforms and b) the Green 
Revolution. The Zamindari Abolition Act took away a large proportion of land hitherto 
held by the Zamindars, who primarily came from among the Brahmins, Thakurs and 
Ashraf Muslims, and distributed it mainly among the peasant communities. These 
beneficiary communities were predominantly drawn from the upper castes within the 
larger Shudra category. The activities undertaken through the Green Revolution brought 
about commercialisation of agriculture by encouraging facilities, such as better irrigation, 
high-yielding varieties of seeds, subsidised fertilizers and market accessibility. Due to 
these developmental activities of the State we have witnessed the emergence of a class of 
‘rural capitalist farmers’750 from among the traditional upper castes as well as from 
among the rural dominant castes that have come to constitute the upper layers in the 
Shudra category.   
 
Although the Dalits were, in the name of not being peasants, excluded from these 
developmental activities, they were to benefit from and through other programmes and 
policies.  For instance, government-owned land has been distributed among the Dalits for 
housing, as also a small proportion of surplus agricultural land under the land ceiling 
laws. The reservation facilities not only produced a class of political leaders, but more 
                                                 
749 Ibid., p. 105.  
750 See Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for Power… especially, chapters 2 & 3: ‘Social Conflict and Political 
Discontent: The Historic Decline of the Congress’, and ‘Agrarian Change and Rural Unrest: Farmers in the 
Forefront’, pp: 17-120; Lietan, G.K and Ravi Srivastava. 1999. Unequal Partners: Power Relations, 
Devolution and Development in Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi: Sage Publications, esp. chapter 2: ‘Land, 
Politics, People’, pp: 38-82. 
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importantly, resulted in the emergence of a small section of educated and employed 
people among them, who in turn, constituted a Dalit middle-class.  It is true that a vast 
majority of the Dalit masses neither benefited from the developmental activities of the 
State, nor from the reservations. But all this generated tremendous awareness among the 
Dalits and resulted in their conscientisation.  They are now, to give two examples, able to 
question the social discrimination against them by the Brahmins, and social domination 
as well as economic exploitation by the Thakurs. It is, indeed, this Dalit questioning of 
the traditional as well as of modern caste power - acquired through the augmentation of 
the class position, that has led to social conflict in UP since the early 1970’s.  We have 
noted some of the incidents of violence against the Dalits and the response of the latter.  
 
During the same period the Dalit leadership in AP was completely domesticated by the 
Congress’s upper caste leadership, especially the Reddys.  Of course, Damodaram 
Sanjeevaiah, a Congress Dalit leader was made chief minister of AP, but it was more to 
pacify the infighting among factions of the Congress’ Reddys rather than from a real zeal 
to give the reigns of power to a Dalit. Except in the political arena, Dalit politics and their 
activism in AP simply followed the path of UP, particularly in the programmes of land 
distribution and Green Revolution. In the sense, just as in UP, in AP also the non-
Brahmin upper castes, particularly the Kammas, Reddys, Kapus benefited from  these 
programmes and further marginalised the lower castes, especially the Dalits. And one 
important outcome of these programmes was the consolidation of power in Telugu 
society and the economy by the Reddys and Kammas, the two dominant upper castes, 
which were already dominating the political sphere of AP. As the Dalits were more or 
less excluded from these developmental activities, the impact of these programmes was 
rarely felt by the Dalits. However, they benefited from some of the exclusive 
programmes undertaken for the development of Dalits, such as the distribution of waste-
lands, and housing sites for the rural Dalits etc. A section among the Dalits also benefited 
from the reservation policy.  
 
By the late ‘70’s and the early ‘80’s, the Telugu society could witness the changes 
brought in by the developmental activities both at the top and bottom of the social 
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hierarchy.  While the upper castes managed to consolidate their power and domination in 
the socio-economic and political spheres, there was a tremendous surge of consciousness 
among the Dalits of their oppression and exploitation. This in turn, led to a strong zeal to 
improve their condition. And so wherever and whenever there was upper caste 
oppression and discrimination against them, the Dalits began to question it. The upper 
castes, who were habituated to oppressing and discriminating against the Dalits, could not 
reconcile themselves with the growing consciousness as well as questioning by the 
Dalits.  ‘The Malas and Madigas are forgetting their position, they needed to be taught a 
lesson so that they know their position’ – had been the attitude of the upper castes 
towards the Dalits. This attitude led to increased incidences of violence by upper castes 
against the Dalit in the late ’70’s and the early ’80’s. A few of the horrific cases of 
violence were, Karamchedu, Chundur, Neerukonda and Padirikuppam.  These incidents 
of violence, instead of resulting in the suppression of Dalit consciousness – as hoped by 
the upper castes - resulted in stronger determination by the Dalits to question and fight 
against socio-political domination and casteism of the upper castes.  And this led to the 
formation of the Andhra Pradesh Dalit Maha Sabha, under the leadership of Bojja 
Tarakam and Katti Padma Rao.   
 
The period of Congress dominance in UP (1951-89) and AP (1956-83) marks the first 
stage in the second phase of Dalit activism. We can summarise the following aspects as 
important to this phase:  
 In post-Independence India, the Congress emerged as the most dominant political 
party and the Congress became the major beneficiary of the system of political 
representation for Dalits. Dalit activism during this period of Congress dominance 
was either in favour of or against the Congress.   
 Despite the dominance of the Congress, there was a small but strong presence of 
RPI-based independent Dalit activism in UP and AP. But that presence was 
eroded due to the politics of co-option by the Congress.  
 Despite benefiting from Dalit representation, the Congress did little to improve 
the socio-economic condition of the Dalits.  The Dalits might not have benefited 
from these measures, such as land distribution and Green Revolution, but 
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reservations for Dalits in education and employment resulted in the emergence of 
a small but assertive section of the Dalit middle-class, which in turn would 
become funding agents for Dalit politics. 
 Their general development and increased levels of education led to the rise of 
Dalit consciousness in the rural areas. And with this consciousness Dalits in the 
countryside became assertive and began to question the dominance of the upper 
castes and others which resulted in the violence against Dalits both in UP and AP. 
In the context of the acts of violence and discrimination against them, the Dalits 
took to organisational mobilisations in the form of BAMCEF in UP and APDMS 
in AP.   
 
The third phase is emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Dalit socio-political 
activism under the banner of that party.  This phase, both for convenience and for the 
purpose of capturing the nuances in the trajectories of Dalit politics, was examined in 
three parts.  The first part was about the formation of BAMCEF under the leadership of 
Kanshi Ram and the emergence of the BSP from out of that formation. After 
Independence it is not just the political space, but more importantly, the institutional 
space also that has been occupied and dominated by the Brahmins and other upper castes. 
The formation of BAMCEF with exclusive membership of the Dalits, Adivasis, 
Minorities and other lower caste employees from the central as well as various state 
government organisations and institutions demonstrate the domination of the upper castes 
as well as a sense of alienation and exclusion that the Dalits and other lower castes and 
communities experienced.  In a way, it is not just the Dalit Congress political leaders that 
felt alienated by the domination of the Brahmins, but Dalit government employees as 
well.  Interestingly the BSP was not the outcome of the efforts of the Dalit political 
leaders but an outcome of the concerted efforts by the Dalit employees.   
 
There are similarities in the two Dalit organisations, BAMCEF in UP and the APDMS in 
AP. They both emerged in the context of severe oppression and violence of the upper 
castes against the Dalits, the leadership for these organisations was provided by the 
middle-class Dalits and both the organisations rose against the domination and hegemony 
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of the upper castes over the socio-economic, political and cultural spheres in their 
respective states. Yet, one could notice qualitative differences between these two 
organisations in terms of their activities, and the ideas generated from those activities.  
For instance, BAMCEF’s two most important activities, ‘Ambedkar Mela on Wheels’ 
and ‘Denunciation of the Poona Pact’, was not only to awaken the Dalit public against the 
injustices done to them by Gandhi and Congress through the Poona Pact, but more 
importantly, to propagate  the ideas and ideals of Ambedkar, especially the importance of 
political power for the oppressed. This actually led to a major exodus of the Dalit masses 
from the fold of the Congress to become a support base for the BSP.  
 
Dalit activism under the leadership of the APDMS did not take a similar course of action. 
It emphasised ideas of social equality and sought to fight annihilation of caste; and also 
sought to fight for land and livelihood (boomi kosam, bhukti kosam). Undoubtedly these 
are all important questions which aimed to strengthen the Dalits and other marginalised 
castes and communities socially, economically and culturally.  But they could not 
succeed in achieving those objectives in the absence of political power.  In other words, 
political power is sine qua non even to strengthen the socio-economic condition of the 
Dalits.  Thus, we saw that there is a qualitative difference in the approaches adopted by 
the Dalit leadership in the two states, i.e., while the Dalits in UP adopted the approach of 
revolution from above, that is – giving political power into the hands of the oppressed and 
with that power worked to reconstruct the socio-economic condition that produces the 
oppressor and the oppressed. By contrast the Dalit leadership in AP followed the path of 
revolution from below, i.e., they sought to strengthen the Dalits and other oppressed 
masses even before they acquired political power.  Of course, it must be stated here that it 
is not that the Dalit leadership in AP did not emphasise the need for political power at all.  
They did this by forming the Poor People’s Party, renewing the Republican Party of India 
and also by inviting Kanshi Ram to launch the BSP in the state.  But the lack of unity 
among the Dalits, especially between the Madigas and Malas, on the question of social 
justice, and lack of support to these Dalit political formations from other oppressed 
sections in the state, resulted in the failure of all these efforts in acquiring political power.  
Moreover, by the time the Dalit leadership began to direct their energies towards political 
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power, the consciousness raised through the activities of the APDMS among the Dalit 
masses had nearly withered away, especially since the government policies of 
liberalisation had begun to threaten their livelihoods. For an ordinary Dalit, fending for 
his daily meal is more important than political power for the oppressed.  
 
III 
Dalit politics in the third stage (since 1990’s) revolves around the idea of social justice, 
both in UP and AP. One must note here that after relentlessly pursuing the politics of 
political power for the oppressed and on the assumption of political power, the BSP, a 
Dalit-based party, is in a position where it can use the State to pursue the programmes 
and activities that would achieve social justice. But Dalits in AP because of their 
overwhelming emphasis on ideas of social equality and annihilation of caste find 
themselves still at the stage where they are seeking social justice from the state.  Apart 
from these differences in position, there are also differences regarding the constitutive 
elements of social justice as advocated by the Dalits in UP and AP. The idea of social 
justice advocated by the BSP mainly contains two elements: horizontalisation of the 
vertical order, and democratisation of the undemocratic political order.  The two 
elements in the idea of social justice by AP Dalits are: recognition and representation. 
The idea of recognition contains two broad elements: recognising the Dalits as equal 
human beings, i.e., social equality, and annihilation of caste. The idea of representation 
also contains two components: firstly, the representation for Dalits at all levels in the 
structures of political power – this aspect is pursued by all the Dalits, and secondly, the 
distribution of Dalit reservations among all the Dalit castes. The latter aspect is pursued 
by the marginalised Dalit castes, particularly the Madigas and Rellis.  
 
After years of considerable study in understanding the caste system and attitudes of the 
upper castes, the BSP leadership came to realise that before the annihilation of caste there 
is greater need for the horizontalization of the vertical order and in achieving equality 
among castes. Caste equality, in turn, would result not just in changing the casteist mind 
of the upper castes, but more importantly, would help in rooting out caste itself.  Towards 
the realisation of this objective, the Dalits and the BSP leadership took to acknowledging 
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and adopting Dalit titles. This is one of way of making positive the hitherto abused 
identities and forcing the significant others to recognise that positivity and consequently, 
treat them with respect and dignity.  Madigas in AP also followed a similar strategy and 
succeeded in easing out humiliation contained in that identity. Whether adoption of such 
caste-based identities by the Dalit castes leads to annihilation of caste is something that 
cannot be answered just yet, surely the Dalits feel more confident about themselves 
through the adaptation of such caste-based identities. Thus, one can confidently claim the 
arrival of social equality among castes. At this point, it may be recognised here that while 
a majority of Dalit castes in UP have been adopting their caste names, in AP it is largely 
the Madigas who have taken this strategy.  Other Dalit castes, particularly the Malas and 
Adi-Andhras are not in favour of adopting caste identity.  
 
Until the late 1980’s, the Indian political arena had witnessed the dominance of upper 
castes through various political parties. The BSP, whose second objective is its social 
justice agenda, i.e., democratisation of the undemocratic political order, is set to change 
such political dominance of the upper castes by increasing the presence of the lower 
castes and reducing the presence of the upper castes.  As a way of achieving this 
objective, the party made caste the basis in the distribution of seats for political 
representation. That is to say, with an avowed aim to bring in more and more hitherto 
marginalised castes into the political arena the party employed the strategy of caste-wise 
distribution of the representative seats. Although this method of distribution certainly 
results in the inclusion of the hitherto marginalised castes and communities in the 
democratic process and political power, it also marginalised those castes that did not have 
a sufficient percentage of population, for it was not just caste, but weight in terms of the 
population of castes that became the yardstick in the distribution of representative seats. 
In any case, we have to recognise the differences that the Dalits brought into the upper 
caste-dominated polity and society through their political engagement with the BSP.  
There are tremendous changes in the relations between the Dalits and non-Dalits in UP. 
The old forms and patterns of discrimination against the Dalits had become somewhat 
antique, and invitations are exchanged between the Dalits and non-Dalits on the 
occasions of marriages and social gatherings. Separate seating and separate dining during 
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such occasions have also got substantially eroded, in fact, they have become a thing of 
past. In a word, Dalits, who have been denied recognition and respect, have acquired 
political power, which in turn has resulted in new confidence in themselves and more 
importantly,  respectable recognition from the caste-Hindu society.  
 
Interestingly, the two elements of social justice of AP Dalits are not quite fundamentally 
different from those ideas advocated by the BSP.  For instance, the idea of recognition is 
nothing but recognition of their difference with others in the Dalit category. It makes 
provision for a share within the Dalit quota of reservations on the basis of their 
proportional percentage within the total size of the Dalit population.  Although there are 
no differences in the principles of social justice as advocated by the BSP and the 
Dandora, the BSP’s rejection of Dandora’s demand for classification of Dalit reservations 
at the national level and by the Mala Mahanadu at the state-level has placed Dalit politics 
and activism in a tangled web.  
 
****** 
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